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2SUNINARY
This thesis identifies and describes some of the main
accounts for health and illness that are current in British
culture, placing them within broader contexts of
psychological, sociological, traditional, religious and
moral discourses; within broader explanatory frameworks;
and, by way of an analysis of these ecological aspects,
seeks to illuminate our understanding of such accounting.
A combination of Q and ethnographic methods were used to
elucidate a variety of alternative ways that people
"make sense" of health and illness. Three main studies were
conducted. The first two investigated accounting for health
and illness within a broad framework of accounts as
"explanations"; as moral judgements and prescriptions; and
as defining meaning. The third study focussed on the
external/internal explanatory framework, and demonstrated
that accounting is far more complex than the Wallston and
Wallston (1981) "Health Locus of Control Construct'
would suggest. Some accounts stressed "internality", some
"externality", some a combination of both, and others
viewed this construct as non-salient. These latter included
accounts about personal autonomy, and, importantly, the
'medical model" account.
In the thesis overall, among the accounts identified were
ones based upon notions of : "the wonders of modern
medicine"; "stress"; "the cultural critique'; 'a healthy
lifestyle", 'tradition"; "individual autonomy", 'Theism';
and "Willpower". These accounts are assumed to operate
both within individual subjectivity and popular discourse,
offering people a variety of complementary 'texts' with
which to weave narratives, drawing upon different 'texts"
according to situational and other demands. Thus
accounting is portrayed as an active, thoughtful and
sometimes contradictory fstorymaking" activity, and people
as competent negotiators of reality.
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CHAPTER 1 : ACCOUNMG FOR HEALTH AND ILLNESS :
THD3RETICAL CONTEXP
15
1.00 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about the way people in Britain account for health
and illness - how they ' explain, to themselves and to others, what
are the influences upon and reasons for good health, becoming ill
and recovery. It is a specifically social psychological endeavour
in that it seeks to articulate this accounting both within the
domains of 'the psychological' and 'the social'.
Both its theorisation and empirical studies draw upon the work of
Claudine Herzlich (1973) who has provided what is still the most
influential analysis of the social psychology of accounting for
health and illness. She worked within Mbscovici's (1961) 'social
representation' theory-base, which attempts to carbine Durkheim's
( 1898) notions of individual and collective representation.
However, while Herzlich discovered a number of alternative
metaphors and explanations for and representations of health and
illness, her approach was basically nomothetic, stressing the
communality of shared representations. The work presented here
takes the alternative approach of exploring diversity,
examining the many different kinds of explanations for and
understandings of health and illness to be found operating both
individually and collectively within contemporary British popular
discourse. Unlike her exclusive use of ethnographic methodology,
here ethnography has been combined with Q methodology
(Stephenson, 1935, 1953), a methodological paradigm specifically
intended to identify and describe alternative images, viewpoints
or accounts.
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The other major difference from Herzlich's work is that whereas
she was primarily interested in just the content of the social
representations she discovered, I have attempted to combine the
tasks of identifying and describing different accounts for health
and illness, and exploring how a focus on accounting may offer
useful understandings about social cognition.
Thus as a starting point, I have assumed that people 'make sense'
of a topic like health and illness, not by being driven by
dispositional traits, psychological mechanisms or sociological
forces, but by drawing upon a number of different accounts. The
research to be presented here was designed to find out what kinds
of accounts might be available to them, and how 'accounting' (cf
Barre, 1979; Semin and Nianstead, 1983) may offer a more plausible
and workable portrayal of 'making sense' than such mechanistic
modelling.
This Chapter is intended to 'set the scene' for the thesis,
beginning with a brief overview of its theoretical
starting-points, particularly that of the new paradigm' of
interpretational social psychology. The next three Sections
describe how the work of the thesis fits into broader
anthropological, sociological and psychological theorisation.
Finally the Chapter ends with an overview of the thesis as a
whole, to provide clarification of how its various themes and
components fit together.
17
1.1 THEORETICAL CONTEXT : NEW PARADIGMS RR OLD
Just as the term "nouvelle cuisine' has been repeatedly used
from at least the eighteenth century to describe whatever was the
latest fashion in cookery, psychology, even in its much, shorter
history, has been continually faced with "new paradigms'. Each
one is presented as a dramatic refutal of a worn-out previous
order, offering fresh insights and innovative solutions. It is
almost as though theories, like washing machines, have built-in
obsolescence, so that after a period of constant use, they
cease to work efficiently and need to be replaced by a new model.
The most recent 'new paradigm" of social psychology (cf Harre
and Secord,, 1972) is no exception, refuting the trap of
essentialism, the austerity and artificiality of laboratory
experimentation, and the image of people as "... idealized
autonEta in bland, anomic environments" (Harr ', 1979), proposing
in its place a 'new psychology' in which the purposive,
rule-making and rule-following, constructive aspects of
parscmhood and social interaction form the subject of study.
1.1.1 Tensions within current theorisation 
This new social psychology was launched in the late sixties and
early seventies at a time of major social upheaval in Western
society; an upheaval comprised of paradoxical tensions between a
renewed interest in sociological and cultural influences upon
behaviour and experience, and commitment to 'social
responsibility"; and an increasing interest in uniqueness of the
individual, and commitment to self-expression.
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On the one hand emergent feminist, Marxist, politically radical
and civil rights groups were questioning what they saw as
the "psychology of the 'good guys'" (Mbscovici, 1971) dominating
theorisation in a way that portrayed women, ethnic minorities and
the poor as 'deNthutt', and failed to recognise the effects of
inequality and disadvantage. On the other hand, the humanistic
and self-actualisation movements were questioning the
mechanistic aspects of behaviourism that portrayed people as
passive and mindless, denying individual creativity and spiritual
values.
These tensions were reflected by pressures, from the former, to
forge links with sociology (and less often with anthropology)
in order to acknowledge the societal and cultural determinants
defining and limiting action and constructing and constraining
experience; and pressures from the latter to develop a new,
emancipatory psychology which recognised the importance of
self-determinancy and the individual's capacity for self
-definition.
Today these tensions between 'the social' and 'the individual'
have emerged as the major theoretical problem that psychology has
to face - how can we develop theories that do justice to the
singularity of each individual's unique experience, while at the
same time recognising the importance of shared culture and common
social experience ? The problem, drawing historically upon the
I/Me distinction proposed some fifty years ago by the sociologist
G.H. Mead (1934), has been variously described as one of :
19
inner/outer dialectics (Riegel, 1978); person-constructs-reality
/reality-constructs-person (Buss, 1979) person as subject/object
(Henriques et al, 1984); psychological/sociological levels of
analysis (Doise, 1986); material-like cultural/ mental domains
(Pribram, 1986).
1.1.2 Democratic fusion versus sympatricity 
The solutions adopted to this problem have been varied.
Attempts to meld the two within a single theory have been
articulated both within sociology and psychology. The
sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966), for instance, offered
a social constructionist framework within which people are
seen to construct their realities within a cyclical interplay of
three 'moments' (internalization, objectification and
externalization). Within psychology Riegel and Buss proposed
different versions of a 'dialectical psychology' combining the
two theoretical polarities of 'person' and 'society' within
reflexivity, and Pribram has suggested that the duality can be
elided over by simply assuming that they are alternative facets
of a single entity.
However Henriques et al and Doise argue that such a 'democratic
fusion' of theories is impracticable because they are "different
universes of discourse" (Doise, op cit) and therefore cannot
merely be combined or added together. Henriques et al argue the
case strongly in their criticism of the questions raised by 'Ilea
paradigm' socialisation theories (such as those of Shotter,
1974 and Richards, 1974) :
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"None of these questions can be addressed while psychology
brackets off content into the domain of the social and defines it
as outside of the boundaries of its theories, to fall within the
domain of sociology, for example. In socialisation theory it is
implicitly assumed that, if they are added together, the ideas of
psychology and sociology will produce a full explanation. But
this assumption is itself based upon the idea that the theoretcal
objects of the two disciplines - individual and society - are
commensurable. In fact in psychology they are two kinds of
theoretical objects produced in different discourses through
different disciplines, destined to bypass each other in the
addition as they do in the interaction." (p20).
The basis of this assumption of incommensurability is the growing
conviction (cf Devereux, 1972; Doise, 1978, 1986; Potter,
1984) that the articulation of new theories is not the product
of Ethnian (1962) "paradigm shifts" of sequential overthrow, each
new paradigm replacing the last, but rather a situation where at
any mcment there will be competition between a number of mutually
contradictory theories. Press (1980) has offered the term
sympatricity" for such a situation, drawing an analogy between
theories, and species in a biological ecosystem.
Sympatric species are those that compete, within any ecosystem,
for resources and ultimately for survival, but at any point in
time will be seen to be co-existing and equally viable. The image
is of sympatric theories that operate in parallel, at the one and
the same time competing and co-existing. We thus arrive at a
philosophy of science which argues that what researchers and
theorists should be doing is not seeing theory testing and
building as some evolutionary game of theoretical survival of
the fittest", but instead should be exploring theoretical ecology
(cf Adam, 1987) within which each theory implicates (but at the
same time excludes) the others.
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1.1.3 Comolementarity 
These ecological notions are themselves not new. In the
nineteenth century William James introduced a number of pertinent
concepts that are now receiving renewed attention (e.g.
Stephenson, 1986a, 1986b). Most central is that of theoretical
'ccoplementarity' (James, 1891), where phenomena require separate
and different theory-bases to be understood. Stephenson (citing
the physicist Bohr) offers the wave and particle theories of
light in physics as an example.
Applied to present day psychology, the principle of
complementarity proposes that no single theory will ever be able
to 'make sense' of social phenomena. Just as both wave and
particle theories are necessary to 'mike sense' of the
properties of light, so too must more than one theory be used to
Make sense' of people's thoughts and actions. They cannot be
subsumed, because the nature of complementarity is that of
alternative universes of meaning and explanation. What something
'mans' in one universe is different from what it IMN3113 ' in
another (what Barnes and Law, 1976 call 'ind[exicality').
1.1.4 Transitive and substantive thought 
Stephenson (1986c), once more deriving his ideas from James, has
suggested that this problem can be overcome by distinguishing
between subjective thought that is 'transitive', within which
complementarity can be articulated; and explication or action,
by its nature 'substantive', where at any one moment only one
state can exist. Theorisation, argues Stephenson, needs to be
.22
transitive, whereby any theory is seen, to implicate that which it
does not explicate. Pribram argues a similar case, citing as an
analogy the conceptual distinction made by the physicist Bohm
(1971, 1973) between seeing reality' through a lens or a
hologram
"Lenses focus, objectify and draw boundaries between parts.
Holograms by contrast are distributive, unbounded, and holistic
... our lens-given ordinary perceptions (are) explicate, and
those that are holographic (are) implicate." (Pribram, op cit, p
517).
As James (1878) explained it, when we hear thunder, we do not
hear it "pure" as a loud crashing sound, but as thunder-
breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it. All of our
thinking and experiencing (including the thinking we call
theorisation) consists of implicating that which 'makes sense' of
what we are explicating. The message is that we should design
theories that are holographic. Adam (1987) argues the case
specifically, that we need
"... an approach that is not fragmentary, static, linear and
dichotomising, but one which seeks dynamic interrelations where
that which is not studied remains, nevertheless implicated in
that which is being explicated." (p 7)
1.1.5 A new theory of accounting 
Perhaps the most exciting corollary of such an exhortation is
that the principle of complementarity offers not just a
conceptual framework for considering theorisation, but a basis
for theorising itself, about, say, psychological phenomena like
attitudes, opinions and beliefs. Such a theory of accounting is
that the activity of accounting in everyday life is, as is
academic theorising, a process of making explicit (and thereby
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making substantive) one from a number of complementary accounts
implicit within transitive thinking.
From this perspective, when an individual marks an item on an
attitude scale, they are not simply operationalising 'their'
opinion (i.e. making explicit a single implicit and enduring
'essence"), they are selecting one from a range of contradictory
'attitudes' - they are choosing which one to explicate
according to such things as situational demands, 'mood', what is
'top of mind' and so on. But in a different state of mind, or
different situation, or following a different set of prior
events, they might well explicate a different 'attitude'. Like
the physicist who selects which of the wave or particle theories
to draw upon depending upon what is to be achieved, people select
which of their accounts to draw upon according to the function to
be served by its expression.
1.1.6 Holographic theorisation 
This theory-base has been expressed within several current
conceptual developments. One is discourse analysis (cf Potter and
Wetherell, 1987) which stresses the constructive and variable
nature of discourse, and seeks to study what people say in
conversations in terms of the discursive functions of the
variability to be found. The image is one of the person as a
"capable negotiator of reality", able to perform a range of
functions by their utterances, ranging, say, from
self-presentation management to social 'grooming' when in
interaction with others, and from say, rationalising to
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problem-solving when engaged in private thought. Discourse
analysis emerged from psycholinguistics (e.g. Chomsky, 1966;
Searle et al, 1979), from ethnomethodology ( particularly from
the work of Garfinkel, 1967, 1974), from semiology (particularly
the work of Saussure, 1974 and Barthes, 1985) and Mead's symbolic
interactionism (1934).
Another example is 'situated identity' (cf Weinreich, 1969, 1980,
1983, 1986) which draws upon psychodynamic (e.g. Erikson, 1959,
1968), personal construct (cf Kelly, 1955) and, once
more, symbolic interactionist (cf Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1959;
Harre, 1979) theories, to articulate the interplay between
personal and social identity, and the shifting expression of
identity according to situational and other demand
characteristics.
Paradoxically, what such formulations have in common is both a
shift towards a holistic perception of experience and the person
which seeks to integrate the many facets of accounting, discourse
or identity; and a distributive perception of the contradictory
features of the constituent elements. It is an approach which is
fundamentally holographic, seeing the whole as implicated within
each of the parts.
They are thus developments from the simpler ideas of
constructive alternativism' (cf Kelly, 1966), social
constructionism' (cf Berger and Luckmann, op cit) and 'invented
realities' (cf Watzlawick, 1984) in that they posit not just the
construction of reality, nor just that different people (as
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individuals and groups) construct different realities, but that
each individual and collective draws upon and lives within
multiple realities.
But the image is not one of personal or collective
"schizophrenia"; of living and operating within a complete muddle
of unmanageable confused and contradictory thoughts and selves
(although it is a much more multifaceted image than most other
perceptions). Rather, the image is one of people as "negotiators
of reality" (Potter and Wetherell, op cit) whose supreme
competence is that they can and do create order out of chaos,
and make sense of their world amid the cacophony.
This portrayal of people as competent negotiators of reality,
operating upon complementary and sympatric accounts to "make
sense" of their social world and social being, was the basis of
my selection of Q methodology as the main methodology to explore
accounting. Stephenson, the originator of Q methodology,
initially designed it and continues, fifty years on, to develop
it as a means of identifying and describing the complementary
elements that make up our "stream of consciousness" (James,
1909).
1.1.7 Accounts 
The overarching theory-base for this thesis is thus founded upon
the assumption that whenever people explain or describe or
argue about a particular topic such as health and/or illness,
they do so by drawing upon a number of complementary accounts.
According to the moment-to -moment situation, they select from
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these transitively sympatric accounts as a basis for substantive
expression; thus at any =rent, they explicate just one. But that
they express just one at any point does not imply that they have
just one, but that it is merely the basis of their current 'frame
of mind'; and furthermore, in similar terms to what Potter and
in]ther=311 (op cit) have argued, as their 'frame of mind shifts
within the course of conversation or thinking, so too does the
account from which they draw.
However, this theory-base is not just suggesting that accounts
are synonymous with unconnected 'thoughts'. The assumption is
that accounts are complex and highly articulated implicit
theories within which are interwoven attributions about reasons
and causes, predictions and understandings; within which
particular meanings are accredited to propositions and words and
images; within which are moral prescriptions and evaluations.
Accounts, as I have defined them for use in this thesis, share
properties with Abelson's (1976) 'scripts', Bartlett's (1932)
concept of 'schema', Moscovici's (1961) 'social representations',
Kelly's (1966)'personal construct system' and Potter and Litton's
(1985) linguistic reportoires' in that they are the product of
active striving to 'make sense'. Some will originate
intrapersonally as a result of individual thinking and
particular life-events, but others will have their roots in
collective discourse, products of interpersonal debate, ideas and
images proffered by the media, within socialisation, by folklore
and popular wisdom, as the tenets of religious and ideological
creeds, and so on. Accounts are both constructed by and
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constructed for the individual, although they are often so
cverlearned by habitual use and hence so well established as
taken-for-granteds, that they assume the status of 'truth',
belying their hypothetical and constructed qualities.
1.2 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ACCOUNTING FOR HEALTH AND
MIMES
The majority of anthropological studies of accounting for health
and illness have been (and continue to be) based upon fairly
small-scale, very intensive investigations of the overall
'medical systems' of particular cultural groups, seldom
distinguishing between health and illness related practices
(which include, for example, what we would call public health
measures) and the beliefs and explanations which underlie them.
As it is often impossible to extract just the aspects that refer
to accounting, in this Section I will often refer to the broader
'medical system' of a culture or group.
1.2.1 The history of medical anthropological theorisation
Although the term 'medical anthropology' was not used until
1963 ( by Scotch), anthropologists have explored the medical
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systems of so-called 'primitive' cultures from at least the time
of Rivers ( (1924, 1926) descriptions of 'primitive' accounting
for illness in terms of sorcery and agency of the spirit world;
good health a matter of respecting taboos and religious rules of
conduct; and curing as effected by ritual or magic. Somewhat
later Clements (1932) classified 'primitive' medical systems in
more detail, particularly the assumed mechanisms of illness
causation - intrusion into the body by disease objects and
spirits, and the capture of the soul. Ackerknecht (1942, 1971)
subsequently argued that although all 'primitive" systems were
essentially magico-religious, the accounting system for
health and illness within each culture will reflect broader
cultural features.
Ackerknecht, Rivers and Clements, like most early
anthropologists, tended to be impressed by those aspects of other
cultures that were strikingly different from their own - their
literally outlandish rituals, taboos and practices. A number of
contemporary medical anthropologists (e.g. Guess 1984; Kleinman,
1984) have noted that this resulted in early theorisation that
assumed all 'primitive" accounting was magico-religious, ignoring
the 'commonsense ( practices (e.g. herbal remedies for everyday
aches and pains) that were actually fairly common.
However, by the 1950s and 60s (e.g. Paul, 1955; Dunn, 1968)
the 'primitive'/"civilised" distinction became increasingly
untenable and systems theory was imported to provide a conceptual
framework within which all medical systems could be compared,
later yielding more ecological theories linking cultural
elements into a more comprehensive system (e.g. Alland 1970;
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systems in other cultures; it is just one of many alternative
ways of explaining illness and health, and directing medical
treatment. The major conceptual paradigm within which this
perspective has been promoted is that of social epistemology,
drawing heavily on major theorists such as Foucault ( 1970 •,
Habermas (e.g. 1970, 1983) Berger (e.g. 1965, 1979) and Douglas
(e.g. 1978, 1982), all concerned with the representational
forms and codification mechanisms by which knowledge is
portrayed, shared, interpreted and constructed.
A number of contemporary medical anthropologists have thus
devoted their energies to examining the way that the dominance of
biomedicine reflects a relationship between the status of
different forms of knowledge concerning health and illness in any
society, and the distribution of power within that society. This
interpretation argues that economic and professional dominance,
and the threat posed by sickness, enable healers in all
societies not only to gain status and material advantages, and
control access to resources, but to promote their own accounting
systems. Young (1980) noted that the dominant professional
orthodoxy is believed by its proponents to be a matter of 'facts'
rather than (beliefs'. Taussig (1980) has argued that where
biomedicine is concerned, such a process "... reproduce(s) a
political ideology in the guise of a science of (apparently)
(real things', and that as such poses a danger that "... the
experts will avail themselves of that knowledge ... to make the
science of human management all the more powerful and coercive".
This has introduced into anthropology a perception of medicine
as a mechanism of social control (e.g. Crawford, 1980, Zola
1972).
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Aakster (1986) has suggested that biomedicine is also being
questioned in Western popular discourse, with people becoming
increasingly convinced that orthodox medicine fails to solve
their health problems. Initially the response .was to pour more and
more money and resources into the medical system. But as that
failed to stem the tide of "... more cancer, more mental disease,
more heart infarcations, ... suicides, addictions", they have
increasingly turned to various forms of 'alternative medicine'
such as homeopathy, acupuncture and naturopathy.
Thus both within current anthropological theory and in the
accounting systems operating within Western popular culture, we
have arrived at a position in which biomedicine is ceasing to be
seen as it has been in the past (in Western societies at least)
as : "...the administration by doctors as a group of morally
neutral, essentially benign and effective techniques for curing
disease and reducing pain and suffering." (Ehrenreich 1978). This
'cultural crisis of modern medicine (
 (the title of Ehrenreich's
Look) is the dominant theme of medical sociology at present. What
is surprising (and perhaps a little disturbing) is that it has
also come to dominate, to a large extent, contemporary medical
anthropology. There is a noticeable tendency for many of its
most articulate and competent theorists (e.g. Crawford, Young
and Taussig in America; Littlewood, Heiman, Frankenburg, and
Armstrong in Britain) to be concentrating upon the accounting
systems of Western cultures, and particularly this issue of the
role of biomedicine. To what extent this is a wise attempt to
(know thyself' before attempting to understand others, and to
what extent it is ethnocentrism in another guise remains to be
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seen.
1.2.3 Intercultural differences 
However, in its concern with the epistemological status of
biomedicine, ecological modelling also developed the notion that
accounting systems differ intraculturally as well as between
cultures; that within any society or community there will operate
a number of alternative systems, which co-exist and compete in
dynamic interplay, varying in their culturally sanctioned
legitimation. Kleinman (1978) for example has distinguished
between 'folk', 'popular' and professional' medical systems.
"Professional' systems are the orthodoxy of whichever
professional group has been culturally legitimated, 'folk"
systems those that arise from indigenous ideas and folk wisdom,
and "popular" systems those current in everyday usage (which
often combine 'professional' and "folk"). More recently the
concept of "rival" systems has been introduced, based like
professional' upon codified knowledge, but set up as
alternatives to orthodoxy (e.g. homeopathy in our own culture).
Dunn (1977) has proposed the use of geographical divisions,
identified according to their sphere of influence : cosmopolitan,
regional and local. Local medical systems are defined as those
restricted to small geographical areas, based upon the indigenous
accounting systems of that area. Regional medical systems are
also indigenous, with a single paradigm (often linked to
religious and moral ideologies) extending its influence over a
wider geographical area. As example would be Ayurveda medicine,
arising from within classical Indian philosophy and religion,
which extends its influence throughout the sub-continent of
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India. A cosmopolitan medical system is one which has been
exported world-wide, biomedicine being the most notable
example, but including other systems with fundamentally different
theory bases, such as Traditional Chinese Medicine. The concept
of (medical pluralism', and investigations of sympatricity within
cultures (particularly competition between cosmopolitan
biamedicine and local systems in areas like India and Mexico) is
another major theme of contemporary medical anthropology.
Other classifications have focussed upon the kinds of belief
systems themselves. The most comprehensive division is
between attribitions of exogenous or endogenous causes of illness
(cf Valebrega 1962; Stoetzel 1960). Herzlich (op cit) notes that
Clements (op cit) 'primitive" ascribed causes can be accamodated
within this framework: intrusions of disease objects or spirits
being exogenous explanations; soul capture endogenous. However,
many other classifications have been suggested. For example
Foster distinguished between personalistic and naturalistic
health belief systems (Foster 1976):between illness
arising from the intended intervention of another person or
being, and illness the product of naturally occurring processes.
Others (e.g. Jones, 1977; Pellegreno, 1963) work from the
assumption that accounting for health and illness reflects the
overall worldview of the culture, and classify alternative
systems accordingly. Jones, for instance, distinguishes between
naturewissenshaft(N-tending) and creisteswissenshaft (G -
tending) worldviews. Western scientific thought, including the
accounting system of biomedicine, is firmly based within an
N-tending worldview, whereas, for example, homeopathy and
Traditional Chinese Medicine arise from within a G -tending
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worldview.
Leslie (1987, personal communication) has recently suggested a
framework which brings these various elements together into a
simple but comprehensive classification that can be applied to
all accounting systems. He argues that they all include (though
in varying degrees of salience) three different kinds of
explanation: mechanistic theories, which construe health as
the correct functioning of a machine-like body, and illness as
its breakdown; equilibrium theories that regard health as a
matter of balance and harmony, and illness as their breakdown;
and ethical theories linking health to 'right living' and
seeing illness as a punishment for misdeeds or transgression of
moral codes. There is considerable diversity within each of
these, and the different ways they are incorporated together into
the particular accounting system of a specific culture or group;
a diversity that biomedicine (particularly in its training)
undervalues and attempts to reduce and control.
1.2.4 Theories about the cognitive processes involved in
accounting 
A number of anthropologists (e.g. Blumhagen, 1980, 1981; Good
1977,1981; Kleinman 1978, 1980; Young, 1980, 1982, 1987) have
developed quite complex theories about the cognitive processes by
which people within a culture arrive at their accounts for health
and illness. They all begin by distinguishing between three
meanings of bodily, social or psychological discontinuity or
deviance, to make explicit the difference between what it is that
the person experiences, and what it is that biomedicine sees
within its 'clinical gaze' (cf Foucault 1973). Overall, these are
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called forms of (sickness'. Disease is what doctors diagnose, is
written in medical textbooks, and biomedicine treats. Illness is
what people experience as bodily and psychological dis-ease.
Within this framework, Good (op cit) has specified a theory based
upon core symbolic elements, where the polysemic
characteristics of the dominant symbols in cultural thought
allow for multiple application in different contexts, and in
this way link different domains in cultural discourse and
accounting. There are resonances here with the structural
linguistics of Habermas (op cit), which itself draws from the
work of Chomsky (op cit) and Searle (op cit) where communication
is seen to transmit not just explicit and contextual messages,
but also culturally sedimented aspects of social interaction,
social relations and ideology. He proposes a cognitive system
based upon a semantic illness network of linked ideas,
definitions and relations.
Kleinman (op cit) proposes a similar model, concentrating upon
what he calls core clinical functions which enable people
to perform such cognitive activities as constructing illness as a
psycho-social experience and managing illness episodes, devising
strategies for seeking health care and healing, and responding to
the outcomes of therapy. He regards these as fundamentally
attempts (which are not always successful) to adapt to the
worrisome circumstances of discontinuity that illness poses,
within a social context in which only some forms of discontinuity
are professionally sanctioned as 'disease" (i.e. real
sickness). Thus he suggests that people internalise explanatory
models (EMS) which contain knowledge about aetiology, what to
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expect about the onset of symptoms, courses of sickness episodes,
appropriate treatment and so on.
However, this formulation goes well beyond the assumption that
individuals and groups adopt particular sets of explanations and
systems of accounting for illness which do no more than
provide recipes for understanding and action. He follows Geertz's
(1966) ideas about religious beliefs, that cultures provide
people with ways of thinking that are simulteneously models of
and models for reality; EMS also create order and meaning, and
produce the conditions required for their own perpetuation. EMS
for becoming and being ill also define roles, norms of conduct,
expectation of one's own actions and the actions of others when
illness is seen to occur, not merely aids to understanding, but
also powerful components in the act of constructing the events
themselves.
Young (pp cit) interprets semantic networks as the basis of al's;
they are abstract representations from which an EM can be
generated to respond to a particular episode or set of events
such as the occurence of bodily disturbance. By mapping events
onto the network, the person extracts an explanatory model of
what is going on, in order to be able to answer questions like
"Am I ill, or just feeling under the weather ?", "Should I ignore
this ache, or is it a symptom ?", "Is there a link between the
way my stomach feels, and what I ate for lunch ?" and so on. But
they also provide a basis for communicating with others in shared
attempts to analyse and explain, including situations where a
researcher is asking a person to give information about the way
they account for illness.
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Of particular interest is Young's suggestion that "... an
informant's EMs may be changing during the period in which
his statements are being made". Thus Young's formulations
offer a direct model of the kind of intersubjective syupatricity
of accounts suggested in the previous Section. Also, whereas
Kleinman regarded EMs as essentially specific to the individual,
Young sees them as culturally sedimnted and shared, providing
the component of a person's accounting which represent collective
discourse. He argues that in addition people also resort to at
least two other forms of knowledge which are more individual:
prototypes (after Hallpike 1979) and chain complexes (after
Vygotsky 1962). Prototypes consist of explanations couched in
terms of strings of events and circumstances recalled from the
past, sometimes connected by cause-and-effect assumptions, but
often merely linked in terms of chronology, contiguity and
resemblance. They are typically very personal, though they may be
shared between a small number of people closely connected by
friendship or family. Chain complexes are similar to prototypes,
but are not explanatory, simply strings of recalled events,
sensations and episodes that cohere and persist in the mind of
the individual because of their salience, contiguity or
chronology to the mental life of the person concerned.
Young has proposed this model because he sees people as offering
highly complex and ambiguous descriptions of their accounting
system. It is an attempt to provide a conceptual framework which
does justice to the kinds of explanations people converse about
in everyday life. He argues (personal communication) that
people seldom - if ever - express abstract semantic explanations,
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but rather weave their accounting within episodic and
biographical reminiscences, comments about similarity and
analogy, about social relations, norms of behavior, emotions and
feelings.
1.2.5 Implications for the thesis 
The earliest anthropological studies of accounting for health and
illness, and Young's criticisms of the ethnocentricity of,
particularly, the later systems theorists, remind us that in
order to understand the accounting of others, we need to operate
within their world-making, not through the distortions of our
own.
Anthropology's broader interest in cultural influences upon
social cognition and social being (cf Harr, 1979) stresses the
reality-constructs-person aspect of accounting; the impact of
shared, culturally sedimented ways of 'making sense' that
construct the accounts upon which people in that culture draw.
Anthropology thus offers to psychology a frame of analysis which
insists that individual subjectivity can never be divorced from
the cultural milieu which constructs a great deal of their
reality as taken-for-granted. In some ways it is only possible
to recognise just how much, say, biomedical practitioners assume
that their theories-of-disease are 'facts' by contrasting our
situation with that of a person living in China, where
Traditional Chinese Medicine would be the dominant explanatory
system, and it would be biomedical ideas that were 'strange' or
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'counter intuitive'.
What are perhaps more surprising to the psychologist are the
attempts by anthropologists to devise cognitive theories. The
models of Good, Kleinmann and Young are in many ways very similar
to cognitive psychology's theories of long-term memory (e.g.
Tulving's 1972 distinction between 'episodic' and 'semantic'
memories).
Young's formulations are of particular interest to the work of
this thesis, because they talk directly about ideas akin to
account syapatricity, and attempt to model both the idiographic
and nomothetic features of accounting. More recent theorisation
by Boyer (1987) is even closer in flavour to the approach taken
here. Writing about the difference between systems of
'traditional knowledge' as culturally sedimented, and their
explication as individually articulated, he suggests :
"Some anthropologists consider the system ... as a 'text' people
can use, cite and manipulate. What is on people's minds at any
moment is only a certain idiosyncratic version. " (p 59).
He argues that the task of the anthropologist is to find ways of
identifying and describing the "... underlying edito princeps"
of each system, as implicated by the utterances of people in that
culture, and goes on to discuss the problems that ethnographic
method faces in acomplishing this task. my use of Q methodology
is intended to contribute to this endeavour.
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1.3 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ACCOUNTING FOR HEALTH AND ILLNESS
Sociological theorisation in this area tends to concentrate upon
the effects upon accounting of social forces, particularly
those arising out of the power relationships between different
social groups, such as the State, the professional interests of
the medical and scientific communities, industry and commerce
and lay pressure groups. Much of the conceptualisation is
presented within broader sociological frameworks, in particular
the major competing theories of societal action: structural
functionalism versus dominance theories; and competing theories
of epistemology : as constructed for/ constructed by people
(resonant with the dichotomies described in Section 1.1.1).
1.3.1 Medicine within structural functionalist and dominance 
theories 
It was Parsons (1951) who introduced the term 'sick role' and
brought the 'deviance' of illness into sociological theorisation.
Before Parsons, because illness was regarded as unmotivated, it
tended to be excluded from sociological analyses of deviance
(e.g. of criminality). Parsons theorised that as illness
interferes with the performance of normal social roles, albeit
without deliberate intent, society has to set up mechanisms for
channelling and controlling it so that it does not strain
social order and the smooth functioning of the social system. He
argued that whereas, say, criminal deviance is controlled by
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institutionalised law, the deviance of illness is controlled by
assigning approved roles to the ill person and service providers
to the ill.
Society, from this perspective, has developed a complex of
functional, (self-evident" principles upon which our responses to
illness are predicated. Firstly, there are sedimented beliefs
about ill people being exempted from same responsibilities, but
acquiring others; their lack of culpability for their illness,
but a consequent incapability to overcome it for themselves.
Second, there are sedimented beliefs about the relations between
society and ill people; the responsibility to 'care for' and
offer them sources of expert and effective help. From the
dialectic between these two arises the third set of sedimented
beliefs about the role of the medical profession and service
provision for illness, including assuming that medicine offers
efficacious treatment, and consequently that medical
practitioners must be given the social status to enable than to
enforce compliance.
The question asked is whether these responses are merely
"functional", or do they operate as a system of social control ?
In functionalist terms, they ensure that society meets the needs
of its more dependent members. In dominance theory terms, they
enable the powerful groups in society to promote their interests
by exploiting or marginalising others. The most influential
account of this viewpoint is Zola's (1972) essay in which he
argues that medicine has become:
... a major institution of social control, nudging aside, if not
incorporating, the more traditional institutions of religion and
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law. It is becoming the new repository for truth, the place where
absolute and often final judgements are made by supposedly
morally neutral and objective experts. And these judgements are
made, not in the name of virtue or legitimacy, but in the name of
health." (p 487)
Zola argues that the functionalist analysis allows people to
persuade themselves that modern medicine is a benign and
humanitarian force which replaces (punishment ( (e.g. of
alcoholics) by "treatment ( and absolves the individual from
responsibility for their own misfortunes. This supposedly
liberal discourse, argues Zola, is not benign at all;
condemnation is not avoided but merely displaced. The result of
such processes is that they "... bring man (sic), not bacteria to
the centre of the stage and lead thereby to a re-examination of
the individual's role in his own demise, disability and even
recovery.".
Zola suggests that there are four main ways in which our lives
have become (medicalised (
 by the way in which the medical
profession have increasingly taken into their jurisdiction more
and more aspects of our lives : Firstly, the expansion of what in
life is deemed subsumable within the good practice of medicine.
For example, now that aspects of life-style and habits are
regarded as important factors in illness, the medical profession
is increasingly telling people what to eat, how much exercise to
take, etc. Secondly, the retention of absolute control over
technical procedures. Since doctors alone may prescribe many
drugs and perform surgery, they are able to determine not just
disease treatment, but a wide range of other aspects of people's
lives, from cosmetic surgery to kidney transplants; 'test tube
babies ( to euthanasia; contraception to tranquillisation. Next,
medicine retains near absolute access to certain 'tigY11001 ' areas,
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such as drug 'addiction' and alcoholism. Finally, the expansion
of what, in medicine, is deemed relevant to good practice. The
"interests of good health (
 may be used to influence increasingly
large areas of life (e.g controls on advertising of tobacco and
alcohol).
"From sex to food, aspirins to clothes, from driving your car to
riding the surf, it seems that under certain conditions, or in
combination with certain other substances or activities, or if
done too much or too little, virtually anything can lead to
certain medical problems ... every aspect of our daily life has
in it elements of risk to health." (p 498)
There are a variety of critics of the version of social reality
so transmitted and promoted, including Marxist (e.g. Navarro
1977; Waitzkin 1979); Feminist (e.g. Ehrenreich and English 1973;
Barrett and Roberts 1978); Humanist (e.g. Illich 1976) and more
broad politico-economic (e.g. Ehrenreich 1978, Doyal 1981). Each
one offers alternative values, providing compelling accounts of
the way that capitalism, professional and corporate
self-interest, the patriarchy, Third World exploitation,
industrial pollution, economic and social inequalities etc. are
the true culprits for ill health. Their argument is that by and
large ordinary people have been duped into a 'false
consciousness .' which prevents them from challenging the
construction provided for them by medicine.
1.3.2 Social control epistemological theories 
Both the functionalist and dominance versions of social control
theory assume that popular accounting systems arise passively
out of the imposition of social processes acting upon them. As
such, both portray the commonsense accounting systems of ordinary
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people as being constructed for them to serve the purposes of
others - an image that Digwall (1976) describes as viewing
ordinary people as the 'puppets' of dominant groups (whom
Becker, 1963 refers to as (=al entrepreneurs"). The theorist
who has articulated this perspective most comprehensively is
Friedson (1970), focussing on the interaction between and
within professional and popular accounting systems, particularly
in terms of the notion of (deviance ( and the way that medicine
has gained the authority to legitimate illness.
Friedson has tried to explain the considerable divisions in our
society between the esoteric body of knowledge which constitutes
the professional acounting system, and the ignorance,
misconceptions and irrationality of the popular system,
particularly that held by the 'lowest social classes".
According to Friedson, by their ignorance and seemingly total
lack of understanding of medicine (in professional terms) they
acquire deviant status and hence medical practitioners tend to
give up any attempt to communicate with them. They respond by
distrust, suspicion and not unsurprising dislike of the way they
are treated, and hence their ignorance is at best untouched, at
worst increased. Their accounting system thus becomes not just
"different' but less valid; the working class do not construct or
own their accounting system, but rather have it foisted upon them
by social forces. According to Friedson, doctors have become the
'architects of medical knowledge", knowledge that fails to serve
any functional role for the working class, but rather becomes
incorporated into their exploited and marginalised social role at
the bottom of the class heirarchy.
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There is a danger of responding to such theories simply in terms
of their elitist terminology, and missing the point they are
making about the enormous pressures that are placed upon
particular social groups by the dominance of the more powerful
'architects ( of knowledge, such as the medical profession. As
Young (op cit) has made clear, professional orthodoxy does not
just assume its knowledge is better, it regards other accounting
systems as "not really medicine", and thus creates a setting in
which lay people find it very difficult to be taken seriously, or
indeed, to take themselves seriously. The power relations within
medical encounters are major influences not just in the way
professionals construct the knowledge of their patients within
that immediate setting, but operate at second-hand within popular
discourse.
1.3.3 Social constructive theories of accounting 
Just as psychology has shifted into a (now paradigm' in which
people are construed as actively constructing their own
realities, sociology has similarly shifted towards a social
constructionist analysis which stresses the capability of people
to construct their own knowledge. Its starting point in terms of
accounts for health and illness is that illness is a socially
defined state : " the invasion of a human organism by cholera
germs carries with it no more the stamp of (illness ( than does
the souring of milk by other forms of bacteria." (Sedwick, 1982).
Dingwall (op cit) is the best known theorist to promote the
social constructionist viewpoint, asserting that popular
accounting systems should recognised as functional within their
own domain, and accorded equal epistemological status with other
systems.
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In this Dingwall was not arguing that all accounting systems are
functionally equal, nor denying that they are in part constructed
for people by other groups, but seeking to redress a balance, by
stressing that people from all social groups engage in active
construction and interpretation for themselves. He focused his
theory of accounting upon the concept of 'ordinariness",
conveying the importance of general social norms in accounting
for health and illness. To be ordinary is to do usual, expected,
normal things at usual times in usual places. However, despite
its everyday taken-for-grantedness, being ordinary actually
involves a great deal of fluency with "commonsense knowledge'
(e.g. Cicourel 1973). Dingwall places accounting for health and
illness (both popular and professional) within the context of a
much broader accounting system in which people theorise, to
themselves and others, in terms of estimates of ordinariness and
its various antitheses - deviance, unusualness, discontinuity,
and so on.
A great deal of accounting for health and illness within this
framework is concerned with managing the body in ordinary ways
that are consistent with the social norms of the reference group
(e.g. according to age or gender), creating an assumed definition
of health that is somewhat tautological - healthy people are
normal, and normal people are healthy. The concept of social
norms, however enables the notion of normality to be context
specific; it will differ, say, between the young and old, between
men and women (particularly in terms of gender specific states
such as pregnancy and menopause).
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Dingwall adopted the term 'discontinuity' as the most useful way
of describing the kinds of states, events and phenomena which
demand consideration of 'ordinariness' and 'abnormality' in order
to decide between ascriptions of 'health" or 'illness'. The
social desirability of 'ordinariness' in the face of
discontinuity provides a compelling motivational frame within
which people account for illness, leading to another central
notion within his work, 'theoreticity", adapted from the work of
Puccetti (1968), Blum and McHugh (1971) and particularly Voysey
(1975). Voysey defined theoreticity as involving two elements,
'intelligence' (having access to and being able to invoke same
symbolic conceptual scheme) and 'morality' (the incorporation of
moral symbols). Blum and McHugh describe it more simply as '...
the state of being aware of what you are doing'. Aperson who is
operating within a theoretic mode is sorrielxXly who is aware of the
social norms and rules (both explanatory and morally
prescriptive) involved, and intends their action in the light of
this knowledge. In this framework, deviance is not just a state
constructed for a person by society, or powerful groups within
society, but also involves deliberate and thoughtful decisions on
the part of the person to act in "deviant' ways. Hence Dingwall
interpreted popular accounting for health and illness as not
simply interpretations or understandings of discontinuities, but
powerfully focussed on question of responsibility, blame and
moral culpability.
However, Dingwall argued that in the West, as a result of the
widening of the gap between work and home (of Lasch 1975), the
consequent assumption by the State of tasks previously carried
out by families, and the increasing importance of large
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corporations and the impact of social planning, the distinction
between private and public morality has become increasingly
blurred, reducing the freedom of individuals to define
discontinuity for themselves, or have it defined for them by
their immediate social groups as anything other than illness.
"Other possibilities - witchcraft, spiritual intervention, sin,
bad taste, poor manners and the like - are less and less
frequently available" (Dingwall, op cit).
Thus in the West illness has come to represent the overriding
attribution that can be proffered to exonerate a person from the
stigma of culpable deviance. So long as they can establish that
they did not behave in ways that brought it upon themselves,
illness is a way that a generally ordinary, theoretic person can
legitimately, and socially acceptibly, account for behaving in
unusual ways or demonstrate unusual bodily manifestations.
However, the tension between ordinariness and deviance means that
illness cannot be regarded as an accepted part of everyday life.
It must be divorced from it by its seclusion as (private trouble'
within the family, or, if it is more serious, contained within
institutions like hospitals to insulate public awareness from the
deviance in its midst.
1.3.4 The institutionalisation and stigmatisation of disability
and illness 
Theorists like Goffman (1968) have argued that such
institutionalisation tends to exaggerate the deviance of illness,
both as a result of institutional regimes themselves, and the
separation from the everyday world that institutionalisation
creates. Outside institutions, (illness' is a very restricted
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escape route from (deviance', only available for sickness of
short duration. Permanant disability tends to be stigmatised
... people expect ... the cripple to be crippled; to be disabled
and helpless; to be inferior to themselves, and they will become
suspicious and insecure if the cripple falls short of these
expectations. ... the cripple has to play the part of the
cripple..." (Goffman 1963).
Life-threatening illnesses, especially those that have
acquired strong social metaphorical status (cf Sontag 1977) as
(scourges", particularly stigmatise the sufferer. According to
Herzlich and Pierret (1985) a (scourge ( is not merely perceived
as a state of an individual body; it represents a very
threatening form of collective (misfortune ( , since it affects the
equilibrium of the community. Up until recently in the West,
cancer has tended to be the dominantly stigmatised illness
(Lebrun 1984; Pinell 1986). Now AIDS is rapidly acquiring the
status of a powerfully stigmatised disease (Birchall and
Birchall, 1987) even in cases where moral culpability is not
assumed (e.g. hoemophilia). AIDS has all of the qualities that
override any ability of illness to avoid the attribution of
stigmatism - it has gained strong moral antagonistic symbolism
because of its associations with other forms of deviance (i.e.
drug addiction, homosexuality and sexual promiscuity); it arouses
terror because of its lengthy incubation period; its mechanisms
of infection are poorly understood, and so it engenders fears
about contagion; it leads to disfigurement and a slow, painful
and at present inevitable death (Kingham, 1987).
In their desire to redress an assumed dominance of the
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taken-for-grantedness of naturalistic accounts for illness, all
of the social constructionist analyses of illness have tended to
underestimate the biological threat of illnesses that are
contagious and consequently menacing. It is here that perhaps the
ethnocentricity of sociological theorisation is most apparent. In
Third World Countries the biological reality of sickness, famine
and high infant mortality has always been highly salient. AIDS is
re-introducing into the West the need to develop socially
functional responses to sickness that, so far, biomedicine cannot
tackle. Its means of infection demand reconsideration of the
(social control ( thesis; for, within our current understanding,
only changes in lifestyle and behaviour can alter its exponential
spread (Birchall and Birchall, op cit).
1.3.5 Implications for the thesis 
Sociological theorisation in general offers three main conceptual
constructive frameworks pertinent to the work of the thesis.
Firstly, its emphasis upon sociological forces (like
anthropology's concern with culture) provides a rich source of
ideas about the ways that people's realities are constructed for
them, including the social functions of the (sick role ( in the
maintenance of social order, the ways in which powerful
hegemonies act as the (architects of knowledge' and the potential
impact of medicine as a system of social control.
However, the development of the concept of 'theoreticity'
demonstrates that sociological theorisation also has insights to
offer our understanding of the person-constructs-reality aspects
of accounting, in particular in its focus on its moral aspects,
and concerns about blame and responsibility.
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Thirdly, sociological analyses of the concepts of 'deviance' and
its contrast !ordinariness ( have clear links to the
growing interest within psychological theorisation about
accounting as a means of explaining or justifying disruptions of
social interaction, norm infractions (cf Harre, 1979; Semin and
Manstead, 1983) and coping with situations like threatened
identities (cf Weinreich, 1979, 1983). Such theories have tended
to focus upon the social and psychological fracturing of the
taken-for-granted flow of social being, but Dingwall 's analysis
of the way that illness is construed in relation to
.'ordinariness ( brings biological discontinuity into the
accounting arena. Henriques et al (1984) insist that our theories
must accomodate our biological as well as our social realities,
and therefore our theorisation about accounting needs to be
informed by the detailed analysis that sociology has made of the
'deviant .' qualities of illness.
And finally, it is important to note that a sociological analysis
of the influence of econcmic and political factors upon health
and ill health, and the role of power and control in both
creating the disadvantages that lead to ill health, and in
constructing knowledge, is itself an account for health and
illness, a cultural critique of medicine that challenges the
biomedical account.
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1.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL PEUELS OF ACCOUNTING
Buss (op cit) argued that psychological paradigms reflect one of
two underlying perceptions : a) Person-constructs-reality, and b)
Reality-constructs-person. Paradigm revolutions, according to
Buss, are either shifts from a) to b) or from b) to a). For
example, psychoanalysis represented a shift from person
-constructs-reality to reality-constructs-person. Prior to Freud,
rationality and consciousness were emphasised, with an individual
seen as acting in ways that a 'reasonable person' would.
Freud and his biological theories of motivation undermined and
transformed this view, with the subject becoming the object of
irrational and unconscious forces. Humanistic approaches shifted
once more to person as subject, as a reaction both to
psychodynamics and behaviourism, emphasising self-development,
the individual in control of her/his destiny, and actively
striving towards fulfillment and self-actualisation.
In a somewhat parallel manner, we can observe that the
operationalisations assumed to be salient within psychological
theories of accounting (e.g. beliefs, opinions, values and
implicit theories) have at various times been treated as either
dependent variables, products of, say, particular events,
psychological processes, or psychological mechanisms; or as
independent variables, reasons for, say, action.
These two dichotomies can be used to provide a conceptual
framework within which to examine different psychological
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theories and models of accounting :
Reality-constructs
-person
Person-constructs
-reality
accounts
as
dependent
variables
A B
accounts
as
independent
variables
C D
This schematisation over-simplifies, in that many theories seek
to explain more than one cell in the matrix, but broadly this
does distinguish between theories that :
A : construe accounting as the result of events, processes
or mechanisms acting upon the person as 'object";
B : construe accounting as the result of the person, as
'subject', constructing it for themself;
C : see the person as 'object' whose accounting results in
particular perceptions, behaviours, symptoms etc.;
D : see the person as 'subject', whose accounting enables
them to construe the world in a particular way, act,etc..
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Rather than attempt to review all psychological theories of
accounting, I will illustrate these alternative kinds of model in
terms of a selection of the best-known.
1.4.1 Person as object, accounting as dependent variable 
As Buss identified, psychodynamic theories are within the mode of
reality- constructs-person, the 'reality' in this case being seen
as the interface between events (mostly in childhood),
biological, developmental processes and the conflicting forces of
psychological components of the 'self'. A person's psychological
'reality' is the result of their experiences, as interpreted in
terms of the inner conflicts between unconscious forces and as a
consequence of how they, as an individual, have (or have not)
resolved them at different stages in their life-cycle.
Psychodynamic theory has thus provided a rich source of ideas
about accounting as a dependent variable, beginning with the idea
of ego defence established by Freud himself (cf 1926) and
developed by his daughter, Anna Freud (1936) and Alexander (1934)
in particular. Within this framework, the way a person explains
their world is a product of competing psychic forces such as
conscience, impulses of the id, and reality formation.
Probably the best known legacy of this approach is Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) description of
the 'authoritarian personality', a 'view of the world' which
renders people submissive to authority figures, hostile to the
violation of social norms and antagonistic to "deviance'
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(i.e. particularly vulnerable to the kinds of social determinants
of accounting described in Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.4). In
less extreme formulations, the psychodynamic model of acounting
stresses the salience of 'psycho-logic"; mechanisms like
defensiveness, self-justification and self-protection.
Festinger rs (1957) cognitive dissonance theory is another
reality-constructs-person formulation. Festinger actually gave an
accounting for health example, of a person who simultaneously
smokes and believes that smoking causes cancer. Dissonance
reduction may take the form of refusing to accept the evidence of
the link between cancer and smoking; or focus on counter examples
from their own experience; changing to filter-tips and persuading
themself that this reduces the risk; assert the advantages of
smoking; stress its pleasurability; or promote an anti-authority
view of their actions. Thus dissonance theory sees accounting not
as rational, but rationalising; a person's account enabling them
to justify actions which for one reason or another they are
highly motivated to pursue.
Another form of rationalisation is when people respond
self-defensively (Walster 1966; Shaver 1970) to calamities. A
tragic event produces a need for observers to believe that the
event could have been averted, and thus could not happen to them.
Thus the victim is blamed for their misfortune, and the worse the
tragedy, the more uncomfortable it is to acknowledge that this
kind of thing could happen to rime r , and so the greater the
tendency to see the victim as culpable. Similarly attribution
theories (e.g. Kelley, 1967) assume that accounting is often a
product of a need to feel in control of the environment.
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Seligman's (1975) 'Learned Relblessness'
	 Theory, also
based within social learning theory, and drawing upon notions of
external/internal control, has in its later version (e.g.
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale 1978) sought to explain two
kinds of (hopelessness". Where experiences of lack of control
over outcome are attributed as arising externally, then learned
helplessness leads to a fatalistic accounting system - tragic
and distressing events (such as illness and disability) are
assumed to occur by chance, or by the agency of powerful others.
But when the individual blames themself, then the accounting
system becomes one of recrimination - events are assumed to occur
because of one's own failings.
1.4.2 Person as object, accounting as an independent variable 
Psychodynamic theory suggests that people may unconsciously
'want' or "need" to be ill, because this enables them to resolve
inner conflicts; however dysfunctional or irrational a particular
act there is always a reason - though the reason may be based
upon unconscious motivations. Illness is a defence mechanism or a
mechanism for justifying what would otherwise be considered
aggressive behaviour. Psychodynamic theory also suggests that
physical symptoms may be the products of psychic energy seeping
out somatically, whether as the hysteria of the nineteenth
century or the migraines of the twentieth. Unacceptable or
threatening emotions may be rechannelled into somatic illness, or
they may result from pressures to submerge (rather than act out)
anger or frustration. That such accounting has entered into
popular discourse is evidenced by Sontag's (op cit) description
of a woman who blamed her cancer on 'inner negative feelings',
and Crawford's (1984) description of a man who blamed his on the
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inability to control his anger.
However, the best known version of this theory is the popular
conception that illness is the result of 'stress ( or
'hypertension' (Blumhagen 1980), also evident in the theory base
of the links assumed between 'Type A (
 personality and illness,
particularly coronary risk (Glass 1977; Heiman 1987). (Although
it is worth noting that the notion of Type A personality has also
been used within person-constructs-reality formulations, cf Smith
and Anderson (1986) ). This, originally academic theory for
illness, has also by now become pervasive within both
professional and popular discourse (Herzlich op cit; Young,
1980).
However, by far the most unbiquitous set of accounting theories
within this class is the broad sweep of attitude theories that
have proposed attitudes as independent variables that can be
measured and then used to predict action. As McGuire (1986) has
remarked, the repeated failure to do so "...has remained a
scandal of social psychology ever since." A proper review of
these theories could take up a Chapter in itself, and so (as the
reader will no doubt be relieved to know) I will concentrate
on just two. The first is the Fishbein and Ajzen model of
reasoned action, which has been increasingly applied in health
related contexts in attempts to predict such things as cigarette
smoking (Chassin et al, 1981) drug use (Budd et al 1983) and
contraception (Fishbein et al 1980). The second is the Health
Beliefs Model (cf Rosenstock, 1974) used to attempt to link
accounting to uptake of preventive medicine (Becker et al 1977,
Maiman et al 1977), chronic illness behaviour (Kasl, 1974)
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preventive dental behaviour ( e.g. Weisenberg et al, 1980; Chen
and Land, 1986), attending exercise classes (Heinzmann and
Bagley, 1970) and many others.
The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1969, 1972;
Fishbein 1980) was derived from Dulany"s (1961, 1964, 1968)
theory of propositional control, firmly based within a
behaviouristic framework. The main concern of the theory is to
predict behavioural intentions which are assumed to mediate overt
behaviour. According to the model, an individual 's intention to
perform a given act is a mathematical function of their attitude
towards performing the act, their estimate of what others expect
them to do in that situation (normative beliefs) and individual's
motivation to comply with the norms. A number of workers have
attempted to improve on this model's predictability by
introducing other factors into the equation such as "ideal
behavioural intentions' (Budd and Spencer, 1985), and by making
the mathematical relationships between the various components of
the equation more omplex (e.g. Crube, Morgan and McCree, 1986
used a computer model that incorporated interactive effects, and
multidimensional estimates of normative beliefs from parents and
peers, which they claimed provided a better fit to the data they
obtained).
The Health Beliefs model was originally designed to predict
health preventive behaviours (e.g. having innoculations,
attending screening sessions). It assumes that people consider
action rationally according to their beliefs about four main
aspects : the extent to which they see themselves as susceptible
to the disease in question; their perception of the barriers
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which must be overcome to act; their view of how serious the
disease would be; and their general ideas about health
prevention. In addition, these are seen to be mediated by a
general psychological readiness for action, the degree to which
they regard prevention as feasible, and, importantly, whether
there has been a stimulus (e.g. an inviting letter, TV programme
or contact with a friend who has participated). Thus although
accounting is regarded as an important independent variable, it
is seen as mediated by a number of other factors.
1.4.3 Person as subject, accounting as a dependent variable 
It is existential psychology which probably provides the best
overarching description for the new person-constructs-reality
psychology in the 1960s and 1970s that focussed on accounting as
a dependent variable. Within this perception, accounting is seen
as the product of individual freedom and choice
"The individual is therefore responsible for constructing
his(sic) own experience and reality. Every person is in the
position of having to realise that they are the creator of their
own world; that all life's experiences are there because they
have drawn them thus, and that they can do with them as they
choose; that one is one's choices. " (Graham, 1986, p 68)
Graham suggests that the European tradition of existential
psychology (based upon the works of Sartre, Camus and
Rierkegaard) generated an image of the person as on the one hand
fundamentally free and self-directive, but, in acceptance of
death as a necessary force in constructing an authentic and
purposeful reality, on the other hand able to recognise their
fundamental isolation. In this respect existential psychology
differs from the predominantly North American humanistic
psychologies of, for example, Maslow and Rogers. Holland (1977)
61
has suggested that the characteristic sentimentality of
humanistic psychology, in contrast to the much harsher
existentialism in Europe, arose because humanistic psychology
developed within the "me' culture of the North American
middle-classes, whereas the Europeans like Laing (1959, 1983) and
Frankl (1955, 1969, 1973) devised their theories in the context
of poverty, institutionalisation and inhumanity (for Laing,
the mental hospitals of the East End of London; for Frankl, as an
innmate himself in Auschwitz). Not surprisingly, then,
existentialism is an (angry .' rejection of the prior order. Frankl
wrote
"I am absolutely convinced that the gas chambers of Auschwitz,
Tteblinka, and Maidanek were ultimately prepared not in some
Ministry or other in Berlin, but rather at the desks and the
lecture halls of nihilistic scientists and philosophers" (1955,
1973 edn, pxxi)
Ftankl's existential psychology therefore combined the person
-constructs-reality principle with a strong moral element; his
model of accounting is one in which human existence is
characterised by three things : a person's spirituality, their
freedom, and their responsibility. Consequently, he strongly
denied what he saw as the psychodynamic position, in which
"sickness' is equated with a distorted world-view :
" a distorted world-view cannot be set straight by psychotherapy
... Not only is it inadequate, but not competent ...
psychotherapy has insufficient resources to deal with the
totality of psychic reality. On top of this insufficiency there
is its incompetence to deal with spiritual reality in its own
right. Not only is it exceeding its authority in dealing with the
individual's world-view as a "neurotic' phenomenon; it is going
too far altogether when it constructs theories of the
pathological origin of all world-views." (as above, p14)
Thus this is an accounting system which claims that the "self'
can and should transcend its biological and social limitations;
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what matters is not what happens, but how one choses to interpret
it. He gives numerous examples of people who are facing death,
coping with bereavement and with many other tragedies who made a
choice - to allow themselves to give up to dispair, or to embrace
the experience and make it meaningful. Within this context,
illness may be a biological reality, but this is not the reality
that matters - what is important is the meaning with which the
individual iMbues the experience. He developed (logotherapy'
(therapy of making spiritually meaningful), the basis for which
is the positive power of an individual's spirit and sense of
purpose.
Frankl does not deny the reality of physical and mental illness;
rather, he says that these are only a part of a person's
totality, and that they apply to only some forms of troubledness
that people bring to doctors (a position reminiscent of
Dingwall "s). A proportion of these are noogenic (soul sicknesses'
arising out of a sense of drowning in the ubiquity of mass
culture, and the kind of fatalistic innability to avoid disaster
that comes from living in the age of atomic weapons, linked with
a fanatical clinging to one's own worldview and rejection of all
others. These are moral, not psychosomatic conflicts, matters of
conscience that require spiritual healing. The epidemics of such
moral malaises are, Frankl argues, within society itself.
1.4.4 Person as subject, accounting as an independent variable 
Kelly's (1966) Personal Construct Theory is the best known and
most thoroughly articulated person-constructs-reality
functional model, within which accounting is a regarded as a
dynamic, self-modifying system in which the constructed reality
is continually tested against observed events and recouched in
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terms of what happens. The taken-for-granted reality that forms
the basis for everyday life is a functional (objectivity' that
enables individuals to cope with the complex demands of living in
society, making decisions, planning action and understanding
one's own actions and the actions of others. In emphasising
person-as-scientist, Kelly stressed that this is just one aspect
of many forms of constructive alternativism that occur within
accounting. Swift, Watts and Pope (1983) have argued that the
notion of (scientist' has often been wrongly interpreted as an
entirely reductionist, rationalising, dehumanising image, whereas
for Kelly the term was chosen for its liberating properties - its
ability to reject reductionism and overcome the dehumanising
(person-as-passive-organism' image of behaviourism.
Kelly's basic postulate that a person's processes are
psychologically channelized by the ways in which they anticipate
events, made clear that he saw the system as directively dynamic.
The focus on anticipating events enables active (understanding(
and (insight ( by organising the uniqueness of events into some
kind of framework by which they can be classified, understood and
responded to. However, a point frequently forgotten about Kelly's
model is that he was not implying a single, coherent, logically
intact system; his fragmentation corollary specifically states
that there are many more or less independent sub-systems which
are inferentially incompatible with one another. In other words,
(account sympatricity ( and complementarity fit well into a
Kellyam framework.
Personal construct theory is not, however, just about individual
construction. Kelly's communality corollary makes explicit
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that people can and do experience the world in similar ways, to
the extent to which their construct systems are similar.
Communality of construction is crucial to operate effectively
within a social world, success as a social being depending upon
how accurate those constructs are, and how appropriately they are
applied. However, Kelly placed the communality and sociality
corollaries subservient to the range and modulation corollaries,
arguing that while people can and do have similar construct
systems, ultimately constructs that are central to one person are
irrelevant to another. Kelly's is a personal construct theory,
stressing the uniqueness of each individual construct system, in
contrast to theories such as Mbscovici (s (1981, 1984) (social
representation (
 theory and (linguistic repertoire' theories of
Potter and Litton (1985) which focus upon the sharing of common
understanding.
1.4.5 Dialectical models and their appropriate methodology 
The (social representation (
 and other similar approaches are, in
principle if not always in practice, dialectical theories that
stress the interface between reality as construced by and
constructed for the individual, operating, for example, at the
individual level of self-concept and at the same time at the
social level of group membership (See, for example, poise, op
cit; and Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). An increasing number of
studies in this field are to be found in the social psychological
literature, examples being	 "Litton and Potters (1985)
investigation of (lay explanations ( of the St. Paul 's(riot(;
Furnham and Henderson (s (1983) study of Play theories ( of
delinquency, and Amanico and Soczka (s (1986) investigation of the
(understandings' current in Portugese culture about
65
discrimination against women at work.
All of these share two things in common. First, they are
account, not person, taxonomic, seeking to identify and describe
a variety of accounts as sympatric alternatives. Instead of
trying to classify people, they seek to elucidate the different
theories, explanations or understandings that people express.
Secondly, they are all ecological, interpreting account
sympatricity within broad social, cultural and historical
frameworks. Potter and Litton's work, for example, made use of
data from mass media (and people's responses to them) in order to
understand better the interface between individual constructions
of events, and events as constructed by say, television news
reporting; and analyses of the impact of minority cultural
worldviews (i.e. of (blacks ( living in a predominantly (white(
society) within a social setting like St.Pauls.
However, despite their sophisticated theory-bases which emphasise
the importance of (everyday ( and 'commonsense' accounting within
the (new paradigm' (i.e. within realistic settings, and in
self-referential domains), their methodologies are less advanced.
Harre (1979), still one of the foremost proponents of the 'new
paradigm(, argues that psychologists need to find new ways of
investigating such phenomena as accounts that offer at least some
hope of getting to grips with the reality-as-understood
-by-the-subject-of-study. He is equally denigrating about
interview and questionnaire methods
"The interview itself is a social event, heavy with ambiguity,
and shot through with efforts at self-presentation by both the
interviewer and the interviewee, so that it is doubtful whether,
in many cases, the interviewer understands the answers of the
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interviewee or the interviewee understands the questions of the
interviewer. Each, apparently, reconstrues the speech of the
other in accordance with their own conceptual framework. ...
(T)he use of questionnaires with a limited range of questions ...
which effectively preclude elaborations and reinterpretations ...
means that the concepts deployed ... are predetermined. The
effect of this is to produce not a representation of the social
world being studied, but the representation of the shadow cast
upon the social world by the prior conceptual apparatus deployed
by the person who constructed the questionnaire." (p 115).
Harr argues that what is needed are techniques that make people
their own ethnographers; that give them opportunities to express
their own (meanings ( and not have them interpreted for them by
interviewers, or foisted upon them by questionnaire designers.
The studies in this thesis have used Q-methodology, developed
over fifty years ago by William Stephenson, in conjunction with
ethnographic (interview and written open-ended responses) in an
attempt to provide such opportunities. As will be described in
Chapter 3, Stephenson devised this technique and developed its
theory base as a means for studying what he has called 'operant
subjectivity' - as a technique for enabling people to make
explicit their own (attitude of mind ( (Stephenson, 1953). This
technique has much in common with repertory grids, but was
selected rather than that approach because it also directly
enables, via its by-person factor analysis of response
configurations, the identification of shared patterns of
operancy. Unlike the usual item-by-item factor analysis, which
dismembers individuals ( response patterns, homogenising all of
the responses of a group, and then reconstitutes patterns of
response, Q factor analysis correlates and clusters holistically.
It identifies those overall response patterns which are common to
groups of people. It therefore seemed to offer the best method
available today to investigate accounts as the expression of
(understandings', (explanations" and so on, as articulated by
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individuals but also as shared between them.
1 . 5 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
It is within this kind of dialectical framework that this thesis
has been carried out; like the studies described above, to
approach the topic of accounting for health and illness as
taxonomic and ecological investigations. Three main objectives
were set
1. To identify and describe same of the main accounts for
health and illness that are current in British culture, in
terms of their broad ecological setting within the extant
medical (orthodox and rival), religious, sociological,
psychological and moral discourses in which they operate.
2. To identify and describe accounts for health and illness
within different explanatory frameworks, particularly in
relation to alternative understandings of (internal' and
(external' influences and controls, and to set these too
within their broader societal/psychological/moral ecologies.
3. To explore what these account taxonomies and ecologies
have to offer to illuminate our understanding of accounting
itself.
The next two Chapters describe the empirical and methodological
bases upon which these objectives have been investigated.
Chapter 2 reviews the recent empirical work carried out elsewhere
to investigate accounting for health and illness: studies of
(folk' and "indigenous' accounting; studies of social
68
determinants of accounting; and studies which have demonstrated
account sympatricity (including Q-nethodological studies about
health and illness). Chapter 3 is devoted to Q methodology,
providing details of its operation, history, theory-base and
current status.
There follow two Chapters describing empirical work. Chapter 4
presents Study 1, an initial investigation into account taxonomy,
both a Q study in its own right, and conducted to provide the
basis for Study 2. Chapter 5 describes Study 2, in which an
80-item Q sort completed by seventy participants identified nine
alternative accounts for health and illness which included same
accounts which were primarily explanatory, same primarily about
'Meaning ( and some primarily about moral issues; and couched
within alternative socio-political explanations about health and
illness viewed within the relationship between the individual and
society, through explanations articulated around the links
between biology and medicine, to accounts that were concerned
with notions of blame and responsibility, and the rights of the
individual. The division between internal/external influences
emerged here as particularly salient to explanation.
Chapter 6 offers a brief review of the literature on (locus of
control ( generally, and studies of (health locus of control' in
particular. Chapter 7 describes Study 3, in which three
instruments were used to explore the internal/external control
construct in relation to account sympatricity: the standard
(Multivariate Health Locus of Control Scale ( (NBIC) (analysed
conventionally and using by-person factor analysis); an
(Influences on Health and Illness Questionnaire ( (IHIQ), and a
Q-sort. In this study eighty three participants completed all
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three instruments, and their responses were used to tease out the
similarities and differences between the accounts identified.
While the MBIC scale data offered support for the established
external/internal construct for some participants, even this data
provided evidence for a number of alternative accounts; and the
IHIQ and Q-sort data de-constructed the (health locus of
control ( construct further. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a
review of the empirical results and theoretical insights gained,
making suggestions about theoretical and practical applications,
and potential developments.
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CHAPTER 2 : STUDIES OF ACCCUNFING FOR HELM AND ILLNESS
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2.00 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter provides a review of the empirical studies that have
been conducted to investigate "lay' accounting for health and
illness within contemporary British and North American cultures;
that is, different aspects of the way ordinary people (as opposed
to medical professionals) explain, understand and portray health
and illness, becoming ill and recovering from illness.
The earliest empirical studies of such 'lay' accounts (usually
termed 'lay health beliefs') were carried out in North America.
They demonstrated that although biomedicine tended to dominate
'lay' as well as "professional' accounting, and that the
physician was popularly seen as the primary source of medical
consultation and treatment, respondents also cited a whole range
of other sources (e.g•Chiropractors, 	 Christian Science
Readers, the "corner druggist') and reported using a wide
variety of over-the-counter treatments (e.g. trusses and sun
lamps) (Saunders and Hewes, 1953). Consultations with physicians
tended to be restricted to occasions when the symptoms of illness
were seen to be ambiguous and to interfere with work or social
obligations (Apple, 1960). This was particularly the case with
poorer people, who were more likely than the better-off to treat
themselves, or seek alternative advice. These differences between
rich and poor were partly attributed to the cost of treatment,
and partly to the ethos of robust 'keeping going' in adversity
and lower expectations of working class culture (Koos, 1954).
Finally, early research on the concept of 'health' found it was
articulated as a complex of three main constructs : feeling good,
absence of symptoms and the ability to perform normal functions
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(Baumann, 1961), with the working class people tending to favour
the latter two categories.
More recent studies have tended to adopt one of three approaches
: the 'folk' approach, arising primarily from anthropology; the
social determination approach arising primarily from sociology,
and the 'account plurality' approach, originating from various
disciplines but focussing upon the diversity of alternative
accounts to which people have access.
2.1 THE 'FOLK:APPROACH
The studies of accounting arising from an anthropological base
have concentrated upon examining how the 'lay' beliefs of
ordinary people in British and North American culture differed
from the professional accounting system of biomedicine, and in
particular upon their links to the indigenous folklore of the
cultural group within which they were expressed. I have selected
as examples of this approach a study by Snow which explored the
'folk' beliefs of poor people living in Tucson, Arizona, and a
study by Heiman, a British GP working in Stanmore, of the 'folk'
beliefs of his patients.
2.1.1 Snow's study of American folk beliefs 
The 'folk beliefs' studied by Snow (1974) derived from a mixture
of European folklore, African cultural roots (particularly
concerning genetic illnesses specific to blacks), the form of
Voodoo religion that arose from the West Indies (particularly
notions of sympathetic magic), and hot-cold theories arising
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from Spain, via Mexico; these overlaid by the trimmings of
scientific medicine and the messages of the American media
(where, for example, far more patent medicines - for instance,
for haemorrhoids and diarrhoea - are advertised on television
than are seen as acceptable to "good taste' in Britain).
Snow interviewed 47 poor, predominantly female and black
inhabitants of Tucson, Arizona, and also attended community and
religious meetings to put the interview data into context. All
but one of her respondents had been born in the beep South' and,
aged between 35-85, most had experienced considerable racial
discrimination. Her investigation was very detailed, including at
least two lengthy interviews with each person, covering
life-history and aspects of work, religious practices and
family organisation (70% were single-parent heads of
households) in addition to specific questions about beliefs
concerning health and illness.
These respondents perceived the world within which they lived as
hostile and dangerous, beset by natural agents of disease (e.g.
the chill wind and damp, polluted air), supernatural influences
(e,g. a punishing God, devils and spirits) and the malevolence of
other people (e.g. via hexing, spells and mal o o (evil
eye)). Within this worldview, the individual was thought of
as powerless, dependent upon the aid of talismans, spiritual
healers and religious intervention to cope with illness.
Notions of balance were very pervasive, both in terms of the body
(to retain its natural equilibrium) and in social life (to avoid
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God's punishment for being 'uppity', or the envy of others): To
stay healthy in this hostile, precarious world it was seen as
crucial to eat, drink and live in a temperate, respectable
manner. This was seen as particularly important at times of
increased vulnerability; for example, during menstruation and
pregnancy, at particular times (e.g. the waning of the moon) and
stages in the life-cycle (e.g. infancy and old age).
Within the notion of balance an important concept was that of
hot-cold, which has been traced back from humoral pathology via
Spanish folklore and then via Mexican and Puerto-Rican folklore,
into American cultural ideas (et Clark, 1970; Currier, 1966;
Harwood, 1971). Illnesses were thus regarded as either caused by
'too much heat' or 'too much cold', arising, for example, from
imbalances in diet, the effects of climate, or exposure to water
or wind. By reference to the hot-cold system, complex
explanations were built up to account for illness and suggest
remedies. For example, eating insufficient blood-building, 'hot'
food was seen to lead to 'low blood' illnesses like anaemia or
tuberculosis. Healing was seen as a personal gift (usually from
God) rather than the product of training.
Typically spiritual, religious or indigenous healers were
regarded with much more respect and authority than physicians,
seen as greedy and often hostile to the black ccurunity and poor
whites alike. This reaction is not at all surprising, given the
enormous gulf that existed between poorer North American
'ethnic minorities' and the predcadnantly white, male, Jewish and
Protestant medical establishment. Their worldviews operated upon
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entirely different assumptions, and often came into conflict (for
instance, when a doctor diagnosed both high bloodpressure [high
blood] and anaemia [low blood]).
2.1.2 Helman's study of the folk beliefs of his patients 
In the context of Snow's work, Heiman's (1978) study of the folk
of
beliefs
A
his patients, people living in Stanmore and Edgeware in
Britain, suggests at first sight that within a system of welfare
provision of medicine (i.e. the British National Health Service)
there are fewer divisions between popular and professional
accounting. However, it is important to note that Helman's data
were derived mainly from interactions between a physician
(himself) and patients, and upon second-hand reports by other
health professionals (e.g. via interviews with nurses, other GPs
and receptionists). Thus they represent the accounts a) of people
who had taken their medical problems to doctors' surgeries and b)
that people were prepared to express in that context.
Heiman entitled his paper 'Feed a cold and starve a fever', and
focussed on the ubiquity of a colds/fevers classificatory system
current in British culture which was used particularly by older
patients. Most minor illnesses, according to Heiman, tended to be
classified by patients and by doctors in their consultations
according to the way they made a person feel (i.e. 'hot' or
'cx)1(1') and the kind of symptoms ( -wet' or 'dry'), leading to an
assumed division between 'colds and chills' and 'fevers and
infections', the two accorded different aetiology and assumed to
need different kinds of treatment.
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Colds and chills were predominantly assumed to be caused by the
influence of exposure to some unfavourable aspect of the
environment, in particular damp, rain, cold winds and draughts -
i.e. anything which lowered the body temperature. Exposed skin,
particularly on the top of the head, neck and feet (but not face
and hands) was seen as particularly vulnerable, if not 'properly
wrapped up'. For example, men often assumed they were likely to
get a 'head cold' after a haircut unless they wore a hat. Other
forms of vulnerability reported were transitions between hot and
cold - sitting in a draught or going out into the cold after a
hot bath; seasonal changes in the weather (November and February
were both considered dangerous months because of their
transitional nature) and shifts from one climate to another (e.g.
'summer colds' attributed to returning from hot countries to
colder Britain).
These assumed links imbued colds with a quality of moral
responsibility and culpability; the idea was that they could be
prevented by avoiding exposure - waiting a sensible time after a
bath before going outside; wrapping up warm in winter; changing
out of damp clothes. Alternatively, they were a 'price to be
paid' for new fangled ideas like holidays in Spain, or skimpy
fashionable clothes. However, strength to fight the cold was seen
as built from within, by tonics like Virol, Cod Liver Oil,
Haliborange and Sanatogen, by eating warming food and drinking
warming drinks (ideas taken up by advertisements for example, for
porridge : 'central heating for kids', hot Ribena and drinking
chocolate, all of which have used strong images of 'inner'
warmth). Treatments similarly stressed the need to warm the body,
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with hot lemon and honey drinks, hot water bottles, vapour rubs
(e.g. Vick) and ample warming food ("feed a cold").
By contrast, fevers were assumed to be characterised by a
feeling of 'hotness' , to be more severe, longer-lasting, and
potentially more dangerous than 'colds' and to be due to
infection from 'bugs', 'germs' or 'viruses', terms borrowed from
biomedicine, but rooted more strongly within folklore than in
modern microbiology. Germs were seen as living, invisible, very
small malevolent entities that you catch, mostly from other
people's sneezes, dirty hands, unsavoury toilet habits or through
ill-prepared .
 food, entering through the body's orifices. Once
inside the body they were assumed to move around and be able to
infect almost any part. There were thought to be no good 'gems'
only bad, harmful ones. Viruses and bacteria were seen as
equivalent. There was far less moral culpability attached to
fevers. Although always 'caught' from somebody else, that was
part of the risk of normal, everyday social interaction. Moral
imperatives were placed upon sufferers (e.g. not to spread their
germs by going into work with 'flu, or sending a child to school
with chicken pox), but there was much more of a sense that if
there is '... a bug going around' then there is little anybody
can do to avoid catching it.
Methods of dealing with germ illnesses fell into three
categories. The germs could be ejected - 'washed out' or
'flushed out' by taking fluids, coughed up by taking
expectorants, or sweated out (encouraged by hot drinks, warm
rooms and extra bedclothes); starved (particularly stomach
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'bugs') and killed, usually by antibiotics. Heiman commented
upon the pressure frequently put upon GPs to supply antibiotics
for almost any form of infectious illness, irrespective of their
side-effects and inability to treat viral infections.
Heiman pointed out that the accounting system used by GPs in
their interactions with patients mirrors that of the popular
system. GPs, he claimed, frequently tell people things like
'You've picked up a germ that's going round' or 'You seem to have
a urinary infection', which, despite their vagueness, satisfy
patients and reassure them that no further diagnosis is
necessary. Seldom is any attempt made to identify the infectious
organism, promoting the view that all 'bugs' attacking a similar
site can be dealt with in a similar manner - and indeed, doing
little to question the efficacy of antibiotics as 'magic bullets'
for any kind of infection. Heiman suggested that as a result (due
largely to the self-limiting nature of the illnesses, and the
constraints on the GPs time and resources) most GPs reassure
patients by confirming their expectations about treatment ('a) to
bed, take plenty of fluids, and keep warm') and offering
prescriptions for unneeded, expensive and often positively
harmful medications. For instance, at the time of writing the
paper, Helman estimated that six million gallons of cough mixtures
were prescribed each year on the NHS, despite the considerable
doubts that have been expressed about whether they serve any
therapeutic' functions 'other than reassurance.
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2.1.3 Common themes within studies of 'folk beliefs' 
While there may seem to have been greater communality between
Helman's patients' accounting systems and that of biomedicine,
than between biomedicine and the accounting of poor black people
in Tucson, this may well be somewhat illusory. Heiman showed
that GPs tend to concentrate on providing reassurance and
acknowledgement of the individual's symptoms as disease, rather
than treatment or accurate diagnosis - not, in practice, all that
different from spirit healers promising to remove a 'hex'.
Similarly, Snow's identification of three main themes in the
accounting of the people she studied suggests that the basis of
accounting for health and illness was not nearly as different in
the two cultural settings as her descriptions of mal o'o,
voodoo and a punative God implied. Her themes were
"First, that the world is a hostile and dangerous place; second,
that the individual is liable to attack from external sources;
third, that the individual is helpless and has no internal
resources to combat such attack but must depend on outside aid."
[p83]
Helman's patients also saw the world as a hostile place, a
source of attack upon the individual - environmentally (in terms
of wet, damp and winds) and microbiologically (in terms of
*TIPS ' that can invade the body). They too saw themselves as
helpless, assuming that whenever they were ill they needed
treatments like cough mixtures and antibiotics rather than
accepting that most minor illnesses are self-limiting. That
ideas of supernatural causes of illness or personal malevolence
did not enter Helman's analysis may well merely reflect the
'official' settings in which his data were collected. Other
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workers (e.g. Csordas, 1986; Leslie, 1976; Williams, 1986)
suggest that religion pervades most accounting for health and
illness, even for people who are not affiliated to any
particular church. Williams, for example, talks of the 'invisible
religion'
... of a worldview which, often selective in doctrine and
uncommitted to the church, nevertheless (draws) upon universal
statements of faith or ethics to make sense of experience ... in
the medical sphere, both secular pragmatism and 'invisible"
religion are currently important in shaping answers to the moral
questions posed by bodily decline." (Williams, 1986, conference
paper abstract).
Snow's and Helman's studies demonstrate that in Western settings
no less than in the Third World mummities that form the bulk of
anthropological data sources, the accounting systems adopted by
ordinary people to explain health and illness, and tackle the
problems that illness generates, can only be understood within
the much broader context of indigenous culture and "folk-wisdom.
Folklore is not something restricted to historical times or
so-called "primitive" cultures, but is alive and active within
America and Britain today. It has historical, indigenous roots,
transmitted for instance as aphorisms and as powerful
cultural archetypes, reinforced by socialisation, media images
and "professional" endorsement. 'Folk wisdom' is the very fabric
within which popular discourse is woven.
2.2 INVESTIGATIONS OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING
An increasing amount of research has been conducted, particularly
in Britain, to investigate the links between accounting systems
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and health inequalities. The Black Report (Cf Townsend and
Davidson 1982) established a strong positive relationship between
socio-economic status and health - the lower a person's
socio-econamic status, the more likely they are to die young or
suffer chronic illness, a finding recently confirmed by the (now
defunct) Health Education Council's publication 'The Health
Divide' (1987).
Many researchers have sought to investigate the reasons why there
are large inequalities between the health of poor and rich
people in Britain. While structural factors (e.g. poor
housing, limited income and unhealthy working conditions, see for
example, Doyal " 1979; Mitchell, 1984) have been blamed,
differences in behaviour and lifestyle (e .g. diet and smoking
habits) have also been implicated, resulting, it has been
suggested, from educational limitations, alienation between the
medical profession and working class people and structurally and
socially induced 'learned helplessness' (cf Seligman 1975).
In consequence a number of studies have recently been conducted
to investigate the health beliefs of working class people, both
with a specific focus on particular communities, and in
comparison with middle class accounting systems. The purposes of
research were to discover to what extent health inequality was a
product of differences in the way better-off and poor people
account for health and illness, and, in consequence, differences
in their propensity to adopt 'healthy' or 'unhealthy' habits and
lifestyles.
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2.2.1 Studies of lay aetiology within working class culture 
The best known British research into lay aetiology is Blaxter and
Paterson's (1982) detailed ethnographic study of the beliefs
about the causes of disease held by working class mothers and
their mothers (i.e. women who were grandmothers) living in
Aberdeen, based upon content analysis of a series of in-depth
structured interviews with each respondent. I will begin here
with the responses of the 46 grandmothers (Blaxter 1984). Blaxter
stressed that these women had sophisticated models of disease
causation, mentioning a wide variety of causative factors,
including : infections, heredity and familial tendencies, agents
in the environment (e.g. pollution), the effects of drugs (e.g.
the contraceptive pill), secondary consequences of other
illnesses, stress, strain and worry, effects of
childbirth/Menopause etc., of injury, or surgery, neglect, the
constraints of poverty, individual susceptibility, behaviour,
ageing, and natural degeneration.
Infection was the most commonly cited cause of illness, though
this reflected in part the commonplace nature of many infectious
childhood diseases. The older women distinguished between these
mild and untroublesome infections, and past memories of serious,
life-threatening illnesses like diptheria. While some reported
active steps to eradicate "germs' (e.g. boiling dishes), far more
frequently infection was seen as outside of their control -
prey to the weather, brought on by damp housing, something in
the water'.
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The next most commonly cited cause was heredity and family
susceptibility including notions of both genetic cause and mere
family similarity. Comments were also made about individuals
having 'particular weaknesses'. This category of attribution was
one which shifted blame away from the individual. Reactions to
the 'natural' ageing process (including the menopause), and the
effects of childbearing similarly denied culpability - one should
expect to suffer consequences from pregnancy and giving birth,
from the menopause and getting old, they are an inevitable aspect
of these processes. Stress, strain and worry, together with
reactions of anger, resentment, frustration and despair was
another major category.
Blaxter included in her 'agents in the environment' category a
wide range of rather different causal factors considered capable
of increasing the chances of falling prey to infection, from
'poisons' through to working conditions and climate. While
Blaxter accepted that indeed these women did face predominantly
hostile environmental conditions in terms of climate, poor
tenement style housing and unpleasant working conditions,
she noted "To find a cause in the environment was more acceptable
than to locate the responsibility in one's own body...". Intien
it came to attributions specifically linking behaviour to
illness (e.g. a fondness for sugar leading to diabetes),
Blaxter commented that once more "... self-responsibility was
explicitly denied. Yes, it was this behaviour that caused the
disease, but in the circumstances, no one could behave
differently."
84
Although the content classification used in the study gave the
impression that many attributions were single, Blaxter emphasised
that they were generally placed within the interviews within a
much more complex, biographic context. A minor illness (e.g.
'flu) would be spoken of as leading to bronchitis, which might
'weaken the heart'. While a doctor may see illness incidents as
discrete events, to the individual experiencing the sequence of
illnesses, they are often interpreted as causally interlinked,
and indeed not just linked to each other, but to all manner of
life events, circumstances and individual responses.
The overall picture of the older women's accounting was of low
expectations, their portrayal of 'good health' being
predominantly one of the capacity to continue to function
normally . Health was construed within a stern moral context of
'not complaining', with 'giving in' to illness seen as a weakness
of character. Within this construal, the women sought to absolve
the individual from any personal blame if they did become ill -
their behaviour may be the reason for illness, but was not its
cause. That lay not in themselves, but in the conditions in which
they lived their lives.
When Blaxter and Paterson (1982) compared the accounts of the
two generations, while the concept of health was similar for the
older women and their daughters of a younger generation, their
attitudes to doctors and use of medical services were different.
The majority of the older generation expressed trusting, grateful
and deferential attitudes towards doctors, stressing what 'good
patients' they were, and derogating the way others abused the NHS
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by seeking help for trivial reasons. The attitudes of the
daughters were much more varied, and often more critical. Their
use of Health Services (both community and hospital emergency
services) was far greater, as were their expectations. Many told
stories of clashes with doctors who would not give them
sufficient information, or who refused to provide the level of
service to which they considered themselves entitled. Attitudes
to health visitors depended a great deal upon their circumstances
and self-confidence. Those who were coping well with
predominantly healthy children usually spoke favourably of the
support the health visitors provided; however those who were
coping less well and had children in poorer health often resented
what they saw as being 'judged" and 'bold what to do', and tended
to make least use of preventive services like ihoculations and
dental checks.
Blaxter and Paterson initiated their research to explore the
hypothesis' that had been publicised by Keith Joseph that
deprivation is cyclical - disadvantaged parents transmit the
roots of deprivation to their offspring. In particular they
wanted to investigate the extent to which the older women had
influenced their daughters' accounting, such that when they
became mothers themselves, they adopted dysfunctional attitudes.
NO evidence for this thesis was discovered, and Blaxter and
Paterson argued that whereas there were similarities between the
accounts of the two generations, it was much more likely that
they had a common source (i.e. social disadvantage itself) than
that the similarity was a product of socialisation. The new
generation of mothers saw themselves - and were seen by their
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mothers - as living in a very different world, in which friends
and people like health visitors were a much better source of
advice about health matters than their mothers.
2.2.2 Lay attributions of 'external' and 'internal' control 
Pill and Stott (1981; 1982; 1985a; 1985b; 1987) carried out a
series of studies within a research programme in which the
beliefs about health and illness of Welsh 'lower working class'
mothers were explored with specific focus upon the distinctions
construed between internal causality (i.e. individual
responsibility) and external attributions (fate and the influence
of powerful others). They used a combination of in-depth
interview techniques (from which they derived indices of health
related behaviours and lifestyle), and psychometric instruments,
including tests of knowledge ' and the Multivariate Health
Locus of Control Scale (MHLC) (Wallston and Wallston, 1978) ,This
construct and research with the scale, including further analysis
of Pill and Stott 's work, are described in more detail in Chapter
6).
In their 1981 study Pill and Stott developed a 'Salience of
Lifestyle' (SLI) index which was used to distinguish between
'lifestylists' and 'fatalists'. 'Lifestylists' were the
women who defined health in terms of a dynamic relationship
between the individual and their environment; who saw health as
under a level of individual control, although they also saw
resistance, life events, interpersonal relationships and emotions
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as influences on health. They had positive concepts about mental
and physical wellbeing, and gained higher scores on tests for
knowledge (i.e. of current orthodox wisdom about the
causes of heart attacks and cancer) than the "fatalists',
and they spontaneously reported taking active health-promoting
steps such as exercise and stress reduction, and said they would
evaluate the medical advice offered to them, rather than follow
it unquestioningly. These i lifestylists' were contrasted with
the 'fatalists" in terms of their scores on the HLC scale.
Although there was a trend for the "lifestylists" to score higher
on the'internal control" sub-scale, and score lower on the
"external control" sub-scales (chance and powerful others) than
"fatalists", this trend did not reach statistical significance.
In their later study (1985), using a much larger respondent
sample, Pill and Stott elucidated the relationship betweeen SLI
scores and attributions. Moving away from the simple
lifestylist/fatalist dichotomy, they identified three clusters of
causal attribution
Score on
	
Attribution of illness and role of behaviour
SLI scale
LCW Tended to reject the idea of blame and
personal responsibility completely, or attributed
illness to dysfunctional mental attitudes.
MEDIUM Tended to emphasise the role of short-term risks
involving stupid or careless behaviour as causes
of illness.
HIGH Tended to stress the role of life-style, and the
need to take long-term health maintenance measures
to avoid illness.
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Pill and Stott stressed that within their sample "...most of our
respondents were probably neither out-and-out fatalists nor did
they believe that leading a healthy life would guarantee complete
immunity", indeed "(M)ost people appear to be quite capable of
holding a number of apparently contradictory general theories
of causation at the same time ... The overlapping nature of the
characteristics reveals ... how those with same degree of belief
in the importance of lifestyle decisions develop more complex
views which can embrace both fatalistic and lifestyle
orientations without cognitive strain."
Pill and Stott attempted to elucidate accounting further by
looking for links between NEMC and SLI scores and other factors
such as home ownership, marital and employment status, education
and participation in outside organisations (e.g. religious
affiliation). While they did establish significant positive
correlations between SLI and both educational level and
amount of religious commitment, with the other variables
significant effects only emerged via more complex interactions.
For example, house ownership alone did not link significantly
to a rejection of 'chance' in illness causation and high SLI
scores, but ownership plus more education did.
Overall, Pill and Stott refuted the traditional stereotyping of
working class fecklessness and laissez-faire attitudes,
contrasted with an assumption of middle class concern for health
and a greater commitment to healthy lifestyles. Instead they
argued that those who were poorest off were being realistic in
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their attribution of illness to living conditions and the
struggle for family survival in an urban environment. For
example, in answer to a question about the main reasons for
falling ill, one respondent replied
"Overwork, pace of living - people just not getting the proteins
they need and there is just not the money about to give your
children what they need ... I think it boils down to money every
time as far as Iin concerned because people like, you know, my
husband has to work so many hours to make it worthwhile for your
family and your everyday life to go all right - if you know what
I mean - as far as food and that goes. There's a lot of worry
attached to it - I think it is this that makes people ill, mainly
nerves and, you know, the rush ! my husband has to get up at 4.00
am in the morning for the morning shift. I don't think it's right
for any man to work like that - if you work the normal hours you
haven't got enough."
As did the women in Blaxter's sample, many of Pill and
Stott 's respondents acknowledged a link between behaviour and
lifestyle, and health and illness. But the issue was not seen
as one of personal responsibility. Living in conditions which
give you few choices about your actions, how can (or should) you
accept blame ? Pill and Stott suggested that "(W)hat, from one
point of view, may be seen as 'fatalism' may from another
perspective, be interpreted as a realistic appraisal of the
complex variables involved in the aetiology of illness...". In
their most recent paper (Pill and Stott, 1987) they have offered
a complex 'cascade' model which links together sociodemographic
factors, accounting and various' barriers 10 action which they
see as interweaving in a complex manner to influence lifestyle
and behaviour. This model is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Barriers[1] Behaviours
1
1	 1
I
I	 I
I
1
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Figure 2.1 Pill and Stott 's cascade mocel or antecedents to
health behaviours (from Pill and Stott, 1987).
Sociodemcgraphic 	 Beliefs &
Factors	 attitudes
Education
	 Concepts of
causation,
Childhood	 prevention &
socialisation	 responsibility
in illness
Religious
commitment
Marital
status	 Beliefs about
the nature of
Income
	 health and
factors which
promote or
hinder health
maintenance
Support - overall
- relatives
- friends
	 Beliefs about
personal
Wbrk	 - self
	 control in
life and
- husband
	 role of
chance in
illness
	
Family structure 	 Or
health
Conjugal
relationship
* PREVENTIVE
HEALTH
PROCEDURES
* PERSCNAL
• HEALTH
PRACTICES
* SRTF -
DEFINED
HEALTH
CBOICES
[1] All antecedents in the cascade may have the potential to act
as barriers under certain circumstances.
90
2.2.3 Comparing 'middle class' and 'working class' accounts 
Unlike the previous two research programmes, which focussed
entirely on the accounting of working class wcmen, Calnan and
Johnson (1985) specifically attempted to compare the accounts of
working class women with those of middle class women. Their
sample consisted of 30 women from each group who lived in London,
all interviewed by a single interviewer. They did find some
differences, particularly in the way the two groups defined
health. While the middle class women offered many more
definitions, there was a tendency to offer proportionally more
positive descriptions than the working class women. This showed
up most clearly in the middle class wamen's emphasis on health as
a feeling of fitness and strength, being active and energetic
compared with the working class emphasis on 'getting through the
day' and 'never being ill'.
There was far less difference in reported feelings of
vulnerability, although Calnan and Johnson did observe, as had
Blaxter, a tendency for working class women to see worrying about
illness as unhealthy in its own right, as weakness or
hypochondria. For both groups, but particularly for the middle
class women, perceived vulnerability to illness tended to arise
out of experience of symptoms (e.g. suspecting a breast lump)
rather than a person's own actions (e.g. smoking). Calnan and
Johnson suggested that health beliefs of the 'abstract' kind they
examined may be more a matter of making sense of health actions
than acting as precursors to action.
However, this study is difficult to interpret, Calnan and Johnson
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themselves noting sampling problems and that some of the
effects may have been due to differential responding to the
middle class interviewer. It is also hard to tell to what extent,
say, the greater stress laid by working class women upon not
worrying about illness reflected structural differences (e.g. in
the resources to allow for 'being ill', or to seek medical advice
and treatment) rather than differences in accounting.
2.2.4 . Overall themes in studies of social determination of
accounting 
The ethos of working class accounting as noted much earlier in
North America by Koos (op cit) appears to be one of denying
individual responsibility and culpability, of low expectations,
and of robust stoicism in the face of adversity. All three of the
studies offered consistent support for this description. However,
while these studies do provide evidence to refute the
stereotyping of working class people as causing their poor health
through their own feckless behaviour, none of them really get to
grips with the main question of whether working class values and
discourses per se play a role in promoting inequality. All
three sets of authors note that the structural disadvantages
experienced by the working class women were so pervasive and so
influential within their daily lives, that it was impossible to
discern whether their accounts (e.g. denial of blame) were simply
the products of disadvantage, or contributed to it. Part of the
problem arises from the way ethnographic methods iron out
variability in accounting. Reading the studies, very little
impression is given of the diversity of accounts within working
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class culture - how people who share similar levels of structural
disadvantage might adopt different strategies to cope with it,
based on different accounts.
Even with Pill and Stott 'S programme of research, where attempts
were specifically made to tease out alternative perceptions, the
high/medium/low SLI index confounded accounting and
socio-economic status. Their data indicated more about the
process of upward social mobility than they did about the cycle
of deprivation : that the more upward social mobility a working
class person achieves, the more they are likely both to have
acquired the resources to adopt the behavioural and practical
trappings of a good "lifestylist" and the more likely they are
to have internalised middle class individualist values.
What, of course, the MHLC data analysis leaves out is
consideration of structural features, excluding attributions of
external influences such as poverty or poor housing and working
conditions which showed up so strongly in the interview data. As
I will describe in Chapter 6, detailed analyses of the original
Locus of Control Scale (cf Lefcourt, 1980) indicate that it has a
political dimension; that 'internality" is also a measure of
political conservatism (i.e. as epitomised by the "Now Right").
Radical and politically active socialists and Marxists tend to
score as "externals" (although attributing control to big
business and dominant hegemonies rather than fate). Since this
aspect of externality/internality is excluded from the MBLC
scale it is perhaps not all that surprising that Pill and Stott
found the MBLC data so disappointing, only yielding significant
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effects when linked to measures of socio-economic status (like
home-ownership and education levels).
Thus Pill and Stott's work, as much as the other two studies,
leaves the reader hanging. Did the "lifestylists" acquire their
more positive self-perceptions and expectations as a
consequence of overcoming or avoiding adversity - or did they
overcome or avoid adversity because of the attitudes to life they
adopted ? Were the "fatalists" fatalistic because life had given
them a raw deal, or did they get a raw deal because their
fatalism led them to make no effort to help themselves ? There is
polemic in plenty about this issue, but so far no research of
sufficient sophistication to go much beyond polemic. Rather, these
two alternatives are themselves "accounts for health and
illness", as the studies described later in this thesis show.
2.3 sTuDnas OF ACCOUNT SYWATRICITY
The studies described in this Section are ones which have
specifically explored alternative accounts for health and
illness. That is, they were all based upon the theoretical
assumption that individuals have access to more than one kind of
account, accounts varying either in their content, or form, or
both. Within anthropological theorisation this parallelism is
usually referred to as 'medical pluralism: (cf. for instance
Kleinman's (1978) division into "folk", 'popular' and
"professional" systems). Within sociology it is generally couched
within a framework of competing belief systems arising out of
sociological divisions (cf. for instance, Friedson"s (1970)
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analysis of the divisions between 'medical and 'lay'
accounting). Within psychology, account sympatricity has been
treated theoretically by way of such constructs as "social
representation' (cf Moscovici, 1961, 1984 ) constructive
alternativism' (cf Kelly, 1966) and 'complementarity' (cf
Stephenson, 1986a)
In all these disciplines the notion of 'alternativism' is based
upon a social epistemclogical interpretation in which accounts
are construed as the products of variable forces within
collective discourse. Directed towards the topic of health and
illness, they all posit that since reality is socially
constructed, accounts for health and illness vary according to
the particular forces (cultural, sociological, inter- and
intrapersonal) impinging on the individual as part of a social
group. The empirical studies have thus sought to identify and
elucidate these different accounts for health and illness, and to
gain a better understanding of their sources.
2.3.1 Social representations of health and illness 
Herzlich (1973) carried out extensive interviews with
predominantly middle class Parisians (and a few country
dwellers). From their accounts, she developed sophisticated
descriptions of the social representations for health and illness
that she saw as operating both subjectively and intersubjectively
- as accounts that individual have internally represented within
their thinking and as discourses within the public domain.
From her interviews, Herz lich concluded that different accounts
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for health/illness are not polar opposites to each other, but
quite discrete conceptions.
She interpreted her data as evidence that individuals have access
to multiple conceptions of "healths"; co-existing formulations of
different aspects : health-in-a-vacuum; reserve of health; and
equilibrium. "Health-in-a-vacuum" was the term Herzlich used for
the notion of health as the absence of illness, of a lack of
awareness of the body, and/Or simply not being bothered by it,
essentially a state of "bodily silence". "Reserve of health'
represents health as an asset or investment rather than a state.
It has two main aspects : physical robustness or strength; and
resistance to attacks, fatigue and illness. Health is something
you 'have' that enables you to perform your job, etc., defend
yourself against disease, recover from illness. 'Equilibrium"
was described by Herzlich's respondents as "real health" or
health in its highest sense; it carried the notion of positive
wellbeing or "high level wellness" (cf Ardell 1977) as well as
some of the sense of balance and harmony and even some of the
attributes that psychologists such as Maslow (1968) have proposed
for optimal human functioning, such as self-actualisation.
Herzlich commented that although her respondents used the term
"Equilibrium" with frequency, they found it hard to pin down, and
overall it seemed to carry a two level meaning: a substrate of
essential harmony and balance in bodily, psychological and
spiritual life - from which a functional sense of
self-confidence, alertness, freedom, energy and indefatiguability
stem. Thus it had both a psychological reality concerned with
self perception, and a somatic reality to do with physical
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capability and readiness to take on all comers.
Herzlich"s respondents distinguished between four different
classes of illness : serious illnesses which may be fatal;
chronic conditions; everyday, trivial illnesses like colds and
"flu; and childhood ailments. They also referral frequently to
intermediary states between "real" illness and "real" health
"There are the little troubles, the little situations of
discomfort which you have more or less all the year round,
headaches, the after-effects of alcohol, digestive difficulties,
fatigue..." [p 541
These intermediate states were typified by links to mood
(particularly depression and inertia); to their undesirable
impact on relationships with others; and their tendency to be
long-lasting.
However, beyond this, in contrast to the well articulated
classification of aspects of health, accounts of illness were
vague, unsystematic and heterogenous. There were attempts to
distinguish illness from other states (e.g. accidents and
physical disability) and a variety of dimensions were
introduced : (e.g. severity, painfulness, curability). Despite
this lack of clarity, however, Herzlich did identify three
'metaphors' for illness which distinguished between different
social representations : illness as destroyer; illness as
liberator and illness as occupation.
"Illness as destroyer" was an image which tended to be held by
people who were or had been particularly active or engaged in
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society, and for whom any interference with their professional or
family role was a serious problem. The focus was upon the impact
of illness to limit fulfillment of role responsibilities, and
concomitant loss of social position and subsequent social
isolation. Bound together in this social representation were
fundamental assumptions about responsibilities to others, and
the ability for dependency to negate the individual as 'less of a
person'. People who saw illness as 'destroyer' stressed the
positive aspects of health; they responded to illness,
paradoxically, both by trying to assume control (by denying it,
or keeping going as if they were not ill) and by feeling impotent
(by 'giving up' when struck). These were the people who
avoided doctors at all costs, and would do almost anything rather
than accept the label 'ill'.
'Illness as liberator' in contrast, stressed the capacity of
illness to liberate the individual from their responsibilities,
or the pressures that life places upon them
"When I'm very tired, I often wish I were ill ... illness is a
kind of rest, when you can be free from your everyday burdens ...
For me, illness is breaking off from social life, from life
outside and social obligations, it's being set free." [p 1141
The benefits of illness were seen as making possible greater
intellectual activity that the pressures of everyday life
exclude; the solitude of illness could be enjoyable; there were
privileges to be gained, sympathy and care from others. Herzlich
argued that within this perception are provided the seeds of the
'invalid' personality, bound up in ideas of the capacity of
invalidity to promote self-examination, that experiencing illness
can enrich understanding and force upon the sufferer a better and
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more valid set of values; a belief that experiencing illness is a
route through which an individual can attain full self-knowledge.
'Illness as occupation' was the notion that when you are ill, you
should see illness as a challenge - as something that you must
fight with all the powers you have. It stressed the energy needed
to focus all your energies to get better and not to worry
about your other responsibilities. It carried two main
imperatives - to accept your illness as real, and a moral
responsibility to take an active role in your own recovery. There
was also a strong sense of 'mind over matter'.
Although these three descriptions tend to read as though
people could be classified according to one or other perception,
Herzlich stressed that only some individuals adopted a single
construction; most people drew upon two or all three, offering
complex understandings and explanations. Herzlich argued that
these social representations, singly or in concert, acted as
strong determinants, not just of the way illness was perceived
and responded to, but also of the way people saw themselves when
they were ill, when they were well, and particularly when they
were in intermediate states between ill and well.
The disjunction between the representations of health and of
illness meant that representations of what influences health were
construed differently from attributions for becoming ill. Health,
predominantly, was seen as a matter of individual strength and
resistance, of a capacity to adjust and find harmony between the
self and the environment, in part a kind of 'natural heritage' of
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bodily strength, in part a product of self-fulfillment; health
was represented as something inside the individual. Illness,
conversely, was construed as the result of assaults upon health
from the outside such as pollution, the wear and tear of modern
life, the pressures of confinement. It also included the effects
of behaviour (e.g. staying up late, not eating sensibly), but
these were usually seen as themselves a product of "way of life'
- dysfunctional responses to the root cause of ill health, the
stress, fatigue and pressure of urban living (and less
frequently, of country living)
"You could say that now, with the life we lead, certain diseases
are increasing because our body no longer reacts because it no
longer has enough resistance ... Modern life induces a kind of
fatigue which makes us ill ... everything to do with modern work
and its conditions makes us more vulnerable to most diseases."
[p 21]
Resistance, within this analysis, was attributable to three main
factors : a) inherited bodily predisposition - people are born
physically strong or weakly, with high or low or intermediate
reserves to fight off onslaughts from way of life; b) temperament
- the ability to fight is in part a product of the kind of person
you are; and c) specific weaknesses and vulnerabilities -
individuals are seen to vary in the kinds of assault (specific
germs) to which they are vulnerable and/or particular parts of
the body that are prey to attack, for example 'a weak nervous
system:.
Illness was thus represented as a product of interaction between
a person's individual characteristics, and their "way of life'.
But it is noticeable that 'way of life', as described by these
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middle class Parisians, was not equivalent to 'lifestyle' (as
Pill and Stott would define it) but rather an interpretation in
which people are construed as passive objects upon which a
particular "way of life' was imposed. While its illness-provoking
qualities were construed as products of the modern 'rat race',
the tendency to blame agents in the outside world for illness
(directly and vicariously) was very similar indeed to the refutal
of personal culpability discovered within the working class
samples studied by Blaxter and Paterson, Pill and Stott, and
Calnan and Johnson. In the 1960s, when Herzlich carried out the
interviews, middle class people appeared to deny personal
culpability as much as working class people.
2.3.2 Studies of the accounting of older people 
Williams' (1981a, 1981b, 1983, 1986a, 1986b) researched
specifically into the accounts for health, illness and in
particular about ageing of 'older people' (i.e. 65+). Williams
used similar ethnographic methods to other researchers in this
area, but where his work differed from that of others in this
field was in his use of formal logic to analyse his data,
exploring the categories Herzlich discovered, particularly those
of 'health as destroyer' and 'health as occupation', seeking to
elucidate what he calls the 'lay logic' and 'structure of
ideologies' that underlie such concepts.
Williams' early studies (1981a and b) were primarily concerned
with the 'lay logic' behind older people's notions of health
and illness in relation to their own experiences of ageing. His
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data showed that that although it is sometimes naively assumed
that 'old people' can be treated as a single group and assumed to
see the world in similar ways, in his sample different people
interpreted the physical manifestations of growing old in
radically different ways. Those people who adopted a 'health as
destroyer' metaphor tended to see themselves as being 'finished'
or 'fading away' when they experience the gradual physical
decline of older age. However, those who adopted a 'health as
occupation' metaphor were much more likely to see themselves as
basically healthy as they got older, albeit maybe suffering from
some form of specific weakness. Such a person was more likely to
see themself as 'keeping going' and 'fighting on' despite the
inevitable degeneration that old age brought. This helped to
explain the apparent paradox which emerged from his interviews
and Herzlich's, that people often considered themselves
'healthy' even though they reported symptoms of illness. Among
Williams' (1983) sample of older people, over fifty percent of
those experiencing chronic conditions (e.g. arthritis) rated
their health as good or excellent.
However, Williams argued that all of his respondents shared a
common account of 'health as strength', a corollary of
Herzlich's 'reserve of health'. Within this account, health was
seen as a property that can either be 'taken care of', built up
or maintained - or alternatively, spent or squandered. Williams'
respondents talked about how this strength could be compromised
in one of at least four ways : a) by being temporarily depleted,
but with full or partial recovery expected; b) by the effects of
localised chronic disease, suggesting a particular weakness of
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some part; c) by the development of general weakness which has
the effect of overall attenuation; and d) by the exhaustion of
the power of recovery.
Williams' interviews were conducted with a carefully balanced
sample, but his identified alternative accounting for ageing
appeared to arise from factors which were quite different from
those controlled for' by sampling techniques. Neither age,
social class or gender could predict whether people saw growing
old as a time of decline and inevitable decay and restriction -
or as a liberation from responsibility, to be savoured and fought
for against any irritating symptcms of old age. Recent work by
Cornwell (1986) has suggested that which of these is adopted in
later life is largely a reflection of biography and the
self-concepts and strategies each individual has developed in
their earlier life. She commented, for example, upon the "...
immense variation between the older respondents with regard to
what they consider to be 'normal' ageing" [pll]. This diversity
reflected some aspects of biography that were common to all
members of the same age cohort (e.g. World War II, the
introduction of the National Health Service), some that were
shared by particular groups or collectivities (e .g. the poverty
and mass unemployment of the Depression in the 1930s that
affected working class people differently from middle class
people), and some that are more specific to the individual (e.g.
a good or bad marriage).
While Cornwell has tended to emphasise individual biography as
the framework upon which accounting is built in the '1101A7',
103
Williams' more recent work (1986b) has stressed the role of
collective discourse as a basis within which a number of logical
premises can be 'made sense of'. For example, some people were
able to reconcile the premise that early old age (.e.g. just
after retirement) is a setback with the premise that it is a
repairing of defences, thus arriving at the conclusion that
ageing is a resistable process. In carrying out an analysis of
this kind, they constantly referred not just to their own ideas
but to their estimates about 'what other people would think' and
to moral and ethical standards set both by the individual for
themself, and by the community at large. Williams described three
main "schemes of ageing" : as a resurgence; as a siege and as a
delayed capitulation
... each internally coherent, which at once supply and limit the
stock of ideas on which Aberdonians draw. It is between these
possibilities that those searching for coherence have to
chose..." [pp 15-161
Thus while Cornwell 's analysis of accounting about health and
illness in old age was predominantly idiographic, Williams was
much more concerned with the intersubjective discourses available
to the individual to draw upon in order to make sense of what
they frequently recognised as paradoxical and conflicting
patterns of ideas of their own. He saw these discourses - he
calls them 'schemes' or 'schemas' - as reference sources which an
individual can use to impose structure upon their understanding.
These are not just specific to the topic in question, but embody
commonly shared values
... this generation had the basis for a unified consciousness of
certain distinctive values - respect for neighbourliness, for
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authority, for perseverence and thrift." [ p191.
Thus Williams saw accounting as a product of a personal
dialectic, with the individual account arising - both by way of
reality-constructs-person and person-constructs-reality
processes.
2.3.3 Studies of 'public' and 'private' accounting 
Cornwell's earlier research (1984) investigated the accounts for
health and illness of 24 people who lived in London's East End
(Bethnal Green). She also obtained data about her respondents'
housing, work, life-histories and social networks so that she
could place their accounts into the context of their daily lives,
family relationships and personal histories, as well as within
the broader geographical and historical context of the area. She
obtained two distinctly different kinds of account - the public
and the private.
Public accounts, usually offered in early interviews in response
to general questions about, say, the causes of illness, she saw
as lay interpretation of expert opinion. They were often
prefaced by such phrases as "Well, they think that....",
reproducing what was seen as legitimised knowledge. These, she
argued, were the kinds of account a researcher must generally
expect to be offered in the setting of a formal interview, when
the interviewee sees themself as somewhat 'pitting on a
performance'. Such performance variables are well known to
psychologists (Cf Rosenwald, 1986; Semin and Rogers, 1973) and
are one of the ways that the research process itself tends to
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reify culturally sedimented discourses as 'what people think' or
'what people believe' when, in fact, they may well have more the
qualities of a contract in which the interviewee offers the
interviewer what they (the interviewee) assume the researcher
expects to hear.
Private accounts, by contrast, Cornwell argued, arose out of
personal experiences, and from the feelings and thoughts that
accompanied them. They were usually offered in later interviews
when Cornwell had become more accepted and trusted, and had
managed to reduce the social distance between herself and her
interviewees. But they also arose in response to requests for
stories about the respondent's own experiences, or those of their
family and friends.
Public accounts tended to be complex (in fact very similar in
content to Blaxter's lay aetiologies), and what Cornwell
(personal ccmmunication) has called 'static' : "By static I mean
one thing acts upon the other' and that is it. No movement
backwards or forwards." In other words, public accounts were
linear chains of assumed causality, and somewhat abstracted from
the context of biography - rather like Young's (1982)
'explanatory models'. Cornwell abstracted from her public account
data a three-part classification of illness causation
* internal/external
* avoidable/unavoidable
* blame/no-blame
However, although logically there were more possible
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combinations,only the following four were used
1. internal/avoidable/blame
2. external/avoidable/blame
3. internal/unavoidable/no-blame
4. external/unavoidable/no-blame
Within these different explanations the avoidable/blame
categories were far less frequently mentioned than the
unavoidable/no-blame, and in the former, blame was usually
attributed to others (e.g. other parents for sending their
children to school with infections). Personal blame for illness
was denied, and in particular, the idea that individuals can
alter their life-styles to promote good health and avoid
illness. Blame was only accepted to the extent that other
people were seen to adopt defeatist attitudes or engage in
stupid or careless behaviour. Of Cornwell's twenty four
respondents, only two accepted as valid the messages of the "Look
after yourself" health education campaign current at the time
(i.e. to reduce drinking, stop smoking, eat properly and take
exercise).
Cornwell suggested there were many forces militating against such
messages, including the moral imperative that morbid thinking
about illness is contrary to the cultural ideology of cheerful
acceptance; resentment about 'being told what to do' by meddling
outsiders; the perceived difficulty of overcoming the influences
of individual constitution or cheating fate; conflicting
personal experiences (e.g knowing smokers who had lived to a ripe
old age) and a perception of the benefits to be gained from
'unhealthy habits - e.g. the relaxation to be obtained from
smoking. Cornwell argued against seeing such accounts as
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'fatalistic' because to do so overlooks " the premium ...
attach(ed) to taking the initiative in relation to health
problems ... making individuals responsible for their diseases
... conflicts with their most fundamental attitudes and moral
beliefs." Such beliefs about illness causation were, she argued,
embedded within a broader worldview.
She suggested that the more general worldview was primarily a
product of the 'hard earned lives' of the working class within
...an unequal, heirarchical, and largely immutable 'natural
order of things'...". Workers can respond to such a system in one
of two ways. They can construe themselves as passive victims;
prey to the whims of "The Bosses". Or they can, with dignity, see
themselves as cheerful, right-minded, robust individuals who put
a 'good face' on adversity. Within this latter construal, for
an individual to accept responsibility for illness would be to to
deny the powerful economic and political constraints upon them,
and would undermine their perception of themselves as able to
Win out' against the odds stacked against them. Thus denial of
culpability is a logical corollary of maintaining a role as
'victor ' rather than 'victim'.
The private accounts were far less frequent and scattered through
the interviews and other conversations, often emerging when other
topics were the ostensive focus for discussion. An example
which illustrates the very different flavour of this kind of
account was Mary Webb 's descriptions of her brother, Arthur's,
illnesses and subsequent death. Mary saw the sequence beginning
with Arthur catching jaundice in the Second World War,
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introducing a specific "weakness" in his liver - a condition
subsequently exacerbated by his drinking, a result of his
'sociable nature and its consequences. This led to cancer, but
according to Mary it was the surgical intervention for cancer,
not cancer itself, that killed him - by 'opening up' his body,
and thus allowing the disease to 'get a grip'. Thus in Mary's
private account could be discerned a complex network of reasons,
linkages and assumed causes and effects used to make sense of
Arthur's biography and ultimate death.
Cornwell described the reasoning of her respondents within
private accounts as not so much a matter of attempting to ascribe
'blame' but one of "What if ?". What if Arthur had not been
called up ? What if his nature had not been sociable ? Illness
was frequently construed as potentially 'avoidable"( i.e. not
inevitable) but its complex aetiology, arising - as it was seen
to do - from a web of interconnecting elements, meant that it
could not be 'blamed' on anybody. Arthur could not be blamed for
being called up into the Navy, nor for having a sociable nature.
Private accounts were thus not just more personal in content
than public accounts, they were also different in form,
incorporating elements which were linked together dynamically and
interactively.
Cornwell 's analysis suggests that the accounts for health and
illness may differ in form as well as content; underlying public
accounts of an explanatory nature or co-existing with them are
more private accounts with rather different characteristics.
However, it is not necessary to engage in intimate conversations
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to discover aspects of private accounting. For example, recent
work by Morgan and Spanish (1985) using highly public group
interview techniques, found that in response to requests for
'stories' and 'personal experience' respondents gave
individualised, concrete accounts whereas in later phases, in
response to requests for 'theories', respondents demonstrated
categorical, and later abstract, systems of knowledge.
Morgan and Spanish suggested that people formulate and use
'health belief schemata' to organise knowledge and thus inform
beliefs, a schema being based upon three levels of accounting
Abstact understanding, categorical analysis and episodic
knowledge. Young (op cit) has offered a similar framework, though
the terms he used were different - explanatory models,
'prototypes' and chain complexes, each representing knowledge in
a different form, with different characteristics. More recently
(1986b) Cornwell herself has argued that the public/private
is
dimension Aless important than recognising the variety of
alternative sources of knowledge upon which people base their
accounting in different settings and circumstances, and the need
to explore these more fully
"Social and personal experience are important sources of ideas
and theories about the causes of illness, but there are others.
There are 'cannon stocks' of information and ideas in different
social mileux; there are information and ideas specific to
particular families and informal social networks, and there are
'external' and 'official' sources of information about health
matters - medicine and media. The range of elements - symbols and
images, factual knowledge and heresay, folk wisdom and medical
certainties - in the common stock of different social mileux
remains to be fully documented."
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2.3.4 Studies of the emerging 'healthist' image in popular
culture 
In contrast to Cornwell 's East Enders' rejection of 'Health
Education' messages, Crawford (1980) studied the way that
'healthism' (particularly in the USA) has become a dominant
cultural image
"A new popular health consciousness pervades our culture. The
concern with personal health has become a national preoccupation.
Ever increasing personal effort, political attention, and
consumer dollars are being expended in the name of health. The
past few years have witnessed an exercise and running explosion,
the emergence of vocal and often aggressive anti-smoking ethic,
the proliferation of popular health magazines, and the appearance
with amazing frequency of health themes in newspapers, magazines
and advertisements for even the most remotely related products ...
On numerous social occasions, and in spite of much professed
rejection of concern or derisive amusement, personal health has
become a favourite topic of conversation" [p 365]
He has suggested that people in the West have become increasingly
health conscious because they are not just bombarded with advice
from their doctors about diet, exercise etc. but also by similar
messages from health educators, with popular magazines and
television shows jumping on the bandwaggon, and the emergence of
a whole new industry providing designer jogging suits and Jane
Fonda exercise tapes. The hash-brownies of the seventies have
been replaced by the wholemeal-added-fibre-low-fat brownies of
the eighties. Today, he argues, health is not just being
individualised (i.e. promoted as a personal responsibility) but
commodified.
Crawford subsequently (1984) conducted an interview study which
provided evidence that the laealthist' account was indeed
articulated by (mostly middle-class) North Americans. However,
his research also discovered a second, ccmpeting account which
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represented health is as a 'release' from pressure - that being
healthy is to do with a rejection of self-control, involving a
determination not to passively respond to 'kill-joy' invectives
to follow a 'healthy lifestyle'. Within this account, health
is to do with personal fulfillment, gained by enjoying 'the good
things in life'.
Arguing against theorists like Reiff (1966) and Lasch (1978), he
suggested that this 'release' account was not merely a
denial of the dominant cultural therm of 'responsibility' in the
form of individualistic hedonism or an anti-authority ethic, but
is a competing cultural theme itself, arising out of social
pressures within a consumer society to see oneself as entitled to
life's pleasures - the 'good life' that is marketed by the
tobacco, confectionary and alcohol producers, among others
"Consumption itself must be understood as a moral demand system,
with its own controls, internalizations, and modal personalities.
Our notions of self, fulfillment, and even health are
substantized through the 'gorgeous variety of satisfactions' that
the new system both offers and demands." [Crawford 1984, p 91]
He thus interpreted contemporary Americans as the objects and
subjects of two opposing mandates, one to adopt self-discipline
(both in the search for health, and as necessary as labour
producers) and the other to indulge in gratification (as
oonsumers). This is epitomised, he suggested, in paradoxical
messages (e.g to slim and to eat) which create their own
disorders (e.g. bulima); in the competing messages of tobacco as
a form of unwinding release from the tensions of life, and a
damage to health; the elixir of pleasure and pain offered by
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health clubs : 'We'll work you out and then pamper you' as
advertised by a Chicago health studio.
Crawford, like Herzlich and Williams, noted that although some
people tended to focus on one or other of the cultural mandates,
most people he interviewed referred to both. Within 'middle
America's' highly =modified culture, he argues that health has
taken on a variety of representations constructed by the mass
media which equally stress personal worth and fulfillment, but
offer contrasting routes by which it is to be gained. Within
such an analysis, people do not so much have access to a
single account of health as several accounts; their accounting
for health and illness is a process of shifting between these
alternatives.
2,3.5 Q Studies of accounts for health and illness 
In the 1960s Stephenson, the originator of Q methodology, carried
out a series of studies to investigate alternative 'images' of
health that were current in the culture of the North American
Midwest at the time (1962, 1963). The first of these explored
accounts that were primarily concerned with the organisation and
funding of the medical systems. Using a combination of intensive
open-ended interviews and Q methodology (which will be described
in full in the next Chapter) he identified three alternative
accounts.
The first was an account which was predominantly expressed by
poorer people. It construed existing medical care and treatment
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at the time as effective and benign, but the practice of medicine
as based too much upon profit, as too specialised and as
over-professionalised. It favoured a shift to an insuranced based
system for paying for medical treatment, which was seen as
able to maintain people's independence, choice and
self-sufficiency while avoiding the crippling costs of the
current fee-for-service system. The second account, expressed
more by the well-off (including many people who were themselves
medical professionals), was satisfied both with the current
practice of medicine, and with its ability to cure illness and
maintain health. This account endorsed the existing
fee-for-service means of payment, wary of any move to an
insurance based scheme which would detract from the independence
of medical practitioners. The third account ) expressed by a
liberal and wealthy Democrat, focussed on wellbeing rather than
mere health, and while broadly favourable towards current medical
care, saw health as just one among many important human values.
This account favoured a socialised system of funding, that would
determine provision of health care in response to need (e.g. in
old age) rather than ability to pay.
These accounts were identified by factor analysis of a Q sort
(based upon the writings of a contemporary opinion leader) and
elaborated by data from detailed interviews. For the second
study (Stephenson 1963) a new Q sample of 56 statements was
constructed containing a few of the items from the previous
sample, but mostly new ones derived from statements people had
made in the interviews. For example :
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10. Welfare takes away individual responsibility - you have
somebody else to look after you.
14. I think everybody should have medical care who really needs
it, and should pay for it in proportion to his(sic) income.
41. The statement of a goal in life is paramount for people
looking for direction for themselves - we all need a sense of
'living'.
56. The unknown should be left alone; much of what the scientists
are discovering can only lead to harm.
This study is of particular interest because the accounts were
gained from people who were physically challenged or chronically
ill, and their carers. The subject sample consisted of twenty
four chronically ill or 'disabled' persons, and eleven of the
people who cared for them. The disabled/ill people ranged from a
ninety four year old widow who, Stephenson described, was
"...suffering from nothing more than hurt pride and old age"
(p58) to a twenty three year old college sophomore,: paralysed'
from polio in both arms and legs, who manipulated pages of books
(and, when he came to do it, the Q sort) with a stick held in his
mouth. The group included six people with polio, two people
confined to wheelchairs following accidents, three people
suffering from coronary disease, a quadruple paraplegic, somebody
with congenital syphilis several with cancer and seven older
people (aged seventy to ninety four) who were experiencing
multiple physical symptoms of ageing.
All participants in the study were intensively interviewed first,
using pictures to get conversation going, then more specific
questioning about health and finally a focus on chronic illness.
After the interview the respondents carried out a Q sort using
the new sample that had been derived from the interview protocols
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of the respondents in the previous study.
Three factors were identified. The first (Factor I) Stephenson
labelled the independent viewpoint; the second, Factor II) the
interdependent and the third (Factor III), the dependent.
These can be briefly summarised as follows
Factor I : Independent
The main theme of this account was very strong approval of
medical professionals, seeing doctors and nurses as high-level
professionals who know their job, valuing personal qualities as
well as technical skill, and seeing existing medical treatment as
highly effective against both physical and mental illness and in
preventing illness and promoting healthy old age. The account was
highly antagonistic to any form of socialised medicine, denying
any need to offer free services to those who could not afford
them or to put more public money into medical aid. The
interviews with the people whose Q sorts loaded strongly onto
this factor all emphasised a strong commitment to independence;
focussing on the need to struggle to achieve, to manage on one's
own and pay one's own way, expressed with a certain harshness and
emphatic moral undertones that it is wrong to be dependent, and
sinful to be weak - and also morally wrong to disrespect rightful
authorities such as doctors, or find any fault with so dedicated
and selfless a profession as medicine. Most of the people who
expressed this account, despite their disabilities, were managing
to hold down jobs. Those that were not lived in families
sufficiently well off to care for them without need for welfare
or external support.
Factor II : Interdependent 
This account saw people as having the right to medical care as a
product of need, not ability to pay, and stressed the
humanitarian obligation of society to help the chronically ill;
also it endorsed broader social values (e.g. provision of foreign
aid). The interviews of those who expressed this account clearly
impressed Stephenson - he wrote of "... the liveliness of mind,
alertness, charm and wonderful adjustment" of all the individuals
whose Q sorts identified this factor and that "...they accept no
easy solutions, no hard-and-fast stereotypes ... they are
flexible and autonomous... they are realistic and essentially
libertarian ... they idealise no one, and yet can be grateful."
Some of these people commented that they had accepted financial
support (e.g. from the Polio Foundation) and it had saved them
from financial ruin. They saw society as needing to operate in a
way in which people could retain their dignity and self-esteem,
and yet be interdependent - giving and accepting help from each
other.
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Factor III : Dependent 
The main theme running through this account was that
those who are chronically sick or disabled need the support of
others, and medical care should be available to all who need it,
irrespective of ability to pay for it (and indeed, that this
should have priority, say, over foreign aid, which would be
better spent on federal medical programs for poor Americans).
Perhaps not surprisingly the people whose Q sorts identified this
factor were the poorest in the sample, usually lacking in
education and most of them living in the poorest slums in the
area. Their interviews described an overall picture of gross
deprivation - of chronic illness and disability meaning that they
could not work, of the welfare payments they received being
inadequate for well people, let alone to provide for the needs of
the sick, and of their disabilities being exacerbated by the
physical constraints of their poor living conditions, inadequate
diets, and inability to afford the medical treatment they needed
- and the psychological impact of 'existing' rather than living.
Stephenson noted that there were no obvious demographic
differences between those who expressed either the accounts linked
with Factor I or Factor II, and gave the impression that their
very different viewpoints and responses to their own disability
were products of person-constructs-realit
worldviews. Both sets of people were relatively well off and able
to cope with their disabilities, but had constructed different
images of themselves and of how society should operate. Factor I
account gave the impression of Herzlich's 'illness as
occupation', whereas the Factor II account suggested an image
of 'illness as release'. However, the people who expressed Factor
I were also those for whom personal independence was as a deeply
held value, whereas those who expressed Factor II placed more
value on equality. Rokeach (1968) has suggested that of all
his 'terminal values', 'freedom' and 'Equality' are the most
distinctively political. For example, participants in and
sympathisers with civil rights demonstrations are much more
Y aspects of their
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likely to stress "equality" as their most important value,
whereas those who are positively unsympathetic are more likely
to place "freedom" as most important.
With the Factor III account, the impression given was of an
account which was derived more from reality-constructs-person
forces. The people who expressed this account were so
structurally constrained by their material disadvantages,
socially low status and lack of power in addition to their
physical handicaps or chronic illnesses, that they seem to have
had little opportunity to construe their illness as either an
"occupation" or as a "release"; it was just another factor in
their overall state of dependency and powerlessness.
The results of this study suggest that different accounts are
likely to have different aetiologies. Rather than seeking any
general model which attempts to show how various forces operate
in the construction process, it should be recognised that what
might be important for one account may be unimportant for
another. For some social or structural or cultural forces may
dominate; for others personal values may be the major
determinant; for yet others, different factors entirely (e.g.
membership of particular social groups) may be the key to
understanding. The balance between person-constructs-reality and
reality-constructs-person is likely to differ, perhaps as much as
the accounts themselves differ from one another.
More recently Levin and Coreil (1986) have used Q analysis to
identify alternative accounts within what they termed 'new age
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healing' in the culture of North America. These accounts were not
derived via Q methodological study of people's operant
subjectivity, but from Q analysis of the authors' interpretations
of variables relating to aetiology, origins of founder,
orientation of teachings, source of healing, means of treatment
and styles of treatment, based upon written descriptions of 81
examples of 'Ilea age healing'. Five factors were identified, with
49 of the examples loading >0.6 on one or other. From further
interpretation of these data, they arrived at a typology of three
main alternative accounts. These are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Within the first account, the major emphasis was upon ways of
attaining somatic or psychosomatic health or wellbeing, usually
by new means, not by rediscovered ancient teachings. It is an
account which is secular, Western and not supernaturally
orientated, concerned with mental or physical self-betterment.
Examples were Biogenics, Eidetics and a variety of ideologies
upon which had been built theraputic communities such as the
'Cornucopia Living Love Center', Kerista Village and 'Wellness
Associates'. While the groups concerned varied widely in their
conceptualisations of health and healing, all shared a wholistic
approach in which body, mind and soul are seen as equally
important, and stressed the role of individual action and
The second account emphasised esoteric teachings as the route to
health, drawing upon same ancient corpus of 'truth'. The groups
adopting this account profess belief in supernatural healing and
sources of illness, and many define themselves as explicit
Religious, Eastern,
mostly ritualistic,
mostly super-
naturally oriented
THIRD ACCOUNT
Contemplative	 Soul
practice
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Figure 2.2	 Levin and Coreil's typology of new age healing
(From Levin and Coreil, 1986
Mode of healing	 Primary	 Common
emphasis	 characteristics
FIRST Accoumr
Mental or physical 	 Eody	 Secular, Western,
self-betterment	 not supernaturally
oriented
SECOND ACCOUNT
Esoteric teachings 	 Mind	 Mostly Western,
supernaturally
oriented, not
ritualistic
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churches or religious sects, including the Theosophical Society
in America, the Universal Church of Scientific Truth, and the
Ojai Foundation. These groups perceive the oneness of all humans
as critical, placing strong emphasis upon learning from
'teachings' and intellectual engagement as means of
enlightenment, and thus health, stressing the role of
'knowledge'.
The third account was characterised by those predominantly
Eastern imported ideas that encourage spiritual practice as the
basic means of attaining good health, particularly forms of
contemplation and meditation. Examples include Swami Rama's
Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science and Philosophy,
Chowado Henjo Kyo, the Inner Light Foundation and the Inter
Cosmic Spiritual Association. While the other two accounts often
included meditation or contemplation within their practices and
treatments, within this account such practices are central,
stressing the role of 'inner experiencing'.
These three accounts remind us that new and radical
ideologies (e.g. existentialist and humanistic accounts, as
described in Chapter 1) and the worldviews of other cultures,
particularly from the East, are having an increasing impact upon
popular accounting, observable in the emerging public and
'professional' acceptability of and more frequent resource to
'alternative' medicine (cf Aakster, 1986; Keulartz, Kwa and
Radder, 1985). In Britain 'alternative medicine' has gained
the added endorsement of the royalty, rendering homeopathy in
particular less 'cranky' in popular discourse than in, say, North
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America. The '110W age healing' accounts also suggest that in
contemporary Western culture as well as in the East, religion may
not only provide a background framework of values (as Williams
has argued for the Calvanistic tradition in Scotland) but in some
accounts be much more directly linked into explanations for
health and illness (e.g. as in Christian Science and Spiritualism
as well as religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism).
2.3.6 Overall themes in studies of account sympratricity
These studies portray accounting for illness as much more complex
than either the 'folk' or 'social determinants' approaches,
demonstrating that people seldom, if ever, express a single
account, but rather draw upon many. This is true in at least
three senses. First, as particularly illustrated by the work of
Herzlich and Williams, people frequently account for health in
different ways from those they adopt to account for illness, and
indeed, often there are further sub-divisions, including
alternative accounting for processes like recovery from illness
and ageing, and for capacities like 'resistance'. Second, as
evident from the work of Cornwell, Morgan and Spanish, and Young,
the kinds of 'knowledge' from which accounts are constructed
vary (see also Blumhagen,1980; Good, 1981 and Kleinman 1978). In
some cases it is abstract and semantic, in the form of an
explanatory model; in others more personal or episodic. Finally,
and most crucially for the concerns of this thesis, accounts are
sympatric, co-existing and competing both within cultural
discourse as alternative 'ways of making sense of the world' that
121
filter and construct individual understanding, and internalised
within individual thinking itself, as contradictory
representations available to be drawn upon at different times and
in different circumstances. This sympatricity was expressly
referred to by Herzlich, Crawford and Williams (and in earlier
Sections by Pill and Stott) and was indeed the basis for the
Q analyses carried out by Stephenson and by Levin and Coreil.
2.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter I have briefly reviewed the contemporary
literature which describes empirical studies of "lay" accounting
for health and illness in British and North American culture. A
number of themes emerge, but two are particularly strong and
consistent. The first of these is that although biomedicine
is the orthodox "professional" account in these cultures,
"lay" accounting is not the mere watered-down version of
biomedicine that many physicians assume (cf, for example, Stoekle
and Barsky, 1980). Whereas the scientific basis of biomedicine
expressly decouples its accounting for health and illness from
other epistemological realms, "lay" accounting for health and
illness is deeply and intimately bound within a broader framework
of accounting in which "folk wisdom:, the ideologies and values
of particular cultures and social groups, personal experiences,
religion and ethics all play a part.
Ordinary people do not "make sense" of such questions as	 lAby
me ?" and "Why now ?"
	 by reference to some specific,
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self-contained account for illness, but within a much broader set
of 'plausibility structures' (cf Berger and Luckmann 1966). They
interpret their own role, particularly in terms of links between
their actions and their state of health, not within same narrow
aetiological theory, but as a product of their construals
of the social, circumstantial and environmental forces upon them,
and as a reflection of the accounts they have constructed to
describe and make sense of who they are, and where they are 'in
the order of things'. Consequently, the perceived extent of an
individual's personal control over, and responsibility for
health and illness cannot be decided by reference to an
explanatory model restricted to health and illness alone.
It is this which provides the second major theme of studies of
'lay' accounting, the concern about perceived control and
culpability. The accounts divided between those which asserted
that health is very much a matter of individual striving and
personal control (notably the 'healthist' image described by
Crawford, and the 'new age healing' systems described by Levin
and Coreil) and those that denied personal responsibility,
notably the accounts described by Blaxter and Patterson, Pill and
Stott, Herzlich and Cornwell. These latter accounts did not
refute that certain actions ran the risk of causing or increasing
the likelihood of illness, or that certain 'ways of life' were
bad for health, but these were not seen as implying that
individuals have much control over whether they stay healthy or
becone ill.
These two themes provided the impetus for the empirical work
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conducted for this thesis. The first two studies, described in
Chapters 4 and 5, sought to find out more about accounting for
health and illness within a broader epistemological context - to
see how accounts may link to such other accounting domains as
politics and ideology, experiences of chronic illness and
'disability' and terminal values such as equality and individual
freedom. The third study, described in Chapter 6, sought to
identify and elucidate different accounts in terms of perceived
control, culpability and influence, and included opportunities to
explore perceptions of the role of God and supernatural power as
well as looking at more traditional concerns within the
external/internal dimension, including self, chance, powerful
others and social and environmental factors.
As has already been described in Chapter 1, Q methodology was
included as one of the techniques by which accounts were to be
identified and described, and account sympatricity examined. At
the time at which these studies were planned and carried out I
was unaware of either Stephenson 's or Levin and Coreil's studies
(neither had been published) and chose Q method independently, as
a promising route by which a wide variety of accounts could be
observed. The next Chapter provides a description of Q method and
its theory base, and explains why I chose it as a technique
capable of offering original and interesting data within this
area.
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CHAPTER 3 : Q 1493IITIODOLOGY AND ITS THEORY BASE
125
3.0 INTRoDucrioN
Excellent reviews of Q method and theory exist elsewhere
(notably Brown, 1980; Kitzinger 4 1984) and it is not intended to
replicate them unnecessarily. However, since Q theory and
methodology are central to the thesis, this Chapter is included
to place both its theorisation and empirical work in context. The
Chapter is divided into four main sections, the first
describing Q method, showing how it differs from other
psychological methods, and describing how Q theory fits into the
broader framework of interpretational social psychology; the
second tracing the history of Q method and Q theory; and the
third dealing with criticisms, distinguishing between those that
are inappropriate (because they have arisen from
misunderstandings of Q) and those that do need to be taken into
account and dealt with by researchers who adopt Q within their
methodological repertoire. Finally, in the light of these three,
the fourth section explains why Q method was chosen to study
accounts for health and illness from a social epistemological
perspective.
3.1 Q METBOD, Q DATA AND Q THEORY
3.1.1 Q method 
Q method is based upon the activity of Q-sorting, which consists
of providing people with a number (somewhere between 30-100) of
items which they are asked	 to	 evaluate. Posters
Waffler, - ,..1986), paintings (Sherlock, 1980),photographs
(Goldman, 1984; Lesser and Hughes, 1986; Savage, 1985) and
cartoons have all been used as items, but statements are more
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commonly used, and all the Q studies carried out in this thesis
used statements. An example set of items employed is provided in
Appendix 3. As can be seen, all of the statements are "matters of
opinion', not 'matters of fact', which the Q sorter evaluates
self-referently - e.g. from Most disagree with" to "most agree
with".
The sorter is provided with each of the statements on separate
cards or pieces of paper (a Q-pack, or Q-deck) and instructed to
first sort the statements into three piles : one for "disagrees";
one for 'agrees"; and a middle pile for "uncertains", and
statements about which the sorter feels ambivalent, or neutral.
Then the sorter refers to a response matrix provided, as shown in
Figure 3.1. In this case there would be 54 statements, and the
sorter's task would be to allocate the statements according to
the grid (See Appendix 3 for an example of instructions given to
sorters). Markers (i.e. cards marked with -5 to +5 and the number
of statements to be allocated) are usually provided to facilitate
sorting and act as reminders. Figures 3.2 - 3.6 illustrate a
Q-sort being carried out. The administration of Q sorts is
described more fully in Brown (op cit, pp 194-197).
3.1.2 Q data
When the statements have been sorted in this way, their numbers
are transferred to the response matrix (Figure 3.1). For analysis
they are converted to scores, with, for example, -5 in this grid
being coded as 1, -4 as 2, up to +5 as 11. These data are
subjected to a by-person factor analysis i.e. where the full data
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Figure 3.1 Example Response Matrix as used in a Q study
STRONGLY	 STRONGLY
DISAGREE
	 AGREE
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Figure 3.2 Participant cutting up Q items from sheets
supplied 
Figure 3.3 Participant starts by arranging markers, and
sorting the items into three piles 
-
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Figure 3.4 Participant starts sorting at extremes 
Figure 3.5 Participant completing the sort
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Figure 3.6
	
Participant writing responses onto response
Matrix 
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set from each sort is compared with the data sets from all other
sorts. The statistical manipulations are identical to
conventional orthogonal factor analysis, but the data is
correlated. person-by-person rather than the item-by-item
correlation of traditional factor analysis. Full details are
provided in Brown (op cit pp 208-224). This by-person factor
analysis thus identifies factors which indicate alternative,
statistically different and independent sorting configurations.
Brawn describes the process thus
"... factor analysis is a method for determining how persons have
classified themselves ... If two persons are like-minded on a
topic, their Q sorts will be similar and they will both end up on
the same factor." (Brown, op cit)
A number of methods of rotation can be used to obtain the most
useful or pertinent factor discrimination (Brown, op cit, pp
224-239 provides full details). In this thesis varimax rotation
was used. The factor analysis provides a factor loading for each
factor attributable to each Q sort. Factor interpretation is
carried out by identifying as exemplificatory Q sorts for each
factor those that load strongly onto just that one factor and
have non-substantive loadings on the others. In each study
criteria are selected (e.g. all loadings >0.60, where no other
loading is >0.35) to identify examplars. A procedure of
weighting and averaging the individual factor scores is then used
to integrate the individual exemplar Q sorts, providing an
idealised Q sort pattern that provides a lest approximation' of
that factor's response pattern. (This procedure is described in
Brown, op cit, pp 239-243). The account described by the factor
can then be interpreted by reference to the statement placements,
examining the configuration of statements in relation to each
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other (once more described by Brown, op cit, pp 247-258).
Q data thus differ specifically from the measurements usually
gained from, say, Likert scales. Q data, obtained by asking
people to consider items in relation to each other, and
interpreted via an analysis of their configurational properties,
incorporate evaluations of the contextual and relational
properties of statements as they "make sense", subjectively,
to the individuals who sort them. Q data therefore contain
two sources of information. The metrics attached to each item
(the factor scores) give clues about the evaluative dimension
(e.g. more or less "agreed with"). But in addition, the data
reflect configurations of item placements which give clues about
sorters" interpretation of the meaning and significance of items
in respect to each other. The by-person factor analysis
identifies alternative patterns of response, thus treating each
person's data set wholistically. As used in this thesis, Q data
provide the opportunity to identify alternative, independent,
response patterns which, when interpreted by referring back to the
item placements, enable the identification and description of
alternative accounts.
3.1.3 Q theory 
The theory base of Q methodology relates to the purposes for
which Q method and data are used - to gain insight into
alternative construals of an issue, topic or image. Q sorting
has been used in this thesis to gain access to alternative
accounts, both to identify what they are and distinguish between
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them, and to provide clearly articulated descriptions of them. It
is thus specifically antagonistic to hypothetico-deductive
theory, proposing that knowledge about another's subjectivity
must be gained via their expression of that subjectivity, made
operant within their Q sorting, and cannot be defined, tested or
classified
definitions,
topic there
and 1986t)
individuals'
according to a researcher's prior objective
prior hypotheses or prior assumptions. For any
is assumed to be a concourse (See Stephenson, 1986cL.
of salient propositions available both within
subjectivity and within cultural discourse e.g.
within 'attitude' or 'belief' systems and within interaction and
communication as expressed within everyday conversations, via
mass media etc.. This concourse is the universe from which the Q
statements for a Q sort are sampled; thus the statements are the
sample of the study, needing to be comprehensive and
representative of the concourse.
Propositions that make up accounts are assumed to be linked into
articulated discourses - they are not experienced or thought
about in isolation, but are formed into arguments, explanations
or theories by way of what is oftenreferred to as 'insight',
intuition and 'making sense of the world'. Crucially, people -
as individuals and as members of social and cultural groups -
are assumed to differ in the accounts they utilise and construct
within a dialectical framework. In this Q theory is neither
nomothetic nor idiographic; it neither assumes that all accounts
are essentially similar for all people, nor that each individual
adopts an unique set of accounts.
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Thus Q theory, as adopted within this thesis, has a lot of
similarities with Kelly's constructive alternativism, with
MOscovici's social representation theory, and with Berger and
Luckmann's social construction of reality formulation, in that it
stresses variability, constructivism and an interface between the
individual's role as a constructor of discourses, and their
role as a recipient of discourses constructed for them by
social and cultural forces. People are assumed to have access to
a variety of alternative accounts, which are sympatric both
within individual accounting (e.g. to serve different discursive
functions, as suggested by Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and within
collective discourse (e.g. to serve different social functions,
as posited by Mbscovici, 1961,- 1981,1984).
Q theory thus provides the rationale for Q method, and an
explanation of what it is intended to achieve. The end result of
a Q study is a set of descriptions of different accounts, where
the interpretational links between elements within each account
are derived from the different ways people actually linked
statements together in their sorting. It needs to be stressed
that these descriptions are not intended to be classifications
of people, but clarifications of the accounts themselves. Q
theory and its methodology, as used in this thesis, are means by
which the social epistemology of accounts within a dialectical
framework can be abducted from the operant subjectivity of the
people taking part in the study.
3.1.4 The difference between Q and R factor analysis 
A compelling illustration of the fundamental difference between
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Q and more conventional factor analytic approaches has been
provided by Brown (1972), in a study designed specifically to
make explicit the difference between : R (i.e. conventional)
and Q data; R (traditional) and Q factor analysis; and
between the study of objectivity and the study of subjectivity.
Brown used data about the human body to demonstrate three
approaches. First he carried out a standard R analysis of R
data. He took objective measurements of 25 parts of the by
from 20 persons. These were subjected to conventional (i.e. item
by item) factor analysis, and eight factors emerged, clustering
together, for instance (Factor 1) measurements of height, arms
and legs. This showed quite clearly what the usual R analysis
approach achieves. It compounds together in an homogenising way
all the data from a sample of people, and then dismembers it into
parts - identifying 'traits' which indicated here that the human
body is made up of limbs, of ears, the trunk and so on. The
outcome of the analysis is illustrated in Figure 3:7.
Brown next inverted the analysis of the R data. The same
measurements as before were put into an inverted matrix and
subjected to factor analysis by person. A single factor emerged,
which accounted for 99.42% of the variance, with all the persons
loading 0.99 or more onto it. This had the effect of treating the
data wholistically, indicating that the bodies of the twenty
people all conformed to the same overall plan. The outcome of
this analysis is illustrated in Figure 3.8, which was drawn from
normalised factor scores.
What these different factor analyses showed was that the
Factor 1
Factor 2
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Figure 3.7 Artists impressions of the factors identified by
R (traditional) factor analysis of R (body
measurements) data 
Factor 4
N.B. Factor 3 proved non-interpretable
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Figure 3.8 Artists impressions of the factor identified 
by Q (by-person) factor analysis of R (body measurements) 
data
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results of conventional and inverted analysis of the same
data are interpretationally quite distinct; conventional factor
analysis dismembers and dissects, (in this case the body into
separate body parts) whereas the by-person factor analysis brings
out the wholistic configuration - that while people may differ in
specifics, the human body basically conforms to a tight overall
plan. Brown (1980 ) makes this clear by suggesting that one
imagine never having seen a human body before in its totality,
only pictures of its parts (as in Figure 3.7). It would be
impossible to reconstruct an accurate body picture. Because of
course we do know what bodies look like, we could reconstitute
one from Figure 3.7. But it is our prior knowledqe.that
provides the capability to do so, not the data itself.
However the crucial difference between R and Q analysis becomes
much more explicit when Brown introduced the proper subject
matter of Q analysis - subjectivity. The same twenty people were
given a list of body parts corresponding closely to the
measurements taken, and each of them were asked to rank them from
'most significant to me: to "most insignificant to me: (i.e.
seeking measures of self-referential psychological significance).
These ranked data were factor analysed by person (i.e. Q factor
analysis), and four factors were identified. That is, within the
twenty people ranking the body parts for importance, four
different patterns of response were to be found, identifying four
alternative perceptions of 'what matters'. Factor 1, which was
described only by women, emphasised the importance of the eyes,
head, mouth, neck and chest. Factor 4, which was described
only by men who were tall and slim, emphasised the hand. The
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Figure 3.9 Artists impression of one of the factors
identified by Q (by-person) factor analysis of Q (subjective 
estimates of importance of body parts) data 
The artist was told which were the largest and smallest
factor scores, and then all the others estimates were
expressed as proportions of these. The illustration was
drawn from these proportions, the most and least important
parts drawn larger than those sorted in the middle of the
grid. Those sorted into the (least important' categories
are drawn shaded. Thus the largest, unshaded parts of the
body were those to which this Factor accorded most
importance, and the largest, shaded parts of the body were
those to which least importance had been accorded.
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Factor scores for Factor I were treated as before and an
illustration drawn, reconstructing an image of 'psychologically
significance' from the values, as shown in Figure 3.9.
The difference between this and Figure 3.8 is a striking
portrayal of the difference between studying objectivity and
subjectivity. The Q analysis of psychological significance
yielded an image of the body which looks very strange indeed, but
conveys a sense of subjective 'reality' which tells us a lot
about how these women see themselves in relation to their bodies.
It is a pity that Brown did not have the other Factors drawn up,
as this would undoubtedly have shown - in a way any analysis of
measurements never could - the huge divergence between the four
different images. Q analysis of Q data is wholistic, in that it
retains people's responses as overall, related patterns. But it
is not homogenising - where true alternatives exist, they are
made explicit.
3.1.5 Q as an abductive methodology 
Q methodology and theory are not, however, just different means
of handling data : "...methodologies are at issue, and not
merely a few statistical theorems" (Stephenson, 1953). Q theory
occupies a place within the emergent anti-positivism of much
contemporary social theory to be found, for instance, in
sociology (e.g. Giddens1977 ), political science (e.g. Miller,
1972) and social psychology (See, for example, Gauld and Shotter,
1977; Gergen, 1982; Harr; and Secord, 1972; Rosenwald 1 1986 and
Semin and Manstead, 1983). However, Q theory, developed by
Stephenson in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, evolved in parallel to
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and independently from the better-known interpretational
approaches based, for example, on hermeneutics and social
constructionism. Stephenson's formulations in the 1950s were very
much ahead of his time, as exemplified by these statements in
his Study of Behaviour (1953)
"The situation in psychology ... calls for an attitude of
curiosity as well as hypothetico-deductive logic. A somewhat
detached, but inquiring attitude is called for, in which one
seeks to learn more about the intrinsic empirical possibilities
rather than the purely logical or deductive, or carefully
reasoned ones. We should be making discoveries rather than
testing our reasoning." [p 151, emphasis in the original].
"An experiment, therefore, is much more than the fulfillment of
predictions, or of the empirical testing of previously asserted
propositions. It is an opportunity for making discoveries. They
may be incidental or accidental, trivial or important. Flemming
discovered penicillin rather accidentally, but the result was
profound. In psychological research there should be roam for
matters of this kind, as an intrinsic feature of the
methodology. "[p 329, emphasis' in the original]
Thus Q method was devised to utilise the potentialities of factor
analysis to investigate such things as accounts inn-a manner which
is genuinely exploratory. Brown (op cit) describes this well
Q samples provide the launch pad for an investigation, an
entr6 into a phenomenon, the scientists best initial guess as to
how a particular ... social consciousness, or whatever operates.
The data gathered with the Q sample may lead in quite different
directions, however, since theoretical rotation may produce a
factor structure about which the original statement design has
little to say. There is never a guarantee, in other words, that
splashdown will occur in the same area as the point of
departure." [p 39].
Q method is primarily, therefore concerned with what Peirce
(1934) termed 'abduction', described by Stephenson (1961) as "...
inference, like induction, but concerned with explanation,
whereas induction (is) descriptive." (See also the writings of
the philosopher Rozeboam, 1961, 1972). To abduct an hypothesis is
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to build it up from data - "The concern primarily is wjA:11
discovery ... The logic is that if certain facts occur, they will
have such-and-such explanation." (Stephenson, 1953). The task of
the Q researcher is to provide, via a Q sample, (derived from an
appropriate concourse) opportunities for others, in effect, to
create facts' - that is, to make operant by their Q-sorting
limited numbers of configurations of response from the enormously
large number of configurations possible. These data are the
basis upon which the researcher must abduce hypotheses; provide
descriptions that are consistent with the operantly expressed
configurations.
Q method, in common with other interpretational approaches, thus
differs from those methods based upon hypothetico-deductivism in
two fundamental ways . It is anti-positivistic in that it
stresses the importance of 'meaning' as constructed; and it is
abductive, seeking to discover rather than merely test
hypotheses.
3.1.6 Differences from ethnography 
Q is not, of course, the only anti-positivistic methodology used
by psychologists, ethnographic methods are similarly abductive.
However, there are two fundamental differences between Q and
ethnography. Herzlich's (1973) study of social representations
of health and illness, (described in the last Chapter, Section
2.3.1), provides a good illustration of the distinctions. For
instance, Herzlich described accounting for illness thus
"Subjects almost unanimously describe, often vehemently, how city
life produces a world of fatigue and nervous tension. Way of life
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and fatigue and disturbance of nervous equillibrium are, in the
last resort, synonymous for the individual. 'Paris is fatigue and
nervous tension, with this exhausting and rather unhealthy life.'
. r.rhe constant commotion isn't made to make people ordinary, they
are difficult, nervous, tired; that's the truth about modern
life."... 'Nbdern life induces a kind of fatigue which makes us
ill ... everything to do with modern work and its conditions
makes us more vulnerable to disease..." [pp 20-21]
It is her "almost unanimously" that indicates the first
difference between ethnographic analysis and that of Q method.
Potter and Litton (1985), and Potter and Wetherall (op cit) among
others criticise such reporting as glossing over the many, and
potentially highly salient, inconsistencies that arise in
interviews
"The broad categories often used in content analysis ... can
easily obscure theoretically interesting differences in the
discourse ... analysts working with open-ended discourse find it
relatively easy to construct one coherent story of events,
processes or beliefs out of the material at their disposal.
Versions that are in line with their preferred story can be
reified and others, which are in conflict with it, can be
ironized." (Potter and Wetherell, 1987 : 41-42) ['Ironization . is
the term they use to indicate the opposite of reification]).
This homogenising of accounts, stressing similarity, is a feature
of ethnographic studies which adopt a nomothetic approach. While
they provide rich and compelling descriptions of the way people
'in general: are interpreted as understanding and making sense
of a particular topic, they inevitably iron out discrepancies
and portray popular discourse as highly consensual. In
contrast, the purpose of a Q study is to seek for diversity.
Herzlich and indeed several of the other researchers described in
the previous Chapter (notably Pill and Stott, Crawford and
Williams) both derived alternative accounts and commented upon
people's facility to draw upon more than one "without cognitive
strain" (as Pill and Stott, 1985, put it). But whereas their
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extraction of alternative accounts was a post hoc analytic
response required to 'make sense' of data that could not be
moulded into a single account, Q method assumes alternativisn a
priori.
The contrast is that in an ethnographic study, the abduction of
alternative accounts is in part a product of the conversational
skills of the subjects. There will always be a tendency for those
participants who are most vocal and most articulate to dominate
the process of interpretation - for their accounts to stand out
and demand attention, gaining more credence than the less vocal
and articulate. In a Q study it is the factor rotation which
performs the process of abduction, and in this way the
alternative accounts abducted are a product of all the response
patterns of all the participants in the study.
The second difference between Q and ethnographic method is that
in ethnography the abduction of accounts depends upon the skill
of the researcher in inferring them from the densely interwoven
discourse of the subjects' interviews. Q researchers argue that
this, no less than hypothetico-deductive methodology, is a
process of studying the researchers', not the subjects'
hypotheses. Ethnographers are generally highly skilled
interpreters, and devote enormous effort to iffateTsing themselves
in their data in their quest for understanding. But ultimately it
is their thinking which forms the basis for whatever
classification they arrive at. In Q methodology it is the
response configurations provided by subjects' making operant
their subjectivity upon which account classification is built.
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Interpretational skills are still required in the task of
reconstituting an account from each arrangement of item
placements. And in many Q studies additional open-ended data is
used (as Stephenson, 1962, 1963 did with his study of 'public
health images') to augment the interpretation of the Q data. But
these are post hoc interpretational processes of refinement and
elucidation. The abduction of the accounts themselves is based
upon - and only upon - subjects' operancy, and performed by
factor rotation not by interpretation.
3.1.7 Idiographic uses of Q method
Q method as used in this thesis differs from idiographic methods
(e.g. the use of repertory grids to identify personal constructs)
in that it seeks to identify alternative accounts as shared
within collectivities; the Q Factors discriminate the different
accounts about a particular topic as they are expressed within
the Q sorts of those people participating in the study. However,
just as repertory grids can be used namothetically, Q method can
be used idiographically as a case study of an individual. Instead
of the Q sorts being administered to many people, and factoring
used to identify alternative accounts within collective
discourse, Q sorting is carried out by an individual a number of
times according to different conditions of instruction. In this
case the factoring identifies alternative conceptions within an
individual's discourse. Stephenson himself has carried out a
large number of such single case studies (see Stephenson 1974).
Other examples are Maudlin's (1985) exploration of the self
concept of a young woman he called Evyln, and Ricks' (1972)
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investigation of the person perception and self-concept of a
black janitor.
Typically the items used for sorting are derived from the
individual's own statements (e.g. from interviews), the aim being
to to explore the individual accounting, teasing out the
alternative construals to which that one person has access. Since
the work in this thesis has been sited within an explicitly
dialectical framework, single case Q method has not been used
here, though its potential for examining accounts in fine detail
and as constructed by individuals would undoubtedly have much to
offer in the area of health and illness.
3.2 TBE HISTCRY OF Q MEDICO ANI) THEORY
3.2.1 Origins 
As has been already noted, Q as an abductive methodology, and Q
as an interpretational theory were developed independently from
(and largely prior to) the development in mainstream psychology
of hermeneutic and social constructionist approaches. Stephenson
devised Q theory and method as means to use factor analysis
(upon which he was working at that time with Spearman) to study
subjective experience. From the 1930s and throughout the heyday
of reality-constructs-person behaviourism in the 40s, 50s and
60s, Stephenson swam against the tide, unfashionably denying that
psychology can be studied positivistically.
He proposed that what matters in human thought is psychological 
significance. In this he was (as he freely admitted)
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merely restating an already well established alternative
viewpoint to positivism, based upon ideas going at least as far
back as the work of Giambattista Vico (see Berlin,1969, 1976 and
Shotteri 1981) who in 1725 proposed a Scienza Nuova, a '1104
science' of history. Vico argued that we can know more about
our own and other people's experiences (in which we act as
participants and indeed as instigators) than about the physical
world, which we can only ever observe from the outside, and
moreover, that such self-knowledge can only be obtained per
causas, 'through causes'. We can only fully know scmething if,
and only if, we know why it is as it is, or how it came to be,
not merely that it is as it is. This idea Vico embodied
within a principle of verum ipsum factum, that we can only
guarantee the truth which we ourselves make.
Closer in time and.place to Stephenson, Bartlett was saying
similar things about about the psychological study of memory.
Refuting Ebbinghaus' (1885) attempts to study human memory by way
of recall of nonsense syllables, he argued that it is "...
impossible to rid stimuli of meaning so long as they remain
capable of arousing any human response", that attempting to do so
creates an artificial situation and thus prevents the study of
what is most human about memory and "... ignores dangerously
those equally important conditions of response which belong to
the subjective attitude." (Bartlett,1932). He also stressed the
interpretative and constructive processes involved in memory,
both at an individual and social level.
Stephenson's innovation cannot be claimed, therefore, to be one
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of expressing the importance of psychological salience, nor of
linking individual and group constructivity. What he did that was
innovatory was to suggest how this aspect could be empirically
studied using Q method. Its components were already well
established in the group within which Stephenson was
working. Burt (1915) had already tried out by-person factor
analysis, and ratings of, say, picture-postcards of paintings
were one of the techniques being used to explore aesthetic
preferences. What Stephenson did was bring these together,
suggesting they provided a means by which a researcher could
explore subjectivity in a systematic manner. He wrote in June,
l935, in Nature that inversion of the traditional forms of
factor analysis "...has interesting practical applications.., and
reaches into spheres of work hitherto untouched or not amenable
to factorisation. It is especially valuable in experimental
aesthetics and in educational psychology, no less than in pure
psychology." (This letter is provided in full in pp9-10 in Brown,
1980).
There followed a number of papers (e.g. Stephenson, 1935b, 1936,
1949, 1950a, 1950b, 1952) but it was not until 1953, in his book
"The Study of Behaviour : Q Technique and its Methodology that
he provided a comprehensive account of his theory and method.
Probably the best description of Q method in Stephenson's own
words is from a later book, The Play Theory of Mass
Communication (1967)
"Fundamentally it is a method by which an individual can model
for himself(sic) what his attitude of mind is about complicated
topics, issues or situations. Its primary concern therefore is
with a person's subjectivity as he describes it, not as we
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(as psychologists or onlookers) infer it. All measurements in Q
are central to the person - the scales, so to speak, are in the
person's own mind. The method begins with ... what one person
models about himself and compares this with models provided by
others." [p5] (emphases in the original).
This description says same quite simple things, which can be
easily overlooked, but it is these that distinguish Stephenson's
work from that of the many others who have sought to study
subjectivity. First, he makes it clear that the method is
primarily intended to enable a person to gain insight about and
express their own 'attitude of mind' - before all else the method
is a form of self-expression, like the kinds of humanistic
approaches which see their fundamental purpose as facilitating
the individual's ability to gain a better understanding of
themselves. But it differs from humanistic approaches in that it
also seeks to discover systematic similarities and differences
between alternative ways of making sense of the topic in
question.
Thus Q sorting was devised to perform two crucial functions, and
it is the combination of these that are its strength and
demonstrate what it is that Stephenson has offered as his
innovation. By making the expression of a 'way of seeing things'
an explicit task for the individual, Q method makes the subject
of the study the true 'subject" (in contrast to their usual
position as 'object", cf Riegel, 1978). Q sorting is a means by
which a person is helped to explicate their own understanding,
not just have it interpreted for them by a researcher. But by
doing so in a manner that allows one person's explication to be
compared with another 's, the factor analysis carried out on
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Q sorts enables the researcher to discover a range of
collectively shared understandings.
3.2.2 Early misconceptions 
It was unfortunate that the first report of Q method (1935)
referred to 'inverted' factor analysis, focussing on the
statistical manipulation involved. It led to considerable
misunderstanding which became entrenched in the minds of his
contemporaries including Cattell, Burt and Thompson, who argued
that conventional factor analysis and Q analysis were
merely variants of each other. Burt (1972), for example,
maintained that Stephenson 's Q analysis was no different from his
own use of by-person factor analysis in an earlier study to
investigate 'character-qualities' of children (Burt, 1915), set
up to discover whether children's emotional manifestations
co-varied in a similar fashion to their intellectual performance.
Teachers were asked to rate children in terms of the frequency
with which they were observed to show particular kinds of
'emotional behaviour:, and these ratings were factor analysed in
the usual way, yielding a single 'emotionality' factor, and a
subsidiary extroversion/introversion factor (N.B. this work, of
course, pre-dated Eysenck's by many years). Because a number of
different teachers were involved in the rating procedure, Burt
also carried out an inverted factor analysis on the ratings, to
check out whether there had been inconsistency between judges.
Burt describes what he did thus
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"Each child had a figure alloted to him for each of a dozen basic
emotions, indicating the frequency with which (according to a 
competent observer) he(sic) displayed each emotion during the
periods he was under observation - out of school as well as in.
This method, I fancy broadly corresponds with what Stephenson
calls a 'Q sort'. The chief difference is that, although in our
case the frequencies usually approximated to a normal
distribution, this distribution was not forced on the observers,
whereas Stephenson, to make the procedure more precise, insisted
that every observer should adhere to exactly the same normal or
near-normal distribution that was specified in the instructions."
(1972: 42) (my emphases)
This description of what Burt imagined a Q sort to be totally
missed the point that responses to Q sorts are always
self-referent, and concerned with subjectivity, and are always
procedures in which a person ranks estimates of various kinds,
they do not purport to measure them. Whereas in Burt's study the
data were counts of observed, operationally defined events (i.e.
were assumed to be independent of, and isolated from one another)
the data from a Q sort are always relational; the essence of the
data is that it is ordinal, each datum dependent upon the other
data, and meaningless in isolation. It was therefore quite
wrong to treat as equivalent Burt's 1915 inversion, Thompson's
(1935) speculations that there are interesting statistical
insights to be gained by inverting matrices, and Stephenson 's Q
factor analysis of Q data. The observation that all three apply a
statistical technique in a similar manner is as instructive about
Q method as the observation that computer programs, music and
visual images can all be encoded by a similar technique onto
magnetic tape. That the technique is similar tells us nothing
about the massive and fundamental differences between the
purposes of such encoding.
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3.2.3 The appropriation of Q as an essentialist methodology
In 1948 Stephenson moved to the University of Chicago, and
introduced Q method to the Counselling Centre Group working there
(led by Carl Rogers). Kohlberg, among others, was encouraged by
Stephenson to try Q method, and carried out a study of
alternative interpretations of Dostoevsky (Kohlber5 1963). Beck,
Mblish and Sinclair (1956) used it to explore something that had
been concerning clinicians for same time - the divergence of
clinical judgement between different social workers. Using a
Q sort devised by Stephenson, they were able to make explicit the
ways in which family case studies were interpreted and childhood
schizophrenia diagnosed in different ways by different individual
social workers.
However, not all of Stephenson's colleagues at Chicago were
content to retain the principles of Q theory along with Q
technique. Butler and Haigh (1954) devised a 100 item Q sort to
explore patient's self-esteem, by comparing the degree of
correlation between their Q sorts for myself-as-I-am and
myself-as-I-would-like-to be. This Q sort was subsequently
used in a large number of studies (e.g. Chase, 1957; Engel,
1959; Lepine and Chodorkoff, 1955; Reznikoff and Toomey, 1958 and
many others). Butler and Haigh stayed true to Stephenson's
principles of subjectivity and self-reference in that they
accepted as credible and important a person's self-definitions,
but they transgressed them in that they used the estimate of
agreement/disagreement between the two Q sorts as a measure of
self-esteem, and consequently of 'mental health', utilizing it,
for example, to assess the success of therapy.
153
Dymond (see for example Rogers and Dymond, 1954) went further.
She was disconcerted that the measure of 'mental health' was in
this way defined entirely within the person's own frame of
reference (e.g. a mentally unhealthy person could get a high
mental health score by having very low expectations of their
ideal self) and so she had two clinical psychologists, as
'experts', sort Butler and Haigh 's statements into categories of
'adjustment' and 'maladjustment'. These psychologists selected 37
for each category. Dymond (and indeed many subsequent
researchers) therefore used just these 74 statements, and
estimated each person's adjustment score by counting the number
of 'adjustment' statements sorted as 'characteristic of me' and
'maladjustment' statements sorted as 'uncharacteristic of me'.
Lepine and Chodorkoff had their judges define 'adequacy' and
'inadequacy'; Engel had them define positive and negative
attitudes. The Q sort was thus appropriated as - an objective
instrument to test people, and it is unfortunately this version
that has often been presented as the Q sort technique, with no
reference to Stephenson's work at all.
Fitzinger (op cit; who provides a far more comprehensive review
of such studies) notes that in all uses of this kind
... the Q sort is forced from its use as a measure of operant
subjectivity, into a typical essentialist test in which items are
assigned a priori meanings, in terms of which people are ranked
along a pre-defined continuum. The imposition of meanings on Q
sort correlations or items represents the appropriation of a
constructionist methodology and its assimilation into mainstream
psychology as an essentialist tool." [97]
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3.2.4 Q method as a means to study popular discourse 
After a year spent in advertising in New York, and short periods
spent working in Washington and Berkley, Stephenson moved in
1958 to the University of Missouri (where he still retains the
position of emeritus professor), shifting from a Department of
Psychology to a School of Journalism. This change marked a point
at which he became more interested in Q method in its relation to
mass communication, in particular in the spheres of market
research, social and public policy, journalism and political
science.
Apart from encouraging voluminous research in addition to a
steady flow of his own which continues up to the present day, in
his time at Missouri Stephenson produced his second major book
The Play Theory of Mass Communication (op cit), devoted
specifically to the application of Q method and theory to such
areas as the impact of mass media and processes of*comnunication.
It was in Missouri that Steven Brown became his student, and it
is Brown (now at Kent State) who has emerged as his most
energetic supporter and who has been responsible for introducing
Q theory and method into political science, where today it is
better known and more used than in psychology. It is also he who
has provided (1968; 1977) and continues to provide (in the Q
methodological journal he edits, 'Operant Subjectivity')
bibliographies of Q studies. Brown's book 'Political
Subjectivity : Applications of Q Methodology in Political
Science' (1980) remains the standard guide to its techniques
and applications.
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3.2.5 The current status of Q research 
Other than that of Stephenson himself, currently Q research in
North America tends to be carried out by people like market
researchers (e.g. Levy, 1985, 1986; Maudlin, 1985, 1986a, 1986b;
van Taubergen, 1986), communication theorists (e.g. Barchak,
1985; Brenner, 1985; Goldman, 1984. 1985, 1986; Parker, 1986),
educationalists ( e.g. Caldwell, 1985), policy theorists (e.g.
Asher, 1986), therapists (e.g. Rohrbaugh, 1986) and particularly
political scientists (e.g. Brown, 1984, 1985, 19867 D"Agostino,
1986; Koshansky, 1985; MODonnel, 1986; Peritore, 1986). Apart
from a few exceptions (e.g. D"Agostino's work and that of
Peritore) this research is predominantly pragmatically based,
particularly in areas like Market Research, therapy and
education.
In Britain Q methodology is currently the domain of a small
group, mostly psychologists, who have adopted it as a
deconstructionist social epistemological methodology, to explore
and open up taken-for-granted constructs such as lesbian
identities (Kitzinger, op cit and 1987, forthcoming; Kitzinger,
C. and Stainton Rogers R., 1985), human rights (Stainton Rogers
R., and Kitzinger C., 1986), moral development (Kitzinger C.,
1986), the social construction of insanity (Gleeson, 1986), the
womens" peace movement (Kitzinger, J., 1986), childbirth
practices (Kitzinger, J., 1987) energy policy (Stainton Rogers,
W., Stainton Rogers, R. and Lowe, 1986), addiction (Stainton
Rogers, R. and Stainton Rogers, W., 1986) and gender (Thomas,
forthcoming).
156
The cross-Atlantic distinction is thus more than just one between
psychology and other disciplines, and reflects an emerging
divergence between two academic discourses. The majority of North
American Q researchers are tending to utilise Q methodology as a
useful technique for identifying and describing alternative
images, viewpoints, responses to advertisements etc..
most
	 Q researchers in Britain and some in North America
(notably D'Agostino and Peritore) are at the time of writing this
thesis working within a social epistemological framework as
described in Chapter 1, focussing on the potential within Q
theory to develop an epistemological social psychology much more
within the European than the North American tradition, with roots
as much within the work of people like Berger (1972, 1977),
and Schultz (1962, 19671 Shultz and -Luckmann, 1973) as
in the work of Stephenson.
They view Q as a radical methodology, providing opportunities to
work within wider politico-economic contexts. For example,
Kitzinger's (1984) detailed study of lesbian identities was
conducted as part of a deconstruction of prior essentialist
theorisation about lesbianism. She argued that research in the
past has been used as a justification for portraying lesbianism
within a patriarchial analysis which excluded lesbianism from the
political arena by pathologising it or presenting it in terms of
personal choices' and 'private lifestyles'. D'Agostino is
similarly working within an explicitly Marxist framework, and
Peritore within that of the radical left.
By contrast,
157
Q method and theory are thus proving to a new generation of
researchers to have strong resonances with politico-economic
theories that conceive of social processes in terms of power
inequalities, in broad societal terms (e.g. Marxist analyses),
within gender politics and analyses of professional hegemonies.
As Marxism questions the 'givens' of structural functionalism,
feminist theory questions the imposed assumptions of patriarchy,
and the cultural critique of medicine, (cf Ehrenreich, 1978;
Zola, 1972) questions the medicalisation of health and illness, Q
theory questions the whole objectification of mental life, and
has therefore been adopted as a basis for radical critiques of
traditional psychological theorisation and praxis.
3.3 CRITICISMS OF QbENTECCELGY
Criticisms of Q methodology fall into six main categories: its
focus on subjectivity; statistical problems to do with the
non-independence of data; the constraints imposed by specifying
the distribution of responses; its restricted utility because of
the time-consumingness and intellectual demands of carrying out
the sorting procedure; the potential to introduce bias within the
Q sample; and potential bias arising from participant sampling. I
will deal with each of these in turn in this Section.
3.3.1 The critique of Q's focus on studying subjectivity 
I have already described (Section 3.2.3) the way that many of the
clinicians who adopted Butler and Haigh's (1954)
actual-self/ideal-self comparison version of the Q sort
appropriated Q method as an essentialist test. To make its use
more acceptable, its focus on subjectivity and its primary
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purpose to enable people to make operant myself-as-I-see-ne were
rejected in favour of turning it into a technique for measuring
their (the researchers') version of the-self-as-it-really-is.
Kitzinger provided a convincing illustration of the way Q sort
responses demonstrate that the search for such objectivity is one
that is doomed to fail because statements 'mean: only what the
reader perceives them as meaning, and indeed often mean
different things to different people. In her study of accounts of
lesbian identity, she included the following item in one of her Q
samples
37. Lesbians pose a threat to the nuclear family and society as
we know it.
The item was chosen to embody same of the sentiments of mental
health theorists who view lesbianism not so much as 'inherently
sinful' (as a patriarchial analysis suggests) as a threat to
social stability because it is "...disruptive of family life"
(Socarides 1965). Kitzinger noted that two of the accounts she
obtained from her Q study endorsed this statement : Factor A
allocated it +3 and Factor B +4. In objective terms, the
agreement between the two suggests that both support the 'threat
to social stability' interpretation. But consider the
differences between the two factors' placements for the following
items
Factor scores
A
24. I think sadness and regret are the
appropriate emotions of any parents who 	 +2	 -2
find they have a lesbian daughter.
47. If a lesbian genuinely wishes it,
facilities should be made available to
help her to change.
59. Lesbianism is a personal tragedy and
lesbians deserve sympathy and understanding.
7. Lesbianism is a blow against the
patriarchy (i.e. society structured
by men for men).
36. Lesbianism is fundamentally a political
statement, not a sexual preference.
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Factor scores
A
+4 -5
+4 -4
-2 +5
-3 +4
Clearly it is only the account identified by Factor A that
interpreted item 37 within a pathologising ethos, reading the
statement as a criticism of the 'danger' of lesbianism. The
account identified by Factor B adopted a radical interpretation
of lesbianism, seeing it as an explicitly political, and superior
choice to heterosexuality. Within this account endorsement of
item 37 was one of approval; that the capacity for lesbianism to
threaten the nuclear family is a 'good thing' - the nuclear
family is something that should be challenged.
Brown argues the case against spurious objectivity, explicitly
"... an individual's relationship to his(sic) words is wholly
different from everyone else's. When a subject responds to a
scale item, therefore, the meaning and significance his response
has for him may differ in major respects from the meaning assumed
by the observer or anyone else, and to ignore this possibility is
to be unwilling to accept what is before one's eyes, to be aspect
blind, and to prefer the artificial to the natural.
Language-in-use is by its nature symbolic and self-referential,
with each combination of words being capable of carrying a wide
range of meanings. For an investigator to regard his own
understanding as in some sense objective or correct is therefore
pretentious in the extreme." [p3].
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Q theorists therefore refute the criticism that Q method is 'not
objective' as inappropriate, because Q method is not intended to
be objective. However, radical Q theorists like Kitzinger (1984;
1987 forthcoming) go further, and along with other contemporary
social theorists (e.g. Cohen 1971; Hall, 1986; Riegel. 1978)
including several working in the area of health (e.g. Press,
1980; Taussig, 1986; Young, 1980, 1982) argue that the strivings
of social scientists to be 'really scientific' by being
'objective' have been motivated by more than mere pretension or
the seeking for upward intellectual mobility of an academic
nouveau riche. Kitzinger (citing Cohen) stresses the self-serving
nature of being a 'trader in definitions'. For a profession to
claim that there are truths, techniques and insights to which
only they have access, and solutions to problems that only they
can provide is a well established ruse by which professionals
justify their existence and build upon their power-base (cf
Illich, 1973). Psychologists have had every motivation to
convince the wider public that attitudes, beliefs, opinions and
personality differences are phenomena which only they have the
knowledge and competence to uncover.
Claiming to be able to objectively define psychological
'reality', from a radical perspective, is a route by which
psychologists have gained not just status, but power and
livelihood. The last fifty years, in Europe and North America,
has seen a proliferation of practitioner roles within such areas
as clinical and educational psychology (See, for example, Figure
3.10) and ever increasing pressures to create monopoly status for
initiates (as evidenced, for instance, by attempts within the
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Figure 3.10 Number of PhDs Granted in Health-Service-
Provider and Academic/Research Subfields in Psychology in
USA 1960-1984 
Note. Data for 1960-1982 PhDs are from Science and Engineering Doctorates:
7960-82 by the National Science Foundation. 1983, Washington. DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. Data for 1983 PhDs are from Summary Report
1983: Survey ot Earned Doctorates by the National Research Council. Office
of Scientific and Engineenng Personnel. 1983. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press. Data for 1984 PhDs are from Summary Report 1984: Survey
ot Earned Doctorates by the National Research Councal, Office of Scientific and
Engineering Personnel. 1986. Washington. DC: National Academy Press.
(From Howard et al, 1986 'The Changing Face of American
Psychology", American Psychologist, 41(12) 1311-1327, p1313)
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British Psychological Society for registration, see Stainton
Rogers, R. and Stainton Rogers, 14, 1984). Operational definitions
are therefore not just pretension dressed up as objective
reality, but are the tools of self-serving power ploys.
The desire to carefully regulate and control research conditions,
however, is not just pretention or power mongering. It has a
valid motive, which is paradoxically (in view of the points just
raised) to prevent the researcher from biassing their results.
Stripping away spurious objectivity does not solve this problem
but replaces one problem with another. The task facing
interpretational social psychologists, including Q
methodologists, is how to conduct research in ways that do not
pretend objectivity, but which nevertheless offer some kinds of
external checks. It is for this reason that Q method has been
adopted as a radical methodology. As it studies operant
subjectivity, it enables disciplined enquiry based not on the
researcher's implicit theories, but on the everyday
understandings expressed by ordinary people. But, as will be
apparent within the research presented in this thesis, it does
not make the problem of researcher-bias 40 away'. Rather it
places upon the researcher the duty to construct Q samples that
are truly representative of the concourse of ideas about the
topic under study, so that participants in the study are given
adequate opportunities to express their accounts, and to provide
checks against imposing their own understandings (e.g. to
negotiate account interpretations with participants).
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3.3.2 Inapplicability of statistical tests 
A number of people (e.g. Cronbach and Gleser, 1954; Sunderland
1962; Kerlinger, 1964, 1972; Lemon / 1973) have criticised Q
methodology because of the difficulties of applying traditional
statistical tests for significant difference to Q data. For
example Kerlinger (1972) has noted that it is impossible to
"...calculate the means of two different groups on subsets of Q
items".
Though it is true that the properties of Q data make them
unsuitable for some forms of statistical analysis, that is not a
'problem' with the data, but a quality of it. As Kitzinger's
illustration (Section 3.3.1) demonstrated so well, items in a Q
sort can be accorded no essentialist, objective 'meaning'. They
mean different things to different people in different contexts.
The observation that two people place a particular item in a
particular position in a Q sort does not mean that they are
doing so for the same reason, or are interpreting the statement
(or whatever) in the same way.
Thus criticism about the inapplicability of some of the standard
statistical procedures is ill-founded, based within a
misunderstanding of the nature of Q data. Q method makes just one
(and only one) claim for statistical analysis : that by-person
factor analysis of placement categories identifies statistically
independent, alternative response patterns that represent
statistically independent, alternative configurations of
operanqy. It does not assert that an individual datum within
factors can be subsequently compared across factors. This is
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illustrated by Kitzinger's example. Her respondents' placement
of Item 37 : "Lesbianism poses a threat to the nuclear family
and society as we know it" provided data of which only part was
the allocation of a similar position (+3 and +4) in two
factors. Also crucial (as the later consideration of other
placements of other statements made explicit) was the subjective
aspect of what, in different accounts, the statement was
construed as meaning.
It should now be clear why some statistical approaches to Q data
are innappropriate. It is not so much, as Kerlinger argues, that
they try to apply normative techniques to so-called ipsative
data, but that they ignore the subjective qualities of Q data,
and thereby attempt to impose manipulations which are
fundamentally out of place. This is not, as Kerlinger suggests, a
'serious loss' of information, nor is it, as Lemon argues, a
reason for lowering the acceptable level of statistical
significance assumed when certain statistical tests are applied.
Quite simply, they should not, and do not need to be used.
3.3.3 Specifying response distribution
Q studies usually specify, precisely, how many categories of
response a person should use and precisely how many items should
be placed in each category (as in Figure 3.1). This enables
factor extraction to be carried out with precision, but it also
inevitably constrains response. The difficulties of this
constraint are of three kinds: statistical, interpretational and
procedural. The statistical problem is more apparent than real,
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for the correlational analysis that provides the factors takes
account only of relative position, and is itself not tied to the
metrics accorded to placements. In practice, specification does
not distort the results appreciably from what they would be if
the subject were allowed free choice. Comparisons made between Q
sorts using grids like the one shown in Figure 3.1 and where
respondents are allowed complete freedom to specify their own
categories show no significant difference between the data
obtained (Jones 1956). What response specification does is make
the factors more reliable, because respondents typically assume
fewer categories if left a free choice. The more specific and
discriminatory the matrix, the more reliable the factors obtained
(Livson and Nichols 1956).
However the procedural and interpretational difficulties are
real. The whole issue of response specification and its impact
upon data is complex, and presents some interesting questions
About the nature of Q data. It is taken up in more detail in the
empirical chapters, particularly Chapter 6, in the context of a
study designed to explore (among other things) alternative ways
of collecting data.
3.3.4 The demands of Q sorting 
Many participants enjoy completing Q sorts (cf Burns, 1979;
Kerlinger, op cit; Lemon, op cit), but Livson and Nichols (op
cit) reported that in their study acceptance of the procedure was
7
'somewhat strained' and Gaito (1962) noted 'hostility towards the
experimenter' in his. Kitzinger (1984) reported that her
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participants varied in their response to Q sorting, with those
who saw it as a 'test" antagonistic, whereas those who regarded
it more as a "game" responding positively. She noted that in
order to gain willing co-operation, the Q researcher needs to
convince participants that the method is not an essentialist tool
for classifying people, and reported that most of her initially
antagonistic participants became much more favourable once shown
the results and offered opportunities to discuss and negotiate
the account interpretation.
It is the demandingness of Q sorting that is usually criticised,
because this restricts Q method to those people who are
sufficiently competent to carry out the procedure. It has been
argued that this limits the use of Q methodology to just those
people who are highly articulate, persistent and intelligent
(Blaxter, personal communication). Such criticisms, I believe,
underrate the competence of ordinary people. Stephenson (1962)
has obtained Q sorts from a wide diversity of people, including
the very poor and educationally disadvantaged, and the severely
physically challenged; he has also obtained one from a four year
old (Stephenson, 1980).
Obviously the ease with which people can perform a Q sort depends
a great deal upon the language used in statements. To enable a
wide variety of people to participate, items must be worded
clearly, expressed in everyday not technical language, short and
to the point (though there is some debate about this; very
long item have been used by some Q researchers, e.g. Peritore
1986). When items are carefully prepared, although the task is
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more demanding than completing other kinds of questionnaire or
responding to an interview, there should be no reason to limit
its use appreciably. The time demanded for Q-sorting (often an
hour or more) has also been a criticism, although this is
considerably shorter than many interviews.
However, for some people the main drawback was the task of Q
sorting itself. As Kitzinger says
Q imposes the problems of categorization on the Q
sorter,whereas in purely qualitative research the problems of 
categorisation remain the exclusive province of the researcher.
In using Q methodology participants are experiencing all the
dilemmas, confusions and decision-making traumas that researchers
usually relieve them of when they undertake content analysis or
other research techniques in which the burden of categorisation
is not shared by the people researched." [pp 133-4]
For some people Q sorting is very frustrating; certainly for most
people it is effortful, demanding complex judgements comparing a
large number of statements with each other. A Q sort is meant
to be effortful because of what it is seeking to discover. It is
the 'effortlessness' (i.e. 'mindlessness') of conventional
questionnaires that make them poor instruments for studying
accounting. With Likert type scales responses are isolated from
one another, and co-variance reconstructed via statistical
manipulation. With interviews, it is the researcher's
,interpretational and analytic skills that tease out the main
themes', 'metaphors' and 'schemata'. Q sorting enables people
to articulate relatedness explicitly and intentionally. It is
this which makes Q data able to convey rich information about the
participant's subjectivity. The researcher no longer has to work
just from statistical criteria, or on hunches about what seems
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to link the various ideas expressed in an interview, but has
direct access to information provided by the participant about
item relatedness. But inevitably, by transferring the
responsibility to make decisions about integration and
relatedness to the participant, (i.e. making them their
ethnographers) the task of Q sorting is made demanding and time
consuming.
3.3.5 The problem of bias within item samples 
Q method is vulnerable to the argument that factors (and thereby
accounts) are no more than products of the Q sample. The
argument is that if the Q sample is restricted or biassed, then
the accounts may reflect more the limits of the concourse sampled
by the researcher than the participants' constructions. The
researcher, as any other person, draws upon socially and
culturally constructed ways of 'making sense of the world' and
may, by emphasising that perception within the Q sample, deny
participants their full voice. In part this concern is allayed
by the data obtained in Q studies, which seldom fail to discover
several alternative accounts (even in studies conducted by
relatively inexperienced researchers like undergraduates),
including ones antagonistic to the researcher's own (which can be
empirically tested by the inclusion of the researcher's Q sort in
the analysis). Most also elicit accounts which are unexpected
(see, for example, Brown, 1980 who provides a large number of
examples). However, this drawback is sufficiently problematic to
demand a careful process of sample selection, using a variety of
sources (e.g. interviews, mass media and literature about the
topic in question), careful pilot testing, and account
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negotiation.
There are two methods of constructing Q samples, unstructured and
structured (Brown, 1980 pp 186-194 provides full details).
Unstructured samples are selected atheoretically, on the basis of
providing as representative and comprehensive a selection as
possible from the concourse overall. They are used when the study
is intended to be primarily abductive - i.e. exploratory.
Structured samples are based upon pre-existing theories or
conceptual frameworks. Although there has been debate within the
literature about the most valid means of ensuring consistent
sample structure (see for example Neff and Cohen, 1967), •Q
methodologists refute that such objective consistency can be
ensured. As Brown asserts : " the 'operational definition' of a
person's attitude is not in the items, but in terms of what
he(sic) does with them" (Brown, 1980). However, sample
structuring can be used as a guide, to facilitate
comprehensiveness and to enable theory testing. Both unstructured
and structured samples have been used in this thesis, and their
derivations are described in more detail in the relevant
Chapters.
3.3.6 The problem of bias within participant selection 
The non-randomness and small size of participant samples used in
many Q studies have often been criticised (see, for example,
Kerlinger, 1973 and Wittenborn, 1961). However, since Q method
samples items not people, the principles of comprehensiveness and
representativeness have to be applied to the items that make up
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the Q-pack, not the people that participate in the study.
However, this does not overcome the fact that the only accounts
that can be identified are those expressed by the people who
perform the Q sorting. There is a continuing controversy among Q
researchers about the scale of this problem, and how it should be
tackled. Stephenson has repeatedly argued that for any topic
there exist only a small number (two, three or four, but seldom
more) of alternative accounts, and that participant samples of
thirty or so are adequate to ensure that all are expressed, any
more people than this adding no additional information (i.e.
simply lining up among the factors already identified). Those of
us working in Britain assume that there are usually more accounts
to be found than this, if participants are selected for diversity
of viewpoints.
However, there is agreement between all Q researchers that just
as item sampling should be carried out along the principles more
generally applied to subject sampling, participant sampling
usually needs to be theoretically guided, though abductively
rather than hypothetico-deductively. In other words, Q
participant sampling is seldom random, but deliberately based on
hunches and expectations about the presumed interests,
viewpoints or stances of the participants, hunches used not
to predict what account any individual will proffer, but simply
to increase the probability of discovering a variety of accounts.
For example, Stephenson ( 1987) in a study of responses to the
Nixon-Kennedy television debates of the 1960s took political
allegiance, expertise in political science and gender into
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account; Kitzinger (1984) ensured that in her study of
accounts for lesbianism her participant sample included feminists
and non-feminists, women and men; and Stainton Rogers, R and
Kitzinger (op cit) in their study of accounts of 'human rights'
used a number of methods. They included MPs who had stated
'rights issues' within their listed interests, and
representatives of various religious and rights groups (e.g.
Amnesty International). Many Q researchers also use
'snowballing': asking participants to suggest relatives, friends
and other contacts known to them who they think may have
particularly interesting or 'different' views on the topic. In
this way, the Q methodologist, like a biologist searching .a
habitat for different sympatric species, seeks out the accounts
that comprise the discourse of a particular group (as Kitzinger's
study of lesbians) or a broader collectivity (in which case, the
sample must include a proportion of 'ordinary people', to make
sure that popular discourse is sampled). Like the .biologist, she
or he can never be certain to have found everything that there
is to be found (as with the classic 'black swans' of the
philosopher) but only to be building a taxonomy. For ultimately,
the abductive approach of Q methodology is taxonomic.
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CHAPTER 4 : STUDY 1
AN INITIAL Q INVESTIGATION OF ACCOUNTING FOR HEALTH AND ILLNESS
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4.00 1WRODUCIT3N
In Chapter 2 it was concluded that what distinguishes popular
accounts for health and illness (including the everyday
accounting of professionals) from the biomedical model of disease
aetiology, is that they are articulated within the context of
much broader discourses (such as religious belief or folk
wisdom). Furthermore, they are seldom psychologically neutual,
but often, say, reflect an individual's self-definition (e.g. as
'Winner against the odds' rather than 'victim"). The aim of the
first two studies conducted for this thesis was to begin to
develop a taxonomy of these kinds of broadly based accounts. Such
an objective is exploratory rather than theory-testing, and
consequently unstructured Q samples were appropriate.
While it was argued in Chapter 3 that it is impossible to ever
fully define a concourse, the clarity and range of accounts that
can be identified using Q methodology are products of the extent
to which the concourse has been comprehensively defined and
representatively sampled. This Chapter describes Study 1, an
initial investigation, conducted both as a Q study in its own
right, offering a 'first estimate' of the account taxonomy; and
as the basis from which to construct a more participant-led
Q sample for the subsequent, more detailed Q study (Study 2,
described in Chapter 5).
Study I consisted of two phases. The first was the construction
of the Q sample. The main basis for this was a series of
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with fifteen people,
selected for their diverse access to alternative contextual
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discourses. Items were also derived from a research notebook. The
second stage was the Q study itself, using a 54-item Q pack
sorted by thirty participants. The results of the Q analysis,
together with open-ended responses and suggestions made by
participants were utilised to refine the Q sample for use in
Study 2.
4.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE Q SAMPLE
In principle Q samples should be constructed by sampling the
concourse of items pertinent to the research topic in question.
However, while a concourse is a theoretically useful concept, it
is not definable in practice. As Chapter 3 made clear, Q theory
assumes a researcher cannot use any objective criteria to
specify such a conceptual universe. Thus, in practical terms,
constructing a Q sample consists of gaining a 'best estimate' of
the concourse from as many diverse sources as possible,
recognising that this is inevitably an intuitive process (based
upon the researcher's store of 'pretheoretic knowledge', as
Rosenwald, 1986, would call it), and then subsequently selecting
a Q sample, again intuitively, from this 'concourse-estimate'.
The interviews and data gathering within this phase of the study
were thus regarded as means by which these impressions could be
better informed - not as a means of empirically validating or
defining the concourse.
4.1.1. Interview sample
Thus the motivations for carrying out an interview survey were
both general - a means of gaining entry into a new field of
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investigation, providing exposure to a diverse range of different
viewpoints and ideas in order to develop a better understanding
of the concourse; and specific - to provide a
concourse-estimate' of statements from which the Q sample for
Study 1 could be selected. Consequently, interviewees were not
selected according to principles of representativeness, but
rather to include people who were likely to draw upon diverse
worldviews, as different from each other (and my own) as
possible. Fifteen people were selected for the interview sample
on the criteria of including : "laypepple" and professionals; a
range of interests in health and/or illness; and different ages,
social classes, cultural backgrounds, political views, religions
and demographic characteristics (urban/rural; north/south). There
were six wamen and seven men; their ages ranged from sixteen to
seventy two.
Two interviewees described themselves as 'health theorists', a
sociologist researching into health beliefs [1]*, provided
information both about her own views and about her understanding
of the views of the people she had been studying; and the
director of an organisation concerned with health promotion [15],
chosen to tap views about the links between lifestyle and
illness. Two interviewees were "wanking class', a pensioner [11]
who had been a housewife all her adult life, widowed and living
on her own in an 'inner city' area, and a farmarker [13], an
active trades unionist, living in a rural setting.
* These numbers are for reference when describing the derivation
of the Q samples for Studies 1 and 2.
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A computer technician was chosen as a representative of the
right' and because he lived in the north of England. A fitness
teacher [7] who ran 'Keep Fit' classes at the local Sports
Centre, was selected for her particular interest in
'health-as-beauty' and as someone who was upwardly socially
mobile - she was from a very poor, working class family but spoke
of her desire to 'better herself'. The Grocer [10] was
the proprietor of an 'upmarket' food shop, chosen as a
'traditional conservative' and as a 'foodie'. The school student
[14], also from the north, was included as a younger person and
somebody holding .'left-wing' views.
A range of different health professionals were also included
in the interview sample, including a retired pharmacy technician
who had worked in large hospitals throughout her working life
[2], a Health Visitor [3], a medical student (a member of an
ethnic minority, from a Muslim background) [5], an
occupational physician [6], two GPs, one fairly traditional [8],
the other a trained homeopathist [9] and a dentist [12]. As well
as sampling different professional interests, these people also
reflected different class, political, religious and cultural
backgrounds.
4.1.2 Interviews 
Details of the interview schedule, and an interview summary are
provided in Appendix 1. The interviews were semi-structured, in
that I set an agenda of issues and topics to be covered and
specific questions to be asked, but were largely open-ended.
Given the diversity of the interviewee sample, different people
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naturally focussed on different aspects of 'health and illness'.
For example, the occupational physician worked for a large food
manufacturer, and had a lot to say about the relationship between
'big business', government policy, diet and health. At the time
of interview he had just returned from a visit to the USA, and
provided a great deal of information (and expressed firm views)
about the comparison between attitudes to health here and in
North America.
Each interview lasted between one and three hours, the average
being about two hours. I transcribed the interviews
selectively, focussing on choosing statements to build up the
concourse-estimate'. In several cases I telephoned the
interviewees to clarify particular points. In two cases
(participants 6 and 8) I conducted a second interview, to enlarge
on topics raised. From the interviews I generated 327 statements,
as close as possible to the words actually used, as a basis for
the 'concourse-estimate'.
4.1.3 Other sources
During the period of four months during which the interviews were
taking place, I kept a research notebook. Into this I recorded
statements about health and illness from a variety of sources
from my reading of the academic literature, discussions (e.g.
at academic conferences) with other colleagues working in this
area, conversations in informal social settings (e.g at the
hairdresser and waiting in queues at the post office), media
sources including television, radio, newspapers and magazines,
and by reading or re-reading novels (e.g. Butler's 'Erewhon',
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1872,and Axel Munthe's 'The Story of San Michele', 1929) and
'popular' texts with a medical or health theme, including old
books (e.g. 'The Practical Doctor' by a Harley Street Specialist,
undated). As with the interviews, the intention was both to
generally 'immerse' myself into as many different pertinent
discourses as possible, and specifically to look for items with
which to build up a 'concourse-estimate'. I took the notebook
with me wherever I went, and actively sought to read as many
different magazines, newspapers and books; to watch as much
television and listen to as much radio; and to enter into as many
informal conversations about 'health and illness' as I could.
From this notebook, 179 statements were selected to add to the
pool.
Unfortunately, I did not obtain a copy of Stephenson's (1962,
1963) unpublished Q studies of 'images of public health' until
some years later, and was therefore unaware of the Q samples he
had used, which would have been valuable in setting up my own.
4.1.4 Derivation of the Q sample 
At the end of this phase of data collection I had gathered over
650 statements about health and illness. Of these about 150 were
concerned with social policy issues and/or matters of funding.
These were excluded, focussing the study on accounts for health
and illness, albeit linked to other contexts like politics and
morality. I thus arrived at 506 statements, derived from the
interviews and other sources, which formed my first 'best guess'
at the concourse. These were reduced in number by procedures
similar to those used in public opinion research (e.g. by
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eliminating highly complex, double-barreled, duplicating and
floridly idiosyncratic material), and by seeking to select as
representative a coverage of what appeared to me to be the
different ideas and views being expressed. Full details about the
derivation of the 54 items selected for the Q sample are provided
in Appendix 2.
4.2 STUDY 1 : METHOD
4.2.1 Materials 
The full materials provided to participants are included in
Appendix 3. The fifty four statements which comprised the Q
••••
sample were typed out 16 to a page, . for participants to cut up
to make a Q-pack. Written instructions, a response grid, and a
participant's details form were provided, also a comments booklet
containing the statements with spaces beside each one. As can be
seen from the instructions, participants were asked to make
comments about the statements (i.e. about their wording and
comprehensibility, any problems, and any more detailed reactions
to them) and to make suggestions for additional statements.
4.2.2 Participants 
Thirty people participated in this pilot study, the main
selection criteria being to find as diverse a group as possible
while ensuring that a proportion were 'ordinary people'. The
participant sample included twenty one women, eight men and one
anonymous person; their ages ranged from thirteen to sixty four;
eight were or had been health professionals, other occupations
included a lawyer, researchers, teachers a cook and a factory
worker; included were people known to express a range of
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political views/ideologies, and to have had a variety of
experiences of illness and 'disability'. In this initial study,
all participants were either known to me, or were contacts of
friends or other Q sorters. In this way, all participants were
either familiar with Q sorting, or could be given oral
instructions and demonstrations if necessary. Participants were
all unpaid volunteers.
4.2.3 Procedure
Each participant was handed the materials, and instructed (as
needed) about how to carry out a Q sort. They were asked to read
-
through all the statements first, next cut up the statements and
sort them into three piles ("agrees', "disagrees" and
"uncertains") and then sort them into eleven categories, from -5
to +5 along a disagree strongly/agree strongly dimension,
allocating items according to the matrix shown in Appendix 3.
Having completed the Q sort, participants commented on the
statements in the booklet provided. Although generally briefed
when the materials were handed over, the majority of
participants took them home and completed them and the ccuuents
forms in private. Response grids, participant's forms and
cournents forms were returned by post, or via my contacts.
4.3 RESULTS
The Q sort data were coded (i.e. -5=1, -4=2, etc up to +5=11),
entered into the computer, and subjected (via SPSS) to factor
analysis by person, factors extracted by varimax rotation.
The factor loadings obtained (listed in Appendix 4) were used to
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identify exemplars for each factor, using criteria of a loading
>0.6 on the relevant factor, with no loading >0.35 on any other
factor. The usual convention among Q methodologists was
followed of only examining those factors with eigenvalues greater
than unity and at least one exemplificatory loading. The
exemplars, and details of the people providing the Q sorts which
produced them, are summarised in Table 4.1. Using Creaser's
(1935) procedure (Brown, pp240-243 provides full technical
details) factor scores for each item were calculated, using a
process of weighting and averaging of the exemplar's scores, to
generate 'idealised: Q sorts which best represent the response
configuration for each factor. These are listed in Table 4.2..
As can be seen, five interpretable factors were derived from the
analysis. By reference to the factor scores for each factor, they
can each now be interpreted.
4.3.1 : Factor 1 
The	 account identified by this factor stressed the
influence of structural factors upon 	 health and illness,
implicating poverty, inequality, disadvantage and environment
(e.g. pollution) as the main reasons for illness and poor health.
Health was seen as a product of wealth and privilege (Item 30 =
+5)l and tranquillisers seen to be prescribed to help people put
up with intolerable conditions (Item 52 = +4). Individuals
were regarded as having little choice about their lifestyles
(Item 35 = -5), and the idea that working class people are to
blame for their illness rejected (Item 12 = 5). Pollution was
seen as a pervasive threat to health (Item 51 = +5). This account
1: The list of items provided in Appendix 2 is convenient for
checking them against these reports. Note that some items are
expressed in the negative, and hence, where the factor score
is also negative, careful interpretation is necessary.
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Table 4.1 Summary of exemplificatory Q sorts, Study 1 
Factor Loading No.
Participants providing Q sort
Description*
1 .85 5 Student, lesbian feminist
.68 12 Nurse, feminist
.74 17 Graduate student
.87 23 Researcher, lesbian feminist
.74 26 Teacher, lesbian feminist
2 .72 20 University lecturer, psychologist
.78 30 Nurse
3 .68 27 General Practitioner
4 .72 22 Factory worker
5 .76 14 Graduate student
* These are the descriptions participants gave of themselves
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Table 4.2 Factor scores obtained in Study 1 
Item
number: 1
Factors
2	 3 4 5
1 0 +1 +5 -5 -2
2 +2 -3 +1 -2 -3
3 -1 -5 -3 -3 -1
4 -2 +1 -3 0 0
5 +1 -3 +3 +3 +3
6 +1 -3 -3 +5 -1
7 -2 -1 +4 -3 +3
8 -2 -4 +1 -1 -1
9 +3 +3 •	 0 +1 +1
10 -1 -3 -5 -5 0
11 -5 -3 +3 -1 +1
12 -5 -4 -2 -4 -4
13 -1 -1 +4 0
14 -4 -5 -1 -1 -2
15 +2 0 -4 0 -2
16 -4 -4 +2 -2 -1
17 0 -1 0 +1 -2
18 -2 -2 +1 -4 +2
19 +3 +1 0 +4 0
20 -3 0 -2 +1 +2
21 -3 -2 0 -4 +2
22 -2 -4 -1 -2 -3
23 -3 0 -4 -5 -3
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-3 -1 0 -1 +4
25 +4 +2 +5 +2 +1
26 +3 +2 -1 -2 0
27 +3 +4 0 +3 -2
28 -1 0 +4 -3 +1
29 +5 +1 -5 +3 -3
30 +5 +2 0 -4 -5
31 +2 +4 +5 +3 -2
32 -1 +3 -3 +5 -4
33 +1 +3 0 +3 +5
34 +2 +3 +2 +5 0
35 -5 +1 -4 +2 -4
36 -4 -2 -5 0 +3
37 -1 -5 -4 0 -3
38 +1 -2 +3 +1 +2
39 -3 0 -2 -2 +3
40 +1 -2 -2 0 +2
41 -4 +1 -1 -3 +4
42 0 +5 +3 0 +4
43 +4 +4 +2 +1 -5
44 +3 +5 +2 +4 +5
45 +4 -2 -3 -1 -5
46 0 +4 +1 +4 +5
47 0 -1 +2 +2 0
48 0 0 0 +1 -4
49 +3 0 -3 +4 +3
50 0 +5 0 0 -1
51 +5 +3 -1 +2 0
52 +4 +2 +1 +2 0
53 +1 +2 +4 -3 +1
54 +2 +1 0 -2 -1
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was, however, more than just a recognition of structural
influences, demonstrated by the strong endorsement of Item 29,
which asserts that treating people as mentally ill is a form of
social control (= +5). It couched issues relating to health and
illness within a radical, 'dominance' model of society, of the
kind described by Doyal (1981) and Ehrenreich (1978), in which
the poorer health of the disadvantaged is viewed not just as a
product of inequality but of oppression.
Consistent with such an analysis, the account was also strongly
antagonistic to orthodox medicine. Doctors were seen to have
little sympathy with their patients (Item 45 = +4), modern
medical "triumphs' were not seen as major achievements (Item 11
= -5) and modern drugs not seen as effective (Item 36 = -4).
Rather, health care was taken to be a social responsibility
(Item 25 = +4), and there was rejection of the exclusivity and
protectionism of orthodox medicine (Item 16 = -4; Item 14 =
-4) including compulsory medical checks (Item 41 = -4).
The written caments made by three of the five women whose Q
sorts exemplified this factor (all of whom identified
themselves as lesbian feminists) demonstrated that the Q sample
did not offer them enough opportunities to express a
sufficiently radical viewpoint. For example, in response to Item
23, Participant 26 suggested
"An item is included on exploiting animals for medical research
but no items on exploitation of the 3rd world countries for drug
dumping."
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However, the most critical statements of these three women were
reserved for the inadequacy of the Q sample for expressing their
radical feminist perspective. For example, the following
suggestions were made
"My prevailing view at the moment, which I don't feel comes
across in the Q sort, is that there are more important (and, for
those in power, more threatening) ways in which I can direct my
energies than the struggle to maintain my own individual body
against the onslaughts of the man-made world and the natural
order - especially as this is a battle I'm doomed to loose.
Ruling men create a stressful, polluted, noxious environment for
me and then try to sell me the notion (along with the equipment)
that I can counteract it if I do press-ups and eat brown rice.
And if I'm unhealthy it's therefore y fault ! In this context
I feel that concern with my individual, personal health is a
dangerous indulgence. Also utterly futile as long as I must
breathe their air, drink their water, eat their food and walk in
their streets ... Also I didn't feel this sort expressed my views
on medicine as interventionist and intrusive - causing iatrogenic
disease etc. Stuff on childbirth has lots of this (epesiotomy,
forceps deliveries, induced labour, etc.). (Participant 23).
"Social responsibility' yes but it mustn't rest solely on
womens' shoulders as it has tended to do so far." (in response
to Item 25)
"Male medicine often refuses to take women's illness etc.
seriously e.g. menstruation pain is merely the grief at the loss
of an unborn child, menopause is merely psychosomatic etc." (in
response to Item 37)
(Participant 5)
In contrast, one of the other women providing an exemplificatory
Q sort for this factor pointed out the lack of coverage of class
issues
"To me the crux is a question of the class struggle ... the
exploitation of the working class within a capitalist system."
(Participant 17).
Thus Factor 1, because of lack of discrimination within the Q
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sample, grouped together two accounts which shared an overall
'dominance' perspective on health and illness, but which differed
in their interpretation of the primary source of oppression
patriarchy (for the lesbian feminists) or capitalism. These
contrasts are to be found in the literature; Marxist analyses
(e.g. Navarro, 1977; Waitzkin, 1981) differing markedly from
feminist analyses (e.g. Barrett and Roberts, 1978; Ehrenreich and
English, 1978; Graham, 1984).
4.3.2 : Factor 2 
The account identified by Factor 2 was far less concerned with
'politics' than that identified by Factor 1. Rather it stressed
definition of health as overall physical and mental wellbeing
(Item 44 = +5) and offered a broadly psychosomatic perception of
aetiology. Item 50, that worry and stress are major health
hazards, was accorded +5, and Item 31, that the body has
self-healing properties accorded +4. Item 37, that psychological
explanations of illness are 'rubbish' was denied strongly with a
-5 placement, and Item 8, that many mental illnesses are 'just
signs of weakness - placed -4. This account regarded professional
medical care (both orthodox and 'alternative') much more
favourably than that identified by Factor 1, viewing teamwork
between medical professionals as crucial (Item 42 = +5), not
seeing doctors as unsympathetic (Item 45 = -2) and
decision-making as a common social responsibility (Item 27 = +4).
In contrast to the account identified by Factor 1, this account
construed the individual as both responsible for their own health
and capable of affecting it through a sensible lifestyle (Item
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46 = +4), which doctors were seen to have a duty to encourage
(Item 22 = -4). It did not deny structural factors (Item 12 =
-4), but did place upon the individual the right and the duty to
actively participate in the health-seeking and maintaining
process (Item 16 = -4).
The general picture that emerged is one of
liberal-humanist, individualist values coupled with a view that
illness is as much 'in the mind' as 'of the body'. The emphasis
was on personal responsibility and autonomy, and a view of health
as wholistic, a product of both physical and psychological forces
contributing - according to circumstances and the individual's
willingness to adopt healthy habits - either to a positive state
of wellbeing or to depression, stress-induced and dysfunctional
lifestyle-induced ill-health.
Comments from the participants who provided the exemplificatory Q
sorts indicated their desire for more coverage of these areas.
For example, in terms of psychosomatics
"I would have liked to have seen much more about the role of
psychological factors... e.g. 'Doctors should be encouraged to
look for underlying causes for so-called spontaneous recovery'.
'Methods which utilise psychological factors in treatment e.g.
imaging, relaxation should be more widely encouraged'. 'There is
an intimate relationship between psychological and physical
wellbeing.'". (Participant 20).
"There is not really enough about the psychological and emotional
influences. For example, with many minor illnesses, often just
going to the doctor can make a person feel better. Often what
people need is just a little reassurance that their symptoms are
nothing to worry about. Once they stop worrying, the symptoms
often clear up " (Participant 30).
Participant 30 also wrote, in response to Item 16 about the
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responsibility of the individual
"Quite the opposite ! Patients don't get half enough involved,
they are very passive. I worry a lot about the way people seem to
want medical treatment simply to legitimise their illness. For
example, far too many drugs are prescribed because people need to
feel that the doctor has 'done something' about their illness.
Yet there is a great deal they can usually do themselves. And for
some people illness becomes a way of life. They should be
prepared to look for more functional ways of giving meaning to
their life."
The written comments also made it clear that agreement with a
woman's right to medical treatment from a woman doctor (Item 43 =
+4) was endorsed here for rather different reasons from the
previous account (where it was similarly placed +4). Whereas
that endorsement was presumably within the context of distrust of
male doctors as agents of patriarchy, here the rationale appeared
to be motivated by the focus on psychological aspects. For
example, Participant 30 commented about this item
"... because the relationship between the doctor and the patient
is crucial to healing and care, obviously patients do better when
they have a doctor they can trust. For some women, this means
having a woman doctor to turn to, often particularly about
gynecological matters, where they feel another woman will have
more understanding and sympathy."
4.3.3 : Factor 3 
A number of themes were interwoven within the account identified
by this factor. Most noticeable was strong endorsement for
current medical practice in the NHS (Item 7 = +4). Doctors were
perceived not merely as good diagnosers (Item 1 = +5) and
treaters (Item 15 = -4) of symptoms, with access to particular
expertise (Item 13 = +4), but as humanitarian and caring,
offering reassurance and emotional support more than medicine.
This aspect was elucidated by comments (which were tape recorded
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by dictaphone) from Participant 27, the GP whose Q sort
exemplified the factor. In response to Item 25, he said
"Medicine is not about technology but about human caring. Of
course a doctor has his(sic) job to do in care of the elderly,
but only in the context of supporting the family."
In response to Item 34
"I don't like the wording here at all. 'Dispatched' sounds like
getting rid of a useless person. It is much more a question of a
willingness to overcome our obsession with seeking to cure people
regardless of their quality of life. If somebody is suffering
with an incurable illness, the doctor should be willing to let
them die with dignity if this is what they choose ... The
ability to intervene with high technology does not mean that
this is the doctor's sole response, we must never forget basic
human qualities like compassion and respect ... medicine seems .to
me to have become far too fascinated with its own technical
cleverness."
While this account, like the previous one, incorporated
psychosomatic elements into its explanation of health and illness
(Item 53 = +4; Item 37 = -4) the stress in this case was less
on the the positive benefits of psychological processes (e.g. the
capacity for relaxation techniques to reduce stress) and more
on the negative aspects. Participant 27 again, in response to
Item 53
"I really believe that people can die 'of a broken heart' or
because they have simply lost the will to live."
In response to Item 37
"A lot of illness is worry. People see themselves as ill because
their marriage is going badly, or they are overtired, or under
stress. Things get on top of them, and they use illness as a way
of asking for help or for somebody to take notice."
In response to Item 45 :
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"It is sometimes difficult to be sympathetic all the time. People
today expect somehow they have a right to be fit and well all the
time, and when they get minor symptoms they are convinced that
they need antibiotics. Most minor illnesses are self-limiting and
would clear up if people simply ignored them. But they get
worried about them, and so in the end I often give them what they
want to stop them worrying."
This last comment helps to explain the superficial ambiguity
between the endorsement of testing new drugs on animals (Item 23
= -4) and yet a rejection of modern drugs (Item 36 = -5) as
lacking in efficacy and causing side-effects. Drugs and high
technology were seen as appropriate and useful in same, strictly
limited situations, and in those cases the best of what modern
medical science has to offer should be available. But for the
majority of minor illness that a GP sees, all that was assumed to
be required was reassurance that the body can heal itself (Item
31 = +5), and that most ordinary illnesses do not need medical
intervention (Item 28 = +4).
Finally, this account rejected any political interpretation of
medicine (Item 29 = -5), that illness has supernatural causes
(Item 10 = -5), or that people have a great deal of choice (Item
35 = -4). Basically, illness was seen as a product of the
natural world and the human condition.
4.3.4 : Factor 4 
This account contained elements of the 'medical model" view of
health and illness in that medicine was seen as a science (Item
6 = +5) and diagnosis as well done by computers as by doctors
(Item 1 = -5). It has been included in the results because it is
the only account to hint at the biomedical perspective, but I
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found the account overall impossible to interpret at this stage,
particularly difficult as there was only one exemplar, and the
person whose Q sort provided it wrote no comments. I therefore
regarded its emergence as encouragement to seek for such an
account in the next study rather than as a basis for explicating
a 'medical model' account at this point.
4.3.5 : Factor 5 
The account identified by Factor 5 strongly endorsed health
education (Item 33 = +5), health promotion (Item 46 = +5),
preventive care, compulsary if necessary (Item 41 = +4) and good
teamwork (Item 42 = +4). It rejected any politico-economic
analyses of inequality (Item 30 = -5), personal choice about a
woman doctor (Item 43 = -5) and the notion that health is a human
right (Item 32 = -4). It saw medical professionalism as benign
(Item 24 = +4, Item 45 = -5). It shared the 'individual
responsibility' theme with the account identified by
Factor 2 (e.g. Item 46 = +5), but construed psychological
aspects as a lot less salient. Item 50 about worry causing
illness was allocated -1 and Participant 14, whose Q sort acted
as exemplar for Factor 5, wrote "This is just an excuse".
Although Item 37, that too much rubbish is written about
psychological aspects of illness, was designated -3, she wrote
"But there is a lot of rubbish !". And in response to Item 35
"You don't choose to be bitten by a rabid dog, break your leg or
catch a cold"
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4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
So far the accounts have been referred to by the number of the
factor which identified them. Despite the fact that this is
somewhat clumsy when writing about them, it is a deliberate
policy of many British Q methodologists not to label accounts, as
this is seen to over-simplify and reify them in a way that cannot
convey their subtlety or complexity. Instead we have adopted a
practice of deriving account summaries which are then negotiated
with representatives of those people who provided the
exemplificatory Q sorts for the factor. North American Q
methodologists do use labels (e.g. Stephenson's term
'bitter-enders' to describe the first account in his 1963 study
of images of public health), and there is a continuing debate
between us about this issue. Brown (personal communication), for
example, has written
"I would like to disagree with you about labelling factors, not
so as to uphold the idea of labelling itself (a minor matter),
but because I think not labelling factors is no defense against
essentialism, any more than negotiated summaries are."
This debate continues, but for the time being I have retained the
practice of using account summaries. The summaries for the three
accounts clearly identified by this study are listed in Figure
4.1. As can be seen, Account 1 is sub-,divided into two versions.
The reason for this will be described later.
4.4.1 Account sympatricitv 
What is perhaps most striking about the accounts is just how
diverse were the allocations of items. There were, within the 54
items, only three (Items 25, 31 and 44) which were allocated
positive scores within the accounts described by all five
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Figure 4.1 : Account Summaries for Study 1 
Account la
Health and illness in our society must be seen in terms of broad
social, economic and environmental forces. Although everybody's
health suffers from influences like pollution, the poor and
otherwise disadvantaged have little choice about the unhealthy
lives they lead, and the ill health that results. Modern
medicine does little to help; many doctors have little sympathy
with their patients; modern drugs and treatments are often
ineffective; and medical care and diagnosis are often used as
social control. Medicine does not tackle any of the real health
problems people face. Doctors have far too much power, and our
health would be improved if patients gained more autonomy and
control, and many aspects of our lives (e.g. the process of
ageing) which are currently 'medicalised" were to become regarded
as ordinary life experiences, for which society as a whole should
take responsibility.
Account lb
Health and illness reflect the dominance of the patriarchy in
our society, and of imperialism in the Third World. Although
everybody's health suffers from influences like pollution, women,
forced to live in the stressful, noxious man-made world, have
little choice about the unhealthy lives they lead, and the ill
health that results. Modern medicine is dominated by men who
use their power to construct women as subservient. It dispenses
unnecessary surgery to 'medicalise' normal processes like
childbirth; harmful drugs to control diseases (like hysteria)
invented to marginalise and trivialise the structural problems
women face; and diagnoses (e.g. of lesbianism as 'sick') as forms
of social control.
Accotmt 2
Good health is far more than the absence of disease; it is a
positive state of wellbeing. People's health or illness are
predominantly a reflection of their psychological state and
particularly the level of stress they have to cope with in their
lives. We can make no clear distinction between "mental" and
'physical' illness, and treatment needs to be directed at the
(whole person', supporting the body's considerable powers of
self healing, offering both physical remedies and psychological
support. Good teamwork is essential. Individuals should take
responsibility for their own health, and plan their lives to
promote their own health and wellbeing.
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Figure 4.1 : Account Summaries for Study 1/cont.
Account 3
Where health and illness are concerned, we cannot differentiate
between 'mind' and 'body'. Consequently, diagnosis is far more
of an art than a science; illness usually requires good 'care'
rather than medical treatment; and the will to live is a major
factor in recovery. The body has strong powers of self-healing,
and it is often better to let nature take its course than to
meddle with self-treatment (e.g. by taking medicines which may
have serious side-effects) or run to the doctor with every little
ache and pain. We have every reason to be proud of our National
Health Service, and are lucky to have doctors who are able to
tackle the underlying causes of illness.
Acoount 4
We are lucky to live in a world of medical excellence, with all
the powers that modern medicical science has to cure illnesses
that were killers fifty years ago. Good health is both
everybody's basic right, and their own responsibility.
Account 5
Health Education enables people to promote a positive state of
health and wellbeing, and regular medical check-ups help to
prevent illness. Doctors are usually highly competent, and
provide expert advice and treatment; but teamwork is essential,
medical professionals working together to provide an effective
service. Health is not a right, but something you have to work
for - rich and poor alike have the . to be healthy if
they adopt lifestyles that are health promoting.
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factors, and only four (Items 3,12,14 and 22) which were
allocated negative scores within all. Stephenson calls these
consensus items', but I prefer not to use this term, as it
implies that similar allocation scores arise from similar
interpretations of meaning, an assumption refuted within radical
Q theory as essentialist (See Section 3.3.1 in the previous
Chapter).
With the remaining 47 items, there was always at least one
account in which each one was placed neutrally, or
antipathetically to the rest. Often the spread of responses was
very wide indeed. For example, Item 1 was placed at both
extremes of the Q sort
Factors
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. However complex the programming,
computers will never be as good at	 0	 +5	 -5	 -2
medical diagnosis as doctors.
Item 6 was similarly diversely placed, ranging from the
strongest agree slot to fairly strong disagreement
Factors
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
6. Medicine is first and foremost
a science, and must be based on 	 +1	 -3	 -3	 +5	 -1
rigorous scientific principles.
So too Item 29 about medicine as a mechanism for 'social
control'. Although this statement was strongly endorsed within
Account 1, it was rejected equally strongly by Account 3, with
the rest falling between
29. Treating people as 'mentally
ill' is often a means by which
society controls those who don't
conform.
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Factors
1 2 3 4 5
+5 +1 -5 +3 -3
There was also, just as clearly, no consensus about the
symapthy" of doctors - Account 1 agreed strongly with the
statement they were unsympathetic, whereas all the other
accounts rejected this assertion, sometimes strongly
Factors
45. The vast majority of doctors
have no sympathy with their
patients.
1 2 3 4 5
+4 -2 -3 -1 -5
But perhaps the item that separated out the five accounts from
each other most dramatically was the item about injustice
Factors
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
30. The health of people in our
society will only improve overall	 +5	 +2	 0	 -4	 -5
when we have overcome the in-
justices between the 'haves' and
the "have-nots".
Recalling that within the Q sorts people had to select just
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three items for each of their +5 and -5 placements, the responses
to this item demonstrate just how contradictory and varied are
the accounts for health and illness that are expressed in the
discourses operating within popular culture in Britain today.
First, some accounts differ strongly in the way they 'make
sense of the world'. Account 1 and Account 5 take opposite
positions concerning injustice and inequality. But salience too
differs between accounts. Within Account 1 the impact of
inequality and disadvantage is perceived as one of the major
reasons for ill-health, sufficiently important to be accorded one
of just three 'strongly agree' positions in the Q sort.
Similarly, within Account 5, one of the three 'strongly
disagree' positions were used to reject this idea, suggesting
that within this account refuting inequality as an explanation
for ill-health is very pertinent. But although they express
diametrically opposite evaluations of the item, within both
accounts the issue of inequality is perceived as . salient. But for
Account 3 the neutral allocation of this item suggests that the
issue is simply not very important.
NO claims are made at this point that all or even most of the
competing accounts to be found were identified and described. But
despite its explicitly exploratory nature, this initial study did
offer convincing evidence for cultural sympatricity. There exists
no single, consensual 'popular account' for and about health and
illness, but a variety of accounts in which what is salient
differs from one to another; and what are taken-for-granted
'truths', or deeply held convictions in one account are refuted
as 'untruths' with conviction in others.
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4.4.2 Implications for Study 2 
As well as demonstrating account sympatricity and begining an
account taxonomy, an equally important purpose of the study was
to gain information from which to construct a more comprehensive
and systematic 'concourse-estimate' as the basis for subsequent,
more detailed investigation, and Study 1 did offer considerable
guidance for Study 2.
The account identified by Factor I raised interesting but
difficult research questions. As described in Section 4.3.1, this
account was distinguished from the others by the theme which
Ehrenreich (1978) has termed the 'cultural critique' of medicine
(to distinguish it from the other critique expressed within the
'left', which focusses on inequal distribution of resources,
termed by Ehrenreich the political-economic critique). Within
such a critique health and illness are construed within the
context of power inequalities between dominant and marginal
groups
"Modern medical care ... does not consist of the administration
by doctors of a group of morally neutral, essentially benign and
effective techniques for curing disease and reducing pain and
suffering. The techniques themselves are frequently useless, and
all too often actually physically harmful. The 'scientific
knowledge' of the doctors is sometimes not knowledge at all, but
rather social messages (e.g. about the proper behaviour of wamen)
wrapped up in technical language. And above all, both the
doctor-patient relationship and the entire strength of the
medical services are not mere technical relationships, but social
relationships which (express and reinforce (often in subtle ways)
the social relations of the larger society : e.g. class, racial,
sexual and age heirarchy."(p 15)
Even given the limited opportunities within the 54-item. Q sample,
this critique was clearly identified and expressed, and
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articulated in more detail by the open-ended responses. However,
it was equally clear that within the account were melded at least
two versions : the feminist and the marxist. The feminist
critique is predicated upon the assumption that
••• the taken-for-granted understandings of the world,
particularly insofar as they relate to gender and sexuality,
rely on a construction of reality which oppresses women."
(Kitzinger, 1984, p40).
Marxist analyses, in contrast, focus upon the impact of
capitalism. McKinlay (1984), for instance, couched his critique
upon a perception of capitalism as a 'predatory' force within
Western society
..• the rapinous activities of large-scale capitalist
institutions (mainly banks, insurance companies and industrial
corporations): the act of invading, exploiting and ultimately
despoiling a field of endeavour - with no necessary commitment to
it - in order to seize and carry away an acceptable level of
profit." (p 2).
He argued that within such a system, the business of
medicine has been rendered a highly desirable source of profit,
and in consequence, particularly in North America, predatory
organizations have invaded and now dominate 'health care'.
These two worldviews, the feminist and the marxist, do share
elements in common (as exemplified by Participant 26's suggestion
that issue of exploitation of the Third World for profit had been
omitted from the Q sample). However, they differ fundamentally in
their interpretation of the forces at work. To the feminists, the
predation is that of	 ruling men' who "...create a
stressful, polluted and noxious environment for me, and then try
to sell me the notion (as well as the equipment) that I can
'199
counteract it if I do press-ups and eat brown rice." (Participant
23). The 'invading, exploiting and despoiling' are acts
perpetrated by men, and the 'polluted, noxious environment' they
have produced is a man-made world. My attempts to negotiate
with Participant 23 an account summary which stressed the
communality of the 'cultural critique' was met with rejection -
for this woman, only an explicitly feminist analysis would
suffice to provide what she saw was an accurate account of her
views. But Participant 17 as strenuously denied the feminist
analysis. For her the blame could equally well be placed upon
women as men
"That wamen have played only a small part in the oppression of
the working class reflects, true, that women have been pretty
powerless throughout most of history ... but living within a
Thatcherite economy, with that --- woman the prime architect of
the most strident and vicious form of capitalism we have ever
seen, don't --- talk to me of man-made misery." (expletives
deleted).
At this stage I therefore faced a difficult decision. The
technical demands of Q sorting limit the number of Q items in a
sample. Within these limits, it would heve been difficult to have
selected sufficient items to enable these two accounts to be well
articulated, pursue the other promising alternatives hinted at by
the results (particularly the 'medical model' and 'health
promotion' accounts), and seek for evidence of additional
accounts not discovered by Study 1 (e.g. the politico-economic
critique, as described by Ehrenreich, op cit).
Consequently I decided against the possibility of a study like
Peritore's (1986) investigation of the alternative accounts
within the discourse of the 'Maw Left' in Brazil, restricting my
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Q and participant samples to just those issues relating to, and
just those people concerned about ideological and political
aspects of 'health and illness'. My reasons were threefold.
First, I saw the overall objective of this research, at this
initial stage, as one of developing a broad account taxonomy, and
did not want to become sidetracked into consideration of just one
set of issues or forms of understanding. my interest was as much
in the processes of and psychological functions of accounting
themselves, as in the content of the accounts, and such a
diversion would have limited my ability to explore accounting
across a range of viewpoints, social and cultural situations,
etc-.Secondly, I felt that the discriminations between the
variants of the 'cultural critique' were already well documented
in the literature, and as a growing field of academic interest,
this area was likely to be covered extensively elsewhere.
Most importantly, however, although Q methodology is not intended
to provide information about the segmentation of opinion within
any population as a whole, I did want the research to offer a
basis for a better understanding of popular accounting. While
the 'radical critique' is of great interest within an academic
discourse, it is not generally salient within the accounting of
'ordinary people'. Academics do not lack opportunities to express
their views, and I did not want to be persuaded to develop the
'cultural critique' at the cost of denying a voice to others less
privileged.
I have devoted space to explaining what is often 'hidden' within
research reports (cf Reason and Rowan, 1981) - the thinking
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behind decisions made about what to exclude from study -
because it is a crucial issue for Q as an emancipatory
methodology. Like any other technique, it is not neutral, nor can
it be utilised outside of the power-relations of researcher and
researched. In choosing to study one thing, inevitably the
researcher chooses not to study others. Q has its own
methodological constraints that demand of its user selection of
research questions based upon judgements like the ones I have
described above. The researcher decides what opportunities will
be provided within the Q-sample, and what people to invite to
participate; these inevitably control the accounts that will be
published as the 'results" of the study. The results are not mere
products of the data obtained, but are products of these
decisions.
My desire to pursue a broadly based account taxonomy meant,
therefore, that I chose to develop a Q sample for Study 2 that
tried to extend opportunities for Accounts 4 and 5 to be better
articulated, to open up opportunities for other kinds of account
(e.g. the political-economic), but most of all, to use it as an
abductory methodology, seeking to discover the unexpected and
unpredictable rather than merely further refine the divisions
within a particular account.
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CHAPTER 5 : STUDY 2
A INVESTIGATION OF ACCOUNTING FOR HEALTH AND ILLNESS
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5.00 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter describes the second, extended study carried out to
identify and describe the alternative accounts for health and
illness currently operating in British culture. It was built upon
Study 1, employing feedback from it to devise a more
comprehensive and representative Q sample. Also modifications
were made to improve the administration of the Q sort, to make
the task more acceptable to participants, and to gain more
detailed additional information to aid the interpretation of
factors.
5.1 DERIVATION OF Q SAMPLE
In this study, because of its taxonomic objective, an
unstructured rather than a structured Q-sample was appropriate.
To ensure that the Q sample was able to offer a wide range of
people ample opportunity to express diverse accounts for health
and illness, the Q-sample was built upon the resultsof, and
insights gained from Study 1, (including its "concourse estimate"
sources, viewed anew after factor extraction and account
interpretation) and by pilot testing.
5.1.1 Derivation of a new "concourse-estimate" 
Of the 54 items in the Q sample for Study 1, thirty nine
which had demonstrated the most utility for the expression of
different accounts (i.e. been allocated the greatest spread of
responses) were retained in the concourse estimate, some worded
as before, others rewritten in response to feedback. Further
items were added from suggestions made by participants, from the
pilot interviews for Study 1, and from the updated research
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notebook. By reference to the results of Study 1, a pool of
196 items were selected as a 'concourse estimate' for pilot
testing.
5.1.2 Pilot testing of Q sample
The 196 items were typed out and given to seven associates
(including other Q researchers, a Lecturer in English Literature,
and colleagues and friends who express views different from
mine). They were asked to comment on the items for
comprehensibility, wording and general 'acceptability' and
clarity of the English used; to pick out any items which seemed
to them to be strikingly different from the others, or not
salient to the topic of health and illness; and then to indicate
any that seemed to them to be saying much the same thing.
In this way, the 196 item-pool was reduced considerably in
number, excluding items that the pilot-testers saw as 'too
similar', of limited salience, or as in some way strikingly
outside of the domain of the other items. Stephenson (1953) has
stressed the need for Q samples to be homogenous. While, from a
social epistemological perspective, this is not something that
can be operationally defined, the pilot testing was used to weed
out at least the most glaringly irrelevant and anomalous items,
to avoid obvious duplication, and to ensure that wording was
clear.
Stephenson (1953) asserts that when constructing a Q sample,
... the sample should be balanced with respect to at least one
effect" by ensuring that "... for every statement with a
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positive assertion or meaning, there can always be chosen
another with a negative (meaning)... But mere negations are
not recommended." (emphases in the original). Radical Q
methodologists do not share Stephenson 's conviction that the
researcher can, a priori, assess the meaning that will be
applied to any statement because different participants are
likely to interpret the same statement in different ways.
Therefore 'balance' within the Q-sample was based upon asking
these people also to sort the items into three piles : agrees,
disagrees and ambiguous/don't knows. They were asked to do this
for their own opinions, and to personate (cf Semin and Rogers,
1973) the views expressed by their perception of two or three
people they knew, with different views from their own. Including
my own actual and personating sorts, this provided eight personal
sorts and nineteen personated sorts. It was these 3-category
sorts that were used to 'balance' the Q sample. The items chosen
were those which, for a range of accounts, offered roughly equal
numbers of 'agrees' and 'disagrees'. As a result of this
procedure, some items were recouched in converse terms.
Via the procedures outlined above, the 196 initial items were
reduced to a set of 80 which offered a broadly homologous,
comprehensive, non repetitious, clearly expressed and balanced
sample. These items are listed in Appendix 5, together with
details of the derivation of each item.
5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 Participants
In all 121 people were asked to participate in the study and
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sent materials, 74 of wham returned completed Q sorts, of which
three were unusable (because the responses were not made
according to the response grid) and one was returned too late to
be included. Thus the study was based upon the data provided by
70 participants, 26 of whom were men, 42 were women, the
remainder not providing information about gender. Their ages
ranged from 14 to 63 (the majority in their 30s and 40s), and
occupations included students, teachers, lecturers and
researchers, administrators, an architect, a social worker, a
police officer and an army major. Twenty four were health
professionals, including nurses, GPs, hospital doctors,
physiotherapists and a dietitian.
The aim was to find as diverse a group as possible, as before,
but again also to include a proportion of (ordinary people'.
Thus about half of the participant sample were chosen
theoretically, as people who would be expected to express
particular kinds of accounts (e.g. in terms of professional
expertise and experience, religious affiliation and political
views) and about half recruited in a variety of manners to
ensure a broad spread of (ordinary ( viewpoints. (Snowballing' was
used, both by seeking contacts from participants in Study 1, and
by asking those who had participated in this study to nominate
others. A number of participants in Study I agreed to take part
in this study too.
5.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
The materials used in Study 2 were very similar to those used in
Study 1, except that : additional instructions were provided (as
most participants worked entirely from these); the response
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grid was enlarged to accomodate 80 items, with responses
ranging from -6 to +6, 13 categories in all; and the instructions
for completing the Q sort were amended in response to comments
made by participants in Study 1. In particular, participants were
given more reassurance about the balance of their responses, and
invited to mark off their responses to show where agreement ended
and disagreement began. The reason for this was partly to make
any imbalance more acceptable, but it also provided additional
information for factor interpretation. These new materials are
shown in Appendix 6.
In addition to the Q-sort, two additional booklets were
provided, each listing all the items with spaces for cam nt
(both identical in form to the comments sheets provided in Study
1, See Appendix 3). Booklet A, with which participants were
instructed to begin, was intended to familiarise them with the
items, encourage participants to consider them in relation to
each other when Q sorting, and provide additional
open-ended material to aid factor interpretation. The Q-sort was
completed next and finally Booklet C was used to indicate reasons
for sorting placements and interpretations made of items regarded
as ambiguous. (A full set of experimental materials is available
from the author).
5.3 RESULTS
The 70 completed Q sort response grids were coded as before, and
subjected to a Q factor analysis (principle components) using
SPSS, with varimax rotation. There were twelve factors which had
eigenvalues greater than unity. Of these nine contained at least
one Q sort with an exemplificatory loading, the criteria used in
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this study being loadings >0.60 1 with no other significant
loading (>0.30). Factor Loadings are provided in Appendix 4, a
summary of exemplificatory Q sorts in Table 5.1, and factor
scores calculated as before in Table 5.2. By examination of the
configuration of scores for each factor, the account each one
identified can now be interpreted.
5.3.1 The account identified by Factor 1 
This account is similar to the account identified by Factor 1 in
the previous study, with three of the same participants providing
exemplificatory Q sorts, but, with a larger participant pool,
an additional four exemplificatory Q sorts, including my own.
It is a re-statement of the 'cultural critique' of medicine (cf
Ehrenreich, 1978), indicated by strong endorsement of 'mental
illness' as a form of social control (Item 17 = +5)?,hea1th as
determined by inequality (Item 19 = +6); and the worst off in our
society as having very little choice about the unhealthy lives
they lead (Item 48 = +5). Two new items increased the
stress on a Marxist analysis : capitalism is inherently
anti-health (Item 45 = +5) and drug companies are more concerned
with profits than making people well (Item 72 = +4).
Participant 59 wrote about this item
"1 : The purpose of factor extraction in Q methodology is to
identify the alternative accounts within the data, and this is
the pre-eminent criterion against which factors are selected for
interpretation. With an 80 item sample, all loadings above 0.30
are statistically significant, which is why a loading of 0.30
on another factor was chosen as the cut-off point for rejecting
an exemplar. However, the 0.60 criterion is more arbitary, and
was utilised to simplify the task of selecting exemplars. It was
used because it was found to provide clear-cut factors which were
interpretable. Given that even this stringency nonetheless offers
nine factors for consideration, while it excludes other potential
accounts which the data may contain, it at least reduced account
reporting to manageable levels.
2 : The list of items provided in Appendix 5 is a convenient
way of checking against these results. Once more double
negatives need careful interpretation.
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Table 5.1 Summary of exemplificatory Q sorts, Study 2 
Factor Loading No.
Participants providing Q sort
Description
1 .88 6 Student
.69 16 Hospital doctor, radiology
.90 25 Researcher (EF1, Study 1)
.85 44 Myself
.67 46 Student
.84 50 Teacher (EF1, Study 1)
.79 59 School student
2 .67 52 Secretary
.69 68 Student
3 .71 48 Nurse
4 .72 27 Dietitian
5 .63 20 Lecturer
.60 43 Physiotherapist
6 .67 69 Environmental Health Officer
7 .66 37 Social Worker
8 .71 53 Lecturer
9 .69 38 Personnel officer
*EF1 = Exemplar, Factor 1 in previous study.
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Table 5.2 Factor scores obtained in Study 2
Item
no : 1 2 3
Factors
4	 5 6 7 8 9
1
-5 +1 -2 0 -6 -5 0 -4 +1
2 +3 0 -4 +1 -1 -2 0 +2 -6
3 -2 -4 +1 +2 +3 -1 0 -2 0
4 -5 -1 -3 -3 +2 -3 -3 -6 -2
5 -1 -4 -1 -2 -4 0 -1 -1 0
6 -6 +1 +1 -2 +6 +3 0 +2 +2
7 -3 -3 -5 +2 -4 -4 -3 0 +3
8 -3 -3 -6 -4 -5 +2 -4 -3 -2
9 +4 0 +2 -1 -3 -2 +1 0 +1
10 +1 +6 +3 +1 +1 -1 +6 0 +1
11 +1 -2 -3 -1 0 -1 +6 0 +2
12 -2 0 +1 0 0 0 +1 -1 +1
13 +3 -1 -3 +2 -4 -4 -5 -2 0
14 -6 +1 0 +3 -2 -4 -2 -3 -3
15 -5 +5 0 -1 +1 -5 -1 -5 0
16 +5 +4 +2 -3 0 +5 +1 +3 +6
17 +5 -5 0 -2 -4 0 +5 +3 -5
18 -2 +5 -1 +2 +4 -1 -5 0 0
19 +6 -5 +6 +1 -2 +5 +1 +6 -3
20 +1 +3 +5 +6 0 -1 +2 +1 +2
21 +1 +2 +6 +1 -3 +6 -1 +5 0
22 -3 +5 +2 +2 +5 +3 +4 +2 +2
23 +2 +4 +1 +4 +6 +1 -5 +6 0
24 0 0 +4 +2 +1 0 +6 +5 +1
25 +3 +6 +4 -1 +2 0 +2 -1 +1
26 -5 +3 +1 0 -5 0 +1 0 -3
27 +1 +2 +6 -1 +2 -2 +5 0 +2
28 0 -4 0 -2 -3 +1 +5 +1 -2
29 +3 0 -2 -3 +2 -1 +1 -6 0
30 +1 +6 +1 +5 +1 +3 +3 +3 +3
31 -2 +4 0 +1 -4 -3 -4 -2 -4
32 +2 -6 -2 -5 -5 +6 +1 +5 -6
33 -1 +1 -1 -6 -3 -5 -6 +6 -1
34 -1 -1 0 -2 -1 -1 +2 -1 -3
35 +4 -3 -5 -5 -3 -1 -2 -1 -2
36 -2 +3 0 +3 +1 -2 0 -3 +3
37 -4 -5 -4 -5 -1 -4 -2 +4 -2
38 -1 +1 -2 +1 -1 0 -2 -4 -1
39 -1 -4 +2 +1 +4 0 -3 -3 +3
40 -3 -2 -4 -6 -4 -4 -5 +4 0
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Table 5.2	 Factor scores obtained in Study 2/ cont.
Item
no. 1 2 3
Factors
4	 5 6 7 8 9
41 0 0 0 +2 +6 +1 +4 +1 +4
42 +4 +5 +3 0 +3 +5 +2 +5 0
43 +6 +1 +2 +4 -1 -3 -1 -3 +2
44 -2 +3 +3 +3 +5 +2 +3 0 -1
45 +5 -6 -1 0 -1 +5 -3 +1 -5
46 0 0 -5 0 -2 -3 -1 -3 -4
47 -2 -1 +5 +4 +5 -6 -2 +1 +6
48 +5 -2 +4 +3 -4 +5 +2 +1 -5
49 0 -1 -2 +4 0 +4 -1 -1 -1
50 -4 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -4
51 0 -2 -1 -3 -1 -2 -6 +2 -1
52 -1 -1 -3 -4 0 0 0 +2 -5
53 +2 +1 -5 -1 +1 +5 -1 -4 -2
54 +3 -2 -2 0 +2 +1 +3 -1 +4
55 +2 +2 +5 0 +3 +1 +3 +3 +3
56 +1 +3 -1 +5 0 -3 -3 0 -2
57 +3 0 -3 -3 0 +2 0 +2 -4
58 +4 -2 +1 0 -1 +4 +3 +1 -2
59 -6 +1 +4 0 +4 +2 +5 -4 -1
60 -1 -2 -1 -1 +1 +4 0 -1 -1
61 0 -1 -1 +5 +3 +6 +1 +4 +5
62 +3 -1 +3 0 -2 +3 0 +1 -4
63 -4 -3 -4 -3 -3 -3 -1 0 +1
64 0 -1 -1 -2 0 0 +3 +2 +4
65 -4 +2 +3 +5 -2 +3 +4 0 +5
66 -4 0 -4 -4 -2 +2 -4 -4 +5
67 -3 -5 -6 -4 -6 -6 -1 -2 +1
68 +2 -1 +2 -1 +3 +3 -2 +4 0
69 -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 0 +2 +3 +2
70 +2 +3 +4 +6 +2 +2 -2 -2 -3
71 +2 +2 +2 +3 0 0 +4 -1 +3
72 +4 -1 +1 -1 +4 -1 +4 +1 0
73 0 0 0 -4 +1 -3 -3 -5 +4
74 +1 +2 +1 +4 +3 +1 0 -2 +1
75 -4 +4 -1 -5 -1 -2 0 0 -1
76 -1 +2 -3 +6 +1 +1 0 -2 +6
77 +2 +4 +3 +3 +5 +1 -4 +3 +5
78 0 -3 0 -4 -5 -5 -4 -5 -5
79 -1 -4 0 +1 +4 +2 -3 -6 -3
80 +6 +1 +5 +1 +2 +3 +2 +4 +4
212
"Yes, Doctors are bribed to prescribe more brand named drugs by
companies offering incentives - e.g. holidays, etc.
However, comments again stressed that the Q-sample was
ethnocentric in its omission of the impact of exploitation upon,
say, Third World Countries. For example, in response to Item 45
(about the relatively greater importance of public health
measures) Participant 6 made it clear that this was only true
"...in the West" and this additional item was suggested by
Participant 16
"... something on the cost of developing Western medicine in
terms of the suffering and death of Third World peoples (e.g.
dumping of contraceptives, ... baby milk powder.)."
As before, there was rejection of the supposed benefits of
modern medicine, described more fully with the increased item
sample. Within account 1, modern therapeutic achievements (Item 6
= -6), medical 'excellence' (Item 44 = -2), and modern drugs
(Item 22 = -3) make limited contributions to health. Medical
science is unlikely to ever eradicate disease (Item 63 = -4),
and many forms of treatment do more harm than good (Item 13 =
+3). Doctors often treat symptoms, not the underlying causes of
illness (Item 9 = +4) and frequently recommend surgery when it is
not really necessary (Item 14 = -6). Going to the doctor is not
something that will make you feel better (Item 26 = -5), indeed
Participant 6 crossed out 'better' and substituted 'worse'
Doctors should not 'play God' by expecting unthinking compliance
(Item 1 -5), threatening disease as retribution for non
compliance (Item 75 = -4) and deciding whether, and under what
conditions people should be given accurate information (Item 15 =
-5). A good health service is one which respects people's
autonomy even if that puts people at risk (Item 54 = +3).
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In the comments, particularly, it is clear that the account is
not just about the way doctors exploit and misuse their
professional power. It is couched in the context of a much more
general theory of the relationship between the relatively
powerless individual and powerful hegemonies of many kinds. For
example, in response to Item 2, about bodily decay being
inevitable, and anybcdy who tells you different being a liar or a
fool, Participant 6 wrote
"The second half of the sentence adds a different dimension.
Agree with first half, but not second. People who tell me
otherwise (e.g. promise me eternal youth) are not fools or,
primarily, liars, but exploiters and oppressors."
Participant 25 made a general point in response to Item 10, about
health being to do with state of mind
"Feel uncomfortable with all these 'mental' items (Nos 24 and 30
too). Resent anyone daring to interfere with or make assumptions
about my state of mind. Doctors already claim the right to
administer judgements about my body; that's enough. Keep them off
my mind."
Provided with opportunities within the Q sample this account now
also stresses a social constructionist analysis : the experience
of 'being ill' is learned (Item 29 = +3), and doctors to some
extent invent diseases rather than merely 'discover' them (Item
35 = +4). Examples suggested were "Pre-menstrual tension,
frigidity, vaginismus, failure to achieve vaginal orgasm and
post-natal depression" (Participant 6 ) and "anorexia, alcoholism
and drug addiction" (Participant 16).
From the written comments it is clear once more that forthreeof
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the people providing exemplificatory Q sorts ( two 	 women who
provided exemplificatory Q sorts for account 1 in Study 1 plus
Participant 6. .) found limitations in the Q sample frustrated
their radical feminist analysis, and again they commented that
the Q statements did not offer them sufficient opportunity to
make their views explicit. Participant 25 argued that she had
been denied the opportunity to express a radical feminist account
because of the Q sample's " focus on class (and capitalism) not
gender (and patriarchy) as a significant division in health
care.".
Once more, this feminist analysis contrasts with that which
asserts forces other than patriarchy as the creators and
perpetrators of exploitation and oppression, as demonstrated by
the cannants of Participants 16,46 and 59
... lobbied by those with the money to bribe the politicians...
and medicine, like parliament, is an 'did boys club' serving its
own interests rather than those of patients, and keeping
promotion for members of the medical-mafia" (Participant 16, in
response to Item 58)
"... health care is increasingly becoming dominated by the firms
who market the equipment and drugs ... the NHS is increasingly
squeezed for funds by their greed." (Participant 46 , in response
to Item 72)
...people who live in dreadful housing, who work long hours and
who cannot afford to feed themselves or their children properly
don't stand a chance." (Participant 59, in response to Item 19)
While Participants 16, 46 and 59 agreed that women experience
oppression, the version of account 1 expressed by them
frequently mentioned other groups who they saw as equally
disadvantaged, including the poor, ethnic minorities and the old.
Item 17 provides a good illustration of the division. All of
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participants who provided exemplificatory Q sorts for Factor 1
allocated this item +5 or +6. But it is clear that even within
a single account, interpretation of meaning can differ. The
self-defined radical feminists wrote comments against Item 17
like "...for all of us, lesbianism is the prime example."
(Participant 25). But the other participants wrote
"Yes, medicine pathologises and controls. In Russia it is
dissidents who get thrown into mental hospitals, but even in
Britain there is a long history of using the label 'mad' for
people who are often just misfits, and soporifics used to damp
down unacceptable behaviour. A good example is their use in
Mental Handicap Hospitals to prevent masturbation." (Participant
16).
"Academics and particularly clinicians call behaviour
'dysfunctional' when what they mean is that it does not fit the
norms of what is socially acceptable. Those who don't conform are
labelled 'mad' or 'delinquent'." (Participant 461
"At school you are called a 'loony' if you are the least bit
different." (Participant 59).
Overall, what brings these two versions together within a single
account is the challenge presented to taken-for-granted values of
individual self-sufficiency and personal choice, and the view
that being ill or healthy is largely to do with factors other
than medicine - adequate food, better housing and proper drains
have done more to improve our health than all the medical
discoveries of the last 100 years (Item 43 = +6). The major
causes of sickness and premature death are social, economic and
political disadvantage and the disease provoking physical and
social environment. Once more what distinguishes the two versions
is disagreement about the most important social forces at work.
For the radical feminists it is patriarchy which has created an
unhealthy physical (i.e. polluted) and social (i.e. oppressive
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and exploitative of women) world. For the rest, patriarchy is
just one among many forces, along with capitalism, class conflict
and professional self-interest.
5.3.2 The account identified by Factor 2 
Whereas Account 1 is sited almost entirely within the social
domain, the account identified by Factor 2 is sited almost
entirely within the personal and interpersonal. It is an account
for health and illness which focusses upon what goes on
within the individual, and like Account 2 in Study 1, offers
a psychosomatic model in which the body's biological functioning
(e.g. its self healing properties, Item 20 = +3) and its
psychological functioning (e.g. state of mind aiding recovery,
Item 30 = +6) both play important parts. Indeed, comments from
participants who provided exemplificatory Q sorts are peppered
with psychodynamic terms. Participant 68, offered several good
examples. She wrote about Item 50 (illness is a punishment for
misdeeds)
"No, never, but if someone believes this, they may inflict it
upon themselves subconsciously"
She explained her rejection of Item 40 (feeling to blame for
illness) in Booklet C with the comment
"This I found a strange concept (Because I believe that the
'desire' to be ill is not a conscious one).
And she explained her endorsement of Item 56 (that faith-healing
can cure) with
"Interpreted as the healing being a subconscious self-healing
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brought about by belief in the faith-healer."
Participant 52 commented in similar vein
"Only when the cure needs to be psychological and only physical
cures or not the right 'mental cure' have been tried."
This construal of the body as a self-adjusting biological system
affected by psychodynamic forces leads to a very different
perception of medical care from that portrayed by Account 1.
There are similarities in that within both accounts minor
illnesses are often best left to 'nature' (Item 70: Factor 1 =
+2, Factor 2 = +3), and giving birth is not illness, but a
natural process (Item 25: Factor 1 = +3, Factor 2 = +6). But
within Account 2 (in contrast to Account 1) modern drugs make a
major contribution to health (Item 22 = +5) and medical
excellence is of benefit (Item 44 = +3). It also strongly
endorses the idea that health and illness are products of both
bodily and mental functioning (Item 10 = +6), that state of mind
can aid recovery (Item 30 = +6), and less strongly the
desirability of seeing illness as a 'challenge' (Item 36 = +3)
and that researchers should look for the underlying causes of
so-called spontaneous recovery (Item 71 = +2). Negative effects
of (state of mind' are also important, evidenced by endorsement
of the idea that illness can become a 'may of life' (Item 18 =
+5) and that it is quite possible for people to die of a 'broken
heart' (Item 31 = +4). Thus whereas Account 1 specifically denies
many of these ideas because they 'pass the buck' to individual
responsibility, Account 2 accepts them because they do hold
the individual responsible.
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Another contrast is the interpretation of Item 16 about stress
and pollution, which both accounts accept as strong influences
upon health (Factor 1 = +5, Factor 2 = +4). For Account 1 it is
(man-made) pollution and the stress of living "as a woman in
a man's world" or of being a member of an exploited and
oppressed group in society that is to blame. For Account 2, the
emphasis is upon stress as a psychodynamdc force
"Yes, the stress of modern life has a lot to answer for, where
many people let themselves get run down in the constant hurry and
seeking after consumer goodies." (Participant 52).
"True - particularly stress" (Participant 68).
Similarly, Account 2 endorses the idea that people who suffer
from 'depression' are often just responding to the intolerable
pressures and problems of their lives (Item 42 = +5) because of
its 'stress-potential':
... and not just in layman's(sic) terms of feeling 'fed up',
worry and unhappiness do affect the body, and can lead to
reactive clinical depression" (Participant 68).
It is therefore not surprising, that from the construal of
Account 2 medical care is seen as an 'art' more than a science
(Item 3 = -4) and technical expertise seen as less important in a
doctor than personal qualities (Item 79 = -4).
Constitutional determination of health is rejected (Item 5 = -4),
and so too is luck (Item 7 = -3, Item 67 = -5). Rather, good
health is to some extent a product of 'taking care of yourself'
(Item 74 = +2) : by eating well (Item 55 = +2), and preventive
measures like inoculations (Item 65 = +2) and fluoridation of
the water supply (Item 76 = +2). However, again and again in the
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comments, 'state of mind' was stressed as what really mattered.
For example, Participant 68 commented
"Of course they are eventually, but this question implies a
somewhat surrendering attitude.:' (about Item 2, disease and decay
being inevitable.)
"Often it can also be a reflection of the emotional or mental
state of the person." (about Item 7, illness is a result of bad
luck).
"Illness is not the 'natural' state, therefore health has to do
with positive thinking." (about item 27, health is a positive
state of wellbeing.)
"This is why some people may be better off after being told of
their serious illness, so they can 'switch on' the will to live
and think positively." (about Item 30, the 'will to live'. a
significant factor in recovery.)
There is, then, within this account a portrayal of health as a
'resource' (a schematization identified by both Herzlich, 1973
and Williams, 1986a)which can either be 'squandered ( or
Mobilised'. That this construal is pre-eminently one of health
and illness under the control of the individual is further
evidenced in two ways. First, there were surprisingly similar
comments from Participants 52 and 68 about Item 33, about other
people being unpleasant 'making me
	 :
... I can see it might affect someone's state of mind."
(Participant 52).
"Indirectly yes - but only if one let's it get one down
mentally." (Participant 68)
Thus it is not the unpleasantness of other people, per se, that
causes illness, but the effect that this has upon the individual.
The second indication that health and illness are matters of the
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individual, not social forces, is the emphatic ref utal of any
political dimension to health, both in the Q sort selections and
the comments written about the items. For example, Item 17
(about the label of (nrertally ill' used for social control) is
allocated -5 and engendered the following comments
Participant 52 : "Not in this country".
Participant 68 : "Russia Only !"
Item 19, that we will only improve the overall health of people
in the world when we have found ways to overcome the fundamental
injustices between rich and poor, was also allocated -5 and the
following comments were written
"I find this term 'injustices' makes this a nonsense. Poverty is
not an injustice': (Participant 52)
"I totally disagree, this is complete rubbish': (Participant 68)
Also Item 48, that the worst off in our society have very
little choice about the unhealthy lives they lead, was allocated
-2, and drew the following comments
"Even the poorest people have a lot they can do for themselves'
(Participant 52)
Participant 68 : "False, almost everyone can be clean."
But the strongest rejection was reserved for the most politically
overt items, such as Item 32, which suggests that as doctors are
committed to preserve life, they have a moral duty to support
Nuclear Disarmament (allocated -6). The written comments were :
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Participant 52 : "NO, as some would say that through disarmament
more may die through conventional warfare."
Participant 68 : "Rubbish. Politics has nothing to do with it.
Doctors have personal lives and ideals - are not doctors all the
time."
And similarly, a rejection (Item 45 = -5) of the idea that
Capitalism is inherently anti-health
Participant 68 : "Political rubbish. Must have came out of a
communist manifesto."
This account, then, appears to be a more articulated version of
Account 2 in the previous study, paralleling its stress on a
psychosomatic model of health and illness, its focus on the
individual as "in control' and liberal-humanistic values that
refute any kind of politico-economic explanation of illness as a
product of poverty, or 'cultural critique' explanation of illness
as the socially constructed outcome of oppression and
exploitation.
However, although it sites the 'arena of operation' within the
individual, it is not a classic 'internal control' (cf Rotter,
1966) account for health and illness, as has been incorporated.
within the 'Health Locus of Control Scale' (cf Wallston and
Wallston, 1981). Although the individual's actions and
lifestyle are accorded salience as influences over health and
illness, it is the individual's 'self-control' or 'state of mind'
which is construed as the major determinant.
It would be wrong, therefore to regard Account 1 and Account 2 as
polar opposites (indeed, if they had been no more than that, they
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would have been identified by stong positive and negative
loadings upon a single factor) even though they contrast very
markedly. Both in their different ways portray the individual as
purposive and actively striving to resist external forces upon
them. Where the main differences lie are in their contrasting
perception of how much actual control the individual has over
their health and illness, and what it is they are fighting
against. Within Account 2 a person's power is seen as great -
however poor, or disadvantaged they are materially, they can
mobilise their (inner resources' to wage battle against the
(largely naturally occurring) sources of ill-health. Within
Account 1, people have very limited powers to fight the
person-made (or in the case of the radical feminists,
specifically man-made) sources of illness that beset them.
5.3.3 The account identified by Factor 3 
Only one person's Q sort was an exemplar for this factor,
participant 48, a nurse. The account, unlike the previous two,
focusses on health rather than illness, and is predicated on
health as a fundamental human right (Item 21 = +6), a positive
state of wellbeing (Item 27 = +6) and (one of the most important
things in life' (Item 47 = +5). Within this account health is not
a matter of luck (Item 7 = -4, Item 67 = -5); disease and bodily
decay are not inevitable (Item 2 = -4). Health promotion has not
become just another fashion (Item 53 = -5) but an important
means of improving health. Participant 48 commented
"Though it is in itself a dangerous statement, which devalues the
notion of seeking after health by one's own actions, whilst a
little of me agrees - I'm unhappy that people are being led to
feel you need expensive clothes to take exercise."
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She commented on several occasions about "... one's own
behaviour" or "one's own actions" being crucial for health,
clearly indicating in her comments that at the basis of her
explanation for health and illness is a conviction that it is an
individual's own behaviour and lifestyle that are the major
determinants of good health. As an example, Item 46 (that life is
1=.00 short and too sweet' to spend too much time worrying about
health, placed -5) she wrote
" This is rubbish. It implies that living healthily is boring and
miserable, when the opposite is true. Eating well and taking
exercise are not just good for you, they are enjoyable - and
feeling fit (which you can only do if you live a healthy
lifestyle) is to be able to enjoy life to the full."
However, while this is an attribution of 'internal control' (as
defined by the Health Locus of Control Scale, cf Wallston and
Wallston, op cit) this account is not "individualistic'.
Participant 48 made the point specifically, explaining in Booklet
C that she placed Item 61 (about taking responsibility) in the -1
category "...because health education is crucial, and not
everybody is well enough informed ",But it is clear that given
the benefits of opportunity and knowledge, within this account
health can be improved by such things as diet (Item 55 = +5,
Item 68 = +2).
The account is clearly concerned with the inequalities in health
between rich and poor (Item 19 = +6), and the poorest having
little choice about their health (Item 48 = +4). Indeed the
participant directly refers to the impact of social disadvantage,
although her stress is on education rather than structural
inequality:
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"The inequalities in health between those in Social Classes I and
II and those in ... Classes IV and V are scandalous. Health ...
is strongly linked to education - the more years of schooling a
mother has had, the healthier her children are likely to be."
This account, certainly as expressed by the woman who provided
the exemplificatory Q sort, is clearly informed by the writings
of the Health Education Council. For instance, commenting on
her endorsement of Item 58 with a +1 allocation (Government cares
more for tobacco tax revenues than health), she said
"The HEC has almost no funds for anti-smoking advertising
compared with the tobacco companies".
And in response to Item 62 (The Government has suppressed
information about food = +3) she commented
"Yes, the reports produced by the HEC are being put under
pressure by lobbying from the Food Industry".
The account contains clear concern about environmental causes of
illness (Item 80 = +5) although item 16 (the effects of stress
and pollution) is only allocated +2 because
"It's too easy just to blame stress and the environment, when
there is a lot you can do - excuses don't help people to strive
for themselves."
There is guarded approval of modern medicine, including its
therapeutic advances (Item 6 = +1) and the benefits of modern
drugs (Item 22 = +2); the idea that treatment often does more
harm than good refuted (Item 13 = -3). That individual
health-promoting behaviour needs the support of proper medical
services is evidenced by the rejection of sports facilities as
more useful than hospitals (Item 11 = -3) "...this being a
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cop-out for providing good health care".
Overall, then, this is an account sited squarely within the
promotion ( discourse, stressing the benefits of health
education and individual action and lifestyle while valuing
personal autonany, and concerned about inequality in a world in
which health is as a fundamental right denied to many by their
own ignorance, contraints of the lives they lead and cuts in
medical services. It is critical of Government, seeing it as
swayed by the powerful interests of 'Big Business" and its shift
to monetarism resulting in reduced medical care, but it is very
much less concerned with oppression and exploitation than Account
1, less concerned with medical hegemony, and more willing to
accept the benefits of orthodox medical care. It thus falls
between Account l's siting of control over health and
illness almost entirely within society, and Account 2's siting of
control almost entirely within "self-control"; both the personal
and the social are involved, with the amount of
self-determination an individual is able to mobilise a product of
their education and resources and the quality of service
available to them.
5.3.4 The account identified by Factor 4 
Once more this account was exemplified by the Q sort of just one
person, Participant 27, a dietitian. It focusses upon the biology
of health and illness and construes the body's self-healing
properties as crucial (Item 20 = +6), and 'letting nature take
its course .' (Item	 70	 = +6) the best response to minor
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illness. Disease organisms play an important role, evidenced, for
example, by comments made in response to Item 43 (about public
health measures having contributed more to improvements in health
than medical discoveries = +4)
"Yes, although it depends what discoveries you mean. Insulin, for
example, and kidney machines save many lives, as have the drugs
like antibiotics that are real 'magic bullets ( against same of
the major killers:"
Other aspects of this account concerned with the biological
origins of ill-health were repeated mentions of the damaging
effects of substances such as tobacco, asbestos and particularly
food additives. Not surprisingly, given that Participant 27 is a
dietitian, food is seen as very important to health (Item 55 =
+5) even mental health. For instance, she commented about Item 4
(that mental illness are forms of weakness):
"More likely to be the product of stressful environment,
biochemical imbalance, food Intoleramoelallergy, vitamin/mineral
deficiencies."
This biological model of aetiology is consistent with this
account accepting, unlike all but one of the other accounts (See
Table 5.2), that illness is sometimes no more than a matter of
load luck' (Item 7 = +2). Health is not just a matter of luck,
though
"But if nutritional status good, this will go a long way to
giving protection from colds, cancer, heart disease and organ
malfunction. However difficult for me to determine the case re
infectious diseases, insect bites and the like."
However, despite the stress on infection, the account does not
present medicine as a panacearwith -therapeutic achievements
denied (Item 6 = -2), and treatment as sometimes doing more harm
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bodily appearence worry about body - aches and pains or
appe.arance.1'.
When the themes of biological mechanisms and moral culpability
are brought together, what seems to emerge is an image of the
body almost as a kind of warrior, beset by bugs and toxins
against which it has to build up defences and fight. Staying
healthy is a constant battle against a variety of forces, which
must be waged by sensible defensive actions (e.g. inoculations ),
sensible precautions (not smoking, and having a good diet) and
perhaps most importantly, by not "giving in' to worry or the
temptations of the sick role. Curative medicine, while a source
of after-the-event palliatives and preventive measures, can be
dangerous, not just because it causes iatrogenic disease, but
because it beguiles people into a false sense of being "let off
the hook' and not needing to care for themselves.
This then, is an account which is founded on a belief in
individualistic 'internal control' as is Account 2. However, it
differs from Account 2 in three critical aspects. First, it sees
the individual as (in control' by way of their actions rather
than their mental state. Second, whereas Account 2 gave strong
impressions of internality as 'what is' (i.e. an attribution of
causality), Account 4 implies internality as (What should be'
(i.e. a proscriptive formulation). Finally, it stresses
prevention rather than treatment of illness, and in particular
the preventive actions taken by individuals to protect their own
health rather than relying on medical intervention.
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5.3.5 The account identified by Factor 5 
Unfortunately, although two participants provided exemplificatory
Q sorts, for this factor, only one (Participant 43) sent in
comments. It is the account among all nine which most strongly
and consistently supports biomedicine. Within this account,
modern therapeutic achievements have made major
contributions to health care (Item 6 = +6), and modern drugs to
fighting disease (Item 22 = +5). We are fortunate to live in a
world of medical excellence (Item 44 = +5), doctors do not just
treat symptoms (Item 9 = -3) and medical treatment does not do
more harm than good	 (Item 13 = -4), against which Participant
43 wrote
"No, proper medicine is still the best if you have something
seriously wrong with you."
Of all the accounts it is the one which regards medicine most as
a science (Item 3 = +3), stressing the technological expertise of
doctors (Item 79 = +4) not 'bedside manner ( (Item 25 = -5). It is
noticeable that this account does not (as all but one of the
other accounts do) construe the body's defences as important
(Item 20 = 0), although there is mild endorsement for letting
nature take its course with minor illnesses (Item 70 = +2).
However, the account also stresses personal responsibility (Item
61 = +3), health in adulthood depending upon building up a
robust constitution when young (Item 39 = +4), and more care in
adulthood able to prevent many of the illnesses of old age (Item
74 = +3). Many people suffer from illnesses caused by their own
bad habits (Item 41 = +6) and the worst off in our society do
have choice about the unhealthy lives they lead (Item 48 = -4).
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Participant 43 /s comments were
"Yes health is linked to way of life and money but some people
can never be educated into health care no matter how well off."
(about Item 19).
"But we have the responsibility to maintain our own health. Some
people feel it up to others to make them healthy." (about Item
21).
"Education helps but people have a choice, they may not use the
knowledge to their advantage." (about Item 48).
The following additional item was suggested
"Some people don't want to participate in their treatment, they
should be educated to the contrary."
However, responsibility involves making your own decisions
When it comes to medical treatment patients should not be
expected to follow their doctor's orders (Item 1 = -6). The
comment added here was
"Patients should decide if the advice is in their best interests:
Similarly with regard to. inoculations (Item 65 = -2) Participant
43 commented
"The patient should assess the risks involved and decide
accordingly:
And the following item was suggested as another addition
"Doctors should explain the aims of treatment more to patients to
ensure their co-operation."
Overall the flavour is one of frustration; modern medicine has a
lot to offer, and there is a great deal of sound scientific
knowledge available to inform us about how to look after
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ourselves. But there are a lot of people around who are either
too ill-educated to take notice, or are stubborn, and won't do
what's best for themselves. People should draw upon medical
advice and technical skill, but ultimately the buck rests with
the individual, and each of us must decide for ourselves about
health care, treatment and lifestyle. This account has parallels
with Account 4 in the previous study, in its support for modern
medicine, but adds a sense of annoyance that given its benefits,
many people take little heed of the advice offered by medical
professionals, and often expect others to "make them well' or
make decisions for them rather than taking the responsibility for
themselves. It also shows some similarities to Account 4 in this
study, in its stress upon the individual's duty to take care of
themselves, but takes a less sympathetic view of people who do
not. However, whereas Account 4 in this study stresses
prevention and the body's self-healing capabilities, Account 5
sees the individual as needing to use the resources biomedicine
has to offer.
5.3.6 The account identified by Factor 6 
According to this account, ill-health is a product of the
injustices between rich and poor (Item 19 = +5), capitalism is
inherently anti-health (Item 45 = +5) and the worst off have
little choice about the unhealthy lives they lead (Item 48 =
+5). The Government is more concerned with tobacco revenues than
people's health (Item 58 = +4), information about improving diet
has been suppressed because of lobbying by the food industry
(Item 62 = +3) and health foods and jogging suits are just more
ways to persuade people to spend money (Item 53 = +5). Although
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in these respects it parallels the 'cultural critique' of Account
1, it is much closer overall to the critique Ehrenreich (op cit)
labelled the politico-economic. It construes health as a
fundamental human right (Item 21 = +6) and agrees that doctors
have a moral duty to support nuclear disarmament (Item 32 =
+6), statements which Account I regards as naive.
It is when responses to modern medicine are compared between
Accounts 1 and 6, however, that the distinction between the
'cultural and politico-econamic critiques is most apparent
Factors
1	 6
6. Modern therapeutic achievements (like
heart
	
transplants)	 are	 important	 -6	 +3
contributions to progress in health care.
8. Fringe medicine is a dangerous
intrusion on proper health care. 	 -3	 +2
13. Many forms of medical treatment today
seem to do more harm than good.	 +3	 -4
17. Treating people as 'mentally ill' is
often a means by which society controls	 +5	 0
those who don't conform.
22. Modern drugs have made a major
contribution to fighting disease.	 -3	 +3
43. Adequate food, better housing and
proper drains have done more to improve 	 +6	 -3
our health than all the medical
discoveries of the last 100 years.
44. We are fortunate to live in a world
of medical excellence - skilled surgery, 	 -2	 +2
highly trained professional care etc.
While Account 1 is critical of modern medicine, Account 2 accepts
it as a benign and effective response to ill-health. Thus
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whereas the 'cultural critique' of Account 1 perceives of medicine
as a socially constructed institution of hegemonic power, Account
6 distinguishes between, on the one hand, the power heirarchy and
self-servingness of the State within a capitalist system, and on
the other, the practice of healing as an inequitably allocated
but essentially benign resource.
However, Account 6 also introduces a more (personal ( element into
the (political ( discourse described by Ehrenreich. As with
Account 4, Account 6 uses several of the stronger (disagree'
allocations in the Q sort to deny personal blame for ill health
(Item 40 = -4), that illness is weakness (Item 37 = -4), or that
illness can be a response to unpleasantness (Item 33 = -5).
Together with several comments (e.g. in response to Item 4 about
mental illnesses being no more than .'weakness", beside which
Participant 69 wrote "Mental illness is not just
hypochondria").
In combination, then, Account 6 (like Account 3) operates
within the domains of the social and the individual, expressing
a politico-economic analysis of ill-health as the product of
social disadvantage and the inequitable distribution of the
benefits of modern medicine, a perception of illness as (real"
rather than socially constructed, and a denial of self-blame for
any ill health that may occur.
5.3.7 The account identified by Factor 7 
This account, exemplified by the Q sort of Participant 37,
emphasises the psychological aspects of health and illness. Being
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fit and well depends as much on • state of mind' as on the
functioning of the body (Item 10 = +6), treatment that uses
''therapy of the mind .' should be used much more widely (Item 24 =
+6). Participant 37's comments also repeatedly took up this
theme
"Yes, but more room should be made for psychological and social
understanding of treatment' (about Item 3),
"Doctors and practitioners need sane psychological training and
training in social problems" (about Item 9),
"Often going to the doctor and easing your mind can make you feel
better' (about Item 26).
"I believe that it could be a state of mind leading to .a
deterioration physically." (about Item 31).
"Yes I believe a positive attitude aids recovery," (about Item
36).
"And having a happy healthy state of mind". (about Item 47).
She suggested the following additions
"Doctors should have more psychiatric and psychological training."
"Doctors cannot understand the social problems underlying some
mental illnesses unless they have actually worked in the
olammmity:"
Overall this account portrays modern medicine as a support
system a person can use to relieve painful symptoms and tackle
infection; but feels that the medical profession does not
sufficiently understand the psychological and social factors seen
as very important in causing and exacerbating illness.
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5.3.8 The account identified by 'actor 8 
This account expresses similar 'political' values to Account 6
improved health depends on resolving social injustice (Item 19 =
+6), good health is a fundamental human right (Item 21 = +5) and
doctors have a moral duty to support nuclear disarmament (Item
32 = +5). It also expresses similar (though less strong)
approval of modern medicine (Item 6 = +2, Item 13 = -2, Item 22 =
+2). However, unlike the mechanistic perception of the body
within Account 6, within Account 8 psychological aspects are more
important, endorsing 'therapy of the mind' (Item 24 = +5) and
rejecting the idea that technical expertise is more important in
a doctor than personal qualities (Item 79 = -5).
However, possibly the most interesting grouping of allocations
for this account are those which have to do with personal
responsibility. Unlike the others, Account 8 consistently gives
positive allocations to these items
Factors
8	 the rest
33. If people are unpleasant to me it can
have the effect of making me ill
37.1 can't help seeing illness as a "weak-
ness" in myself and in others
40. When I'm ill I feel as though in some
way I'm to blame
51. When I'm ill I don't just feel pain and
discomfort, I feel less of a person
+6	 +1 to -6
+4	 -1 to -5
+4	 0 to -6
+2	 0 to -6
Account 8 asserts that emotion can lead to physical illness, as
indicated by Participant 37's comments :
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"Stress caused by major emotional upheaval can cause real health
problems:' (about Item 31)
"Oh yes, makes me physically sick!' (about Item 33).
The notion of illness being something that is learned is
strongly rejected by Account 8 (Item 29 = -6) (Comment from
Participant 37 : "no, crap"). This combination of emotional but
unlearned causes of physical illness imply a psychodynamic model
of aetiology. It is, however, very different from Account 2
which, while adopting psychodynamic terminology, stresses the
ability of the individual to use their resources of (mind(
purposively. While therapies like relaxation (Item 24 = +5) and
the (will to live ( (Item 30 = +3) can aid recovery from illness,
Account 8 construes little benefit in treating illness as a
(challenge' (Item 36 = -3).
Account 8 combines the "personal' and the (political' as does
Account 6, but contrasts markedly in its model of aetiology, and
notions of (blame'. These distinctions are examined in more
detail in Section 5.5.
5.3.9 The account identified by Factor 9 
Within this account, health is highly valued (Item 47 = +6, Item
57 = -4), and illness not inevitable (Item 2 = -6). People should
take responsibility for their own health (Item 61 = +5) and
preventive measures like inoculations (Item 65 = +5) and
fluoridation of the water supply (Item 76 = +5) are important.
Illness is a result of the stress and pollution of (modern life'
(Item 16 = +6). Like Account 2, Account 9 rejects the idea that
health and illness are products of injustice (Item 19 = -3), or
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that the worst off have little choice (Item 48 = -5). This
account on more sites control in the individual, evidenced by
strong rejection of the idea that doctors have a moral duty to
support disarmament (Item 32 = -6). The comment made by
Participant 38 was
"No - freedom must be regarded as paramount to life, difficult as
this choice may be."
Several of the comments stress this theme of personal autonomy,
such as the response to Item 23 (that people should be allowed to
"die with dignity ( ). Explaining his 0 placement for this item in
the Q sort, Participant 38 wrote
"Agree, but the decision must always be the individual's right,
not society 's'.
Although the Q sample provided few opportunities to express this
view, the impression given is that for Account 9 accounting for
health and illness is less salient than the principle of
individual freedom. However, this is not extended to freedom to
damage one's own health (Item 60 = -1), about which Participant
38 commented
"Only if they feel free to pay the costs too ! It's my taxes that
pay for their treatment, and I object."
Some of the other comments were particularly interesting in the
perception they presented of medicine itself. In response to Item
14 (doctors only recommend surgery when it's really necessary =
-3) Participant 38 wrote
"Wish that this were true, but they have their own livelihoods to
consider, and won't diagnose themselves out of a job."
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And in response to Item 61 (people should take responsibility for
their own health) he wrote
"Which includes private health care and insurance. If people had
to pay for their treatment, they would lock after themselves a
lot better."
The comments make it clear that within this account, health is an
'investment ( which can (and should) be insured, and health care
little more than a business in which medical professionals are
engaged. Patients are consumers, as indicated by the comment made
about Item 1 (patients should follow doctor's orders = +1)
"Having consulted an expert, of course it makes sense to follow
his(sic) advice. That's what he's paid for. But second opinions
should be sought in cases of uncertainty."
5.4 NEMITIMMEAMICUNT SUMMARIES
Once the accounts had been identified and initially interpreted,
summaries were written for each one and these were printed and
sent out to people who had provided exemplificatory Q sorts,
together with a short questionnaire asking participants to
comment a) to what extent they were reasonably accurate summaries
of the accounts they had expressed, b) whether anything crucial
had been left out, and c) their views about the other accounts.
-. 1 .Subsequently six of these people were also interviewedMaterials
used for this stage are shown in Appendix 7, and a sample
interview report in Appendix 8. The main motive for the
interviews was to gain more accurate descriptions of the
alternative accounts. These, agreed by negotiation, are listed in
Figure 5.1.
1 : Attempts were made to interview at least one person for
each Factor (i.e. one of the people who had provided an exem
plificatory Q sort), but for a number of reasons, it was only
possible to interview these six .(e.g. Some people were on
leave, others had family problems).
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Figure 5.1 Summaries of the accounts identified from the Q sort
and negotiated with participants 
Account la
Issues concerning health are fundamentally to do with politics
and economics; with the way the rich and powerful exploit and
oppress the weak. The most common cause of ill-health in our
society, but particularly in the Third World, is poverty, with
the poorest and weakest deprived of the resources needed to be
healthy, and forced to live and work in conditions which are
unhealthy. The medical profession is part of the self-serving
establishment, who generally push for their own personal
advancement rather than meeting the real needs of their patients;
treating symptoms, not the underlying causes of illness, and
diverting funds to high-technology, high status areas (which
often, in fact, do more harm than good) rather than offering the
basic, good health care that people really need. Health
professionals are increasingly trying to take over our lives and
tell us what to do. In fact modern medicine makes very little
contribution to good health - more has been achieved in the last
100 years - in the West - by drains, clean water and better
housing than by all the 'breakthroughs' and marvels of medical
science. Capitalism is inherently anti-health : drug companies
are primarily concerned with profits; industry geared to
cost-efective production at the cost of bad working conditions
and pollution; 'big business' continues to aggressively market
tobacco, alcohol and junk food irrespective of the damage they
are known to do to health. And the recent fad for 'health'
products is more a matter of persuading people to spend more on
expensive food and fashionable jogging suits than actually
promoting health itself.
Account lb
I see my health in terms of my position as a woman living in a
patriarchial society in which I am disadvantaged and oppressed by
a Nan-made world in which I, like all women, am bound to loose
out. The medical profession is one of the major institutions
of patriarchial power, which : trivialises the health problems
women face; imposes so-called "treatment" (e.g. high technology
childbirth) to gain greater dominance over women's bodies; and
uses diagnosis (e.g. of lesbianism as a 'sickness') as a form of
social control. Anyway, in a partiarchial society dominated by
men, I must eat their food, breathe their air, walk their
streets, suffer their violence and put up with their conditions
of employment; in such a world I have far more important and
productive things to do than worry about my personal health.
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Account 2
Health is to do with the "whole person' - being ill or well
involves mind as well as body, and treatment for illness depends
a lot on the warmth, understanding and personal commitment of the
doctor. Medicine is not a 'science' (though science has taught us
a lot) but an ''art", based upon human qualities and human
sympathy by a group of people dedicated to helping others.
Medicine is a "calling' - it's not about making money, gaining
fame or having an easy life - quite the opposite ! Compared with
other professions it's very hard work, and its rewards lie in
contributing to the wellbeing of others, and the alleviation of
illness and suffering. The body has tremendous powers to heal
itself and function properly; often a doctor's main role is
merely to promote this self-healing. However, individuals have a
lot of control over their own health. Anybody can improve their
health, given the will to do so. Health is outside of politics.
While it may be true that in countries like Russia mental illness
is used as a means of social control that's not true here.
Indeed, it is within democratic and free societies like our own
that new drugs and improved health care have been made available
to all - capitalism promotes health by providing the incentive
for new discoveries, the resources to fund our Health Service,
and the high living standards upon which basic good health is
built.
Account 3
Good health is a fundamental human right; being healthy is a lot
more than simply not being ill - it has to do with a positive
sense of wellbeing, emotionally and spiritually as well as
physically. Good health is extrerrely important - only when you
are healthy can you enjoy what life has to offer. What is more,
we each have considerable control over our own health - people
can make major improvements in their health by taking sufficient
exercise, eating a sensible diet, avoiding too much alcohol, by
giving up smoking, and seeking out less stressful lifestyles.
Health education is crucial. The worst off in our society tend to
be the least healthy, in part because they have fewer resources
(e.g. for good food, adequate housing) in part because poverty is
stressful, but primarily because they lack knowledge about
healthy living and healthy child care. Our Health Service is
essentially a good one, though it stresses modern hospital
medicine to the detriment of preventive and community care. We
need to re-allocate NHS resources, putting less money into
unnecessary drugs, high-tech equipment and expensive operations,
and more into primary care, education and health promotion.
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Account 4
Sensible people don't get obsessed about health. They take proper
care of themselves by eating a proper balanced diet, taking
sufficient exercise, not smoking and drinking only in moderation
- but they don't take this to extremes, and remember that there
are other more important things in life like good relationships
with their families and satisfying and fulfilling work. Our
bodies are pretty good at fighting off disease, particularly now
that we can get ourselves innoculated against the real killers of
the past, so it's just not worth worrying about the odd germ we
are likely to meet sooner or later - there's not very much
anybody can do about that. What matters most is approaching life
with determination, and if you are unfortunate enough to get
struck by illness, making the best of it and doing all you can to
overcome it - not giving up and becoming morbid.
Account 5
We are fortunate to live in a world of medical excellence which
provides an effective service to keep people healthy, and cure
tham when they are ill. The problem, unfortunately, is that all
too often people don't benefit from what modern medical science
has to offer because of their subborness, laziness or sheer
unwillingness to participate fully in their treatment.
Consequently an individual's state of health is essentially a
product of their willingness to look after themselves, take
advice, stick to healthy habits and take responsibility for
themselves. It's true that some people are born with a robust
constitution whereas others may have certain weaknesses, and the
worst off may not have the opportunities or the education that
others have. But basically, everyone has a duty to accept
responsibility for their own health, and will Only be healthy if
they do so.
Account 6
Everybody has a right to good health. Unfortunately, our society
is one which denies it to many, failing to provide them with the
income or the resources to live in a healthy way, and, by a
system of private medicine and privilege, offering one standard
of health care to the rich, and another to the poor. The worst
off must live in housing and work in environments which are
unhealthy, and drug companies and the like put profits before the
needs of sick people. Illness is the result, more often than not,
of disadvantage. Modern medicine is something of which we should
be proud - it offers the opportunities for people in our society
to recieve a high standard of care and treatment when they are
ill. The trouble is, particularly now that the NHS is being
starved of funds, only a few can benefit from what is available.
A far greater proportion of our national resources should go into
the NHS, and its system of distribution should be made much more
equitable. A good start could be made by spending less on nuclear
weapons, and getting rid of private medicine.
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Account 7
To understand what constitutes "health" and what causes 'illness'
we need to take account of the psychological and social factors
involved. Health has as much to do with the mind and the spirit
as with the body, and often the reassurance of talking about
your troubles with a sympathetic and compassionate doctor will
do more good than anything else. Doctors should have much more
training in psychology and psychotherapy, and more contact with
the communities in which their patients live. So much illness
is the result of distress - ill-treatement, depression and worry
so often lead to illness that although modern medicine can
provide a great deal that is useful and effective, to work
optimally it needs to be combined with an understanding of the
psychological aspects of illness, and techniques which muster our
psychological resources for recovery and wellbeing.
Account 8
Illness occurs in two ways; it can be the simple process of
infection or bodily dysfunction, or it can be a response to
emotional distress, the physical manifestation of inner feelings
and conflicts. Feelings of contentment and happiness promote
health and wellbeing. Feelings of powerlessness and unhappiness
drain the body of its energy and capacity to resist disease,
and feelings of anger show themselves as physical pain and
sickness. Conflicts and unpleasantness make people ill. When you
feel good about yourself, loved and cared for, then you are able
to fight off infection, your body functions smoothly and you
experience wellbeing. When you feel bad about yourself, unloved,
uncared for, aggressed against, then you are dis-eased, your body
showing as illness the turmoil inside. Illness can be a
manifestation of anger. your body telling you what you want and
need, in ways you may be unwilling to admit, not just to yourself
but to others.
Account 9
Each individual has the absolute right to decide for themselves
about matters that affect them. Hence we should encourage things
like private medicine, and where health services are offered,
people should be free to chose what they want, and indeed, refuse
them if that's what they prefer. People are entitled to take
risks with their own health they want to, as long as they don't
expect other people to bear the costs. In Britain we have a very
healthy society - much healthier than Communist countries where
people have very little choice, and must accept the treatment the
State offers. Here we have the ability to select medical care
much like any other professional service - to chose our doctor,
obtain second opinions, to buy whatever expertise we want. I
reject ideas about inequality in health, and deprived people
having little choice. We all have a lot of choice about the lives
we lead, and many of the worst off in our society could be a lot
healthier if they chose to spend their money more wisely, and
organise their lives more sensibly.
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5.4.1 Support for account sympatricity 
However, the interviews also provided valuable information about
the accounting process as perceived by the participants. Each of
the interviewees (representatives providing exemplificatory Q
sorts for all factors except 4, 7 and 9) all confirmed that the
account defined by their Q sort did provide an account which
broadly expressed their viewpoint (with minor changes negotiated
for some of them). Indeed, several of the interviewees expressed
surprise about how well they did reflect their overall views.
Participant 20, for example, said
"I was rather distrusting and a bit irritated by the Q sort - it
took me an awful long time to do, and I did wonder about its
purpose. But I'm pleasantly surprised, I have to admit, about the
result - you have been surprisingly good at encapsulating.
Like most of the rest, he also said
... and I was fascinated by the other viewpoints ... it has
really made me take stock and realise just haw differently people
see things, ... just how many different ways there are of looking
at the same topic ... but even (more) ... interestingly, I can
see descriptions that feel familiar. Account 9 for example,
describes very well the way I feel sometimes, and I know I have
used this argument..."
And, as Participant 53 put it
"I can read each of these and think (Yes, such and such a person
I know thinks like that' or recognise the description. Like
viewpoint three, it reads like a manifesto from something like
the Health Education Council."
What was very clear indeed was that each of the interviewees had
very definite views about each of the accounts. Some they felt
sympathy with, in part at least. Some they rejected, often as
(simplistic ( or (naive ( or because they saw them as stressing
aspects that were to them unimportant or too extreme; some in
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very antagonistic terms, as plain wrongminded. But perhaps most
interestingly, several said that the summary of their own Q
factor lacked "depth" without reference to one or more of the
others. For example, Participant 48 wrote about hers
"I agree with all of it, but on its own it lacks a definite
political and economic dimension:
And in her interview said
"I suppose what I"m saying is that while number three does sum up
my views very well, I am also very much in sympathy with a lot of
number one, and need to bring that in to give a balanced picture
... both are true for me, though I find number one a little bit
extreme, and if pushed would have to say that number three is not
so much a matter of being more accurate as being more optimistic
and practicable ... I agree with most of number one, but on its
own find it depressing... it's what I focus on when I'm feeling
depressed, whereas number three is how I feel whan I'm optimistic
and feel something could be done, and should be done to ...
improve (matters) ... but if you'd got me on a bad day, I suspect
... I would have been a number one. That's me when I'm fed up and
angry."
Later in the interview she commented
"I am also very aware that that's (Account 5) the way I used to
think ... at school we were brought up on stories about the
wonders of medical science, and when I started my training I was,
like, full of a white hot enthusiasm ... that I would become a
nurse and would make people well because of all the wonderful
things medicine could do ..."
The account descriptions came over to many people as very clear
and definite, yet rather too 'mat' to be 'true to life'. They
commented that they were "very self-contained", "more
single-minded than I think most people actually think" and "a
bit too articulate". The impression given was of people having a
commitment to a dominant account which represents "the way I
usually think' but is, on its own, overly simple and coherent
compared with the experience of thinking, which is much more
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muddled and contrary; to reflect this complexity, people were
aware of often dipping into and out of several other accounts,
often in somewhat contradictory ways. As Participant 53 put it
"I think it demonstrates that I've got a sort of rag-bag of ideas
that are sometimes in conflict with each other."
5.4.2 Identification of accounts, not classification, of people 
These impressions, together with the whole ethos of Q
methodology, reiterate that the results of this study must not be
seen as parallel to either a psychometric or ethnographic
investigation. As Brown (1980) stressed
... we are not generally interested in what particular persons
rendered a viewpoint - the same factors could probably have been
gotten from other subjects - but in the ways in which the various
viewpoints themselves differ." (P 238).
The study did not seek to describe what participant X or Y or Z
(thought", what their 'attitudes" or 'beliefs' were - and these
data do not describe participants' accounting in those terms.
Rather, the aim was to identify and define some of the many
accounts to which people have access. In this it appears to have
been very successful, certainly in terms of the participants'
responses; for them at least the data obtained offered
clarification and a means to achieve a better understanding of
the accounts available for thinking, expressing opinions,
arguing with and listening to others. Participan1t53 said
"It has really made me think, and re-examine my own opinions and
ideas, first when I did the Q sort and was put on the line, that
was very hard indeed, and it forced me to, well really make very
difficult choices between my own inconsistencies. Though reading
the viewpoints was more illuminating, as it ... gave me something
to grasp onto ... I think I have a lot clearer picture now of my
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own thinking and of the way other people think ... what really
surprised rre was that all of them were recognisable, all of
them made sense, even though some of them I disagreed with a lot."
5.5 DISCUSSICN AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Section I will first examine the accounts that have
been identified - as accounts - and explore the implications
they have for our understanding about the way people account for
health and illness in our society. Subsequently, I will review
these data in terms of what they have to offer to a theory of
accounting.
The first point to be made is that unlike other studies (notably
those described in Chapter 2) which have tended to identify just
two or three alternative themes or images or viewpoints, this
one has identified nine which differed not just in their
endorsement or rejection of particular propositions, but in the
salience they attribute to different aspects of the topic of
health and illness. It reflects a principle from Kellian theory
that what may be salient to one account is unimportant to
another. Q method, in its focus on account sympatricity and in
offering people the opportunity to specify salience, is able to
Abduce a taxonomy of accounts about a particular topic that is
much more wideranging than with approaches that assume salience
a priori and assume greater consensus.
This is both its appeal and its drawback, for while it gives
access to account diversity that is informative and fascinating,
it also places heavy cognitive loads on the researcher and the
reader. Reports of studies like those described in Chapter 2 are
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made easier to write and to read because they limit account
descriptions to just two or three. With nine accounts identified,
it is much more difficult to "get a handle on ( the data from
Study 2. The discussions and analyses that follow are intended to
make this task easier, while not (doing violence ( to the accounts
themselves by imposing too much further analysis and
classification. Within Q methodology it is the analyses and
classification that people impose upon a particular concourse of
propositions that are the focus for study, and it is not the job
of the researcher to re-analyse these further, but to seek to un-
derstand them better.
5.5.1 Alternative explanations for health and illness 
All of the accounts do offer explanations for health and illness
- explanations of why people are healthy or well, what makes them
ill, and, when they are ill, what makes them recover. This is,
however, nowhere as simple as some theorists have assumed it to
be. The consensual rejection of Item 50, that illness can be a
punishment for misdeeds, places all nine of the accounts outside
of a (personalistic' framework (See Chapter 1). However, even
within each account there is no straightforward distinction
between, say, endogenous and exogenous ascriptions of cause.
Probably the best known and most frequently used classification
is the version of this proposed by Wallston and Wallston (1981)
who, working from the notion of general locus of control
developed by Rotter (1966), argue that people differ in their
attributions of the site of control over health and illness,
dividing between those who see the site as one of 'internal
control (primarily an individual's own actions) and those for
whom control is sited externally (i.e. determined by the effects
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of chance or fate), more recently extended to include a second
form of (external control', that of "powerful others'.
Figure 5.2 shows a general analysis of the reasons ascribed for
health, illness and recovery for each of the nine accounts,
derived from Q sort placements, comments and interview data. For
not one single one of these could an internal/external health
locus of control classification be applied - all combine both
aspects. However, more detailed analysis does show that some
accounts at least, for some aspect of health/illness/recovery,
tend to favour one or the other.
Beginning with an analysis of the ascribed reasons for health,
shown in Figure 5.3, it can be seen that a wide range of
reasons are attributed by the accounts overall: some, like
behaviour, mind, heredity and the body's own defences, arising
from within the individual; others like chance, social policy
and medical advances, arising from outside of the individual.
Account 1, as shown in Figure 5.4 can be seen to focus on reasons
outside of the individual - external control - with the major
emphasis placed upon social forces that exploit and oppress the
weak, the poor and marginal or minority groups. Thus although
there is recognition, within this account, that health is
affected, for example, by an individual's lifestyle, this
(internal .' element is seen as largely determined by social forces
which enable some the freedom to adopt a healthy lifestyle, but
deny this option to many.
In contrast, Account 2, as shown in Figure 5.5, can be seen to
Figure 5.2. Attributions for health, illness and recovery
Account Reasons for
Good health
Reascns for illness
and bad health
Things that affect or
bring about recovery
Reasonable living Pollution, stress, poverty Fundamental changes
1 conditions, adequate and exploitation within a in the way society
food, clean water and
proper drains
capitalist & partriarchial
system; unnecessary and
often harmful medical
treatment & its use for
social control
is organised
2
Positive state of mind,
the high living standards
capitalism makes possible,
looking after yourself.
Stress from things like
life pressures; illness
becoming 'away of life'
The will to live
Modern drugs
Reasonable living cond- Pollution, poverty The body's own defences
3 itions, adequate food,
clean water and drains;
Government policies &
aggressive marketing
good medical care, both
conventional and from
positive state of mind
adopting a healthy life-
style; prevention
of tobacco, alcohol
and unhealthy food
alternative medicine
.
4
Preventive measures
like fluoridation &
Disease organisms,
not following a
The body's own defences
boosted by inoculations
innoculation, taking course of treatment the reassurance of the
responsibility for
yourself, not worrying
properly, bad luck doctor,the will to live
and seeing illness as a
too much about illness -.
	
.	
_	 _	 ..____. ._
Genetic predisposition Bad habits Modern drugs
5 Taking care of yourself Medical treat-
ment, alternative
therapies-
Taking responsibility Poverty	 and neglect Access to good
6 for yourself, adopting
a healthy lifestyle &
looking after yourself
and aggressive marketing
of things like tobacco
alcohol ,and trendy health
products
medical care
Positive state of mind Bad habits Modern drugs
7 Preventive measures like
inoculations, adopting a
healthy lifestyle
Medical treat-
ment, body's own
defences
State of mind, taking Labelling of mental Therapies of the
8 proper exercise and illness as a form of 'mind', medical
leisure, a vegetarian
diet, medical advances
social control treatment
Preventive measures like Stress and pollution Freedom to buy
9 fluoridation and inoc-
ulations; taking respcns-
ibility for yourself; the
the high living standards
capitalism makes possible
of modern life and choose good
medical care
250
	U) 	 tn
	
a)	 4	 a/
	
COO	 -H	 u)
	
@	 -P
	
(T5
4	 a)
Ts
tn4 u)
.4-	 LH -1-1
4-1 0 rEi
(1)
r§
z
-1-1
-P
E3I >1 >-1-414-1
-1-1 T-11
U).--I0
44 r2 it 4
4-4 Ell
(1.)
.4
A 8 ›,
-P
CO
-.4
r-I
-H
U) 4
-H a) w tn -1-1	 44
4-)
ni
.5
'4Bi g -5(1) I—IN
—	
-.- .... —
u) 44	 r 0
S W •	 '5
r0
> 75
-.4 -
()	 .-I
t31 4	 CD
Z
"g
4-1 -P
-.-1	 -r-1(04 J0-P 4-1 P00
4 Q	 u)
,..	 (1)	 P	 2co000
2 1	 'GI a iti 4 3 E-1	 44	 >-1
aij	"g	 u)4
0
a)	 -14
>-. a)
4-1	 ty, 4 .-1	
>	 -1-)
-.-1 u)	 ITS
0	 1:::n	 1-1	 g -1-1 >I	 -P a)	 .-1
-H	 4	 a)	 -.4 .-I 4-1	2 O	 p
...._ ›(ES	 :.0 $(51 ul — -W it u) — Cr W -H
	
p.1 al CU	 g >	 a.) 415
8-	
•0 4 44	 -.-1 (1) P ..- H
rO
N-1 ("6 0>1 -H(13 rd 1-1 u)	 W -Hp Cal u) 1-1 -
- H
-P
251
252
253
focus upon influences arising from within the individual -
internal control. Here the emphasis is upon individuals' own
behaviour - looking after themselves, and taking opportunities to
boost their body's defences by being immunised, by positive
attitudes, and as a product of the natural defences of their own
bodies. While external influences like good living conditions are
seen to be salient (in this analysis, made possible within the
wealth provided by capitalism) the stress is firmly laid upon
internal control - health comes primarily from within.
However, not all the accounts by any means ascribe influences
primarily in one domain or the other. Explanations for why
people become ill are particularly widely spread, those arising
from within the individual including behaviour (e.g. bad habits,
not following courses of treatment properly), mind (e.g. negative
attitudes, worry and stress) and heredity; those from outside
including chance, other people, disease organisms, products of
social forces (e.g. pollution from industrial waste, the
aggressive marketing of tobacco and alcohol) and medical
intervention (e.g. iatrogenic illness). These are shown in Figure
5.6
As an example of how both external and internal influences are
seen to play important roles, Figure 5.7 shows how Account 3
combines the two. It identifies behaviour as crucial - illness is
seen to be a product of such things as smoking, a poor diet,
drinking alcohol to excess, taking insufficient exercise etc.
However, it also identifies a range of external influences
arising as the product of social forces, which encourage such bad
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habits; for instance, the aggressive marketing of tobacco clearly
has an impact upon smoking, as too do pressures from such
socially determined life circumstances as unemployment, and the
stress caused by overcrowded and damp housing. And it ascribes to
poverty and inequality considerable responsibility for a lack of
health education (also Government policies about resources)
which, for example, exacerbate poor eating habits. Added to all
of these are the impact of pollution and illness-engendering
substances (e.g. food additives) which are seen to have a direct
role in making people ill.
With explanations of recovery, once more some accounts stress
one aspect more than the other. Figure 5.8 illustrates the range
of factors, including those arising from within the individual
such as the body's own mechanisms of defence, and those operating
from outside such as medical treatments. Figure 5.9 shows that
Account 4 stresses the role of internal factors in recovery;
both matters of mind like the (will to live ( and (seeing illness
as a challenge ( and the body's natural immunity boosted by
inoculations. While there is some credence given to external
influences, particularly the reassurance of the doctor, this
presumably is regarded as something which facilitates the
positive attitudes from within that are seen as important.
Account 5, as shown in Figure 5.10, concentrates upon external
factors, with the role of medical therapy (predominantly
orthodox, but also alternative medicine) paramount. While
behaviour is seen as important too, this is largely a matter of
willingness to make use of the curative facilities that medical
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19. We will only improve health overall
when we have overcome injustices between
rich and poor.
48. The worst off have little choice
about the unhealthy lives they lead.
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treatment has to offer. Getting better when you are ill, from
this analysis, is mostly a matter of the medical care you
receive.
5.5.2 Alternative models of society 
Accounts 1 & 6 and 2 & 9 adopt contrasting stances about the
position of the individual in society, as illustrated by their
responses to these items
Accounts
16 29
+6 +5 -5 -3
+5 +5 -2 -5
While several accounts (e.g. Account 4) take issue with these
statements in written comments, and others (e.g. Account 3)
incorporate a level of socio-political analysis, it was only
Accounts 1, 2, 6 and 9 for whom individual/society was the
central theme of their agreement or disagreement in the Q sort.
Figure 5.11 illustrates how these four accounts line up along
this aspect.
All four of these accounts predicate their understanding of
health and illness upon the assumption that lifestyle and
environment have a considerable degree of influence upon health
status. They are all concerned with explanations of how the
interplay between the individual and society affect lifestyles
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and the environment, and therefore affect health. Accounts 2 and
9 site their analyses within a (social functionalist ( or
'pluralistic ( view of society - one which assumes that the
various social or cultural groups who live together in Britain
(i.e. social classes, different genders, different ethnic groups)
co-exist in a functional manner, outside of the scope of the
power relations attributed within the (daninance - or (conflict(
worldview of Accounts 1 and 6. Whereas these latter focus on the
reality-constructs-person view that individuals' choices and life
chances - and consequently health status - are largely
constrained and defined by their social position, the 'structural
functionalists ( focus more upon a person-constructs-reality view
that sees individuals as ultimately able to strive for and choose
their life-styles, living conditions and consequently, therefore,
see health status as a matter of individual decision making and
circumstances. Indeed, individual freedom to choose is at the
very heart of Account 9 (s view of the world, and the uniqueness
of the individual central to Account 2, while the lack of choice
for the most vulnerable and oppressed groups is focal for
Accounts 1 and 6.
But even within these two competing analyses, the data show there
to be strong internal divisions. Between Accounts 2 and 9 the
distinction centres around perceptions of the relationship
between the medical profession and the rest of society, and the
mans of distribution of resources. Within Account 9 medical
professionals are regarded as (body mechanics ( not different in
principle from motor mechanics; traders whose services are paid
for by the consumer, who perform particular tasks of monitoring,
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maintenance and repair. Health care, in this analysis, is a
commodity to be bought and sold, and health an investment to be
protected by sensible after-care and insurance. The limits to
personal freedom are only those that impose damage or unfair
costs on others - where their investment may be threatened.
Within Account 2, however, the task of health care is seen as
much more that of a traditional (profession', with its code of
practice, obligations of service, and gentlemanly disdain of
profit - the image of (Dr Cameron ( who knows each patient as an
individual, and has the wisdom to respond to each of their
individual needs. The contrast has resonances to that between the
lqoa Right" and traditional conservatism. This aspect fg. also ex-
pressed by Account 3, Study 1.
Subsumed under the (dominance' analysis, as has been noted
already, are two contrasting critiques, dependent upon
assumptions about the role of the technological efficacy of
biomedicine, themselves dependent upon a distinction between
essentialist and social constructionist worldviews. For the
essentialist Account 2, the (science ( of medicine, like all
science, is ultimately a neutral analysis of a naturally
occurring reality, within which the practice of medicine is
essentially a neutral response. Diseases, for instance, are
things-out-there that can be observed, diagnosed and treated.
Within this analysis, whatever may be superimposed by, for
example, the impact of professional paternalism, the actual
techniques of medical practice and treatment are seen themselves
to be functional - their purposes are, as they purport to be, to
cure disease, save lives, reduce distress, ameliorate human
anguish. The problem is not in the techniques themselves, or even
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mainly in the way medicine is practiced, but in the way that
resources are allocated. Against a principle that medical care
should be available as a product of need, it is seen by Account 2
to be inequitably distributed, with those who have money,
influence or social skills able to grab a larger slice of the
cake.
Within the social constructionist Account 1, the so-called
(science ( of medicine is a chimera, a cleverly constructed mask
of benign neutrality drawn over the face of medicine as a social
institution, whether that of the medicine-for-profit of the gqoa
Right .', or the patronising humbug of the traditionally
conservative (profession ( of medicine. Diseases are
reifications of the doctor's "medical gaze' (cf Foucault, 1963)
and deeply socially sedimented ascriptions of "disorder" (cf
Dingwal1,1976; Taussig, 1986; Young 1 1980). The problem from this
standpoint is not one of the 'haves' snatching all the goodies,
leaving the pickings for the (have-nots', but the questionable
nature of the 'goodies' themselves - good for whom ?
5.5.3. Alternative assumptions about responsibility and blame 
The tendency to attribute blame to others rather than to events
is, of course, the classic formulation in psychology which arose
from Heider's (1958) work on social perception the
'fundamental attribution error ( (Jones and Nisbett, 1971; ROSS,
1977; Nisbett and Ross, 1980) which connects outcomes with
deservedness; misfortune that occurs to others perceived as a
sign of their blameworthiness (Farr and Anderson, 1983 provide a
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review of this area). However, the acceptance or denial of
self-blame is a much more complex area. Post-misfortune
self-blame (e.g. following accidents, serious illness or the
birth of a sickly or (handicapped' baby) has been noted in a
number of studies (Tennen, Affleck and Gershman, 1986 provide an
extensive review). The explanation usually offered is that
accepting behavioural blame (rather than characterological)
provides reassurance that similar misfortunes are avoidable in
the future.
Tennen et al, note that people differ in their willingness to
blame themselves for illness, and the accounts discovered in this
study demonstrate that not only is ''self-blame ( differentially
endorsed, it is understood differently by different people and
varies in its salience. Accounts 4, 6 and 7 in particular used
extreme allocations in the Q sort to stress their lack of
personal culpability for illness, whereas Account 8 was alone in
accepting it
467
Factors
8
37. I can't help seeing illness as a -5 -4 -2 +4
'weakness' in myself and in others.
40. When Lin ill I feel as though in -6 -4 -5 +4
some way I'm to blame.
51.	 When	 I'm ill I don't just feel -3 -2 -6 +2
pain and discomfort, I feel less of
a person.
However, as before, while Accounts 4, 6 and 7 attribute strong
salience to denying blame, their rationales are quite different.
Account 4 focusses upon the biological aspects of health, and
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therefore agrees that illness can be probabilistically
determined. Comments by Participant 4 (who loaded 0.55 onto
Factor 4) helps to show how the blame/responsibility distinction
operates in this context:
"It's not a matter of kismet or karma, but that given we live
side by side in the world with all manner of bugs, and given the
world is an unpredictable place ... and given that say, genetics
is a probabilistic game, an awful lot of what happens to us,
including disease is just that, happenstance ... nobody and
nothing is to blame ... and so it is as wrong to blame it on "rry
bad luck' as it is to blame it on the weather or the Russians or
the atam bomb."
Within Account 4, the unpredictability about whether or not
disease will strike, and indeed the undesirability of worrying
too much, or allowing oneself to become obsessed with
illness, are not in conflict with taking responsibility. There
are strong parallels with the account to which Cornwell (1984)
clearly gained access in her (public accounts' obtained via
interviews with East Enders
"The moral prescription for a healthy life is in fact a cheerful
stoicism, evident in the refusal to worry or complain or to be
morbid. Taking an interest in health is itself regarded as
morbid..." (Cornwell, 1984 p188).
However, interestingly she also notes that once illness is
mentioned
... the onus on the person giving the account was that of
proving that the illness was "real" and that it was therefore
legitimate for them - or whoever was involved - to be a patient.
The basic requirement was that they should be able to prove the
'otherness' of the illness, i.e. prove that it was a
recognisable and separate entity which had "happened" to the
patient and not something for which they were personally
responsible." (p 189).
This too was extremely close to what is to be found in Account 4,
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particularly about mental illness which was stressed by
Participant 27 as "real" (her emphasis). Within both versions
of the account there is also a strong commitment to the idea
that disease having struck, the individual has a lot of choice
about how they respond - by seeing it as an excuse, or a tragedy
or in fatalistic terms as their 'bad luck", or by treating it as
a challenge, something to be overcome or made the best of.
Cornwell notes that several of her interviewees speaking proudly
of relatives who managed to "keep going' in a happy and cheerful
manner, and disparaging accounts of others who (made a meal" of
their illness and just gave up.
Cornwell argues that this moral proscriptive aspect of the
(public accounts' she observed was a product of a more general
worldview linked to the employment patterns of her working class
respondents in the East End, who had little choice about their
working conditions and could only reject the self-deprecating
label of 'victim' by seeing themselves as stoic hard-workers who
made the best of life. But its very evident parallels to Account
4, expressed here by a professional dietitiansuggest that it is
not a prerogative of the working class to have "hard earned
lives" or operate within a moral system that defends
self-esteem against blame for the misfortunes the person
experiences - by seeing life as a challenge, and illness, within
this context, as something to be borne with fortitude.
Smith, Bruner and White (1964) have specifically linked the
'opinions ( an individual expresses to their (personality' and
suggested that one of the major functions of the holding and
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expressing of particular opinions is their adjustive functions
for the person's self-perception. They rejected the psychodynamic
notion of (ego defence ( , which they saw as overly negative, and
adopted the term "adjustive strategies ( to stress the purposive
and positive functions, a product of continual monitoring against
"reality' on the one side, and (inner requirements on the other.
From this analysis, the kind of moral focus that is central to
both Account 4, and the 'public accounts ( observed by Cornwell,
albeit in rather different socio-economic contexts, can be
interpreted as a rational and highly functional (blueprint for
the world' (Smith et al's term) which empowers the individual to
cope with adversity and maintain self-esteem in troubled
circumstances.
Thus there is no paradox in accepting responsibility but
rejecting blame, indeed they are highly consistent within this
framework, both plausibly motivated by an image of the self as
robust and in control. Indeed, more recent theorisation about the
concepts of "causality', (blame' and (responsibility' (cf
Shaver and Drown, 1986) asserts that they are subjectively
distinct; while people generally do accept responsibility for a
misfortune, they deny blame.
Account 6 rejects blame in a different personal context. The
woman who provided the exemplificatory Q sort summed her
reasoning up succinctly
"I don't get ill very much, only the usual things nobody can
avoid like the odd cold. And I don't feel to blame for that sort
of thing, that would be stupid. It just happens to everybody ...
so when I put those ones there (i.e. placed Items 37 and 40 in
the -4 positions) I think the reason why was that I was objecting
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to the whole idea of illness being something that people should
feel guilty about. I think I was reacting against that
kind of claptrap (Account 8) about people "wanting' to be ill.
It makes me sick ! It's an insult... It's just used as another
way of knocking people." (Participant 69).
As Litton and Potter .. (1985) have argued, people do not merely
account in a vacuum, ignorant of the other discourses expressed
within popular culture. They construct their own accounts, and in
particular, argue their own views in relation to others and
frequently by way of denying or refuting others.
Account 7 's denial of blame seems to have similar 'countering
another account' qualities, although this is more dificult to
interpret given only limited written comments from the one
participant whose Q sort exemplified the Factor, and her
unavailability to be interviewed (because of a family problem at
the time). We did speak briefly by telephone and she gave some
indications of her moral stance. She was a residential social
worker, running a hostel for homeless young-women and was
contacted via Participant 66, a man serving a prison sentence
for serious violent crime, whom she had befriended and visited
regularly.
She commented that she was a devout Christian, and this together
with her work and life experience with many people who would be
regarded as society's "misfits", many of them convicted of
criminal offences, had resulted in a worldview which stressed the
sanctity of life - alone among all the accounts, hers rejected
strongly (-5) the notion that people who are incurably ill
should be allowed to die with dignity (Item 23), and the need for
compassion to all, regardless of their supposed moral failings :
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"My faith stresses love, compassion and respect for the
individual, no matter what they have done. Who are we to make
judgements about others - that is for God, and God alone ... ours
is to support with kindness, irrespective of sin ... to cherish
each of God's people." (Participant 37)
She expressed considerable anger about the way she felt that
doctors in particular acted coldly and judgmentally towards those
who have often experienced severe deprivation and harrowing
childhoods. From this perspective, to place personal blame on
individuals, given the inordinate pressures of their lives, is
morally wrong; it is also wrong in that, from this account,
nobody has the right to judge but God.
Participant 53, whose Q sort exemplified Factor 8, herself gave a
noticeably psychodynamic explanation of the centrality of (guilt(
in her view of the world (See Appendix 8). She spoke at some
length about the way illness was paradoxically treated in her
childhood, particularly by her mother. Her statements read like a
classic (double bind .' in which illness was treated both as
weakness and as a reason for being indulged. But at the base of
her 'guilt ( she suggested was the instillation, in her childhood,
of the principle of service - that the way you show that you love
and care for somebody is to do things for them.
Such a basis for human relationships sows the seeds for a dilemma
that if love = service, then not performing service = retraction
of love. Within this, in classical Parsonian terms, illness
becomes very powerful, for it offers perhaps the only legitimate
reason for withholding service while not being seen to withold
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love. To fail to provide (service' because you don't feel like it
or have something else you would rather do instead reeks of (not
caring (; but if you have a (terrible headache (, or a "stomach
bug' then you can continue to be seen to care, but avoid the
chore. There can be few people who have not at some time
explicitly and guilelessly used illness as an excuse because it
will be accepted as valid in a way that most other excuses will
not, and of course there are strong resonances here with
Herzlich's (1973) (illness-as-release'.
What this account does is to shift the focus of the traditional
analysis of (sick role ( away from its facility to discount social
obligation, and place it into the context of personal
relationships and the emotional meaning attributed to actions.
Where service = obligation, then undoubtedly feelings of guilt
may be engendered when illness, say, prevents the fulfilling of,
say, the obligations of being the breadwinner; but they are all
the more likely to ensue when service = love. This analysis also
makes clear the extent to which psychodynamic ideas have in
Britain, as in France (cf Mbscovici, 1961) entered popular
discourse. Participant 53's reported dialogue with herself when
she was ill shows this well
"I do ask myself (What are you trying to avoid with this headache?'
and wonder just how much I am unconsciously providing myself
with a convenient way out of an embarrassing situation, or
something I don't want to do."
To her, illness can be "... my real and more selfish me,
standing up for myself and saying (110 ( .". She explicitly made the
point that she thought that she was perhaps being "... more
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honest than most" in accepting that she felt blame for her
illness. Most people, she thought, not only sometimes consciously
use illness as an excuse, but often do so unconsciously, and are
just not prepared to admit it, or are insufficiently self-aware
to recognise they are doing it. They reject blame because it is
more comfortable not to face their own more selfish side. In part
accepting blame is a means, within this account, of good
self-presentation - of "...being honest with myself, even though
it's painful". It is also, of course, very functional - for
although one can express "guilt' about the workings of one
unconscious, it isn't something one can control (by definition)
and therefore there is no reason to change !
Thus, like Account 4, Account 8 can be interpreted as
concerned, at least in part, with self-concept, but in this case
in a much more reflexive manner; the introduction of
psychodynamic notions enable the expression of moral issues in a
account which is centrally concerned with the role and power of
personal feelings and emotions. It is this which makes possible,
and indeed makes necessary the acceptance of feelings of "blame"
for illness in a way that Account 4's ascription of illness as
"real" does not. Account 4, in Smith et al's (op cit) terms
adopts an adjustive strategy in which you present yourself as a
stoic who does not "give in' to anything but "real', unavoidable
illness; Account 8's adaptive strategy is to present yourself as
having insight into your deeper motives and feelings and admit
that illness may be serving an emotional function. In the two
accounts concepts like 'weakness' and "guilt' convey quite
different meanings - in one they are self-depreciating
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descriptions that need to be rejected to maintain self-esteem; in
the other they become almost matters of pride that you have
reached sufficiently far along a path of self-discovery to have
acknowledged them.
But in popular discourse, particularly within certain sectors of
our society, psychodynamic concepts offer something more. The key
may lie in Participant 53's use of the term "my real ... me".
An idea that is current within popular versions of psychodynamic
theory, particularly as has been promoted by humanistic
developments, is that manifestations of the unconscious are
routes to understanding aspects of oneself that are more "true"
and (real" than the role performances learned and acted out in
everyday social life. For instance, when she spoke of her "real
me' saying (I10 ( she linked this to an account of her changing
role as a woman
"Like most women of my age, I was brought up to believe that my
role as a wife and mother is to look after others, and to put my
needs and wishes in the background ... but more and more I am
beginning to ... believe that I have needs and wants too that I
have a right to look after."
Within this context, an episode of minor illness (like a
headache) can both be interpreted as a 'healthy' and
desirable unconscious signal which legitimises the indulgence
of a day in bed reading ("my body is telling me what I really
want and need') and yet, as something which raises guilt,
stemming from the conscience instilled by 'Mother" that illness
should not be used to avoid obligations of service to those we
love ( .'my body is telling me I don (t really love my children").
Thus Account 8 is more than just an account of health and illness
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in terms of emotion, but is an (intuitive psychology' (cf Wegner
and Vallacher, 1981; Beelas, 1981 ) incorporating the
principles of psychodynamics into everyday understanding of the
self.
5.5.4. Implications for a theory of accounting 
Overall, then, the alternative accounts can be seen to differ in
terms of at least three aspects of accounting : different
assumptions about what is salient and what is irrelevant;
different explanations of causes, reasons and agents; and
different prescriptions about what should be done, how people
ought to behave, about the allocation of responsibilities and
obligations in terms of assumptions about people's duties and
rights. One of Stephenson (s most recent studies (1987), which
examined alternative interpretations of the Iran hostage crisis,
similarly discovered factors which identified accounts that were
primarily moral or primarily explanatory.
The results of Study 2 demonstrated that accounts differ not just
in their content (i.e. what propositions are assumed to be true
and false), but in the emphasis they place upon the
alternative forms of (understanding' that they offer. For some
explanation is central - meaning is taken-for-granted, and
prescription of minor importance. Account 4 is much like this,
for instance in its explanation of ill-health as the product of
dysfunctional behaviour (lack of education) but its avoidance of
blaming individuals who behave in this way. But while Account 5
shares similar explanatory convictions, it adds on a strong moral
prescription that people should act in the interests of their
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health, and are to blame for illness resulting from their own
stupidity or rigidity. And for Account 1, (meaning ( is central,
concerned to de-construct preconceived assumptions and
reifications rather than seeking to explain what it is,
precisely, that makes a person ill or enables them to recover
from illness.
This variability of focus and salience provide evidence for
Stephenson ( s assertion (1986c) that accounts are
complementary. They cannot be melded one upon the other because
they are "about" quite different things. Further evidence for
account complementarity is the indexicality (cf Barnes and Law,
1976) of the propositions, where meaning alters according to the
context of use. Each alternative account is formulated around
apposing (truths ( regarded as (self-evident (, preventing the
premises of one to be used to argue against the other.
In a recent review of 'ordinary explanations ( (Antaki and
Fielding, 1981) three types of explanations of social actions
were identified : (meaning ( explanations of what an action
denotates, (reason ( explanations of why an action was performed
and "morality ( explanations of their rightness or wrongness.
These three correspond broadly to the three aspects of
accounting discovered in Study 2. However, while the Antaki and
Fielding approach considers them as separate (explanations",
an account is assumed to articulate them in conjunction with each
other. To make sense of the world, an individual needs more than
just access to a motley set of independent explanations about
various aspects of an observation or set of events or ideas;
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these need to be articulated together.
In proposing that accounts are complementary, Q theory is making
a stronger claim than just that people differ in their
understandings of a topic, or in whether they direct their
concern to explaining, to defining meanings, or to moral
analyses. It is asserting that the variability is sympatric - it
portrays accounting as a process of drawing upon a number of
discrete, non-comparable and non-subsumable (storylines ( or
(scripts (
 (Shank and Abelson, 1977). However, along with
discourse analysts like Potter and Wetherell (1987), what is
being argued is not an image of the (person as cognitive miser(
(Taylor, 1981), operating in a (mindless (
 manner (as, say,
attribution theorists like Langer, 1978 suggest), but as an
active and thoughtful selector. Whereas Langer and Taylor assume
that there is usually only a single (script ( available to match a
particular situation, this portrayal is of the person as having a
repertoire of (scripts (
 at their disposal, into which they are
able to dip in and out, both to express and to refute
particular ideas. This (accounting theory (
 will be developed
further in Chapter 8.
5.5.5 Review and prospect 
In this chapter I have described my second, more comprehensive
attempt to identify and describe some of the accounts that
operate in our society concerning health and illness. They have
been found to be diverse and wide-ranging, differing in what they
assume to be salient, both in terms of content and in the kinds
of explanation they stress. Detailed analysis of the accounts
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themselves, and how they relate to eabh other has shown that what
may be an appropriate domain to understand one, is far less
relevant for another. Some, for example Accounts 4 and 8, were
amenable to psychological interpretation they offered
opportunities to examine the functions that accounting can play
in terms of self-presentation and self-concept. Others such as
Accounts 1, 2 and 6 were much more amenable to sociological
interpretation. While an attempt could, in theory, be made to
seek to explain the psychodynamic functions of focussing on
power-relations in Account 1, say, or of the perception of
medicine-as-a-calling of Account 2, within an approach in which
the account itself sets the agenda for interpretation, this is
less appropriate than taking the analytic domains at face-value,
exploring the different perceptions of societal functioning
within a socio-herneneuticframework. Account 1 is proffered as a
sociological discourse; it must be interpreted in those terms.
However, this does pose problems if the aim of enquiry is to
explore the Treason" explanation aspects of an account. Having
established that with reference to a broad concourse (about(
health and illness, accounts differ in the extent to which they
are explanatory, it was decided to shift the research question
into the more specific explanatory domain. The study which will
be described in Chapter 7 does just this. It constrains
the concourse to accounts for health and illness in four
situations - reasons people ascribe for their current state of
health; assumptions about what would influence their capacity to
improve their health in the future; their views about what makes
them ill; and, when they become ill, what enables them to
recover.
278
CHAPTER 6 : THE DEVELOPMENT OF, RESEARCH INTO, AND
DECONSTRUCTION OF, THE HEALTH_ LOCUS OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT
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6.0 INTRODUCTION
The data analysis in the last Chapter demonstrated that the
external/internal distinction between assumed reasons for,
influences upon and causes of good health, illness and recovery
offered a useful conceptual framework for making sense of those
accounts which were primarily concerned with explanation.
Account 1 construed influences on overall health as predominantly
external to the individual - sited within society and determined
by economic and political forces. Account 2 construed internal
influences as crucial, arising from characteristics of
individuals themselves, such as their attitudes, actions and
lifestyle. Similarly accounts differed in terms of their
attributions about recovery from illness. Account 4, for example,
stressed internal factors, particularly those to do with the
individual's willingness to treat illness as a challenge to be
fought off rather than 'given in to"; whereas Account 5
emphasised the role of medical care. Other accounts, however,
(e.g. Account 3) combined aspects of both external and internal
attributions.
This internal/external framework (as was noted in Chapter 1) has
been frequently used in anthropological analyses of cultural
diversity (particularly in the form of the exogenous/endogenous
distinction, cf Stoetzel, 1960; Valebrega, 1962; Young, 1976)
and weaves more broadly through sociological and psychological
theorisation (evident, for instance, in the social
control/theoreticity distinction (cf Dingwall, 1976) in
sociology, and the difference between person-constructs-reality/
reality-constructs-person theorisation (cf Buss, 1978) in
psychology). It has also been a central element within
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attribution theory (Kruglanski, 1975 and Lalljee and Abelson,
1983 provide reviews), and is the basis for Rotter (s (1966)
'Locus of Control' construct, which was itself the basis for the
development of the (Health Locus of Control' scale (Wallston and
Wallston, 1978), which has been used in numerous studies to
provide measures of accounting as both an independent and
dependent variable.
Because of the empirical support from Studies 1 and 2, and the
theoretical ubiquity of the external/internal distinction within
explanatory accounting, it was decided to make it a major focus
for the final study of this thesis. This Chapter briefly reviews
the development and use of the (Health Locus of Control' scale,
to place that study into context.
6.1 THE LCCUS OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT
6.1.1 Locus of Control 
Rotter and his associates (notably Phares (1955, see 1976 for his
review of the early work)) formulated the concept of Locus of
Control (Rotter, Seeman and Liverant, 1962; Rotter 1966) from
social learning theory. The locus of control construct is, as has
been noted already (Section 1.4.1 in Chapter 1) a
reality-constructs-person approach to understanding accounting.
It construes individuals' worldviews as predicated upon one of
two general rationales : they either see the events in their
lives, their roles and status, and the rewards and punishments
they gain from life as internally controlled (i.e. consequences
of their own actions, strivings and personal characteristics), or
as externally controlled (i.e. consequences outside of the
individual's control such as chance and fate). According to
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social learning theory, the one adopted depends upon 	 whether
rewards or punishments have, in the past, been perceived as
arbitary events unconnected with their own actions, or have been
construed as consequent upon how they, themselves, have acted.
6.1.2 Questions about multidimensionality 
A great deal of theorisation and research have been devoted to
exploration of this concept, both within a social learning
framework and beyond it (i.e. both within reality-constructs
-person and person-constructs-reality approaches). One of the
most important developments was Levenson's extension of the scale
to include 'Powerful Others' as a third site for perceived
control (her Chapter in Lefcourt, 1981, provides a summary and
review), a consequence, she reports, of her own experiences of
frustration when made to extend her studies by an adminitrative
ruling
"Lack of my personal control did not result in my becoming a
frustrated fatalist. Instead I believed that events were
predictable, and that there were powerful others who were in
control of these events." [p 16].
Levenson was not the first to question the over-simplicity of the
external/internal dichotomy. Hersch and Scheibe (1967) had also
noted that whereas scores on the Rotter E-I scale were relatively
homogenous for identified 'internals', those who scored as
externals' displayed far more variability, suggesting that
different meanings were being attributed to the 'external
control' construct, and a number of traditional factor analytic
studies indicated that the E-I concept is experienced as a
multidimensional	 construct (e.g. Collins, 1974; Gurin, Gurin
Lao and Beattie, 1969; Mirels,
	 1970). Collins'	 study,
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for example, identified independent factors which suggested that
the E-I scale breaks down into four components : belief in a
difficult world, a just world, a predictable world and a
politically responsive world.
6.1.3 Culturally implicit values 
Multidimensionality has increasingly become seen as salient when
considering links between perception of control and
social-political action (see Klandermans, 1983, for a review).
This is because early work with the E-I scale tended to favour
'internality' as the more socially desirable worldview within
North American culture, with its stress on the individual's
commitment to self-determination, carrying with it the
implication of personal rather than collective responsibility.
Lef court (1981) has commented, for example
"An internal locus of control may be one prerequisite for
competent behaviour and an external control orientation seems
common for many people who do not function in a competently
healthy manner." (p 191).
Roberts and Reid (1978) have claimed that the assumed
unidimensionality of the construct is a product of its
development with exclusively middle-class (and predominantly
student) samples, and that people from different social class
and/or ethnic backgrounds make recourse to aspects of accounting
which do not fit within this framework. MCClelland-(1971) has
described the pervasive valuation of personal control in North
American white, male, middle class culture as 'need-power' and
argued that far from being functional and desirable, it is
divisive and can be positively fatal (he suggestkithat it may
lead to suicide, when people fail because of what they see are
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their own inadequacies). Partington (1976) provided a well-argued
case for the cultural salience of 'internality' to North
American	 'fat cat' psychologists, and its consequent
overemphasis and implicit endorsement within North American
theorisation. To be fair, Rotter himself specifically recognised
the cultural limitations of theE -I construct
"Theoretically, one would expect some relationship between
internality and good adjustment in our culture ... In regard to
the other end of the distribution ... very high scores toward the
external end may suggest, at least in our culture, a
defensiveness related to significant maladjustment." (Rotter,
1966, p16, my emphases).
6.1.4 The introduction of the 'powerful others' construct 
By confounding within externality both 'chance' and the actions
of others, the unidimensional E-I scale denies expression to
worldviews which stress, for example, the agency of
power-relations (as central to Account 1 in the previous
study), labelling this kind of accounting as 'fatalism'. Whereas
Rotter and his associates* assumed (and had provided data to
support the contention, e.g. Gore and Rotter, 1963) that it would
be 'internals' who would participate more readily in
socio-political action, a number of other studies have refuted
this. Although, as Klandermans notes, the empirical results of
studies of E-I and political action considered overall were
inconclusive, some studies at least (e.g. Ghaffaradli-Doty and
Carlson, 1979; Nassi and Abramowitz, 1980; Silvern and Nakamura,
1971; Vleeming, 1976) have shown that it was individuals who
scored more highly as 'externals' who were the most likely to
actively participate in civil rights, womens' rights and other
protest activities. This externality cannot plausibly be
interpreted as mere 'fatalism', and indeed a series of studies by
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Levenson and Miller (1976) showed that given the opportunity,
more politically active individuals with radical or left-wing
views were more likely to regard control as sited in the agency
of "powerful others'.
While the expression of 'externality' in such cases reflected a
denial of personal control, it is highly unlikely to have derived
from attributions of luck. It is more likely to reflect a
construal of the individual's role in society, the events that
occur in their lives, and especially any disadvantage they have
experienced as the result of manipulation, oppression and
exploitation by those in society who had the means to control the
lives of others. Particularly salient to this formulation is the
finding in one of the Levenson and Miller studies that within the
feminist movement, radical lesbian feminists were more likely to
'endorse control by 'powerful others' than other feminists, and
more likely to see themselves as lacking internal- control. It is
surely more plausible that this kind of accounting arose out of
the explicit ideology of lesbian feminism (that women are
exploited and oppressed by the patriarchy) than that lesbian
feminists were more "fatalistic' in their accounting than other
feminists.
There are clear resonances between the 'powerful others' measures
of Levenson 's Multidimensional Locus of Control MIC scale and
the strongly politico-economic accounts in Studies 1 and 2 in
this thesis, where lesbian feminists were observed to be the most
vocal exponents (in their comments) and providers of the
most strongly loading exemplificatory Q sorts which expressed
the view that health is predominantly a product of social
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inequality and the power-control of, in their case, the
patriarchy.
6.1.5 The development of a multidimensionaL. health locus of
cont=rol scale 
The original version of the 'health locus of control scale' (HLC)
followed Ratter's E-Idimension, tapping whether people construed
their health as controlled from within, or by chance. However,
Wallston and Wallston, impressed by Levenson's introduction of
the 'powerful others' construct, and depressed by lack of success
with their HLC scale, decided to reformulate it as a
multidimensional scale.
Given the political context for the emergence of 'powerful
others' as an additional variable within the E-I construct, it is
surprising that Wallston and Wallston formulated 'powerful
others' not to reflect socio-political control (i.e. the role
of medicine as an hegemony, or more broadly the links between
health and social disadvantage) but instead focussed upon the
benign influence of medical professionals, family and friends.
This can be observed by examination of the items in the PCMHLC
(Powerful Others MBLC) sub-scale, for example :
If I see an excellent doctor regularly, I am less likely to have
health problems.
I can only maintain my health by consulting health professionals.
Other people play a big part in whether I stay healthy or become
sick.
Health professionals control my health.
Following doctor's orders to the letter is the best way for me to
stay healthy.
My family has a lot to do with my becoming sick or staying
healthy.
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Thus the operational definition of 'powerful others' built into
the POMHLC scale was at odds with the rationale from which this
dimension was introduced. Furthermore, it included items which
can be interpreted in different ways. For example, the item
'Health professionals control my health' can be read either as
an endorsement of the idea that doctors, nurses and the like
provide effective services to improve health and offer effective
treatments against disease; or as supporting the notion that
medicine is an hegemony, with doctors, nurses and the like
exerting powers which may be detrimental to health, deny services
to the disadvantaged, and construct certain forms of
counter-normativity (e.g. lesbianism) as 'illness ( to be
'treated'. Even within the domain of R methodology, where
construct-validity and reliability are assumed to be crucial for
correct scale construction, the POMHLC scale fails to meet the
requirements of 'good' psychometric method.
This development therefore lacked conceptual and methodological
rigour, given its theoretical origins, a distortion compounded by
the sample on which it was first tested - persons recruited at an
Airport. While air travel is more common in North America, and
not as much restricted to the wealthy as in Britain, it is
unlikely that the sample included many respondents, say, on
'welfare' or belonging to the radical protest groups with which
the political 'powerful others' attributions had proved most
salient. This point, also raised by Nash (1987), is an example
of Barre's (1979) observation that questionnaires seldom discover
more than :
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" ... the representation of the shadow cast upon the social
world by the prior conceptual apparatus deployed by the person
who constructed the questionnaire." (p 115)
Wallston and Wallston appear to have had a fixed image of what
people's perceptions of 'powerful others control' in relation to
health would be, an image so blinkered that they did not even try
to introduce a PO construct analogous to that devised by
Levenson. It neither seems to have occurred to them that medical
care might be anything other than benign, nor that there may be
people whose accounting focussed on the 'powerful others' of the
State, capitalism, or the patriarchy. (In this respect it is
perhaps salient to note that Stephenson was prevented from
publishing his 1962/3 studies of 'Public Health Image' because .of
the assumed (ccomunist ( overtones of his results).
Another source of potential distortion is that the MEC scale
(as does the E-I construct) makes the assumption that people are
consistent in their attributions of control across situations -
that, for example, somebody who sees doctors as crucial for
curing illness also sees' them as crucial to preventing illness.
While the consistency of scores found by Wallston and Wallston
within each of the three dimensions implies that this assumption
was well-founded, the homogenisation engendered by R
methodological analysis is insensitive to the possibility that
while some people may indeed construe control consistently across
situations, others may not. Certainly the accounts identified and
the interview data from Studies 1 and 2 led me to suppose that
people do differ in this regard, for while some people adopt
the same explanatory model consistently for current and future
health, in terms of reasons for illness and reasons for
recovery, others did not, varying their attribution of control
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according to the different contexts. Nash (op cit) has also found
in interviews with people who had completed a version of the MHLC
scale that
"Locus of control tended to vary considerably even within
individuals according to each very specific aspect of behaviour
being discussed.' (p 210).
6.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES WITH THE MHLC SCALE
6.2.1 The MEILC scale 
These considerations apart, Wallston and Wallston's multivariate
(MHLC)scale undoubtedly did represent an improvement over their
earlier version, the unidimensional (HIE) scale (in which only the
internal/external dimension was tapped), and in its use of . a
Likert format, in contrast to the original E-I scale. They
summarised (1981) studies which made use of the MEC scale to
Show that it did seem sensitive to some of the demographic and
other individual difference variables which might be expected to
relate to it (although only mean scores are reported, with no
indication of significant differences)
Mean scores obtained
Sample N Internal Chance Powerful
Others
(IMHLC) (CMHLC) (POMHLC)
Healthy Adults 1287 25.55 16.21 19.16
Students 749 26.68 16.72 17.87
Persons engaged
in preventive
health
programmes
720 27.38 15.52 18.44
Chronic
patients
609 25.78 17.64 22.54
289
People engaged in preventive health programmes gained the
highest mean IMHLC 1 score, and patients suffering from chronic
disease gained the highest mean CMHLC 2and POMHLC scores.
Conventional (i.e. R methodological) factor analytic studies
(e.g. Nagelberg, 1979; Stuart, 1979) confirmed the independence
of the IHIC/EHLC/POHLC dimensions using large American national
samples, though other studies (e.g. Bloom, 1979 on women who had
experienced a mastectomy, and Nash, op cit, with a British
sample) did not. The Bloam study, for example, identified only
two factors - Fate and self-blame (the latter indicating a
division within internality between control and culpability).
While some studies confirmed a high alpha reliability of the MBLC
scale (e.g. De Haas and van Reken, 1979), others (e.g. Lewis,
Morisky and Flynn, 1978; Albino, 1980) found it to be low,
although Wallston and Wallston (1981) claimed that this may have
been a product of methodological differences.
6.2.2 The MHLC scale used to measure accounting as an
independent variable 
Wallston, Maides and Wallston (1976) have argued that there is no
reason to expect that the MHLC scale values will necessarily
predict health related action, noting that social learning theory
assumes that reinforcement expectation and valuation of health
are also important determinants, and that other formulations
(e.g. The Health Beliefs Model described in Chapter 1)
incorporate additional variables such as perceptions of cost and
instrumentality. (Kristiansen, 1985, has also argued that
attempting to use MI= as an independent variable without taking
account of estimates of health value is likely to be
1 : IMHLC = 'Internal' MHLC
	 2 : CMHLC = 'external
MHLC.
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unproductive, since valuation of health varies so dramatically
between people). Wallston and Wallston even express puzzlement
and disbelief at studies in which MHLC values were found to
be strongly and positively linked to health-linked action (e.g.
Sproles,1977), and indeed, these are few and far between.
Their own original study using the E-I based HLC scale
had found that while a measure of health-value did predict
willingness to read health educational literature in a role
play, HLC scores did not, a negative result that held up in an
attempted replication (DiVito, Beznikoff and Bogdanowitz, 1979)
where HLC only predicted action when the measure they used for
health value also scored high.
Nevertheless, Wallston and Wallston hoped that the development of
the improved MHLC scale would gain them better results from a
study of hypertension patients' information seeking behaviour,
but reported, somewhat forlornly
"Now with three scales rather than one we felt we could not
miss... We wish we could report the unqualified success of this
strategy ... but we could find no combination of health-value and
MHLC beliefs that explained the variance in number of
hypertension-related pamphlets chosen."
A later study (reported in Wallston and Wallston 1981) did,
however, reinstate their earlier finding of links with
health-value, and this time with externality and powerful others
scores too, though to their surprise only in terms of information
about hypertension (i.e. where attempts had previously failed)
and not about herpes (a disease they assumed would be highly
salient to their student sample).
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Similarly patchy and not very encouraging results were obtained
when attempts were made to link MBLC with health preventive and
treatment compliance behaviours. Olbrisch (1975) found no
significant differences between the plans for future prevention
of gonorrhea patients with high internal compared with high
external scorers; McCUsker and Morrow (1979) found no significant
correlations between MBLC scores and cancer-preventive actions;
and even with very large samples (participants in the (Weight
Watchers' programme) Stuart (1979) found no significant
correlations at all between HLC measures and a wide variety of
health behaviours. Carnahan (1979) found no links with dental
behaviour; Wallston and McLeod (1979) and Lewis, Morisky and
Flynn (1978) found none with compliance with a hypertension
reduction regime. Baughman (1978) studied female clerical and
secretarial employees with results that even Wallston and
Wallston described as "... mixed but generally unimpressive.".
Better results were obtained by Wildman et al (1979) for
correlations with smoking reduction, but in another study by
Kaplan and Cowles (1978) the better results for internals were
found to be short-lived. The only area where the MBLC scale did
seem to offer some predictive validity was with renal dialysis
patients, with Sproles (op cit), Binik and Devins (1979) and
Levin and Schulz (1980) all finding significant correlations
between either internality or externality and compliance with
dietary regimes.
6.2.3 The MHLC scale used to measure accounting as a dependent
variable 
Wallston and Wallston have argued that MEC is most appropriate
as a dependent variable. They cite a number of studies which
gained, in their own words, "modest" support for their scale in
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explaining antecedents of health beliefs, including one of their
own (De Vellis,Ee Vellis Wallston and Wallston 1980b) which
showed that for patients who had experiences of epileptic
seizures, externality was more salient than the norm, another by
Nicholson (1980)which showed that after hospitalisation on the
birth of their child, first-time mothers gained higher external
and lower internal scores than the norm; and another by Tolor
(1978) which linked frequency of childhood illness to scores on
externality, a result found only with women.
As a dependent variable to provide evidence about changes in
health beliefs following some form of intervention Wallston and
Wallston cited four studies, all of which offered very
disappointing results. Nagelberg (1979) studied the impact of a
health risk reduction programme, in which no significant
differences in HLC scores were found between participants and
controls. Bloom (op cit) fared a little better, with counselled
mastectomy patients proffering less fatalistic responses two
months after their operation than a control group, although, as
has been noted already, Bloom's data were inconsistent with the
dimensions of the MBLC scale. Similar differences were found
by Diller et al (1979) with cancer patients given psydhosocial
counselling, with the counselled group scoring lower on
externality three months post-operatively, but these differences
disappeared by six months after the operation, suggesting that
Bloom's data may have reflected only a short-term effect.
Schiller, Steckler, Dawson and Heyman (1979) used the MBIC to
observe the impact of a health education programme, and again
found no significant results, though Wallston and Wallston
suggested that this may well have been a ceiling effect,
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occurring because people who attended the programme began with
higher internality scores than the norms Wallston and Wallston
had established for persons engaged in health promotion
activities.
Thus the only area in which the MBLC scale has been found to
be encouraging on its own was in studies that compared scores
between different groups of people. Blacks scored higher on CMHLC
than whites (Sproles, 1977); contraceptive users and women who
had had an abortion scored higher on IMHLC than unmarried mothers
(Harkey and King, 1976); persons having lower levels of
education, and of lower socio-economic class scored higher on
CMHLC than those with more education and from higher
socio-econanic groups (Harkey and King, op cit; Rosenblum, 1979;
Sproles, op cit); attenders at a health fair scored higher on
IMHLC and lower on CMHIC compared with a sample of nonselected
adults (Wallston and Wallston, 1976); patients attending a weight
reduction programme gained higher IMHLC scores than those being
treated for cancer by chemotherapy (Saltzer, 1979). Wbmen having
just given birth to their first baby scored lowest on POMHLC
(Lowenstein, 1979), and diabetics scored the highest (Nagy,
1979).
Overall, Wallston and Wallston concluded that while in a few
studies IMHLC scores did provide some positive indications of
(healthy' actions, CMHLC scores were (albeit still infrequently)
better predictors, though paradoxically sometimes of '"desired"
behaviour (eg. compliance with drug regimes) sometimes with
'undesired' behaviour, and that in general "... health locus of
control research is still in its adolescence(sic), full of
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pimples and promises, quivering on the brink of adulthood."
(wallston and Wallston,1981). At the time of writing they felt
that while the reliability of the scale had been reasonably
established, its construct validity was still very much an open
question.
6.2.4 Theorisation about variability within the Locus of Control 
Scale 
Nash's (op cit) more recent research using a modified MEE scale
found similar paradoxical results, her highest (internal ( scorers
being those who, when interviewed, described what she saw as
"unhealthy habits" (i.e. smoking, taking little exercise and
eating (junk food ( ). Nash herself was very critical of the MEILC
scale, and saw it as unsuited to British samples, which is why
she devised a new scale. In an attempt to explain these data she
cited a number of formulations (Janoff et al, 1980; Nowicki and
Duke, 1983; O'Brien, 1984; Wong and Sproule, 1982) that have
argued that extreme scores of particularly high (externality' or
'internality' 	 the Rotter (Locus of Control Scale" are
dysfunctional. Janoff et al., for instance, have suggested
that they represent different patterns of (pathological"
accounting, the (pathology of low expectation ( (where people are
too easily discouraged) and the (pathology of high expectation"
(where people stubbornly persist with insoluble tasks). Wong and
Spoule coined the term "bi-locals" to describe what Nash calls
... sensible people who operate within their external
constraints to achieve realistic goals" i.e. middle-range E-I
scorers, who are more (healthy' than either extreme external or
extreme internal attributors.
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Nash argues, therefore, that some of the reason why the MBLC
scale had proved so ineffective at predicting health-related
actions is that contrary to Wallston and Wallston's expectations,
high 'internal control (
 attributions are not necessarily
functional, nor linked to the kind of (sensible' accounting
system likely to be expressed by the kinds of people who do
(sensible ( things like seek out health education information and
preventive services, and who have adopted 'healthy ( lifestyles.
6.2.5 Studies using MBLC with British samples 
All of the studies reviewed by Wallston and Wallston (1981) were
conducted with American Samples. The best known and most
extensive work with the MBLC scale with British samples is that
of Pill and Stott (1981, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, 1987, already
described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2) who, in an investigation
of the accounting of Welsh working class mothers, examined its
links to reports of health-related actions, knowledge, lifestyle
and a range of demographic variables.
In their initial pilot study (1981) they found no significant
correlations between a salience of lifestyle index (SLI),
developed to tap a mixture of attitudes to health, knowledge
about such things as a 'healthy diet' and reports of health
preventive actions, and MHLC scores, other than a small but
significant negative relationship between 'powerful others' and
SLI scores. They commented in relation to the internality
dimension
"The scale does not distinguish between a locus of control for
health maintenance and a locus of control for illness behaviour.
Moreover, it allows those who place emphasis on modification of
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personal behaviour for prevention and self-treatment of illness
to score as highly as those who stress the use of screening
procedures and professionals for both prevention and illness.
This must account for some of the contradictory findings and the
sometimes disappointing predictive value of the tool." (p98).
And with regard to the 'powerful others'
"There is, of course, no logical reason why an orientation to
prevention that recognises the importance of day-to-day decisions
in personal behaviour could not coexist with frequent recourse to
the physician. The relationship between physician and patient
could be very different, with the professionals being used as
sources of advice to be evaluated and queried at the
consultation." (p 98).
Later work bore out this supposition. A subsequent, more
comprehensive study with a much larger sample (Pill and Stott,
1985a) indicated that while POMELC score overall did not
correlate with SLI, two items from the PCMELC scale did show
significant negative correlations : "Whenever I don't feel well,
I should consult a doctor" (r = 0.14, p = 0.05) and "Regarding
my health, I can do only what my doctor tells me to do" (r =
0.165, p = <0.05).
As has already been noted in Chapter 2, Pill and Stott also made
the point that what is often interpreted as "fatalism" from a
high score on the CMHLC can otherwise be interpreted as "... a
realistic appraisal of the complex variables involved in the
aetiology of illness ... The forces of the market place are very
powerful influences which are essentially external and beyond the
individual's control.". In other words, as they stress in their
later paper that year (Pill and Stott, 1985b) belief about locus
of control is just one among a large number of variables which
determine overall worldview and action. Nevertheless, their most
recently reported study (1987) did find a significant negative
relationship ( r =	 0.263, p = <0.001) between score on an
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improved SLI index and the CMBLC scale. Women who scored highly
on their measure of (healthy lifestyle ( , scored significantly
lower on the CMHLC scale than those with a lower SLI score.
Modifications of the MHIEC scale 
Recently Blaxter (1987, forthcoming) has used an amended version
of the MBLC scale, developed on the first 1000 respondents in a
very large-scale survey of health beliefs, which showed that
younger people, men, and in particular people who have had more
education and those who define health in terms of 'fitness'Itend
to score more positively, seeing themselves as more (in control(
of their own health - even though, paradoxically (as was found by
Nash, op cit), high scorers are more likely to engage in some
forms of unhealthy behaviour such as smoking and drinking.
Blaxter echoes Wallston and Wallston saying "Specific behaviour
cannot necessarily be predicted from attitudes.",
Nash's (op cit) attempts to reformulate the were, as has
been already mentioned, not very successful. Indeed, her typology
(idenfified by R methodological factor analysis of scores)
appears to be even more construct-invalid than the NHLC. She
identified a clear (Chance ( factor, and a (Powerful Others'
factor exclusively concerned with compliance with medical care
and advice, but her ( Internal ( factor seems to have more in
common with Pill and Stott (s (medium SLI ( image of (taking care
of yourself ( (See Section 2.2.2) than what they would regard as
genuine (internality', based as it is on the responses to just
these two items :
Good health depends largely on my taking good care of myself.
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If I was unwell it would probably be because I hadn't been
looking after myself properly.
Nash called the other two factors she had identified - "realism'
and (idealism', though such terminology is strangely at odds
with the items which loaded onto and defined them. (Idealism: was
defined by items about making money being easy, and having
friends because 'it's easy to be popular', and "In life you can
have anything if you want it enough" (which Nash regards as
unrealistic over-optimism). "Realism' comes over as much more to
do with an account in which one's own behaviour is seen to be the
controlling agency, with these items providing definitive
loadings
Good teeth are mostly a matter of sensible eating and brushing.
If I were financially successful, it would probably be because I
proved I was capable.
Good teeth are mostly a matter of regular dental checkups.
If I had a lot of friends it would be because I do things for
other people.
Nash seems to have fallen into the R-methodological essentialist
trap of assuming that her theory-guided classificatory framework
offers an adequate explanation for accounting, when it is quite
clear that equally plausible alternatives are not only possible,
but probably more tenable.
6.2.7 Deconstructing Health Locus of Control 
An alternative explanation for the generally inconclusive
construct validity of the MBLC scale is that its theoretical
assumptions are fundamentally at fault. The poor results have
encouraged researchers to surmise that the MEC scale confounds a
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number of potentially contradictory beliefs. It assumes just
three loci of control - a person's own actions, chance, or the
benign influence of others - but gives these more global labels -
internal, chance and powerful others. Bloom (op cit.), for
instance, suggested that although self-blame and
self-determination are both subsumed within the 'internal(
dimension, they do not necessarily go together, a finding
consistent with the results from Study 2, particularly in the
separation between responsibility and blame made in Accounts 4
and 6. Pill and Stott commented upon the possible divisions
between beliefs about who or what controls the ability to
prevent illness, and who or what controls recovery from illness;
that "chance' attributions may be realistic appraisals of
situational influences (e.g. poverty, working conditions) rather
than fatalism; and that the POMBLC scale omits the more general
political aspects of the Levenson MLC scale, found to be central
to Account 1 in Study 1 and in Accounts 1 and 6 in Study 2.
Part of the motivation for the final study in this thesis,
therefore, was to use Q methodology to deconstruct the locus of
control construct as applied to health, and to seek, in this
way, to do what Q methodology does best - identify
alternative accounts by way of people's operancy rather than to
define, a priori, what their accounts are likely to be and
then to try to mould the data to fit. The Locus of Control, and
its derivatives, the HLC and MHLC scales, are classic R
methodological instruments. If Q method is as successful as its
proponents claim it to be, then it should offer a useful
technique for teasing out from the dimensions of the MHLC
construct some of the alternative accounts which get submerged
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within its three rather crude divisions between 'internal',
"chance" and 'powerful others'.
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CHM:TER 7 : STUDY 3
A INVESTIGATION OF ACCOUNTING FR HEALTH AND ILLNESS, LINEaNG
REE'ORTS ON THE MEC SCALE, INFLUENCES CN HEALTH AND ILLNESS
QUESTIONNAIRE, AND Q SORT
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7.00 INTRODUCTION
The research described in this Chapter examined the ways that, in
British society, people explain what affects
* their current state of health;
* whether or not they will achieve better health in
the future;
* whether or not they become ill;
* the speed and likelihood of their recovery when
they do become ill.
This task was approached by gaining responses on three different
kinds of instrument. The first was the MHLC scale itself,
modified by replacing the words "sidc" and "sickness" with
'ill' and 'illness"; and "physician" with 'doctor; because of the
different meanings these words have Britain compared with
America. The second was a health-control Q sort, structured in
part by way of an analysis of potential influences suggested by
Studies 1 and 2, and devised in part via careful piloting of
items. The third instrument was an Influences on Health and
Illness Questionnaire (IHIQ). This used aLikert format and was
divided up into the four situations listed above, systematically
and more comprehensively covering the different influences
identified for the Q sort. The IHIQ was intended to provide a
link between the NBIC scale and the Q sort, in that its format
was similar to the MHLC (although, with 124 items a lot
longer, and with a 0 = '110 influence" to 7 = 'strong influence",
scaled slightly differently) but its analysis (factor analysis by
persons) more similar to the Q sort. It also offered an
opportunity to explore the potential for Q analysis ofLikert
format data. To aid comparability, all three instruments were
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expressed, as is the MHLC, in the first person (i.e. what
influences 'my' health, illness, etc.).
7.1 METHOD
7.1.1 Derivation of Q sample and the IHIQ 
For the derivation of the Q sample an initial pool of 48
statements was selected, twelve drawn from the MBLC (sometimes
rewritten to read more like everyday language), others from the
accounts identified in Studies 1 and 2, and others from comments
made by participants in those studies, and from some of the
suggestions made by Pill and Stott (particularly their
distinction between 'lifestyle' and 'taking care of yourself").
These were listed on a questionnaire (Shown in Appendix 9)
completed by 8 associates (other researchers and theorists in the
area, other Q methodologists and several colleagues), following
which some items were changed (in response to comments about
wording), some omitted (in response to comments about balance and
duplication) and a number of suggested new items were added. From
an analysis of these responses a framework was constructed to
provide basis for a structured Q sample. This is shown in Figure
7.1. The new items, 60 in total, together with the framework
(Shown in Appendix 10) were sent to 12 associates who once more
provided information about balance, wording and this time also
about comprehensiveness, including suggestions for additional
items.
7.1.2 Materials 
A final Q sample of 80 items and the IHIQ of 124 items were
generated from this pilot testing. The IHIQ was not subjected to
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any psychometric validation, since the intention was not to
provide a scale but to merely explore the kinds of accounts which
would emerge from by-person factor analysis of Likert format
data. Within this context such issues as objectively defined
construct validity are inappropriate - constructs are regarded as
the products of the alternative configurations of responses,
created by participants operancy, not in any sense "in" the
questionnaire itself. The materials used in the study are
provided in Appendix 11 (except for the Q intructions, which were
identical to those used in Study 2, except for the different
format of the Q matrix). The instructions for the IHIQ
contained detailed information about the interpretation of some
of the terns used (e.g. distinctions between circumstances,
relationship and environment, and between 'chance' and
'probability").
7.1.3 Participants 
Seven participants from Studies 1 and 2 also took part in this
one. Two associates placed advertisments on college
noticeboards, recruiting 13 participants, and a further four were
recruited by a relative and eight via a local group of
'Samaritans' (the incentives contributing to fund-raising). Other
participants were recruited from my workplace, pubs, shops, a
Spiritualist Church, a private 'alternative medicine' practice
and a local homeopathic association. 'Snowballing' introduced a
Hindu student, a psychotherapist and several people who were
'handicapped' or had suffered severe illness (e.g. pituitary
tumour). Of a total of 100 sets of materials sent out, 83 were
returned in a usable form.
Of the 83 participants, 36 were male and 47 were female. Ages
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ranged from early teens to late sixties, and occupations included
students, secretarial and administrative staff, lecturers and
teachers, Inte collar workers' (e.g. a motor mechanic, cook
and bricklayer), and 'white collar workers' (e.g. engineers,
computing staff, a company director and accountants). Nine
participants were unwaged, including pensioners, unemployed
people and mothers. Four participants were orthodox medical
professionals, and six were practitioners in 'alternative'
medicine. Religious affiliation included Church of England,
Catholic, Christian spiritualists, and members of the Hindu and
Bahai faiths. About a half of the participants lived in the South
of England, the remaining half divided between the North of
England, Wales and Scotland, both including rural, inner city and
suburb locations. Once more about half of the sample were
strategically selected, and about half to cover as broad a range
of 'ordinary people' as possible.
7.1.4 Procedure 
The materials as shown in Appendix 11 were given or mailed out to
participants who were provided with a stamped addressed envelope
for the return of completed scales and response forms. All
participants worked from written instructions. Participants were
paid £5 for completing the three scales, which was reported to
have usually taken between one and two hours.
7.2 RESULTS
The Q sort responses were coded in the usual way, and together
with the NBIC and IHIQ data were keyed into the computer. The
Q sort and the IHIQ data were subjected, via SPSS, to
principal components by-person factor analyses, factors extracted
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by varimax rotation. The MHLC data were partitioned to give
separate 'AMC, CMHLC and PONELC scores for each participant, but
were also by-person factor analysed for exploration of the
factors which would merge.
7.3 MIRE RESPONSES
The separate scores on the IMHLC (internal control), CMHLC
(chance control) and POMHLC (powerful others control) sub-scales
for each participant are shown in Table 7.1. The scores were
from a six-point Idkert scale, with 12 items in each sub-scale,
coMbining the 6 items from each of the A&B versions. Thus the
maximum score an individual can gain on any sub-scale would have
been 72, with 42 representing the median. The mean for the IMHLC
data is sameWhat lower than means typically obtained in other
(mostly American) studies, but means for CMHLC and POMBIC are
within the usual ranges. However, for all three sub-scales,
the data from this present study contain much more variance,
with the standard deviations approximately double those typically
found. This is to be expected, given that half of the
participants were deliberately selected for diversity, and indeed
provides some endorsement that diversity had indeed been
achieved.
The results of the by-person factor analysis of MBIC data sets
are shown in Appendix 4 (factor loadings). Perhaps surprisingly,
sixteen independent factors with eigenvalues greater
than unity were derived, of which seven contained at least one
exemplificatory loading (in this case the criteria used were
loadings >.0.70, with no other loading >0.35). Table 7.2
summarises the exemplificatory Q sorts, together with the
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Table 7.1 Internal/Chance/Powerful others Scores obtained on
the MBLC scale in Study 3 
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Table 7.2 Exemplars identified in inverted factor analysis of MHLC
scores in Study 3 
Factor Loading Participant MBLC Score
I	 C PO
1 .87 12 57 15 17
.87 14 61 25 17
.77 15 48 26 23
.80 22 50 16 22
.87 28 66 25 21
.90 31 65 31 19
.81 35 54 18 28
.82 36 55 29 23
.83 39 53 22 23
.72 46 58 23 30
.93 48 62 24 16
.91 49 55 20 23
.88 61 64 16 31
.75 62 49 21 27
.82 63 53 15 30
.76 64 56 30 31
.70 65 51 34 26
.82 71 53 30 25
.71 72 56 18 29
.89 76 61 18 37
.76 77 57 31 32
.81 78 42 22 19
2 .76 2 45 64 30
.90 18 29 68 33
.73 40 26 51 18
.80 50 33 57 27
.75 67 21 49 25
.80 68 31 51 15
3 .82 51 25 44 36
4 .75 60 42 49 57
5 .81 25 25 29 27
6 .86 13 59 44 41
7 .81 37
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associated MBLC sub-scale scores.
7.3.1 MHIC Factor 1 
Examination of Table 7.2 shows that Factor 1, with 22 of the
participants' MBIC data sets providing exemplificatory loadings,
clusters together response patterns in which the 'internal'
scores are relatively much higher than 'chance' or 'powerful
others', with the highest IMHLC score 66, and only one
participant (78) with a IMHLC score lower than the overall mean
of 45.53. This factor therefore clearly identifies an 'internal'
viewpoint, contributing 39.7% of the variance in the participant
sample.
7.3.2 MHIC Factor 2 
Factor 2, with six MHLC data sets providing exemplificatory
loadings, clusters together response patterns in which 'chance'
scores are relatively much higher than either 'internal' or
'Powerful others', with the highest CMHLC score 68, and even the
lowest at 49 considerably higher than the overall mean of 35.07.
This factor therefore clearly identifies a 'chance' viewpoint,
contributing 14.7% of variance in the participant sample.
Thus 54.4% of the variance overall can be attributed to either
'internal' or 'chance' viewpoints, with 28 participants in the
sample being identified as one or other by way of the by-person
factor analysis. The internal/chance distinction seems to emerge
from by-person factor analysis as it does from the more
traditional by-item factor analysis. However, for the remaining
five factors, the simple internal/chance/powerful others division
does not emerge as clearly. Even with the limited MBIC scores
311
data, by-person factor analysis begins to deconstruct the MIRE
construct in some interesting ways.
7.3.3 ME= Factor 3 
Factor 3 has just one participant providing an exemplificatory
loading (participant 51). Her raw scores are not very
informative, placing her IMHLC score lower than, but both CMBIE
and POMBIE scores higher than the relevant overall means. This
factor does not identify either a clear 'chance' or 'powerful
others' viewpoint, but something more complex. Examination of her
individual responses shows that she marked no items in the
strongest agreement (6) category, and only two were marked 5,
both 'powerful others' items
10. The type of care I receive from other people is what is
responsible for how I recover from illness.
17. Health Professionals help keep me healthy.
However, she disagreed stongly with the following 'powerful
others' items (placement = 1)
14. I can only maintain my health by consulting health
professionals.
27. Health professionals control my health.
35. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells me to
do.
The viewpoint identified by this factor therefore looks very much
like the one Pill and Stott (1980) found among those of their
Welsh working class mothers who had a high SLI index score. They
rejected powerful others as controlling their health but
recognised that health professionals can play a role in health
promotion and maintenance. Pill and Stott arrived at this
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interpretation by observing that scores on items about 'powerful
others' controlling health correlated significantly negatively
with scores on the SLI index.
However, unlike Pill and Stott's high SLI scorers, Participant 51
has a below average score on the IMHLC sub-scale. Her score is
depressed by rejection of Item 12 (When I feel ill, I know it
is because I have not been taking care of myself properly = 2),
22 (Whatever goes wrong with my health is my own fault = 1) and
25 (When I get ill I'm to blame = 2). Yet items such as 23 (I am
in control of my health = 4), 29 (The main thing which affects my
health is what I do myself = 4) and 36 (If I become ill, I have
the power to make myself well again = 4) all receive agreement.
Since Participant 51 also provided an exemplificatory Q sort, her
account can be explored in more detail later. However, at this
stage, MEC Factor 3 appears to identify an account for health
and illness which, like Account 4 in Study 2, accepts
responsibility for health, denies blame for illness, and sees
chance as salient for becoming ill.
7.3.4 MHIC Factor 4 
Factor 4 is also exemplified by just one participant's loading
(participant 60). In this case the 'powerful others' score of 57
is much higher in relation to the IMHLC and CMIIIC scores, and it
would seem that it is Factor 4 which provides the clearest
identification of the 'powerful others' viewpoint, although
'chance' is also quite strongly attributed. Examination of this
participant's responses shows that getting ill and being well are
both seen as matters of 'what will be will be' (Items 18 and 28
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both = 6), but both family and friends and medical professionals
are seen to have a lot of influence, particularly over recovery
from illness (items 5 and 10 both = 6). While overall the
'internality' score is low, it is the strong rejection of
self-blame items (12,22 and 25 = 2) and of items which suggest
the individual can prevent illness (e.g. Item 13 = 1) which
depress it. Recovery is seen as a matter over which he had
control - item 1 (If I get ill, it is my own behaviour which
determines how soon I get well again = 6).
7.3.5 HUE Factor 5 
Factor 5, exemplified by participant 25, is notable because of
its low scores in all the three categories - all are below the
overall means. No items were marked 6, and only two were marked
5 - item 18 (NO matter what I do, if I'm going to get ill, I will
get ill) and item 34 (Often I feel that no matter what I do, if
I'm going to get ill, I will be ill). The overall low
endorsement, a viewpoint that nothing makes a lot of difference,
and the selection of these two for strongest agreement, suggest
that this factor is one which identifies a genuinely 'fatalistic'
viewpoint.
7.3.6 MB1C Factor 6 
Factor 6, exemplified by participant 13, is in contrast,one where
all scores are higher than the overall means, indicating a
viewpoint which regards health and illness as multiply determined
by all three kinds of influence - 'internal', 'chance' and
'powerful others'. Some insight into this pattern is provided by
a letter sent with the responses by Participant 13, a woman who
was physically challenged by having been born with spina bifida,
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who had always walked with crutches and had experienced surgery
many times in childhood. She wrote
... having filled in all the questionnaires, I realised that I
was taking a different attitude to different ones ... my spina
bifida was just bad luck, I can't really blame anyone or anything
... but that does not mean I can ignore advice about diet, or the
need to keep active even within the limits of my handicap if I
want to be healthy. I have to keep my weight down and do my
exercises regularly if I'm to keep mobile ... People like me
can't help but value what modern surgery has done for us. If I
had been born 100 years ago I simply would not have survived, I
would have died soon after birth ... and without the help of many
doctors .. and people like physiotherapists ... and the
tremendous support I have always got from my family, and from my
friends too, I could not have got where I am now, holding down a
job and owning and running my own home."
She clearly had good reason to endorse all three. These two
latter factors could have been simply interpreted as 'nay-saying'
and 'yea-saying', but as closer examination of the patterns of
response indicate, they do both in fact reflect more complex and
meaningful viewpoints.
7.3.7 MBIE Factor 7 
Factor 7 was identified by Participant 37's exemplificatory
loading. This man's IHIQ data set exemplified a factor, which,
as will be described later, identifies an account which reflects
very much his Hindu background. He distinguishes between fate
(Item 6 = 4) and good fortune (Item 11 = 1), accident (Item 21 =
1) and luck (Item 32 = 1); between the importance of family and
friends (Item 6 = 4, Item 10 = 5) and medical professionals
(Items 8, 14, and 17 = 2, Item 27 = 1). It is relatively easy to
make sense of these with hindsight, knowing about his cultural
and religious backgound, but without this information, his MH1C
responses would give little or no indication of his viewpoint.
's
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7.4 INFLUENCES ON HEALTH AND ILLNESS QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
The by-person factor analysis of the the IHIQ data yielded eleven
factors with eigenvalues greater than unity, of which seven had
one or more exemplificatory loadings (loading >0.6, where no
other loading on another factor was greater than 0.35). The
factor loadings are shown in Appendix 4, and a summary of
exemplars (including MELC scores and, where relevant, the factor
exemplified by the MBIC scale) are provided in Table 7.3 From
this it can be seen that the IHIQ factors deconstruct the MBLC
construct further. Table 7.4 shows the factor scores
(calculated by a weighted averaging procedure similar to that
used for estimating Q factor scores) for each of the 124 items.
Whereas with the MBIC data a single factor drew together those
people expressing 'internal control', here they are divided up
between Factors 1 and 2. IHIQ Factor 1 is exemplified by 19
people's response patterns, five of whom had exemplified HMLC
Factor 1. IHIQ Factor 2 is exemplified by four people's response
patterns, all participants who had also exemplified MBLC Factor
1. Thus the IHIQ data sets yield two Factors which show evidence
of 'internality', but since they are independent, different
versions of ''internality'. Similarly, IHIQ Factor 3 and IHIQ
Factor 4 deconstruct 'externality'. Each one is exemplified by
two people who were exemplars for MBLC Factor 2. IHIQ Factor 5 is
exemplified by two participants, one of whom was the exemplar for
MEILC Factor 7. IHIQ Factor 6 is exemplified by participant 58,
whose MEW data set did not load onto any of the MEW Factors;
but IHIQ Factor 7 was exemplified by participant 60, who was the
exemplar for MBLC Factor 4.
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Table 73	 Exemplars identified from by-person factor 
analysis of  IHIO
	
data in Study 3 
Factor Loading Participant MELC Scores
I	 C	 PO
Factors
from
MBLC data
1 .68 1 55	 41	 38
.70 3 36	 45	 24
.60 4 45	 42	 30
.68 8 56	 39	 35
.73 15 48	 26	 23 1
.76 17 51	 37	 36
.64 23 47	 29	 40
.63 25 25	 29	 27
.69 29 46	 35	 28
.73 35 54	 18	 28 1
.68 38 37	 24	 37
.79 42 50	 28	 20
.72 44 40	 35	 30
.78 46 58	 23	 30 1
.77 52 43	 25	 34
.60 54 54	 47	 60
.72 57 39	 54	 46
.70 61 64	 16	 31 1
.79 78 42	 22	 19 1
2 .64 14 61	 25	 17 1
.69 36 55	 29	 23 1
.67 48 62	 24	 16 1
.60 49 55	 20	 23 1
3 .73 2 45	 64	 30 2
.64 67 21	 49	 25 2
4 .70 18 29	 68	 23 2
.77 68 31	 51	 15 2
5 .63 6 49	 36	 43
.66 37 43	 31	 32 7
6 .61 58 41	 40	 40
7 .61 60 42	 49	 57 4
Factors
item
no 1 2 3 4 5 67
1 3.0 4.4 5.2 1.8 2.0 3 7
2 5.0 6.4 5.7 4.6 1.4 7 7
3 6.0 4.0 2.9 2.8 4.2 5 6
4 6.0 3.0 2.4 1.8 5.4 3 5
5 5.3 4.5 2.9 0.0 6.0 5 3
6 6.3 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.9 2 5
7 5.3 5.8 4.3 1.0 0.7 5 4
8 6.3 5.7 4.6 2.4 3.2 7 7
9 6.0 5.7 2.8 4.6 3.0 3 6
10 4.4 6.4 5.0 2.4 5.1 4 3
11 1.7 1.0 6.6 0.0 0.4 0 1
12 2.7 1.2 6.1 6.6 0.0 3 2
13 4.7 2.0 5.2 2.2 3.7 6 5
14 5.0 1.5 4.8 0.6 6.6 5 6
15 2.9 2.1 2.9 1.2 2.9 5 7
16 5.4 2.4 2.0 2.4 5.6 7 2
17 3.0 1.4 4.3 1.2 2.5 6 6
18 0.0 1.4 2.2 0.0 3.5 0 1
19 0.0 4.9 0.9 0.0 6.4 7 2
20 2.4 3.8 6.1 6.4 3.1 4 1
21 5.4 2.2 3.4 2.8 2.9 7 6
22 6.0 3.6 3.9 2.8 2.2 5 1
23 6.4 3.1 3.9 2.8 2.9 7 1
24 6.0 3.6 2.3 2.2 2.2 3 1
25 6.3 3.0 2.3 0.8 5.4 2 6
26 4.4 4.4 3.8 1.0 2.6 3 4
27 4.7 2.6 6.1 0.0 2.9 4 7
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Table 7.4 Factor Scores obtained fromliradata 	 in Study 3 
Current State of Health
318
Capacity to beccule healthier in the future
(2
item
no : 1
Factors
2	 3 4 5 6 7
28 3.4 3.0 5.7 0.0 2.0 3 6
29 4.7 3.1 5.0 1.2 4.1 5 4
30 5.3 5.7 3.4 0.6 3.4 4 4
31 6.0 5.0 4.0 1.8 4.7 4 4
32 6.6 3.3 5.4 1.8 2.0 5 6
33 6.0 4.6 4.4 0.0 5.4 2 4
34 6.3 5.1 3.4 0.4 3.1 7 4
35 6.0 5.7 5.6 1.0 2.6 1 1
36 5.3 6.1 6.4 1.6 4.5 5 5
37 6.0 6.4 6.4 0.0 4.5 1 0
38 4.0 1.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 4 6
39 0.4 1.6 6.6 0.0 0.0 0 2
40 1.4 1.1 6.1 7.0 0.0 3 2
41 5.4 3.5 2.4 1.6 6.0 4 2
42 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.2 3.7 7 5
43 3.7 2.6 2.6 1.2 4.4 5 0
44 2.3 3.2 3.6 6.0 1.6 2 1
45 3.0 1.1 4.1 2.6 1.4 5 6
46 3.0 4.9 2.3 1.6 1.7 5 0
47 3.3 0.7 5.7 1.6 1.4 7 6
48 5.0 1.0 7.0 0.0 1.6 7 7
49 0.0 5.2 1.8 0.0 7.0 7 3
50 0.0 2.8 1.8 0.0 7.0 0 0
51 2.6 3.0 7.0 5.8 4.2 5 0
52 2.9 0.8 4.3 0.4 3.2 6 0
53 5.7 2.5 4.3 4.8 2.9 7 0
54 5.7 2.4 3.9 4.8 2.7 7 6
55 6.4 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.1 2 0
56 5.1 3.9 7.0 5.2 4.6 6 4
57 5.4 4.8 6.0 3.9 4.7 3 4
58 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 0.4 6 0
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41iether or not I became ill
4
item
no 1
Factors
2	 3 4 5 67
59 2.7 4.5 5.7 4.1 2.4 4 6
60 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 5.4 5 6
61 6.3 4.8 4.3 1.2 5.4 2 6
62 5.3 4.4 3.9 1.8 2.5 3 6
63 4.3 3.8 3.4 0.0 5.1 1 0
64 5.4 6.4 5.9 1.0 3.9 5 0
65 3.6 7.0 6.0 4.4 3.2 7 0
66 1.3 1.7 6.4 0.0 0.4 0 0
67 2.4 1.4 5.6 7.0 0.4 2 2
68 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.2 5.1 3 0
69 4.3 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.8 0 0
70 3.9 1.4 4.9 3.6 3.9 7 0
71 5.3 5.2 5.9 6.6 5.4 7 0
72 5.0 2.1 4.3 4.0 5.4 1 0
73 0.0 5.5 1.8 0.0 7.0 7 4
74 0.0 3.1 1.8 0.0 7.0 0 3
75 0.0 1.6 1.8 0.0 6.4 0 0
76 3.3 0.7 2.3 0.0 3.5 7 1
77 3.6 3.1 7.0 7.0 4.1 7 1
78 5.4 4.2 5.0 4.4 3.5 7 0
79 6.0 4.7 6.0 4.8 5.4 6 0
80 5.7 4.3 3.9 3.2 5.8 5 3
81 6.7 3.8 4.3 4.2 3.2 2 0
82 6.4 3.7 4.3 4.8 3.2 2 2
83 2.6 4.5 3.9 2.8 3.1 4 0
84 5.3 4.8 6.0 5.8 3.2 3 3
85 3.9 1.7 6.4 5.4 3.2 0 6
86 6.0 4.5 4.8 4.2 2.7 3 7
87 4.6 3.9 6.6 7.0 2.4 7 5
88 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.6 3 6
,89 2.6 1.6 6.6 0.0 0.6 4 7
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Vthen Ii'm ill, hag quickly and effectively I recover
4
item
no : 1
Factors
2	 3 4 5 6	 7
90 3.6 3.2 1.3 4.6 4.5 7 2
91 4.6 2.7 2.3 3.2 3.9 5 4
92 5.2 2.5 2.3 0.0 3.9 1 4
93 5.6 6.8 3.3 2.8 4.0 7 6
94 5.3 6.0 4.3 2.4 4.5 5 7
95 5.0 6.4 4.3 2.8 4.5 7 2
96 4.6 6.2 3.1 2.2 5.1 6 5
97 5.6 6.7 2.3 0.4 5.1 0 0
98 0.0 1.1 3.2 0.4 0.0 3 1
99 0.6 1.4 3.7 7.0 0.4 5 1
100 4.0 2.4 3.4 2.8 6.4 7 6
101 3.2 2.4 6.0 2.6 4.5 7 7
102 2.6 2.5 1.0 2.1 3.5 7 6
103 4.7 3.9 5.6 3.6 3.5 6 4
104 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.0 3.5 0 0
105 0.3 3.6 1.8 0.4 6.4 1 0
106 0.0 2.4 2.7 1.2 6.4 7 4
107 0.0 5.2 0.4 2.3 7.0 7 4
108 0.0 2.4 0.4 0.0 7.0 0 0
109 4.0 5.9 6.1 7.0 1.9 1 6
110 5.6 5.2 4.0 4.4 2.2 7 4
111 5.6 6.7 3.9 4.4 2.5 7 4
112 5.6 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.6 4 1
113 2.6 3.9 6.1 5.8 3.6 7 4
114 2.3 6.0 6.1 2.1 4.7 3 1
115 2.9 5.5 6.1 5.8 4.0 7 7
116 3.0 4.5 4.6 1.2 3.9 3 7
117 4.6 6.5 5.0 4.1 2.9 6 7
118 4.9 4.4 1.9 2.3 2.9 4 7
119 2.9 2.4 3.4 2.4 3.5 7 7
120 2.3 4.4 2.0 5.0 3.6 3 3
121 2.3 3.4 6.0 4.8 4.5 7 5
122 3.2 1.4 1.0 2.6 3.5 1 1
123 2.2 1.2 0.6 2.4 0.0 2 7
124 2.6 1.6 6.6 0.0 0.6 7 7
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7.4.1 IHIQ Factor 1 
Table 7.5 lists the items which gained an average score of >6
from the response sets providing the exemplificatory loading.
From this it can be observed that within IHIQ Factor 1,
'internality' is by no means the only focus around which the
account is built. In terms of health and becoming ill, such
things as work and home circumstances and environmental
influences are also seen as important determinants. However,
'internality' is mostly to do with 'state of mind', including
both positive (e.g. feeling 'on top of life' is important for
current health, and 'positive attitude' and 'seeking out things
that make me happy' are important for improving health in the
future) and negative aspects (e.g. 'my state of mind becoming
negative' is cited as something very likely to engender
illness). Within this context, stress is accorded a central
role - particularly in the working environment, and in terms
of the impact of stressful or upsetting events. These
attributions, plus a specific endorsement of the idea that
'tackling unresolved inner conflicts' would be salient to
improving health in the future, imply a psychoscmatio.-accouht of
health and illness. This is supported by the observation that
none of the influences suggested concerning recovery receive a
mean endorsement higher than 6. Psychosomatic explanations are
better accounts for illness than its cure.
However, this account is not just concerned with mind; action is
salient too in terms of health, with 'taking care of myself' and
'lifestyle' important influences affecting current health, and
capacity to be healthier in the future strongly determined by
'taking charge of my life', 'changing day to day behaviour' and
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Table 7.5 Strongest influences as identified within-1717Q 
Factor 1 
Situation Influences scored as +6 or more (Scale 0-7)
My current
state of
health
3.	 my state of mind
4.	 my emotions
6.	 Whether I feel 'on top' of life
8.	 my overall lifestyle
9.	 (Taking good care of myself'
22. My working environment
23. The circumstances of my home-life
24. The current circumstances at work
25. Particular events in life at the time
My capacity
to become
healthier
in the
future
31. Promoting a positive attitude
32. Seeking out things that make me happy
33. Tackling unresolved inner conflicts
34. Taking charge of my own life
35. Changing my day to day behaviour
37. Giving up unhealthy habits
55. Improvements in work circumstances
Whether or
not I
become
ill
60. My body's natural defences weakened
61. my state of mind becoming negative
79. Working in a poor environment
81. Stressful conditions at work
82. Stressful, nasty or unsettling events
86. Inbuilt weaknesses
When I am
ill, how
quickly I
will
recover
none
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'giving up unhealthy habits'. Actions are less involved in
engendering illness, but both 'taking responsibility' and 'giving
up unhealthy habits' gain mean scores of 5.6 in the section about
recovery from illness.
Overall then, this account is one of multiple influences which
expresses a form of 'internal control' attribution in which both
mind and actions are seen as crucial, but where external factors
like events and circumstances (which, of course, will affect such
things as state of mind, particularly when stressful) are also
seen to play a role.
7.4.2 IHIQ Factor 2 
IHIQ Factor 2 responses indicate an account much closer to the
original intentions of Wallston and Wallston for 'internality',
with the majority of items that gain a mean score of 6 or more
being ones to do with the individual's own actions. However, in
addition the body's defences are also seen as very important for
current health and recovery from illness, and conducive
circumstances and medical treatments regarded as salient to
recovery. Unlike IHIQ Factor 1, internal aspects associated with
'mind' are regarded as relatively unimportant. Examination of
Table 7.6 provides a very clear picture of 'internality' as a
belief in the individual's pre-eminent capacity to control their
health in all situations by what they do.
7.4.3 IHIQ Factor 3 
IHIQ Factor 3, like IHIQ Factor 1, identifies an account in which
multiple influences are seen to play a part, as shown in Table
7.7 The influence of luck is strongly endorsed except for
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Table 7.6 Strongest influences as identified withinIHIO 
Factor 2 
Situation Influences scored as +6 or more (Scale 0-7)
Current
state of
health
2.	 My Body's natural defences
10. Actively taking action to be healthy
My capacity
to become
healthier
in the
future
36. Changing to a more healthy lifestyle
37. Giving up unhealthy habits
Whether or
not I
became ill
64. Behaving in stupid ways
65. Adopting unhealthy life-style
When I am
ill, how
quickly I
recover
93.	 Taking responsibility for myself
94.	 Looking after myself
95.	 Being careful about my behaviour
96.	 Making my life-style more healthy
97.	 Giving up unhealthy habits
111.	 Circumstances conducive to recovery
114.	 Treatments
117.	 My body's own natural defences
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Table 7.7 Strongest influences as identified within1Q 
Factor 3 
Situation Influences scored as +6 or more (Scale 0-7)
My current
state of
health
11. Good or bad luck
12. Simple probability
20. Exposure to infectious organisms
27. my age
Capacity
to become
healthier
in the
future
36. Changing to a more healthy lifestyle
37. Giving up unhealthy habits
39. Good or bad luck
40. Simple probability
48. my age
51. Exposure to infectious organisms
56. What happens in the future
57. Exposure to substances
Whether or
not I
became
ill
60. my body's natur	 defences weakened
65. Adopting unhealthy life-style
66. Bad luck
77. Exposure to infectious organism
79.	 rking in a poor environment
84. Exposure to harmful chemicals
85. Other people's stupid actions
87. Virulence of infective organism
89. my age
When I am
ill, how
quickly I
will
recover
101. Quality of medical treatement
109. Virulence of the disease
113. Taking drugs or medicines
114. Treatments
115.	 'Alternative' therapies
121. Seeking medical advice soon enough
124. my age
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recovery (Item 98 = 3.2), 'luck' and 'probability' are
treated as synonymous, both possibly linked to the high overall
salience attributed to infectious organisms and other
uncontrollable agents like pollution, age and other people's
stupid actions. The sense, then, is that it is not so much that
some malevolent or benign 'fate' is operating, as the sheer
unpredictability of factors that are outside of the individual 's
control.
Recovery is treated rather differently from the other situations
in that medical intervention (Items 101, 113, 114, 115 and 121)
is seen as very important (whereas none of the medical
intervention or advice items score much above 4 in the other
situations). While this would be interpreted as a 'powerful
others' in the MHLC scale, it reads in the context of this scale
much more like a perception of illness as amenable to the
technological procedures of biomedicine in tackling disease
organisms and dysfunction rather than the agency of 'people"
per se. Thus this Factor is evidence of a further dimension to
the three within the MBLC construct. It is not an 'externality'
that sites the locus of control either in chance per se, or in
people, but in the unpredictability of disease organisms and the
physical environment, supported by strong endorsements for
'lifestyle' items (36 and 65) in relation to becoming healthier
and what may result in illness.
7.4.4 IHIQ Factor 4 
IHIQ Factor 4 is also external' in focus, though what is
striking is the strong distinction made between 'luck' as
having virtually no influence and 'probability' as being very
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important indeed. From this perspective luck seems to be
interpreted as a capricious determinant ( as in 'I'm feeling
lucky tonight") whereas probability is just a matter of
statistical odds. Here too infectious organisms are scored as
highly salient, with medicine seen as having little role other as
a preventive measure (presumably such things as inoculations )
and in its ability to bring about iatrogenic illness.
Examination of Table 7.8 shows that other influences (e.g.
pollution, the body's defences, medical treatments) are seen as
salient, and the individual is seen as having some control (e.g.
'Taking care of myself' is scored 4.6 with regard to current
health) so it would be wrong to see this account as out-and-out
fatalism. But it provides the clearest picture of what Wallston
and Wallston presumably intended by their CMHIC construct.
7.4.5 IHIQ Factor 5 
This factor was exemplified by the Hindu student (participant 37)
who exemplified MBLC Factor 7. With opportunities to accredit
"God" and other supernatural forces as influences over health
provided, the account can be seen with much more clarity (See
Table 7.9 ). The strong focus on religious, cultural and kinship
aspects of life express a form of "powerful others" control
attribution that is very different from the one Wallston and
Wallston assumed. The second exemplar, Participant 6, was a
Christian Spiritualist, belonging to a church in which faith
healing is practiced. Thus the account is not restricted to a
particular religious or cultural background, but reflects a more
wide-ranging explanatory system in which supernatural powers are
regarded as pre-eminent.
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Table 7..8 Strongest influences as identified within run 
Factor 4 
Situation Influences scored as +6 or more (Scale 0-7)
My current
state of
health
12. Simple probability
20. Exposure to infective organisms
Capacity
to become
healthier
in the
future
40. Simple probability
44. Seeking out preventive services
Whether or
not I
become ill
60. My body's defences weakened
67. Simple probability
71. Effects of poor medical treatment
77. Exposure to infectious organisms
87. The virulence of infective organism
When I am
ill, how
quickly I
recover
99.	 Simple probability
109. The virulence of the disease itself
Situation	 Influences scored as +6 or more (Scale 0-7)
Current
	 5. Inner forces of my 'psyche'
state of
	 14. The culture within which I live
health
	 19. God or some other supernatural power
Capacity to
become
healthier in
the future
Whether or
not I
become ill
41. Improvements in family relationships
49. God's power or influence
50. Some other supernatural influence
73. God's will
74. Other supernatural influences
75.A curse or ill-wishing
When I am
ill, how
quickly I
recover
100. Care from my family and friends
105.Intervention of a spiritual healer
106.Prayers said for me
107.Cod's will
108.Some other supernatural power
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Table 70
	
Strongest influences as identified within IHIQ
Factor 5 
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7.4.6 IHIQ Factor 6 
This Factor, like IHIQ Factor 7 (below), is more difficult to
interpret as it is based upon the response set of just one
individual. However, IHIQ Factor 6 is notable in that, like
Factor 5, God is seen as an important influence (though not other
supernatural powers or ill wishing), making the point that it is
not just people from minority cultural or religious groups who
see a religious dimension to control over health and illness.
7.4.7 IHIQ Factor 7 
1HIQ Factor 7 differs fram the rest in its consistent stress on
constitution, age and the impact of the weather. The participant
whose IHIQ response set exemplified this Factor also provided the
MBLC 'powerful others' exemplification. The wider repertoire of
available responses here shows that this is not as clear-cut an
account as the NIUE factor suggested. Though friends and family
are seen as important in recovery, the main 'others' control
appears to be that of medical professionals, cited as a strong
influence over health and recovery (but not becoming ill).
'Following doctors orders' is scored 7 for recovery. Clearly,
medical expertise and competence are highly respected.
7.5 DISCUSSION OF THE: NUE AND IHIQ DATA
Overall, then, the NUE and IHIQ responses provide evidence about
three aspects of accounting for health and illness. First, they
demonstrate that although accounts vary considerably in their
focus, all offer complex explanations for health and illness
which are never entirely 'external', 'internal' or 'powerful
others' attributions. Of course, Wallston and Wallston and others
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who have used their scale never claim that this is so, but their
use of these labels (often following quite crude statistical
techniques, such as dividing a sample at the mean), as in any
research methodology which labels individuals by averaged
responses, tends to reify accounting, so that a
higher-than-average CMHLC response score is used to translate
an individual into a 'fatalist', suhmerging the complexity of
their responses (themselves highly constrained) and ignoring the
possibility that the person may have expressed strong endorsement
of, say, some (internal' items.
The 'reliability' of the scale assessed over many individuals
beguiles researchers into forgetting that any one individual's
average score on a sub-scale can be obtained just as easily by
endorsing some items strongly and rejecting others as it can be
by marking all items with mild disagreement. And yet, as the
fine-grained analysis made possible by the by-person factor
analyis of the MULC scale data showed, people do make very clear
distinctions between ostensively (to the scale designers) small
differences in wording (as IHIQ Factor 4 showed so clearly in its
distinction between 'chance' and 'probability'). This is
particularly true when culture becomes involved. Participant 37,
whose data sets exemplified MBLC Factor 7 and IHIQ Factor 5, was
socialised and lives within a culture in which the concept of
'fate' is very different from its meaning in the mainstream of
British culture.
Second, these data have shown that the assumed homogeneity of the
three constructs 'internal', 'chance' and 'powerful others', for
all the reliability claimed by Wallston and Wallston for
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sub-scale responses, hides clearly distinctive and different
constructions. 'Internality' segments into a focus on 'my own
actions and lifestyle' (IHIQ Factor 2) and a focus on'my state of
mind' (IHIQ Factor 1). Similarly, there are at least two
constructions of externality, one which is predominantly
'fatalistic' (IHIQ Factor A) and one in which the external
attribution of control is towards the agency of infective
organisms, and the role of biomedicine in fighting them (IHIQ
Factor 3). 'Powerful others' splits up into at least three
alternative constructions: one which stresses the role of medical
professionals as "in control', albeit within a context of
multiple aetiology (IHIQ Factor 7, MBLC Factor 4); one which sees
them as 'advisors' but not in control (HMLC Factor 3); and one
which stresses the role of God, other supernatural influences,
culture and family (IHIQ Factor 5, MBLC Factor 7).
Of course, this classification is unlikely to encompass all of
the accounts that operate within the popular discourse of British
culture, but even accepting that there may well be others, this
range of what are clearly very diverse constructions gives some
clues about why the MBLC scale has not been a resounding success
either as a dependent or independent variable. Its reliability,
which even Wallston and Wallston admit seems to fluctuate quite
disturbingly study by study, is much more a reflection of the
homogeneity of their participant samples and the culturally
restricted coverage of their item sets than the homogeneity of
the constructs as operating within popular discourse.
Finally, these results demonstrate another kind of diversity -
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differences in the distinctions people make between different
situations. The MELC scale assumes that people attribute the same
locus of control, irrespective of whether it is 'being healthy',
'improving health', 'getting ill' or 'getting better from
illness' that is being considered. Some accounts do attribute
similar levels of agreement to the same influences throughout -
IHIQ Factor 4 is a good example, in its consistent endorsement of
chance/probability throughout. But in other constructions strong
distinctions are made between situations. IHIQ Factor 3, for
example switches from 'organisms' as major determinants of health
and illness, to 'medical treatment' as the major factor affecting
recovery. These kinds of within-account attributional
variability question the whole basis of the 'locus of control'
construct - that individuals construe the world according to
some general, consistent causal explanation. These results
suggest that construal is instead a flexible process in which
attribution is differentially applied according to a variety of
situational and other demands (a point also made by King, 1983,
who argues that the "...static and global" features of the locus
of control construct limit its usefulness).
The use of by-person factor analysis for R-data has demonstrated
that even without Q sorting, pattern analysis has a lot to offer.
There is currently a growing movement in social psychology in
this direction, particularly among Europeans (Areni, Mannetti and
Sabino's investigation of the links between cultural schemas and
contraceptive choice, 1985, and Vala-Salvador and Leite-Viegas'
study of the links between value patterns and political opinions
in Portugal, 1987 are good examples). However, despite the
finer-grained interpretation that by-person factor analysis of
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these two Likert format instruments made possible, it has been
argued in this thesis that Q method offers a highly sensitive
technique for investigating and describing accounts in a way that
'mindless' and disjunctive scale responding can never do.
Despite their relatively faster and easier completion, because
Likert format instruments lack the intentional relational
linkages that Q sorting demands, the most distinctive features of
accounts remain untapped.
7.6 Q SORT RESPONSES
The 80 item Q pack was sorted from -5 (strongly disagree) to +5
(strongly agree), 11 categories in all. The Q sort data yielded
fourteen factors with eigenvalues greater than unity, of which
eight had one or more exemplificatory loadings (loadings >0.6
where no other loading on another factor was greater than 0.35).
The factor loadings are provided in Appendix 4, and a summary of
exemplars (including MBLO scores and, where relevant the factors
exemplified by the NIALC and IHIQ scales) is provided in Table
1
7-10 Factor scores are shown in Table 7.11.
7.6.1 The account identified by Q Factor 1 
Of the eight participants whose Q sorts exemplified this factor,
the NEMO data sets of seven exemplified MEC Factor 1, the IHIQ
data sets of three also exemplified IHIQ Factor 2, and of
another exemplified IHIQ Factor 1. These cross-linkages suggest
that Q Account 1 is basically one of 'internal control'
attribution, with both a 'behavioural' and a 'mind' aspect. The
exemplificatory Q sorts were provided by : a psychologist, the
owner of a health food shop, an osteopath/acupuncturist, a
herbalist, somebody who described himself as "a student of the
1: The items are included in the experimental materials (appendix
11) which provides a convenient source for checking factor scores.
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Table 7.40 Exemplificatory Q sorts for Study 3 
Factor Loading Participant
number
MELC scores Exemplification
via other data
I	 C	 PO MEIC LIKERT
1 0.81 12 57	 15	 17 1
0.61 21 52	 34	 26
0.65 28 66	 25	 21 1
0.83 36 55	 29	 23 1 2
0.83 48 62	 24	 16 1 2
0.66 49 55	 20	 23 1 2
0.65 61 64	 16	 31 1 1
0.83 76 61	 18	 37 1
2 0.68 10 49	 26	 31
0.79 16 45	 35	 35
0.71 19 57	 46	 39
' 0.78 34 45	 Li-c)
0.70 45 43	 55	 39
3 0.69 17 51	 37	 36 1
0.73 51 25	 44	 36 3
0.64 73 41	 43	 37 1
4 0.78 43 42	 36	 24
0.79 82 26	 40	 23
5 0.66 77 57	 31	 32 1
6 0.85 47 45	 49	 41
7 0.66 33 45	 25	 25
8 0.77 18 29	 68	 3 2 4
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Table 7-11	 Factor Scores obtained in Study 3
4
item
no : 1 2 3
Factors
4 5 6 7 8
1 +1 -2 +3	 . +3 0 -2 +5 -4
2 -1 +5 +2 -2 +2 +5 -5 -2
3 -1 0 -1 -5 -4 +3 0 +3
4 -4 -1 -1 +3 +1 -2 0 -2
5 -2 +1 -3 +2 -1 +1 -1 +2
6 0 +2 +1 +2 +2 -3 -1 0
7 -2 -3 -1 +2 -2 +2 +4 +3
8 -4 +3 -2 -2 +2 +2 -2 -2
9 0 -4 -3 +5 -1 -5 +3 +1
10 +3 +2 -3 -3 -5 -1 +3 -3
11 -3 +5 0 -4 +2 +5 -4 +3
12 -2 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 +5 +2
13 -2 -4 -5 -4 -4 -5 -5 -4
14 +4 +1 +2 -1 -2 +1 -1 0
15 -5 -3 -2 0 -5 +1 -2 -1
16 -1 0 -2 -5 -4 +4 +5 +1
17 -3 +1 +1 +4 -5 +2 0 +4
18 0 -1 +5 0 +3 -2 -2 -3
19 +2 -5 -4 -4 +5 +3 -4 -5
20 -1 +4 -1 +2 +1 -1 +1 +3
21 +4 +4 +1 +2 -1 -1 +1 +1
22 0 0 +3 0 0 0 -2 +1
23 +2 -1 +4 0 -1 -4 -3 -1
24 -1 -2 0 +3 0 -1 -2 -2
25 +3 0 +1 0 +3 +2 0 -1
26 +1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -2 0 -3
27 -4 -4 +1 -1 +1 -2 -2 -1
28 -4 0 -1 0 -3 +2 0 +1
29 0 +3 +1 +5 -2 +1 +4 +2
30 0 -2 +2 +4 -3 -4 -4 -3
31 -3 +4 +1 +1 +5 +4 +4 +3
32 -5 -3 -2 0 -2 +2 -4 0
33 -1 +1 -3 +1 -3 -2 0 +3
34 -2 -1 -3 -2 0 -5 0 +5
35 +1 -5 -5 -3 +4 +3 -3 -5
36 +4 -2 +3 +2 +1 -3 0 0
37 +2 +2 0 +2 +2 +4 0 +2
38 +1 -2 +4 +1 +1 -2 0 +2
39 +3 +1 0 -1 +2 +5 -2 -1
40 -5 -2 -2 0 -2 -4 -3 -1
Table 7.11 Factor Scores obtained in Study 3 /cont.
Factors
item
no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
41 +1 -1 +5 +3 +4 -3 0 +3
42 +1 +1 0 -3 0 -3 +1 -2
43 -1 0 -1 -4 -1 +1 -3 +2
44 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 +2 0 0
45 -4 +2 0 +1 +1 +4 +4 +4
46 +3 0 +2 +1 -1 0 0 -2
47 0 +2 +4 0 +4 -1 +3 +1
48 0 0 +4 -1 0 -3 +1 +1
49 -1 +1 -1 +5 -2 -3 -1 -3
50 +1 +1 -3 0 -1 +3 +3 0
51 +2 +3 0 -1 0 -3 +3 -1
52 -1 +5 +3 +1 +1 -1 -2 +2
53 +3 -2 +5 +2 -2 0 0 +1
54 -2 +1 -4 -2 0 -1 -1 0
55 0 -5 -5 -4 -3 +3 -3 -5
56 0 -1 +1 0 +3 +2 0 +2
57 -3 -1 -1 -5 -3 0 0 +4
58 +5 +2 0 -1 +5 0 0 -2
59 -2 0 -2 +2 +2 0 -1 -1
60 +3 -3 0 -1 0 0 +1 -1
61 0 +3 +2 -1 +3 0 +1 +1
62 +2 +2 0 +3 0 +1 -1 -2
63 +1 -1 +3 -3 +1 -4 -1 -3
64 +1 -4 -4 -3 +1 0 -5 0
65 +4 +2 +1 +5 +3 +3 +3 +4
66 +5 +4 +2 +1 0 +2 +3 0
67 -1 -3 -2 -2 -1 -4 -3 -1
68 0 +2 +1 +3 -1 0 +4 +5
69 +2 0 +3 +4 -2 +1 -1 +1
70 +5 -1 -2 +1 +2 +1 +1 0
71 -2 -1 +4 0 -3 -2 0 -4
72 -3 0 -3 -2 -3 +1 0 +2
73 -3 +4 +3 +4 +3 -2 +1 0
74 +4 +3 +2 +1 +2 +4 +1 +4
75 +1 +1 0 -1 +1 +3 +1 +5
76 +2 0 -4 -2 +4 0 -4 0
77	 +2 -3 -4 -3 +4 0 0 -4
78	 +2 -1 -1 +3 +3 -1 -3 -2
79	 -2 -3 -1 -2 -4 -1 -2 -4
80	 +3 -4 +2 -2 -2 +1 -1 -3
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arcane school", a. member of a 'charismatic' Christian
church, an acupuncturist belonging to the Bahai faith, an
osteopath/herbalist, and an Open University Course Manager who
was at the time of responding engaged in a course of biogenic
treatment.
Not surprisingly, the account favours alternative medicine (Item
70 = +5), is unconvinced about the efficacy of conventional
medicine (Item 2 = -1, Item 9 = 0, Item 11 = -3, Item 52 = -1)
and rejects the view that illness is cured by prescribed
medicines (Item 8 = -4). Rather, this account stresses an
individual's competence to decide for themselves on treatment,
and the effectiveness of their body's self-healing mechanisms
(Items 65 and 74 = +4). However, the strongest theme is a strong
'internal' conviction about personal control over, and
responsibility for their own health. This shows up in a variety
of statements which expressly endorse such a commitment
21. How well or badly I look after myself generally
has an influence over my overall health. 	 +4
40. When I'm ill, there is very little that I can do
for myself that will help me get better faster. 	 -5
46. My overall state of health has a lot to do with
my own day to day actions - I can allow myself to 	 +3
get run down, or take steps to stay healthy.
58. My own actions are crucial to achieving better
health - it is something I have to work for. 	 +5
66. My health is my own responsibility. 	 +5
This commitment extends to a	 willingness to take the blame
for illness (Item 10 = +3, Item 42 = +1, Item 51 = +2), 1 and is
underlined by strong and consistent rejection of any effect of
luck (Item 15 = -5, Item 28 = -4, Item 32 = -5) or probabilistic
1 : Although endorsement is mild, it is relatively stronger than
most of the other accounts.
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influence (Item 7 = -2, Item 17 = -3, Item 44 = -3). More
unusually, within this account disease organisms are not
*Portant reasons for illness (Item 12 = -2, Item 20 = -1, Item
31 = -3, Item 45 = -4), neither are environmental influences
(Item 4 = -4, Item 33 = - , Item 73 = -3). The influence of other
people is not salient,.	 including relationships (Item 18 = 0),
people being unpleasant (Item 30 = 0), others' stupid actions
(Item 59 = -2) as causes of illness, and the care of others as
influences on overall health (Item 56 = ). However, pollution
and such things as food additives do have some influence (Item 57
= -3). Some flavour of the importance of personal control and
responsibility is provided by the comments written by those whose
Q sorts exemplified this factor
"I feel there is always something you can do to help your health.
The very fact of taking a positive action can help by improving
your state of mind. You could feel very negative waiting for
'good luck' to turn up... We must be the person who knows our own
body best; what exercise it needs, food it needs, rest it needs,
etc. etc. NO one else can take responsibility for these things,
and since I believe that lifestyle has a major influence on
health, we can to a great extent determine our own health."
(Participant 38),
"Health will usually improve if we can help the body heal
itself. Health is the natural state, so luck doesn't really play
a part (except perhaps in one's circumstances)." (Participant 48).
"I am firmly convinced that I have considerable power to
influence my own health... I believe that disease can often be
held off - it is never purely physical... One should have
sufficient control over oneself to prevent one from getting ill."
(Participant 12).
"There's plenty I can do, from resting, taking medicine and
advice and changing those habits etc. which made me get ill in
the first place... It is my responsibility to eat well, exercise
and have a positive state of mind and try to develop these
skills... My own attitude and actions are crucial, not luck."
(Participant 49).
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To begin to unpack what is meant by the commitment to personal
control, it is evident that the focus is upon what might be
called the This account stresses seeing yourself as 'in
charge', by power of mind, of your body, and consequently both of
your health, and your capacity to recover from illness. The
impression given is that while agents capable of engendering
illness - e.g. disease organisms, adverse environmental factors,
pressures from other people - have the potential to affect you,
you regard yourself as both capable of, and in some sense duty
bound to resisting, and thereby maintaining/achieving health in
spite of them.
"I take actions to mean psychological effort here, as that's the
type of work I think achieves health ... If illness only emerges
as a result of psychological factors 'letting disease then
one must try to understand and hence control them." (Participant
12)
"The power of the mind is the strongest influence over my
health." (Participant 21).
"My state of health is often determined by whether I take on
board positive or negative thoughts and feelings. Promoting a
positive outlook will make me much less susceptible to illness."
(participant 61).
This emphasis on 'state of mind' is also evident in the Q sort
allocations (Item 14 = +4, Items 39 and 53 = +3), with 'emotions'
also mildly important (Items 23 and 62 = +2, Item 41 = +1),
particularly life pressures (Item 36 = +4) and less
saliently, sudden stressful life events (Item 38 = +1). What this
suggests, is that as with Account 2 in Study 2, this construal
of control sited in 'the mind' is not one of blind,
uncontrollable psychodynaMic forcesibut of the mind as an active
agent of the will, a means to control, not a means by which one
is controlled :
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"Cur own inner state of health nearly always determines whether
or not we get infected, ill or even have accidents !"
(Participant 28)4
"I do not believe disease attacks as a separate entity in itself
- symptoms express some disturbance of body function - the body
can be encouraged to right itself." (Participant 48).
The internal attribution is thus of the 'body' as well as the
'mind', reflected in a moderate acceptance for inbuilt weaknesses
(Item 1 = +1) and the effects of constitution (Item 36 = -2) and
of the body's self-healing properties (Item 37 = +2). Within
the Q sorts exemplifying this account there is some diversity of
opinion about the role of God, faith healing and prayer, with the
comments of some people denying any divine intervention, but a
majority asserting that the spiritual aspect of health as very
important indeed, albeit in different forms and from different
faiths
"I believe in a sort of Karma. Illness acts as a reminder that I
shouldn't take all the good things in life for granted. If I were
a perfect 'Christian' person I might not be ill." (Participant
36).
"God has frequently answered prayers of faith for physical
healing both for myself and for other people ... God desires that
I should live in perfect health and never instigated my ill
health. Our vulnerability to sickness is caused by living in a
sinful world which has, to a large extent, rejected God ... my
health is a reflection of my lifestyle - I need to be
spiritually, mentally, emotionally and physically whole to be
truly healthy. I believe complete wholeness is only attainable
through reconciliation with God." (Participant 61)
"I believe in the healing power of one's personal prayer to God
or inner spirit or whatever ... Attuning to the universal 'will'
is the best way of shaking loose selfish tendencies which cause
me to be dis-eased." (Participant 21),
This account derived from Q sorting provides a very clear and
definite description of the role of the individual's control,
which appeared in the IHIQ data as simply 'behavioural' with some
'mind' aspects (all the exemplars on this Q Factor load
positively onto IHIQ Factor 1). It is an 'internal' account par
excellence, with external factors such as the vicissitudes . of
bacteria and environmental factors, the influence of other people
seen as negligibly important compared with the individual's own
self-control mechanisms, either in themselves or in conjunction
with a godly or universal power. There is a strong sense both of
Mind over matter' and self-determination over fate, although
bodily factors (i.e. constitution and biological mechanisms) are
also regarded as important. Of the eight Q factors identified it
is the one which most consistently attributes locus of control,
responsibility and accountability within the self, and most
consistently rejects the impact of external factors, or the
influence of other people. Whether an individual is ill or well
is not a matter of luck, but has a reason - and that reason is
predominantly found deeply within the person themselves (Item 80
= +3).
This account has been expressed within popular discourse from at
least as far back as the writings of John Barlow (1843), Daniel
Noble (1853) and Daniel Hack TUke (1872) who asserted : "The
power of the will in resisting disease is unquestionable". More
of our age, in a Vholistic Handbook' Miles (1978) wrote
... nature is an interactive friend, and disease is a feedback
process whithin the choosing system of the individual, a process
which informs the individual that some life-process is off
course. The individual is the only person who can discover that
feedback message and act upon it." (p 20).
In the same book Bauman (1978) counselled expressly against the
"negativity" of blaming the environment for illness. Ardell,
writing at much the same time (1977) specifically stressed
343
self-responsibility
"All dimensions of high level wellness are equally important, but
self-responsibility seems more equal than the rest. It is the
philosopher's stone, the mariner's compass, and the ring of per
to a high level wellness lifestyle. Without an active sense of
accountability for your own well-being, you won't have the
necessary motivation to lead to a health-enhancing lifestyle." (p
94).
Crawford (1980) regards concepts of individual responsibility and
self-determination central to the forms of 'alternative' medicine
that stress wholism. It is therefore not surprising that four
of the six practitioners in 'alternative' medicine in the
participant sample provided Q sorts exemplifying this factor. The
account itself is evidence for the contemporary prominence in
British currently of the kind of 'individualising' discourses
discussed in Chapter 1 (See also Aakster, 1986; Graham, 1986,
Chapter 4).
7.6.2 The account identified by Q Factor 2 
The five participant's whose Q sorts exemplify this Factor
described themselves as a secretary, a fire officer, a clerical
officer, a housewife and a school student. None of their
other data sets exemplified either a MHLC or IHIQ Factor.
Whatever it is that the account identified by Q Factor 2 is
expressing was not picked up by the other measures. Inspection
of the factor scores for this account (See Table 7.11 ) shows
that it expresses multiple aetiology and influence, including
aspects of 'external', 'internal' and 'powerful others'.
So far as 'internality' is concerned, there is conuitment to the
idea that the individual is responsible for, and able to
influence their health (Item 66 = +4), though in some instances
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expressed less strongly than it was Q Factor 1 (Item 40 = -2,
A
Item 58 = +2). Blame is similarly	 ;- accepted
(Item 10 = +2, Item 42 = +1, Item 51 = +3). However, the
attribution of internal control is by no means unequivocal,
given the distinction shown between a mild rejection of
(lifestyle' (Item 78 = -1) but the strong endorsement of (looking
after myself' (Item 21 = +4) as influences over health. This more
attenuated attribution of internal control is matched by
distinctions drawn between different aspects of chance and
probability. Items that place heavy emphasis on luck and
probability over health and recovery are rejected (Items 7, 15
and 32 = -3, Item 44 = -2), getting ill as a matter of luck is
neither rejected or accepted (Item 28 = 0), and items that
suggest some degree of chance are mildly endorsed:
17. Try as I may, there is nothing I can do that I
can be certain will improve my health. The best I can +1
do is change the odds to give myself a greater chance
of becoming healthy.
29. Illness is a fact of life - I cannot expect to go
through life without ever becoming ill, or without	 +3
risk of disability.,
Clearly within this account, with chance/probability allocations
ranging from +3 to -3, quite subtle distinctions are being made
between the alternative wordings of items. These begin to make
more sense when allocations with regard to infectious organisms
are examined. Unlike Q Factor l's account, where they were
regarded as having only marginal influence, within this account
they are accorded consistent, sometimes strong influence (Item 12
= +3, Items 20 and 31 = +4, Item 45 = +2). There is also
endorsement of the kinds of environmental factors which may
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increase one's susceptibility to infection, such as being exposed
to cold or damp (Item 73 = +4). However, within this account the
'strongest agree' allocations were used to endorse the
effectiveness of orthodox medical care
2. When I'm ill enough to consult a doctor, my
recovery will be faster if I comply properly with 	 +5
the treatment I get.
9. I have little faith that the advice I get from
the medical profession can help very much in	 -4
improving my health.
8. I usually expect to take medicine to help me
recover from illness. 	 +3
11. If I were ever seriously ill, I would have a lot
of faith in the ability of doctors to find a cure. 	 +5
52. When I'm ill, my recovery depends a lot on the
quality of medical treatment I receive. 	 +5
Thus looked at simply in terms of the three MBLC constructs, this
account regards all three as influencing health and illness
'internal control' in terms of a degree of personal
responsibility and culpability; 'external control' in terms,
particularly, of infectious organisms; and 'powerful others' with
regard to the efficacy of the care and advice provided by medical
professionals. Together all three may well explain the
distinctions attributed to chance in different situations - being
attacked by disease organisms as an inevitable and probabilistic
'fact of life', but you do not have to be a passive victim - you
can take steps to avoid infection, and to have the infection
treated when it occurs. This multiple attribution of aetiology of
illness, its prevention, and response to it is supported by
observing that participant 13, whose MBIE scores indicated such
an account in exemplifying MBLC Factor 6, loads 0.53 on this Q
Factor; and participants 2 and 67, who exemplified such an
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account via their IHIQ responses, load 0.39 and 0.54 on it
respectively.
However, the Q-sort data enables this particular account to be
interpreted in more detail. While all three of the MHLC
constructs are engaged within it, in terms of 'powerful others'
at least, a distinction is made between the assumed control of
medical professionals (endorsed) and that of friends and family,
which is either mildly rejected, or simply seen as unimportant
18. The state of my relationships with others -
how well or badly I'm getting on with those	 -1
close to me at a particular point in time - has
a significant impact on my state of health.
30. When others are unpleasant to me, or I get into -2
conflicts, it can have the effect of making me ill.
59. Sometimes the stupid or thoughtless actions of
others can lead to me becoming unwell. 	 0
56. The care and support I get from others has an
influence on my overall health. 	 -1
The ministrations of others are, however, important for recovery.
Although the item does not distinguish between lay and expert
care, its wording does imply something rather different from
specifically medical treatment
61. The 'tender loving care' I get from others
when I am ill can make all the difference to 	 +3
whether I make a full recovery or not.
Some clues about the division made between lay and expert
'others' is provided by a neutral allocation for Item 43 (and in
some cases a rejection, as participants 19 and 45 marked their Q
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matrix with these as disagree) that 'sometimes just the chance to
talk to the doctor will make me feel better' and mild agreement
(+1) with Item 5 that the body is 'rather like a machine'. This
perception (albeit only mildly endorsed - no factor allocates it
higher than +2) of the body as machine-like suggests that the
account construes the mechanisms involved in health and
illness as predominantly physical and biochemical. Within this
context, as was the case in IHIQ Factor 3, medical professionals
are not so much 'powerful others' per se as the agents who
operate a technological system of prevention and treatment, and
it is that system which has control over health and illness. This
is shown in one of the comments made by Participant 45,
concerning items about the power of God
"I do not think God or religion has anything to do with your
health. No one but you and the mechanics of your body are
responsible... nothing can cure you but medicine and rest. No
man(sic) can perform a miracle and make you walk."
This mechanistic perspective assumes the body has self-healing
properties (Item 37 = +2) and that for minor illnesses, it is
better to let 'nature take its course' than seek out medical
treatment (Item 65 = +2). This stress on the physical aspects
of illness is coupled with mild rejection of the influence of
'state of mind' over health (Item 53 = -2) and only mild
acceptance that 'thinking positively' aids recovery (Items 14 and
39 = +1). In particular, psychological factors such as stress,
emotions and unresolved worries are mildly but consistently
rejected as explanations for illness (Items23, 41 and 63 = -1,
Items 36 and 38 = -2). Item 80, about seeking deep within oneself
for the reasons for illness, the most psychodynamic, is rejected
the most strongly (= -4). The mechanistic emphasis shows up
particularly in strong refutation of any influence attributable
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to God, other supernatural forces, or indeed any 'mambo jumbo'
(as one participant expressed it) about curses or faith healing
(Items 19, 35 and 55 = -5, Items 13 and 64 = -4, Item 77 = -3).
Overall the internal/external/powerful others dimensions are
simply not all that salient to this account. Rather it is a
mechanistic explanatory model of health and illness - the
'medical model' which provides the basis for biomedicine. This is
supported by observing that Participant 10, who provided one of
the exemplificatory Q sorts, was an exemplar for Factor 6 in
Study 2, which also identified a 'medical model' account. It does
include some recognition of psychosomatic processes (e.g.
Participant 16 commented that in some cases 'smarties' would
work as well as "active" drugs). But fundamentally its perception
is of illness as the simple breakdown in physical function,
due to infection, pollution, injury, or degeneration, capable of
being cured by the body's own regenerative and defensive
mechanisms, aided by medical care and treatment. Within this
model, illness is often inevitable, but can also be held off
some of the time by 'taking care' of the body, and avoiding
situations where it is exposed to infection or damage.
Participant 45 summarises this well in her comments
"I think health in general boils down to you yourself leading as
healthy a life as you can. If you are fat and unfit you are more
likely to have illness. Although health is your responsibility in
some illnesses, not all - e.g. if you break a leg you could not
stop that happening - no matter how much exercise ! Medicine
alone will not make you completely better - your body's defenses,
etc, will start to work and help your recovery. For some minor
illnesses e.g. a cold, you just 'ride it out', no medicine
needed. For more serious illness I would expect to take some form
of medicine - if you go to the doctors, your illness was serious
enough to merit you going, so you always expect something."
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7.6.3 The account identified by Qp,.1 otor- 3 
TWo of the three people whose Q sorts exemplify Q Factor 3 also
provided exemplificatory data sets for IHIQ Factor 1 (i.e. the
"mind' construction of internal control). They are Participant
17, a course manager and participant 73, an unemployed man. The
other person who provides an exemplificatory Q sort for this
factor is Participant 51, a psychotherapist, who exemplified MBIC
Factor 3. At first sight, then, the Q analysis seems faced with
inconsistency, bringing these people together as exemplars.
However, closer examination of their Q sort allocations
demonstrates that they are much more easily reconciled than might
be assumed.
Items that relate to emotions and state of mind are consistently
and often strongly endorsed, including 'state of mind' as an
important influence on overall health (Item 53 = +5) and health
improvement (Item 14 = +2), that when unhappy one is more likely
to be ill (Item 23 = +4), emotional distress can upset general
health (Item 41 = +5), and that when ill, one should seek 'deep
within' oneself for the reason (Item 80 = +2). Although health
and happiness are not equivalent Item 62 = 0), emotions, state
of mind and inner motivations and pressures are highly salient to
health status, the process of becoming ill, and the process of
recovery. This is consistent with the 'mind' version of
'internality' as identified by IHIQ Factor 1. However, unlike Q
Factor l's perception of 'mind' as an active, purposive agent of
the self (i.e. the within Q Factor 3, 'mind' is much
more a passive object of psychodynamic forces. This is indicated
by the allocations to those items which refer to the individual's
ability to manage their health and illness by twill-power' (Item
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26 = -2, Item 39 = 0). Though 'mind' itself is an internal
property of the person, within this account it is not 'in
control' but 'controlled'.
Other Q sort allocations make clear the kinds of agents seen to
do the controlling - all of them "external'. First there is the
agency of 'powerful others'. State of relationships (Item 18 =
+5) is crucial; regarded as less important are 'others being un-
pleasant, and 'tender loving care' in terms of recovery (Items
30 and 61 = +2). However, unlike Q Factor 2, it is not other
people as a source of infection that matters (Item 33 = -3).
Rather it is the influence of events and circumstances (Item 22
= +3, Item 47 = +4), long-term pressures (Item 36 = +3),
stressful life events (Item 38 = +4), and what is going on in
life (Item 48 = +4, Item 54 = -4) that affect health, can make
you ill, and determine recovery. Furthermore stress and 'state
of mind' interact
69. Stress only makes me ill when I'm 'down'; when
I'm feeling full of energy, and/or content, I can 	 +3
ride it out with no ill effects.
This is explicitly expressed in written comments
"I strongly believe that health or ill health is derived from
factors such as environment, stress or upsets with others, and
whether I'm feeling self-confident or not, all working
interactively." (Participant 51).
"What is going on in your life affects how you feel - 'up' or
'down' and so, I think, your susceptibility to coping with
illness ... one's day to day 'ups' and 'downs' do affect one's
general health ... economic resources are one of the major
sources of feelings of security and wellbeing, or insecurity and
stress." (Participant 73).
All of these aspects of the account are consistent with a
stress model,	 in which there is a feeling that both health
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and illness are determined predominantly by external influences
out of the individual's control. i.e. a perception of oneself as
the "innocent victim (
 of illness-provoking circumstances,
stresses, and the psychological responses to them. It also shows
up as a denial of blame for illness (Items 10 and 50 = -3) and
in only limited acceptance of the idea of personal responsibility
for health (Item 66 = +2) or that an individual's own actions are
all that important ( Item 46 = +2, Items 21 and 25 = +1, Item 58
= 0, Item 40 = -2). Additional support for this as a
psychosomatic account is provided by the observation that
Participant 11 (Participant 53 in Study 2) who provided the
exemplificatory Q sort for Account 8 in Study 2 (also interpreted
as psychosomatic) loaded 0.56 on this Factor.
Her Q 'sort responses and open-ended comments in her Study 2
interview included a recognition of the role of biological
factors. The same can be observed here, for while-the idea of the
body as machine-like is refuted (Item 5 = -3), disease organisms
are seen to play a role in health and illness, although not a
highly salient one (Item 12 = +2, Item 31 = +1, Item 45 = 0).
Similarly, orthodox medicine makes some contribution, though
allocations show that its importance is relatively low (Item 2 =
+2, Item 9 = -3, Item 11 = 0, Item 52 = +3), and consistent with
the Psychosomatic overview, taking medicine is not seen as
effective for recovery (Item 8 = -2).
Thus the picture that builds up is one in which control is sited
predominantly externally, in events, circumstances and stresses
that operate upon, the individual 's "mind'
psychosomatically, leading both directly to illness (e.g. thyroid
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dysfunction) and indirectly (e.g. by lowering the body's defences
to fight infection). It is not an 'externality' that sites the
locus of control in chance or fate per se - chance and luck are
rejected (Items 15, 32 and 44 = -2j. Illness always has a cause,
but that cause may be random life-events or life-circumstances,
as Participant 17 wrote in her comments
"I'm well aware that when personal relationships go badly
(particularly at work) they affect my health - specifically
severe insomnia. my state of mind all year has been depressed
and dissatisfied and I rarely sleep more than 4-5 hours. I have
had two episodes of illness that were likely to have resulted
from long-term stresses e.g. a spate of boils during a tough 2
years, and thyroid troubles as a result of years of stress."
This account is about a chain of influences acting upon each
other. Stresses affect emotions, feelings and psychological
wellbeing, which in turn emerge as physical symptoms. There is
certainly some recognition that the individual can play a part in
the process (e.g. participant 51 described how she gives herself
Mars bars when she is (down' as a 'treat' to cheer her up and
tackle her negative emotions), but there is an over-riding sense
that if you happen to get caught up in a lifestyle that is
distressing (e.g. unemployment) or inherently stressful (e.g.
major reorganisation and upheavals at work), circumstances
largely out of your control, illness is likely to follow through
no fault of your own.
This account comes closest to a locus of control construed in
terms of .'powerful others', but not God or supernatural others
(all the relevant items are allocated Q sort placements at the
'strongly disagree' end); nor medical professionals as the
controllers of medical technology; nor the 'political'
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interpretation of hegemony which was so salient to Factor 1
accounts in the two previous studies (and which re-appears in the
next Factor in this study). Within this account the other people
who have control over health and illness are those within close
proximity, at home and at work, who subject the individual to
interpersonal conflicts and attack their self-esteem. While the
account recognises the impact of life-circumstances and
life-events, all of those specifically mentioned involve social
relationships and emotions.
All three of the exemplars are graduates in psychology, so they
are presumably more conversant with noMhosamatics , than most
people in the general population (though note that other
psychologists, such as Participants 12 and 82, do not provide
Q-sorts which express this account). However, Participant 11 is
not a psychologist, and inspection of the factor loadings
(Appendix 4) shows that a variety of other people loaded fairly
strongly onto this factor, indicating that a	 stre ss
account for health and illness has been widely incorporated into
popular discourse in Britain as it has in America (cf Young,
1980).
7.6 4 The account identified by Q Factor4 
Q Factor 4 was exemplified by two women, Participants 43 (a
teacher), and 82 (a research psychologist) both of whom had
exemplified the radical feminist version of Factor 1 accounts in
the two previous studies. Two other women, Participants 3
(another researcher, also a qualified nurse) and 42 (a
postgraduate student) also gained loadings >0.6 but were excluded
as exemplars, because they loaded >0.35 on other factors. my own
Q sort loaded most strongly onto this Factor (0.55). All of these
Factors
1	 2	 3 4 5	 6	 7 8
-1 -2 0 +3 0 -1 -2 -2
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people describe themselves as feminists and politically
Given the purpose of this study was to elucidate explanatory
accounts in relation to the MBLC construct, the Q item sample
introduced few opportunities to provide a 'cultural critique' or
radical feminist analysis. These, it was felt, had been clearly
identified and articulated in previous studies. Thus this
account, expressed as it is by the Q sorts from the women who had
previously exemplified the hegemonic powerful others' account
for health and illness, brings out other features which in this
context provided additional clues about the ways in which
capitalism and particularly patriarchy are seen to endanger
health in three main ways. First, their domination of economic
resources. With the one item in the sample which specifically
mentions economics, this acount is the only one to give it a
clearly positive allocation
24. My state of overall
health is in part a
product of my economic
resources - how "well
off" or "badly off" I
am.
Second, the way that the physical environment is damaged by such
things as industrialisation, creating an unhealthy, polluted
world
Factors
4. To improve my health
would require improve-
ments in the environ-
ment in which I live.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-4 -1 -1 +3 +1 -2 0 -2
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There is strona and consistent emphasis on physical external
influences - such as housing and working conditions (Item 16 =
-5), pollution (Item 3 = -5), and food additives (Item 57 = -5)
and the stressful, exploitative society in which we live (Item 49
= +5) :
"I work in a clean, relatively unpolluted environment. I live in
dry, uncrowded, high standard housing. All of these enable me to
be healthier. If I were an industrial worker living in the North,
or a third world peasant with no clean water and open sewers, or
the inhabitant of a shanty town on the edge of a large city, I
would not have anything like the chances of being well."
(Participant 3).
"Looking out over my Fen in the summer sun, I realise that the
farmer sprays herbicides regularly in the field next to my house,
my tap water comes from surface water heavily polluted with
nitrates and there's radioactive dust in my allotment.
(Participant 43).
The specifically feminist perspective, furthermore, attributes
the major blame for the health-threatening violence done to the
physical world specifically to its man-made features
"I'd add ... patriarchial control of the noxious influences ...
my overall state of health has a lot to do with being a woman in
a man's world." (Participant 82).
Thirdly, hegemonic and particularly patriarchial power is seen as
destructive to health in the way it constructs 'reality' in a
form that seeks to shift the blame for health onto individuals.
Such blame is denied (Items 10 and 42 = -3, Item 51 = -1)
"Telling people that if they don't pull their socks up and take
responsibility for their own health is a lovely way for the
Government and the bosses of industry to pass the buck."
(Participant 3)
... the 'blame the victim' stance of 'if you're ill, it's
because deep down you really want to be ill." (Participant 42)
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Therefore this account - in marked contrast to Q Factor l's - is
wary of the notion that people have some kind of deep seated
mental power either to 'will themselves well' (Items 14 and 39 =
-1) or that may account for illness (Item 80 = -2), and plays
down individual responsibility for health and illness (Item 66 =
+1) and the importance of an individual's actions (Item 21 = +2,
Item 46 = +1, Item 40 = 0, Item 58 = -1). It is clearly a
perception of external locus of control, distinguishing between
chance and probability, with allocations of chance items neutral
(Items 15, 28 and 32 all = 0) but probabilistic influences
endorsed (Item 7 = +2, Item 17 = +4, Item 29 = +5). Illness as a
'fact of life' engendered the comment
"Of course. And important in terms of the rights of the
physically challenged." (Participant 82).
This comment is critical, for it makes the point that an
acceptance of illness and disability as probabilistic is
certainly not 'fatalism' in this context, but what is regarded as
a more realistic appraisal of life than the assumption that the
individual can somehow avoid illness and disability if they
simply adopt a particular lifestyle. It is a denial of what is
seen as a politically motivated 'individualism' which subverts
the rights and self-esteem of people who are physically
challenged. The term 'physically challenged' has been adopted
within the feminist movement and elsewhere (particularly among
groups such as the Disability Alliance, cf Finkelstein ) 1980,
working for the rights of disabled people to self-determination)
to dispute the perception of disability as deviance or
sub-normality, refuting the popular image of health and
able-bodiedness as in some way morally superior to and more
desirable than illness or handicap.
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There is positive (albeit mildly so) acceptance of the effects of
contagious disease organisms (Items 12, 31 and 45 = +1, Item
20 = +2) but, as before, some distrust of biomedicine, mildly
rejecting compliance (Item 2 = -2), the capability of medicine
(Item 8 = -2) and doctors (Item 11 = -4) to cure illness and in
varticular, rejecting - the advice they give (Item 9 = +5). Minor
illness is best dealt with by the body's own defensive (Item 37 =
+2) and curative (Item 65 = +5) capacities.
Overall, then, this account is like the one expressed by Factor
3 in focussing on 'external' causes of ill-health. However, the
accounts are quite different in the way they construe external
factors operating. First, they have a completely different
perception of what kinds of external factors are involved. Q
Factor 3 is concerned more with individual actions and
circumstances (e.g. a particular person who is unpleasant, or a
particular work setting or lifestyle that is distressing),
whereas with Q Factor 4 the concern is with aspects of the power
base within society as a whole - the effects of capitalism,
patriarchy, social inequality etc. Also there is a strong
political analysis of the notion of cause, blame and
responsibility. Participants wrote
"[my awareness of] ... the relationship between poverty and ill
health, Third World women, private health care and of the London
Food Commission report, etc. ... There are more important things
to worry about than the state of my personal health, given that
Man and Nature between them will eventually finish me off anyway"
(Participant 43).
"I see the bugs and viruses as an important a part of nature as
we are, and therefore find them easier to accept than the disease
created by society." (Participant 42).
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Secondly, this viewpoint rejects psychosomatic explanations of
illness, not so much to deny the possibility that —stress'
can affect health, but because it regards such explanations as a
way of shifting blame from society onto the individual. The
explicitly political stance taken here, then, is one which
rejects notions of 'internal control' in a considered and
deliberate way as a form of 'false consciousness', adopting
instead a particular form of 'external control' attribution
predcudnantly to do with the direct and indirect influences of
'powerful others', not as individuals, but as a collectivity.
This construction is placed in a perspective in which illness, in
a biological sense, is a fact-of-life - even in a 'perfect'
society, there would be same disease and disability. What matters
is not so much what causes it, but how we respond to it.
Finally, there is an understanding that 'powerful others'
engender ill-health via their assaults on physical environment -
industrial pollution, food additives, poor housing conditions
etc.
Basically this account can be viewed as a politicised,
Westernised form of a 'personalistic' belief system, replacing
a perception of illness as the result of the direct and motivated
intervention of malicious ghosts, spirits or sAtchdoctors by
the perception of illness as the result of the direct and
motivated impact of exploitative capitalists, politicians, the
medical hegemony and decision and policy makers, groups which
are almost entirely male. For example, in response to item 59
(Sometimes the stupid or thoughtless actions of others can lead
to me becoming ill) Participant 43 wrote, in the wake of the
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Chernobyl incident
"e.g. the stupid idiots who let a radioactive cloud loose over my
planet:'
Accounting for health and illness is divided into two distinct
domains. There is illness which is inevitable within a
biological ecosystem, about which individuals can take some
action (e.g. getting enough exercise and chosing a healthy
diet) but in general, there is little anybody can do. However,
much more importantly, there is illness which is potentially
preventable or avoidable if society were organised
differently. If the patriarchial power-base were replaced by a.
more just society in which clean water, proper drains and
adequate housing were available to all, where poverty was
abolished, and where commerce, industry and the arms-race were
forced to give way to principles of ecological protection and
safe, nutritious food, then all the peoples of the world would
have a good chance of a healthy life. In a world without
poverty, anomie and exploitation, people would not need to resort
to tobacco, alcohol and other 'Unhealthy habits', and in a world
freed from the commercial greed of the profit motive, they would
not be submitted to the aggressive marketing of the ."naughty but
nice'. But beyond this, a truly healthy society would be one
where illness and particularly disability would be freed from
their negative connotations, and where collective living would be
organised to enable the sick and the physically challenged to
participate fully and autonomously alongside the well and the
able-bodied.
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7.6.5 The account identified by Q Factor 5 
This factor was exemplified by . 0ne individual, participant 77,
a homeopathic pharmacist. A number of other people's Q sorts
loaded, though less strongly, onto it, including participant 4, a
lecturer in Neurophysiology; participant 6, who exemplifed IHIQ
Factor 5, a Spiritualist healer; participant 54, a pensioner who
describes herself as 'an active church member', and
participant 55 a nurse in a managerial position. Its
distinguishing feature is its strong focus on the power of
spiritual and religious forces in controlling health and bringing
about recovery. God is regarded as a major positive force for
pramoting and caring for health, this account allocating the
highest endorsement of all for associated items
Factors
1 2	 3	 4 5 6 7	 8
19. God has given me the means
by which	 to improve my	 +2 -5 -4 -4 +5 +3 -4 -5
health.
35. I believe that God watches 	 +1 -5 -5 -3 +4 +3 -3 -5
over my health.
77. By attuning myself to
nature itself - to the 'power
	 +2 -3 -4 -3 +4 0 0 -4
for good in the Universe, I
can improve my health.
"I believe that God has ultimate control over all of us':
(Participant 6).
God does not send illness (Item 55=
 -3) nor can ill wishing or
curses cause illness (Item 13 = -4), but faith healing (Item 64 =
+1, Item 76 = +4) and the power of prayer (Item 71 = -3) can
cure :
"I believe in a God who hears and answers prayer. Though an
analytical scientist, I also believe as a cormdted Christian in
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faith healing." (Participant 4).
Unlike the account identified by Q Factor 1, though, this account
combines religious and spiritual faith with some acceptance of
conventional medical care and treatment (Items 2, 8 and 11 = +2)
as well as 'alternative medicine' (Item 70 = +2). The account is
,seen as
equivocal about individual action, 'fairly salient to recovery
(Item 40 ' 
-2) but strongly linked to health(Item 58 = +5), but
not salient to overall health (Items 21 and 46 = -1). Personal
responsibility (Item 66 = 0) is not important, and blame for
illness is strongly denied (Item 10 = -5). This is likely to be
in part . to milddue acceptance of the role of disease
organisms in causing illness (Items 20 and 45 = +1) and
particularly virulence as affecting recovery (Item 31 = *5).
However, although in other accounts such acceptance of the role
of infection is linked to an acceptance of the role of chance, a
characteristic of this account is its consistent
rejection of luck (Item 15 = -5, Item 28 = -3, Item 32 = -2) or
probability (Items 7 and 29 = -2, Item 17 = -5) influencing
health and illness Indeed, comments about these items show a
strong antipathy to what is regarded as 'fatalism'
"I do not believe in an irresponsible fatalistic attitude to
illness." (Participant 77).
The account allots a definite role to external factors : physical
conditions and pollution (Items 3 and 16 = -4, Items 57 and 72 =
-3); circumstances and events (Item 47 = +4, Item 72 = -3) and
other people (Items 18, 56 and 61 = +3), though not interpersonal
conflicts (Item 30 = -3). Similarly, internal factors are also
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seen as playing some role, e. q. the body's own mechanism and
defenses (Item 37 = +2, items 25 and 65 = +3) and emotional
distress (Item 41 = +4). However, it is God's intervention that
is the ultimate controlling influence
"It is through the Lord Jesus that we are given our health and
wellbeing." (participant 77).
This is, then, an account which superimposes upon the ecological
and biological model expressed by Q Factor 2 a strong belief in
the direct and effective role to be played by God. However, it is
not a ''personalistic' belief system which regards God as
purposively bringing illness and health but rather concentrates
on the ability of God to heal illness. Illness arises out of
'natural' (e.g. viruses and 'bugs') and person-made (e.g.
pollution) attacks upon the body, which the body is able to
fight by its own mechanisms and medicine is often able to cure.
It does not deny self-determination - indeed, there is a sense
of a moral responsibility on behalf of the individual to act in
ways that promote their health, act 'responsibly' and avoid
'fatalism'. It sees the individual as somewhat in control, within
a context of multiple aetiology, with the most important and
benign resource to be drawn upon that of God's love, care and
healing.
7.6.6 The account identified by Q Factor 6
Q Factor 6 was exemplified by the Q sort of participant 47, a
village shopkeeper, with a telecommunications engineer loading
0.60 but also loading 0.39 on Q Factor 5. It is the only Q
factor in which the influence of chance (Item 15 = +1, Items 28
and 32 = +2) and probability (Items 7, 17, and 44 = +2; Item 29
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= +1) are consistently but mildly endorsed. Infectious organisms
are also regarded as important (Items 31 and 45 = +4), and so too
are heredity (Item 34 = -5), the body's own defences (Item 25 =
+2) and, in particular, personal determination to mobilise these
to aid recovery (Item 37 = +4, Item 39 = +5).
"I am a great believer in inner strength ... Determination is
needed. One's spirit helps to try to overcame illness and not
become depressed by illness." (Participant 47)
Emotions, feelings and worries are rejected as affecting health
(Item 41 = -3) or engendering illness (Items 23 and 63 = -4); so
too are environmental influences (Item 3 = +3, Item 16 =+4) and
relationships with others (Item 18 = -2) and interpersonal
conflicts (Item 30 = -4). However, medical care is seen as
influential in effecting recovery (Item 8 = +2, Item 9 = -5, Item
11 = +5) and doctors' orders should be followed (Item 2).
"I have the greatest faith and trust...Because when I have found
it necessary to seek medical help I feel they have given me the
best of their ability and I have faith and trust in their
judgement. You have to camply to give the treatment chance to
work. Advice should also be followed as it might improve and
prolong one's life." (Participant 57).
It is an account that attributes some 'internal' and some
.'external'influences, though largely those over which the
individual has little personal control. While the individual can
affect recovery (Item 40 = -4) and is somewhat responsible (Item
66 = +2), this is not carried through to a belief in personal
control over health by "looking after myself .' (Item 21 = -1),
actions (Items 46 and 58 = 0), or lifestyle (Item 78 = -1).
Rather, this account sees health reflecting overall fulfillment
in life (Item 75 = +3). God (Items 19 and 35 = +3) and prayer
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(Item 71 = -2) have some influence, God may even • send illness
(Item 55 = +3) but curses cannot (Item 13 = -5).
Overall, then, this is the Q account that comes closest of all to
the 'chance control' attribution. Essentially it is a fairly
mechanistic viewpoint, seeing the major factors causing illness
as infectious organisms, and the major protections a 'strong
constitution', the body's own defences and medical care and
treatment. There is basically a denial of one's own behaviour
and actions playing any significant part in maintaining or
improving health, although when illness does occur, individual
action, a positive attitude, God, prayer and medical intervention
can all aid recovery.
7.6.7 The account identified by O Factor 7
Q Factor 7 was exemplified by the Q sort of participant 33, a
secretary. The account denies virtually all external influences
on health except the impact of infectious organisms and invasive
disease, which are strongly endorsed (Item 12 = +5, items 31 and
45 = +4). Getting ill is a 'fact of life' (Items 7 and 29 = +4)
but getting better (Item 15 = -2, Item 40 = -3) and improving
health (Item 32 = -4) are not just luck. Personal
responsibility (Item 66 = +3) and blame for illness (Items 10
and 51 = +3, Item 42 = +1) are accepted, but lifestyle does not
affect health (Item 78 = -3). Neither God nor supernatural
forces affect health (Items 64 and 13 = -5; Items 19 and 76 = -4;
Items 35 and 55 = -3); neither medicine (Item 8 = -2) nor medical
treatment are salient to recovery (Item 52 = -2); doctors cannot
find cures (Item 11 = -4), and the advice given by the medical
profession is not trustworthy (Item 9 = +3).
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"I don't believe that anything the doctor gives you really
works... I don't believe in doctor's treatment."
Possibly the key to understanding this account is the endorsement
of the individual's right to act in unhealthy ways if they chose
(Item 68 = +4) strongly refuting any need to comply with
doctors' orders (Item 2 = -5). The issue of control over illness
and health is, quite simply, not all that salient. The
individual's right to behave as they chose is much more important
then worrying about health, which included doing things
which are known to be harmful to health, reminiscent of Account 8
in Study 2.
"I believe the rights of the individual are what is important
here, not whatever causes illness".
7.6.8 The account identified by 0 Factor 8
Q Factor 8 was exemplified by the Q-sort of Participant 18, a
woman who described herself as a mother. This participant's
data sets provided exemplars ,e4HLC Factor 2, and for IHIQ Factor
4, indicating a locus of control as 'probabilistic'. A Lecturer,
participant 79, also loaded 0.53 (but had loadings of 0.33, 0.36
and 0.43 on other factors). As with IHIQ Factor 4, health is not
a matter of luck (Items 15 and 60 = -1, item 32 = 0) but
probability (Item 7 = +3, item 17 = +4 and item 29 = +2).
"Good or bad health is part of life and worrying too much is
pointless." (Participant 18).
"(Agreement with these items is) ... fundamental to anybody who
construes 'reality' as fundamentally stochastic ... basic
probabalistic or actuarial 'truth'. If not, assurance companies
would go bust." (Participant 79).
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It is not surprising, therefore, to find rejection of the idea
that the individual can do much to influence their own health
(Items 46,58 and 78 = -2) and hence the individual can
hardly be held responsible (Item 66 = 0) let alone blameworthy
for any illness (Item 10 = -3). Good health has more to do with
living a satisfying life than being obsessive over things like
exercise and diet (Item 75 = +5). Illness may be the result of
infection Item 12 = +2, item 31 = +3, item 45 = +4), against
which medical care is effective (Item 11 = +3, item 52 = +2). But
'rrcbli' (Item 14 = 01. , one errotions (Items 23 = -1, 62 = -2);
'other people' (Items 18 = -3, 30 = -3); God (Items 19 = -5, 35 =
;.:5); pollution (Item 3 = +3, Item 57 = +4), 'inbuilt weaknesses'
(Item 1 = -4) and constitution (Item 34 = +5) are all rejected as
influences or simply regarded as not salient.
"Susceptibility to bad health varies throughout the lifetime -
sometimes I will be ill, sometimes I won't - accounting these
variations as a constitution with which I was born is therefore
irrelevant." (Participant 18).
This account regards the issue of the factors that control health
and illness as itself questionable :
"The factors that determine, at any point in time, whether I am
ill or well are complex and interactive. It doesn't make any
sense to me to say that it's X or Y that makes me ill, or that by
doing Z I can ensure good health. That's nonsense - I could eat
all the right foods, take exercise, give up smoking, and then the
nuclear power station close by could spring a leak, or some idiot
could mow me down with his car, and all the 4pold habits' in the
world wouldn't save me from the consequences." (Participant 79).
Even more than Q Account 7, Q Account 8 stresses the rights of
the individual for autonomy and self-determination (Item 68 =
+5), much less concerned to allocate a locus of control than to
express a moral discourse :
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"To me this is a moral issue, and far more fundamental than any
belief I may have about, say, whether exercise is good or bad for
you. It's my body, my risk to die young, my lungs, and I
reserve the absolute right to decide, and not be dictated to by
a doctor or so-called expert from the Health Education Council:
(Participant 18).
"I have the right to the ultimate decisions I make on matters
affecting my health, whether harmful or not: (Participant 79).
7.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
7.7.1 Discussion of the Q data 
The eight Q Factors are illustrated in relation to one another
in Figure 7.2.
The Q data and analyses demonstrate three things. First, it
provides convincing evidence for the inadequacy of the MH1C
construct; while broad internal/external/powerful others
constructs have some relevance for five of the eight
accounts identified, for three they are largely irrelevant.
Even within an (explanatory' framework, accounting cannot be
properly understood by assuming that all accounts share common
constructs that are equally salient. Perhaps most
significantly, the (nedical model ( of Q Factor 2 is only made
operant by the Q sort, neither the MBIC or the IHIQ responses
gave any clues about its existence. The multiplicity of
attributed influences simply gets lost in the MHLC scale,
appearing as so much "muddy data ( that in many studies would be
rejected as (too close to the mean ( and not very interesting.
Given the importance of the 'medical model ( , in biomedicine if
nowhere else, this failure of the MI-MC scale to tap it may
provide some clues about why it is that the NIUE scale has
been found to be so disappointing (as described in Chapter 6).
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However, even in the five Q Accounts where the MBLC constructs
are relevant, the crude division between the three constructs,
which reifies individuals as one or another, is grossly
inadequate to classify the alternative accounts expressed.
While same Q Accounts (e.g. 1 and 4) do focus quite specifically
on just one aspect, for others both internal and external loci
of control are equally important. Furthermore, constructs which
are excluded from the MBIC domain of applicability are highly
salient in some cases (e.g. Q Account 2's focus on :the impact of
stress). This latter account in particular raises questions about
the basis of "locus of control'. While the locus of agency - the
mind - is clearly 'internal', it is nonetheless not a 'locus of
control' in the sense either Rotter or Wallston & Wallston
intended it. Control is attributed, ultimately, externally -
primarily within the domain of social relationships and
life-stresses which operate upon the 'mind'.
Secondly, the Q analysis does offer opportunities to gain more
articulated descriptions of accounts than did the R data. While
by-person factor analysis, acting as a form of pattern analysis,
opened the MHLC and IHIQ data up to more detailed account
interpretation than R analysis is conventionally able to do, the
Q sorting, by its demands upon participants to rank items in
relation to each other, and consider the items in more wholistic
terms, enabled factor interpretation to be both more precise, and
carried out in greater depth. However, it must also be noted that
there were some accounts (notably the one identified by IHIQ
Factor 5) which were not articulated by Q sorting, demonstrating
that the Q sample does constrain the accounts that can be
expressed.
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Finally, the parallel completion of the three instruments
demonstrated surprisingly high consistency across instrument
responses. Mille there were a few occasions where at first it
appeared that people were expressing different accounts in the
different situations, once more detailed analysis was carried
out, the performance of individuals on one scale was usually seen
to be highly compatible with their performance on the others.
Although some aspects were easier to express in different
situations, by and large the same people often emerged as
exemplars of factors with different data, and when they did so,
while what they were 'saying' in their responses was not
identical, it was plausibly linked. This provides independent
evidence that Q sorting does not simply engender particular
accounts from the item sample.
However, it also suggests that Q .sorting is an activity which
focuses attention, and creates a framework in which for some
people at least, performance is a product of a single account
rather than a process of dividing between several. This is not
all that surprising given the demand characteristics. Potter and
Wetherell (1987) argue that accounting within an interview is a
process where people access different accounts in order to serve
different discursive functions. It would appear that in
Q sorting, the demand characteristics encourage some
individuals at least to be more 'single minded', although others
spread their responses over a number of factors (e.g. Participant
52).
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7.7.2 The nature of accounts 
It has been argued in Chapter 5 that this results in the accounts
identified by Q sorting being almost "too good to be true".
Certainly the eight Q accounts in Study 3 read in detail,
convey "storylines' that are usually both recognisable and
distinctive. This was not just a matter of a number of themes
running through all of them, that merely changed in their
evaluative valency. For example, "chance and probability" was a
concept responded to within each account. In some cases people
tended to deal similarly with all the relevant items - all were
agreed were with, or all disagreed with. But in others the
overall topic was deconstructed - chance might be seen
differently from probability or both chance and proability seen
as different in different situations; in some cases chance
attribution was linked to attributions of disease organisms and
in other cases not.
The image conveyed to me is somewhat analogous to chemical
reactions, with different elements combining to produce different
=pounds having very different properties, and the ccmpounds
being highly distinctive according to the combinations. Part of
the reason why Q sorting generates such nice, clear account
descriptions, I believe, is that the process provides the
response conditions under which compounds rather than motley
jumbles of elements are articulated (as is more the case in R
scale responding) but in which some people at least (i.e. those
that act as exemplars) are persuaded to express a single
"ccmpound" rather than a mixture. To take the analogy just a
little further, at the end of the Q study I have a sense that I
began with a muddy kind of mixture which I have been able -
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albeit quite crudely - to fraction out into some "purer'
compounds.
7.7.3 Accounting is complex and multi-faceted 
So what did the alchemy discover ? Well, certainly trot the
mixture contained a lot more than has often been assumed.
Accounting for health and illness is, even within an explanatory
domain, predicated upon sophisticated theories-about-the-world,
which link 'meaning', 'explanation' and Morality' as described
in Chapter 5. The sense conveyed when reading Q Accounts is that
of people making use of complex networks of inter-related
assumptions, interpretations and proscriptions, not merely
responding according to some simple linear model. The NELC scale
in particular can only extract from people very crude, faint and
often very distorted n-order approximations of these rich
constructs, rather like a photocopy-of-a-photocopy, from which it
is almost impossible to decipher the form or content of a
brightly coloured original, where many crucial elements have
simply not been picked up, or so grossly distorted they loose all
of their power to convey anything meaningful. If we want to
discover how people construct and interpret their world, we must
develop theories and methodologies that do justice to the
subtlety and complexity of their thinking - that reflects their
imagination, creativity and sheer competence as thinkers; and the
Abundance of images, ideas and arguments with which they are
bombarded in contemporary life from the mass media. McGuire
argued this case cogently some thirteen years ago
"I stress here the basic point that our cognitive systems and
social systems are complex and that currently conventional simple
linear process models have outlived their heuristic usefulness as
descriptions of these complex systems. In our actual cognitive
and social systems, effects are the outcome of multiple causes
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which are often in complex interactions; moreover, it is the rule
rather than the exception that the effects back on the causal
variables. Hence, students of cognitive and social processes must
be encouraged to think big, or rather to think complexly." (pp
42-43).
Q method, I believe, offers one potential route to 'thinking
complexly'. In the final Chapter to follow I will describe what I
think it has been able to offer to our understanding of the way
people account for health and illness, and in particular what the
results of these studies have been able to contribute to a more
satisfactory theory of accounting.
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CHAPTER 8 : REVIEW AND PROSPECT
ACCOUNTS FOR HEALTH AND ILLNESS , AND OBSERVATIONS mow
PECCUNTING AS rflAKENG SENSE r
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8.00 INTRODUCTION
The objectives set for the thesis in Chapter I were to identify
and describe some of the main accounts for health and illness
that are current in British culture, placing them within broader
contexts and wider explanatory frameworks; and, by way of an
analysis of these ecological aspects, illuminate our
understanding of such accounting. This Chapter summarises the
results obtained in terms of those objectives and examines the
theoretical and practical implications of the dissertation as a
whole.
8.1 IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF ACCOUNTS
Within the three studies, eight very diverse accounts for health
and illness were identified. There were, of course, others, but
these eight represent those of the identified accounts which
were most clear-cut and meaningfully 'common property',
constituted by the responses of several people. in each case, and
(except for the last), identified in more than one Q study. These
were, in summary
1. The wonders of modern medicine account, operating within the
positivist worldview of science, within which illness is
naturally occurring and 'real', and modern biomedicine is seen as
the only source of effective treatment for any kind of serious
illness.
2. The illness is the result of stress account, where the
causes of illness are sited within the immediate social world of
interpersonal conflicts and the 'stress' of modern life, acting
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upon the body through the agency of 'mind:
3. The cultural critique of medicine account, based upon a
'dariinanoe' sociological worldview of exploitation and oppression
and a social constructionist analysis of knowledge as socially
and politically mediated,
4. The healthy lifestyle account, which recognises both
collective and personal responsibility for ill-health, but
stresses the need for positively adopting a 'healthy
lifestyle' in order for good health to be achieved and maintained
and illness to be prevented.
5. The traditional account, which sees illness as largely
inevitable, so that although it can sorretirres be avoided by
'looking after yourself', people should not be blamed for being
6. The individual autonomy account, which is more concerned
with the individual's right to a 'satisfying life' and to elect
their lifestyle for themself than with the aetiology of illness,
7. The Theistic account, within which health is a product of
'right living', spiritual wellbeing and God's care, and recovery
from illness a matter of regaining spiritual wholeness, attained
by intercession to some form of Deity or spiritual power.
8. The Willpower account, which sees the individual as
pre-eminently in control, and stresses the moral responsibility
of the individual to use their 'Will' to maintain good health.
Description	 Accounts*
The wonders of	 Si A4
modern medicine	 S2 A5
account
	
S3 QA2
IHIQA3
The 'stress'
	
S2 A8
account
	
S3 QA3
IHIQA1
The cultural
	
Si Al
critique of	 S2 Al
medicine account	 S3 QA4
The healthy life-	 Si A5
style account	 S2 A3
The traditional
	 S2 AA
account
	 S3 QA6
The individual	 S2 A9
autonomy account
	
S3 QA7&8
The Theistic	 S2 Q7
account MBLCA7
IHIQA5
QA5 & 6
The Willpower
account
S3 QA1
Identified/described
elsewhere
Ehrenreich (1978)
Blumhagen (1980)
Young (1980)
Herzlich (1973)
Ehrenreich (1978)
Taussig (1980)
Doyal (1981)
Crawford (1986)
Pill and Stott- (1985)
Heiman (1978)
Cornwell . (1984)
Blaxter (1984)
Crawford (1984)
Snow (1974)
Williams (1986b)
Crawford (1980)
Levin & Coreil (1986)
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Figure 8.1 : Summary of alternative accounts identified in the 
thesis 
* S = Study; A = Account; QA = Q Account; MHLCA = Health Locus of
Control Account; IHIQA = 'Influences on Health and Illness'
Account.
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The sources of these accounts as identified within the empirical
work of this thesis, and in the literature are shown in Figure
8.1.
8.2 ACCOUNTS IN THEIR SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTEXTS
The first three of these accounts reflect Moscovici's (1984)
assertion that within Western culture, social representations are
often popularised or 'commonsense' versions of scientific,
academic or professional theories, operating within everyday
discourse.
8.2.1 The 'wonders of modern medicine' account 
This account is the most directly derivative, indicating that the
tenets upon which biomedicine is based have been transmitted
outside of the professional domain, modified (e.g. by processes
of personification, figuration and ontologization, cf Mbscovici
and Hewstone, 1983) to form a popular theory which regards
health as the smooth running of the body-as-machine, and illness
as the invasion of disease organisms or the consequence of bodily
decay or breakdown. The technological capabilities of modern
biomedical treatments are regarded as almost miraculously
effective, and medical professionals are seen as possessing
high-level, rarefied skills, expertise and knowledge that enable
them to treat illness effectively.
Kristiansen (1985) in a content-analysis study of the British
press's reporting about health and illness, noted that the
'wonders of modern medicine' is the account most commonly
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portrayed by the media, even in the "quality" press, and
particularly by television. This is an image and a story which
sells newspapers and makes for exciting and entertaining
television programmes, from "That's Life" to "Tomorrow's
World' (Harrell, 1987, provides an excellent analysis of the
construction of popular accounts of medicine and science by the
latter). It is promoted by charities that seek funds for medical
research and equipment, as the sponsorship for any "Fun Run: and
the advertisments in newspapers and on hoardings make evident.
However, as media analysts (e.g. Gardner and Young, 1981; Hall,
1980; Murrell, op cit; Rose and Rose, 1976) have been pointing
out for some time, it is a distorted image, constrained by the
ideologies of the media producers. Morrell, for instance, argues
that programmes like "Tomorrow's World" are not neutral
"windows" through which science can be viewed, but like all
discourses : ... actively reconstructs the real world in
specific ways to generate specific meanings." These meanings
impose ... approving glosses on explanations" and thereby
construct an image of "... an autonymous science which
naturalizes the "impartiality" and, in a material sense, the
inevitability of the consequences of "scientific progress...".
Moscovici and Hewstone (op cit) argue that this kind of
compelling "isn't-science-wonderful . message, popularised by the
media and transmitted within the education system, has turned
many people into 	 amateur scientists". This second-hand
knowledge enables people to fulfil psychological needs.
Biomedical theorisation, which turns illness into disease, and
promises effective cure, gives people a sense of safety and
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fulfills the desire to know, for certain, of the cause (and
usually the treatment) of the worrisomeness of illness.
As Ehrenreich (1978) has noted, however, although its operation
in lay accounting is functional for the medical professionals
insofar as it facilitates patient compliance (although it also
has its drawbacks for professionals, cf Doran, 1983), it is an
account which generates dependency and an unwillingness to assume
personal responsibility, since medicine is seen to be able to
intervene after-the-event, making preventive actions unnecessary.
Thus, as Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich stressed (1978), later in the
book, this is an account which is becoming increasingly
dysfunctional, since it engenders unrealistic expectations which
have led to the
inability of (North)American medicine to deal adequately
with problems that require the patient's willed participation in
the cure ... Patients expect to be cured ... they do not expect
the doctor to impose new hardships." (p 69)
8.2.2. The 'stress' account 
This account is a popularisation and selective modification of
psychodynamic theory. Sometimes, as the accounts obtained here
showed, the stress account is incorporated into a broader account
within which a number of psychodynamic concepts (e.g. 'complex'
and 'unconscious motives') are articulated. The transmission of
such ideas into popular discourse was the first social
representation investigation carried out by Moscovici (1961).
But in its specific objectification of health-threatening
external influence as 'stress', the stress account focusses
attention upon an assumed process whereby troubling and
distressing life events become somatised as disease, an image
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which was central to Herzlich's identification of 'modern life'
perceived as a major threat to health and cause of illness. This
'stress' account has been extensively studied by anthropologists
such as Blumhagen (1980) and Young (1980). Also popularised in
magazines, self-help books, television programmes, lectures and
advertisments for vitamins and sleep preparations, it has
developed into a very pervasive and powerful account of its own.
The stress account can be psychologically functional for people,
since it allows them to attribute illness to a specific cause;
stress acquires 'thinghood' and consequently offers a focus for
explaining how distressing life events or life circumstances make
people ill. However, Young argues that it also serves functions
for the medical establishment, for it allows medicine to distance
itself from its inability to cure and to thrust the
responsibility back onto the patient to 'do something' about
their stressful lifestyle. But, he argues, its entry into
popular accounting and its growing salience do not merely reflect
its function to doctor and patient, but a congruence between the
ideological content of the stress discourse in medicine and the
beliefs most middle class North Americans hold about people's
social nature. These Young argues, combine concepts of
empiricism, individualism and voluntarism.
The stress account enables people operating from these
taken-for-granteds to objectify 'stress' as an immediate cause of
illness, acting on the individual, and thus repress broader
social determinants (e.g. capitalist production, structural
disadvantage) from consideration. To Young the stress discourse
is a means by which the cultural critique is denied. It is not
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unemployment, or a lousy job, or the patriarchy that make you
ill, it is 'stress', and thus the exploitation and oppression
acted out upon people is sanitised into something stripped of
any moral value, thus discouraging any questioning the social
status quo.
8.2.3 The 'cultural critique of medicine' account 
This account has been extensively described and discussed
already. It is explicitly critical of both of the above
popularisation of science' accounts, incommensurable with them,
and indeed constructed (predominantly by academic theorists) and
polemicised as a deliberate attempt to refute the principles upon
which such 'science' is based. Its articulation as a cultural
critique of medicine is couched within the more general social
epistemological account which seeks to demystify essentialism,
positivism and empiricism, and to deny that (in this case)
scientific knowledge is, as it claims to be "... merely mirroring
the real conditions of existence" (Young, op cit) but is rather
the product of social relations which reflect the social
divisions of power and labour in our culture, vulnerable to
historical and ideological forces.
The articulation of the cultural critique of medicine account in
the Q-studies was by the Q-sorting of people who described
themselves as political radicals, although as noted in
Chapters 4 and 5, the account melded together quite different
radical formulations, including feminist and Marxist
interpretations.
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It is interesting as much in its refutal as its expression.
Particularly in Study 2, the items provided for its expression
(e.g. about Capitalism being inherently anti-health) drew forth,
in some accounts, highly antagonistic comments such as "Must have
come out of a Communist Manifesto". Indeed, one participant wrote
to me accompanying his Q-sort, demanding that I remove "... all
this political gobbledygook" from my questionnaire, as "...health
has nothing to do with politics, and to include this rubbish does
no service to you as a researcher."
It is interesting to speculate why this account seemed to make
some people so angry. Certainly antagonism to what is portrayed
in the tabloid newspapers as the 'Loony Left' is an emerging
cultural theme within the political arena in Britain today,
with the label 'Marxist' and even 'feminist' acquiring the status
of insult across a broad popular front. This analysis suggests
that the people who control the media do not just sensationalise
a 'good story' to sell newsprint and increase viewing figures,
but act from overt and explicit political motives, seeking
not just to promote certain accounts conducive to their own
perpetuation, but also to distort and villify other accounts that
they regard as threatening.
To the extent that this is true, the cultural critique account is
suppressed from popular discourse. It tends to be a marginal
and somewhat elite discourse of a particular counter-cultural
-in- group , restricted in in its availability to those who
seek out radical, counter-orthodox ideas by, for instance,
engaging in radical politics and reading the 'radical' press; who
have access to, the motivation and the intellectual skills
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to, read and discuss the appropriate academic literature.
The basis of this acount is usually traced back to the writings
of Gramsci (in English translation, 1971; Bennett et al, 1981,
provide an excellent summary and review), smuggled out when he
was imprisoned by Mussolini. Gramsci focussed on the term
'hegemony' within his argument for a Marxist analysis which
trancended what he saw as the 'vulgar maternalism: of the notion
of class domination. His thesis was that social control is
acted out by powerful groups not just by their capacity to
dominate in terms of their control over economic and other
resources, but by their intellectual 'ethical-political' power to
construct culture.
Gramsci's attacks on intellectualism were specifically
antagonistic to the idea that expert knowledge is either
politically neutral, or should be seen as a justification for
assumed superiority
"We need to free ourselves from the habit of seeing culture as
encyclopaedic knowledge, and men(sic) as mere receptacles to be
stuffed full of empirical data and a mass of unconnected raw
facts... This form of culture is really dangerous, particularly
for the proletariat. It serves only to create maladjusted people,
people who believe they are superior to the rest of humanity
because they have memorized a certain number of facts and dates
and who rattle them off at every opportunity, so turning them
into a barrier between themselves and others. It serves to create
the kind of weak and colourless intellectualism ... which has
given birth to a mass of pretentious babblers... this is not
culture, but pedantry, not intelligence, but intellect, and it is
Absolutely right to react against it ." ( Gramsci, as translated
by Hoare, Lawrence and Wrishart, 1977).
Gramsci argued that the Enlightenment was an emancipatory
cultural movement which questioned the status quo and laid the
foundations of the French revolution. He saw the socialist
critique as a similar emancipatory philosophy, within which new
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ideas do not just emerge (in some quasi-naturalistic manner) but
are (reactions against ( and questionings about the established
order
"A critique implies ... self-consciousness ... Consciousness of a
self which is opposed to others, which is differentiated and,
once having set itself a goal, can judge facts and events other
than in themselves or for themselves but in so far as they tend
to drive history forward or backward." (Gramsci, 1977 as above).
Thus Gramsci was arguing that society is neither merely
constructed by nor operates just in terms of material
divisions, but is more fundamentally the product of the way
different groups wield ideas. The (cultural critique of medicine(
account is a direct descendant of such a notion, both in the way
it is seen by its proponents as a specific challenge to the
taken-for-granteds of the orthodox ideas of biomedicine as
eualltxrated into popular discourse and in its refutation of the
assumption that knowledge is ever empirically based or value
free.
8.2.4 The healthy lifestyle account 
Unlike the three described so far, this account has been
institutionally promoted and popularised as a matter of
social policy, to serve the explicitly defined function of
creating social change. In Britain institutions like the (now
defunct) Health Education Council were set up with the purpose
of persuading people to alter their habits and lifestyles to
conform more closely to those that have been defined
(predominantly by sectors of the medical profession) as (mane
healthy ( , by way of advertising campaigns and health education in
schools, colleges and within the training of health
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professionals.
In North America, where health care is privately funded and hence
oosts employers large sums of money (The Chrysler Corporation
estimated in 1984 that employee medical insurance cost the
company $373 million a year and added $600 to the cost of each
car they sold, Carlson, 1984), health education and promotion is
being funded increasingly by large corporations and insurance
companies, in an effort to reduce corporate expenditure on
medical care and insurance.
However, as Crawford (1984) has noted, from its origins in social
and corporate policy, the (healthy lifestyle ( account has been
taken up commercially. Its moral desirability aspects have
acquired it an image of high social desirability, so that the
promoters of (health foods' and designer jogging suits have been
able to make huge profits by exploiting its culturally
sanctioned positive images. For example, (Tesco ( have attributed
much of their 34% (£176m) increase in profits in 1986/7 to their
investment in the production of free (healthy living ( leaflets,
improved labelling and introduction of new ranges of (healthier(
foods (Polunin, 1987).
Underlying the deliberate promotion of this account is an
assumption that in order to promote healthy living, people need
to be informed, and to develop appropriate attitudes and
motivations Parly health education strategies assumed that it
was merely necessary to provide accurate information and this
would be sufficient to modify behaviour. More recent health
promotion strategies have assumed that attitude change is also
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needed : increasing the value placed on health (Kristiansen, op
cit), and persuading people to adopt a more (internal control(
attribution (see Nash, 1987, for a review).
Crawford comments that as an account it has both liberatory and
(false consciousness ( potentials. As publicised by right-wing
politicians like Edwina Carrie, it is an account which can be
used, like the stress account, to devolve responsibility for
health to the individual and to deny structural and
politico-economic causes of ill health, and hence government
culpability for the inequalities between rich and poor. CUrrie(s
(1987a) suggestions that Northerners are less healthy because of
their poor diet and lack of exercise absolves her (as junior
Minister for Health) from the need to consider social and
economic disadvantage as within her remit; her invectives about
the effects of alcohol abuse among doctors (1987b) absolve her
from the need to consider whether the demands of professional
life may need review. The impression given by such articulations
of this account is that people, as individuals, need to (pull
themselves together and act sensibly(.
However, Crawford additionally argues that the (healthy
lifestyle' account also contains a message of self-empowerment
which has had considerable emancipatory impact, particularly upon
women in relation to its redefinition of the desirable female
body image. The promotion of fitness and muscle as more desirable
for women than the "tyrany of slenderness" has reconstituted the
female body from its earlier ideal (in our culture) of frailty to
one of physical power and competence.
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He also noted that the adoption of a healthier lifestyle does
improve health and wellbeing, and can provide people with a
self-image of greater confidence and self-esteem. Certainly
changes in lifestyle are assumed to be the reason for the
reductions in coronary disease in the United States and other
Western countries (a trend much less marked in Britain).
It is therefore important to recognise that the rhealthy
lifestyle' account has different potentials and meanings
according to whether it is utilised by an individual to plan and
"make sense of' their own actions (where it can be emancipatory);
or used as a form of (victim blaming ( to marginalise and deny
the structural problems faced by the disadvantaged.
8.2.5 The 'traditional (
 account. 
In contrast to the four hegemony-derivative accounts described so
far, the traditional account has its bases within indigenous,
popularly sedimented discourse. 1 It is the account described by
Heiman (See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2) in terms of (feed a cold
and starve a fever', by Blaxter (See Section 2.2.1), Pill and
Stott (See Section 2.2.2) - particularly as articulated by their
'Law' and 'medium: SLI scorers - and in Cornwell 's (public
accounts' (See Section 2.3.3). Although, as Helman (1978)
described, it has drawn upon biomedicine in its incorporation of
notions of infection (modified by processes such as figuration,
as described by Nbscovici and Hewstone, op cit), its roots are
very much within traditional epistemology. 
I: Which is probably why it was so much less evident in this research
than in other studies like Cornwell's and Blaxter's. Q sorting may
well be inappropriate for explicating traditional accounts of this
kind.
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Horton (1982) has argued that whereas scientific theorisation
assumes epistemological progress, traditional epistemology is
based upon the assumption that knowledge handed down from former
generations is necessarily better than new adaptations because it
is (time-tested ( . Horton also drew a contrast between the
"competitive mode of theorising" which epitomises science, and
the assumed "consensual mode of theorising" of traditional
accounts. Boyer (1987) has surmised about a third potential
difference: that while scientific epistemologies are theoretical,
traditional (knowledge (
 may be merely representational or
pre-theoretical "... networks of beliefs that are not strictly
constrained in terms of consistency or explanatory power.".
Boyer does not support or reject this contention, but rather
argues that the task of anthropology is to seek to answer the
question.
Most of our current theorisation about traditional accounts
derives from anthropological investigations of indigenous
cultures in non-Western settings. The best known theorist about
accounting for health and illness in Western culture is Foucault,
particularly in his Naissance de la Clinique (1963), a complex
and painstaking analysis of what he calls the "architecture of
medical perception" as articulated both within medical
professionalism and outside it. He proposed that accounting for
illness has, throughout history, been moulded by and in its turn
has moulded, the more general conceptualisations and discourses
operating in culture. More recently Herzlich and Piarret (1985)
have summed up this analysis in terms of
... a collective discourse that draws the full and meaningful
picture of biological misfortune. Each person's conceptions link
the nature of his(sic) bodily experience and (medical history ( to
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the symbols and frames of reference of his group or society ..."
(p 146).
They note that in Western culture such symbols and frames of
reference are both provided by cultural traditions and by medical
progress, so that the (traditional r
 accounts of today, while they
incorporate biomedical ideas, are more than mere
popularisation of the "medical" account. Williams (1986b) has
made similar points, arguing that these include not just (folk(
theories about health and illness but also a broader range of
sedimented conceptions of personhood and morality, images and
ideas about such things as "... respect for neighbourliness, for
authority, for perseverence and thrift."
In the analysis of this account as identified in the Q studies,
the most pervasive theme was that of stoicism about illness (that
it was not to be (given in to ( ), a responsibility to (take care(
of oneself, but strong denial of blame when illness does occur.
Rorty (1987) attributes this kind of self-perception to a number
of traditions (e.g. Judeo-Christianity and the Renaissance) which
have constructed our modern perceptions of (authentic
personhood"; the characterization of a person as somebody who
will be taken seriously and with respect, despite illness,
ageing, poverty or misfortune
"... assuring us of a certain kind of regard, to be treated as
ends not means, with activities that are rational (or at least
reasonable) and good-willed (or at least well-intentioned) ...
persons should be respected because they are capable of critical
reflective rationality, or because they are free inventors of
their lives, or because they have divinely donated souls, or
because they can be harmed, frustrated in living out their life
plans." (p 57).
Hence the (traditional ( account is at least as much predicated
on deeply culturally sedimented constructions of personhood and
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authenticity as upon specific notions about health and illness
per se. Turner (1986) has argued that our images of selfhood are
about embodiment : "... we are not persons with bodies, but
persons who are embodied." The (traditional ( account seeks to
reconcile bodily discontinuity (cf Dingwall, 1976) with personal
continuity and theoreticity (Voysey, 1975) which it does by
ascribing to people what may seem to be paradoxical qualities -
responsibility for sensible health protecting actions and yet
non-culpability for illness.
In this I am proposing something more global than the suggestions
of blaxter (1984), Cornwell (1984) and Pill and Stott (1985) that
denial of blame for illness is a realistic response to
disadvantage. Within my analysis, denying blame is more
fundamentally to do with our traditional notions of authentic
personhood. But in this I am not claiming (as many attribution
theorists, for example, have done) that denying blame is an
universal characteristic of human cognition; nor (as many
psychodynamic theorists have done) that blame-denial is merely a
form of ego-defense. Rather I am suggesting that blame-denial is
a core construct within our culturally sedimented account of
authentic personhood, and it is its account-specific
taken-for-grantedness that imbues it with its pervasive sense of
"What else could a person be but this ?(.
The remaining three accounts are predicated upon other,
alternative, assumptions about authentic personhood. Rorty (op
cit) has argued that there have been dramatically discontinuous
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changes in the characterisation of personhood across history, and
that such conceptualisations differ across and within cultures.
Fbr example, she lists conceptions of person-as-rational-being,
person-as-creative-being, person as dramatis persona, and
person as socially formed "in the eyes of others".
8.2.6 The individual autonomy account 
This account portrays a very clear perception of authentic
personhood in terms of self-determination and self-defintion.
Party (op cit) described this particular version as
... primarily negative (and) defensive ... that concentrates on
fending off external interference : "Noll me tangere", or, in
Amerispeak, "Don't tread on me buddy."." (p 56).
She argued that it emerged within Enlightenment political
theory as the way "personhood' could be protected against
tyranical or unjust authority. It began within the Christian
conception of the person as defined by the capacity for
free-will. Within our secular society, where such an 'Old Order'
has lost its authority, the concept of free-will has been
retained, and, unfettered from the higher authority of God, has
developed into our contemporary notion of the person as a
constructive, self-determining legistator - the Enlightenment
image of an independent, inquiring, rational self, free from the
claims of any dogmatic doctrine.
However Henriques et al (1984) argue (as do many sociologists and
Marxist theorists) that the emergence of this emphatically
individualist image is also the product of the profit motive of
industrial capitalism. McClelland's (1971) achievement motivation
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formulation is clearly salient in this regard, a rare but welcome
example of psychological theorisation which sought to explore the
interplay between individual and collective features in the
linkages it drew between the level of achievement endorsement
of a culture within an historical era (e.g. as indicated by
the themes in its literature) and its level of production (e.g.
as evidenced by the number of artefacts produced). Within
MbClelland (s thesis, the higher the press for 'making things(
(i.e. (making profits ( in capitalist terms) in a society, the
more individual achievenent is valued in that society. Hence,
within this analysis, the value base of a competitive capitalist
system is one within which rewards are earned and misfortunes
deserved, wherein a class of (self-made-men ( were encouraged to
see themselves as dictated to by nobody, answerable only to
themselves.
Turner (op cit) traced the history of this image of
personhood along similar lines to Rorty, from the philosophy of
John Locke, through the impact of competitive capitalism
(Macpherson, 1962) and Calvanistic Protestantism (Nelson, 1969),
to its importance in the maintenance of social order within
bourgeois society. However, he has taken it further towards our
contemporary culture, arguing that whereas the individualistic
self-perception tended, historically, to be the prerogativeof the
ruling classes, because there has been a democratisation of the
availability of life-styles (and hence ideologies) within the
period of post-war economic recovery, this kind of self-concept
is now a reflection of status rather than class consciousness.
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The comments made by people whose Q sorts identified the
individual autonomy account, when directed to the topic of
health and illness, showed that it can be articulated in
different ways. In Account 9 in Study 2, for example, the
principle of autonomy was seen to imply a conception of health as
a commodity to be bought, sold, invested in and insured,
endorsing (private medicine ( as a means by which people can
assert their freedom by buying services. In Q Account 8 in
Study 3 autonomy was expressed in terms of embodiment
"It's my body, my risk to die young, my lungs, and I reserve the
absolute right to decide, and not to be dictated to by a doctor
or so-called expert from the Health Education Council."
(Participant 18).
Thus the autonomy account, like the cultural critique account, is
one which challenges the hegemony-derivative accounts, although
the motivation is different. Whereas in the cultural critique it
is the (false consciousness' of individual culpability that is
denied (i.e. hegemony is seen as a source of exploitation and
oppression) here what is denied is the right of the State, or of
self-,defined experts, to (interfere' (i.e. hegemony is seen as
the (Nanny State ( or intrusive professional bureauocracy). The
autonomy account has its exponents both from the "new Right(
(e.g. Scruton, 1986) and the (left( (e.g. Donzelot, 1980).
8.2.7 The Theistic account
Herzlich and Pierret (op cit) have traced European "lay(
accounting for illness from roots within Christianity.
Seventeenth century Christian conceptions tended to portray a
wrathful, punitive God who scourged humankind with diseases as
-tests of faith, as punishaents for misdeeds, and as routes to
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spiritual salvation. As an example, in a prayer written in 1654,
Pascal expressed his understanding of his illness thus
"You have given me health to serve You, and I have used it
profanely. Now you send a sickness to correct me ... Do not
suffer me to use Your punishment badly ... Make me clearly
realize that the body's afflictions are nothing other than both
punishment and the image of the soul's affliction." (Quoted in
Herzlich and Piarret, op cit, p 148).
Within the 17th century even medical professionals assumed that
healing began with the purification of the soul, and that
sickness was often an offer of redemption. The shift within
the 18th and 19th centuries to our dominant modern traditional
conception, according to Berzlich and Piarret, was a product of
improvements in health (and hence, illness becoming less of a
mass phenomenon); the growing capability of biomedicine to offer
efficacious cures; the emerging image of the person as 'worker'
within a system of industrial production; and the gradual
loosening of the Church (s hold over society.
up until recently most theorists investigating accounting for
health and illness have assumed that spiritual and religious
conceptions of health and illness have become marginalised almost
to the point of extinction within contemporary Western culture.
The importance of Theism has continued to be recognised in
'other ( cultures, including its salience in the medical systems
of 'immigrants' (e.g. Snow, 1987, who cites more than fifty
studies of minority culture beliefs in North America, based on a
diversity of religious doctrines); and in indigenous cultures
(such as those of the Amerindians in North America). But the
sociological and psychological literature about accounting for
health and illness leaves anybody reading it with a strong sense
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of a highly secularised culture in which religion plays a
negligible part. Religious beliefs find no place, for
example, in - the MBLC scale or the 'Health Beliefs Model".
Indeed, Csordas (1986) has argued that a similar denial of
Theistic elements has occurred in medical anthropology. In its
emergent focus upon Western culture, it has tended to
increasingly ignore the problem of explaining the "...existential.
relation betwealmedical and sacred realities."
In the last few years, however, a few workers have begun to
recognise that despite increasing cultural secularisation,
religious beliefs and Theistic conceptions continue to play an
important role within the (lay ( accounting for health and illness
of (ordinary people ( . Williams (1986b), for instance, writing
about the accounting of older people in Scotland, noted the
salience of an
"...'invisible religion ( of a world view which, often selective
in doctrine and uncommited to the church, nevertheless drew on
universal statements of faith or ethics to make sense of
experience, in a way which showed a number of debts to Scottish
Caltiniam." (conference paper abstract, p 1).
BO argued that irrespective of the Church as an institutional
constructor of discourse, such an "invisible religion ( provides
a competing set of ideas to indigenous concepts of an
individuated self (an image of authentic personhood which reads
very similarly to those described in the (traditional' and
(individual autonomy ( accounts).
Several accounts within the studies conducted for this thesis
(mostly in Study 3) included Theistic elements, drawing both from
conventional Christianity and from other religious creeds and
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ideologies, including Christian Spiritualism, charismatic
Christian faith, Hinduism and the Bahaa faith. Spiritual and
religious concepts were woven into the following (Willpower)
account, but such formulations also emerged as the basis of a
specifically Theistic account, founded upon notions of faith,
(right living' and spirituality as central to wellbeing, and
crucial to healing.
The research in this thesis has only touched, in a very limited
way, upon the salience of religion and spirituality to accounting
for health and illness which is central in many of the
oomsmopolitan (cf Dunn, 1977, see Section 1.2.3) medical systems
such as Traditional Chinese and Ayurveda medicine. Nevertheless,
the ability of Q analysis to draw out uncommon and unusual
accounts (which other approaches to participant sample selection
and data interpretation tend to submerge) did remind us that
although religion may contribute little to the accounting of many
people in our culture (other than as a set of ideas to be
strenuously denied, as one participant described them, as (mambo
jumbo'), for a non-trivial number of people, religious belief is
highly, and often centrally salient.
The Theistic account assumes that God is the pre-eminent
"Powerful Other ( who watches over all aspects of the individual(s
life, is the ultimate source of healing and wellbeing, and is the
authority to whom the individual must answer for their actions.
Within this account bodily health cannot be divorced from
spiritual wellbeing, and the actions which promote health are
those of (right living (
 within religious creed :
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"I believe in a God who loves and cares for me, who watches over
me, and who judges me. He is my strength, and He is my guide. If
I follow His commandments, then my soul will be strong, and as my
soul, so too my body and my mind." (Participant 77, Study 3).
Rorty (op cit) argued that the Christian conception defines a
person as having free-will and a conscience. This was evident in
the Q identified Theistic account, with strong antagonism to
(fatalism (
 or any denial of personal responsibility; but, as the
IHIQ identified version of this account in Study 3 demonstrated,
this assumption of moral responsibility is not restricted to
Christianity, for it was equally salient for the Hindu student.
I suspect that one of the most interesting aspects of this
account, at which, so far, my research has really only been able
to hint, is the different ways that Theistic accounting deals
with notions of (fate (
 and personal responsibility and
culpability - i.e. with the moral and ethical aspects of the
relationship between the person and their God(s).
The combination of submission to a higher authority and yet
strong moral codes of personal behaviour and a deep sense of
responsibility to that authority is one which is problematic for
any simple internal/external control analysis. And yet it is
evident that such a system is both highly meaningful to, and
strongly prescriptive for those individuals who found their lives
upon a strong religious faith. Any attempt to model accounting or
action that ignores the role of religious faith, I believe, will
not only fail to account for the (realities (
 of the religious,
but will be inadequate to account for the wider moral (realities(
constructed by the (hidden religion (
 in our culture as a whole.
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8.2.8 The (Willpower' account. 
This account has already received considerable attention within
Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.1), its origins traced back to nineteenth
century notions of the (Will ( as the means needed to control a
person's lipase animal nature'', and forward to its central role
within many contemporary expositions of rhealthism ( and (New Age
Healing r . The kinds of context now provided by the work of Turner
(op cit) and Rorty (op cit), concerning the historical
development of concepts of (perscnhood r, show that even before
the nineteenth century, self-determination and free-will were
well sedimented within Western popular discourse. Rorty
described the (Will ( focus as the more positive articulation of
the self-determination image, stressing the positive aspects of
autonomy, expressed in two ways. The first emphasises critical
rationality and independent evaluation which portrays the person
as :
... capable of stepping back from his(sic) beliefs and desires
to evaluate their rationality and appropriateness, ... capable of
(at least) attempting to form and modify his beliefs and
desires, his actions, on the basis of rational evaluations." (p
61)
The second expression emphasises a persons capacity to be
creative and (world making'', forming the world in which they live
either as a social and political domain (e.g. by participating in
public life) or as a visionary-poetic domain by shaping, choosing
and constructing systems of values. These two articulations are
reflected, respectively, by the (Enlightenment' theorisation
about human conceptualisation (as argued by Voltaire, Diderot,
and Condorcet; before them Socrates, Spinoza and Hobbes; after
them Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, and Piaget) and the (Romantic(
theorisation (of Goethe and Schiller; before them the Sophists,
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Hume and Leibnitz; after them Levy-Bruhl, Whorf,Xubn, Feyerabend
and Geertz). Shweder (1984) provides a thorough review of this
theoretical tension. The point is that although these alternative
constructions portray personal self-determination in very
different ways, both assume, fundamentally, that authentic
personhood is bound into the capacity for the individual's
willed self-making and self-control.
Haley (1978) and Wharton (1982) both found that self-control was
an image that has appeared in the health discourses of Western
cultures throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Crawford (op cit) has argued that within our culture
generally, health has increasingly acquired the status of a
moral imperative within an expectation that to be healthy
requires self-control, and has thus become increasingly seen as a
goal to be reached through intentional action
"Health is not a given; nor is it just the result of good luck or
heredity ... (n)either is it believed to be the outcome of normal
life activities ... Health must be achieved ... To speak of
health in this way is to speak of resolve. Health as a goal
necessitates the adoption of a more determined regime of
restraint and denial - more "perseverence".". (p 67).
Crawford argued that this account reflects a number of
origins, including : practical reasoning (based upon the
popularisation of medical research about the links between
lifestyle and preventable disease); a developing sense of somatic
vulnerability (particularly as a result of the politicisation of
public health issues and media messages about the toxicity of
food additives, pollution, the ill-effects of stress and so on);
and the re-emergence of self-control as a cultural symbol for
authentic personhood. He too traced this construction of
personhood through from the nineteenth century 'work ethic'
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(Weber, 1930), whereby
... self control became the supreme virtue of a triumphant
bourgeoisie, the foundation of (character ( and achievement, the
bedrock of an ideology of self-determination ... as a guide to
action and morally as a legitimation of privilege	 (p 77).
He also mentioned the impact of psychodynanics as the major force
in constructing the self in terms of the unending war between
biological instinct and social necessity (citing Marcuse, 1955).
Thus within contemporary American culture, he argued, to be
healthy is to demonstrate to oneself and to others an appropriate
concern for the virtues of self-control, self-discipline,
self-denial and will-power.
This (Willpower (account emerged within the Q studies
predominantly as expressed by a variety of (alternative ( medical
practitioners. According to Aakster (1986), alternative
medicines, while differing in their specific theory-bases and
techniques, share the belief that the individual is to be
expected to take sole responsibility for maintaining their own
health, and when ill, to cure themself. Alternative practitioners
regard themselves as supporting (not treating) the individual,
and their therapies as means of strengthening the constructive
forces of healing that are present within the body and the soul.
As was mentioned earlier, Theistic concepts were also woven into
this account, which is primarily one concerned with the concept
of (balance r , both within the person (between body and spirit)
and between the person and either God or some other spiritual
force.
Contrasting with the individual autonomy account, which claims
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for the individual the right to set their own moral standards and
denies, therefore, the notion of any absolute moral values or
norms, the (Willpower ( account is one in which the individual
accords the setting of moral standards to some higher authority
(usually, but not always, Theistic), and judges themself by their
ability to live up to those absolute standards. Whereas the
comments from those who expressed the autonomy account repeatedly
mentioned (my rights ( and 'my freedom', those who expressed this
account wrote about responsibility, duty, the need to avoid
selfishness, traps of (blaming others ( and striving to be a
better person
"If I were a perfect (Christian ( person I might not be ill"
(Participant 36, Study 3).
The image is one Mischel (1966, 1977) has termed the (Puritan(,
typified by high levels of self-control, high achievement
motivation and a strong sense of personal and social
responsibility. Crawford (op cit) asserts that such a
puritanical self-image is likely to become increasingly pertinent
within times of economic recession, when its links to the work
ethic promote its moral features, and its links to the biological
status of the body allow people to, literally, (embody ( the
mandate of hard work, self-sacrifice and discipline
... Our bodies, the (ultimate metaphor ( refract the general
mood. We cut out the fat, tighten our belts, build resistance,
and extend our endurance. Subject to forces that lie beyond
individual control, we attempt to control what is within our
grasp. Whatever practical reasons and concerns lead us to
discipline our bodies in the name of health or fitness, the
ritualized response to economic crisis finds in health and
fitness a compatible symbolic field." (p 80).
Although this account was mainly exemplified in Study 3 by the
Q sorts of alternative practitioners, it was identified by the
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factor to which the highest proportion of overall variance in
the data was attributed, showing that its expression was shared
by the accounting of a much wider diversity of people in the
participant sample. Thus the Q study conducted for this thesis
supports Crawford (s assertion for North American samples, that
self-control is an important theme in accounting for health in
Britain today.
8.3 ACCOUNPING
The terms (account ( and (accounting ( (cf Harr, 1979) as used in
this thesis have strong conceptual links to Mbscovici (s (1961,
1971) (social representation ( formulation, itself resonant of
Kelly's (personal construct ( concept (Fransella, 1984, makes
this point explicitly). I chose (account ( and (accounting(
because they express in a direct and simple manner the
knowledge-source/knowledge-use aspects of the way people (make
sense" of the world and of events. Also, because "accounts ( and
(accounting ( are are neither pinned down by the prefix 'social'
nor that of (personal'', they elide more comfortably between
accounts as individual and as collective property.
However, although (accounting' is sometimes restricted to just
the activities of explaining or justifying action, my utilization
of this term is intended to convey an active process of (making
sense ( which incorporates (meaning ( and (moral ( as well as
explanatory elements. Hence, in this thesis, accounting is
treated as predictive and hypothesis generating as well as
retroactive and analytical, and as covering attempts to "make
seise" of actions (one's own and other people's), and events and
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states of beingness in the natural and physical as well as the
social domain. The term (accounts ( covers both the social
representation/personal construct aspect of a schematization to
be drawn upon for accounting, and the expositions that are the
results of accounting.
This final Section examines the results obtained in the thesis in
terms of what they offer to an understanding of accounting, with
respect to three themes : account sympatricity; the selection,
use and production of accounts; and the links between accounting
and action.
8.3.1 Account sympatricity 
I based this thesis on the assumption that people have access to
and utilise a range of alternative accounts to (make sense of'
health and illness. I argued that this was a more plausible
understanding of what they do than assumptions that there are
specific, enduring personality traits, psychological mechanisms
or social forces that constrain people to think in particular
ways.
A typical example of the personality theory approach is Mischel(s
(1977) formulation of self-control as a characterological
attribute
"At one extreme is the person who predominantly chooses larger,
delayed rewards or goals for which he(sic) must either work or
wait. This person is more likely to be orientated towards the
future ... and to plan for distant goals. He (or she) also is apt
to have high scores on (ego-control ( measures, to have high
achievement motivation, to be more trusting and socially
responsible, to be brighter and more mature, to have a high level
of aspiration, and to show less uncontrolled passivity. ... At
the opposite extreme is the individual who predominantly prefers
immediate gratification and rejects the alternative of waiting or
405
working for larger, delayed goals. Correlated with this is a
greater concern with the immediate present than with the future,
and greater impulsivity." (p 37)
Such a reification portrays people as dispositionally driven,
insensitive to situational and contextual influences. But more
importantly, by treating self-control as an (essence in the head(
it denies the cultural reality of self-control as a concept which
people argue about, gossip about, read about in books, watch in
movies and contemplate upon; one which is culturally sedimented
in fables (such as Aesop (s (The ant and the grasshopper ( ) and
aphorisms like (Don (t spoil the ship for a ha (p (th o r tar ( or (a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush ( . It assumes that only
experts are aware of such a dispositional tension, and that
ordinary people are atheoretic and lacking in any reflexive
self- or other-awareness.
Brown's (1985) description of (perceived control as a coping
mechanism ( for reducing anxiety is a typical example of the
psychological mechanism approach. This portrays people as
(possessed by ( an objectified psychological force. The
underlying modelling is of thought as a kind of
psychodynamically pre-programed control routine that once
triggered, runs systematically through its sequence. Threat,
fear and worry, in this analysis, start up the sequence, and in
order to reduce the ensuing anxiety, the person is driven
inexorably to construe themself as (in control r.
Sociological theorisation such as Friedson (s (1970) assertion
that doctors are the (architects of medical knowledge ( is a
typical example of the sociological forces approach. Within this
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kind of theory-base, people are portrayed as the passive
recipients of understandings moulded for them by others.
Thinking, in this analysis, is modelled as a mindless, automatic
response to the string-pulling of the puppeteers.
All three kinds of theorisation are bound into the
reality-constructs-person moment of the dialectic; all deny
self-awareness and theoreticity. As such they fail to address
the subjectively familiar experience of thinking based upon
confused and contradictory images, ideas and possible
understandings; states of (being in two minds ( or (having half a
mind to ...(, of feeling both (in control (
 and (controlled(.
Itihat an accounting framework does is to offer a way out of these
conceptual straitjackets. In construing accounts as both things
that individuals internalise and consider subjectively, and as
things that are debated and communicated within interpersonal
discourse. (spoken and written), the (text ( from which people
(make sense ( is neither conceptualised as writ, immutable, inside
the head, nor as read, uncritically, from external canons. By
proposing that such (texts ( are many and varied, offering people
(individually and collectively) a range of alternative knowledge
sources from which to choose, the kinds of contradictions,
confusions, half-formed thoughts and half-believed explanations
that form the basis of experience can be accomodated within a
perception of social cognition that nonetheless reflects its
constructive, organised, effort-after-meaning qualities.
Boyer (op cit) argues a similar case for the traditions of a
culture; that they should be considered as "... a text people can
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use, cite and manipulate", but "(w)hat is on people's minds at
any moment is only a certain idiosynchratic version.".
Crawford (op cit) goes further, and argues that "...(L)ogically
entailed in any discourse ... is its opposite ... One discourse
does not exist without the other, ... the interplay between them
... apparent within individuals as well as within society." In
other words, like Adam (1987) he sees accounts (discourses in his
terminology) as implicating as well as explicating.
Rorty (op cit) suggests a similar "patchwork" construal of
our conceptualisations of personhood
"The various functions performed by our contemporary concept of
persons don't hang together: there is some overlap, but also some
tension. Indeed, the various functions that (the (
 notion plays
are so tensed that distinctive attempts to structure or relate
them to one another express quite different norms and ideals.
Disagreements about primary values and goods reappear as
disagreements about priorities and relations among the various
functions the concept plays, disagreements about what is
essential to persons. Not only does each of the functions bear a
different relation to the class of human beings, but each also
has a different contrast class." (p 56).
In this she goes further than Crawford, suggesting that what each
one implicates is different; that one conceptualisation is not a
mere opposite of another, but that they are, conceptually,
topologically dislocated - they must be viewed, in Stephenson(s
(1986b) terminology, as complementary. It is this image of
multiple, contrary and complementary accounts that I have tried
to convey with the term "slmuatricity ( . Originating in ecological
biology, applied to accounting sympatricity allows us to portray
a situation in which diverse accounts dynamically co-exist in the
same (ecological domain (
 within which they have evolved in
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competition with one another.
However, such a biological analogy has a limited range of
convenience, and sympatric accounting is perhaps more broadly
approachable as a process of (making sense' of a difficult topic
by reference to a variety of texts of different kinds, some on
philosophy, some story books, some encyclopaedias. Like the
thesis I am writing, the result is no mere re-exposition of just
one, but the product of my searching first here and then there to
weave the story that, informed by the texts, is still my own.
The accounts as described in the previous Section do convey a
certain library-like quality. Having read them all, one is left
with a sense of different rtexts" that a person could, at
different moments and in different circumstances, pull off the
shelf, digest, use where they are helpful to push the story
along, thrust back when they seem irrelevant or look nonsensical
- (texts ( one would cite, use, manipulate, reject. In the
inherent plausibility and hanging-togetherness of each one within
its own narrative, they convey the sense one often feels when
reading a particular text that its argument is powerfully
credible. But we never read texts in literal isolation, but
always against the backcloth of all the other texts we are
consulting. However compelling the being-read-now argument, we
continue to have the arguments of other texts (at the back of
our mind(.
Nevertheless, when you came to write your own narrative, moment
to moment you can only explicate one storyline at a time.
Accounting is transitive over time (in its library-search and
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reading form) but momentarily substantive in exposition (in its
writing-at-a-particular-iroment form).
A theory of accounting based upon a notion of account
sympatricity is thus one which portrays people as storymakers who
weave a narrative in and out of different 'texts'. This
description is most similar to those proffered in Cornwell 's
(1984) descriptions of 'private accounts' in which people
continually ask the question "What if ?" and seek to answer it,
and Young's (1987, personal communication) perception of
accounting as a narrative process which weaves explanatory models
into (and out of) a fabric also made up of episodic
reminiscences, comments about similarity and analogy,
expectations about social relations and norms of behaviour,
together with statements about emotions and feelings. Some
accounts are communal, as those described in the previous
Section; some will be more personal (as with Young's 1982
prototypes' and	 'chain complexes', see Section 1.2.4).
Storymaking selects from one 'text' and then another, gradually
weaving a narrative that 'makes sense' of the topic or issue in
question.
8.3.2 The selection, use and production of accounts 
Given such an analogy of person-as-storymaker, and the primary
assumption that the function of accounts is to enable people to
'mike sense' of their world and the events within it, it becomes
possible to surmise the kinds influences upon the selection of
accounts at particular points in 'the story'. These are of at
least three kinds :
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* ways in which they are useful for the individual themself;
* ways in which they serve interpersonal functions;
* ways in which they serve collective functions.
So far as the individual is concerned, accounts are likely to be
selected at least in part in terms of their explicatory power.
When people ask questions like "What do I do now ?", the
selection of the account to which they will turn will depend
upon what kind of answer they are seeking. Asking yourself "What
do I do now ?" when you have been bitten by a rabid dog is
unlikely to lead to the 'cultural critique' or the "stress" or
the (Willpower' account; I suspect there are only two that would
serve the purpose for most of us - 'the wonders of modern
medicine' (find a doctor, fast) or the 'Theistic' (pray, hard),
and many people would draw on both. Other accounts would be
better for answering "Why me ?" questions; others for "Why
now ?".
The accounts each of us, as individuals, draw upon to 'make
sense of' health and illness will also be influenced by other,
broader, aspects of our accounting, such as our political
ideology, our religious beliefs (or lack of them), our
constructions of authentic personhood and how we see ourselves,
how we see our relations with other people; these in their turn
mediated by our experiences, upbringing, stage in the lifecycle,
access to media and so on. They will also be influenced by
shorter-term factors, such as moods, emotional states and frames
of mind, and shorter-term autodidactic world-making, such as
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attempts to 'get better and better every day', 'pull ourselves
together', "cheer ourselves up' and so on.
The use of accounts interpersonally will relate, for example, to
the way an individual seeks to construct reality for others, for
either their own purposes (e.g. to persuade them to act in
certain ways, like visit a doctor, or 'take it easy') or to meet
the other person's needs (e.g. to comfort, or reassure them).
Many aspects of collective functions have been described already
in the previous Section, such as using one account to deny,
negate or villify another (e.g. the use of the 'healthy living'
account to deny structural causes of ill-health). Smith, Bruner
and White (1956) note that opinion expression can act to define
and maintain group-membership, and Moscovici (1984) also
stresses the function of social representations as a basis for
group cohesion and solidarity, a purpose accounting can clearly
accomplish too (e.g. the expression of the 'cultural critique' at
medical anthropology conferences, and of the 'Theistic' account
at prayer meetings).
All of these may influence account selection directly (where the
account explicitly constructs the desired or functional reality)
by implication (where accounts say more by what they can destroy
or negate than by what they explicate) and by allusion (where
accounts are polysemic, and their 'meaning' is as much in their
subtexts as within their overt dialogue). Indeed, the selection
of accounts and their expression will often be multiply mediated,
with the account conveying a number of subtexts at different
levels (e.g. personal and interpersonal).
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Thus an account-selection framework offers a dialectical
theory-base, which can incorporate reality-constructs-person and
person-constructs-reality elements. Whereas the person-as-
storymaker focusses on the individual, and the image of the
texts-in-the-library implies a personal search, account
selection and use should be seen much more as a process of
negotiation, both between an individual and their realities, and
between one person and another. Accounting is communal
storymaking in which the roles of 'teller' and 'listener' are
inter- and intrapersonally reflexive.
8.3.3 The links between accounts and action 
In this thesis I have made no claims that gaining a better
understanding of the accounts available for making sense of
health and illness should, per se, enable researchers to predict
which health related or responding-to-illness actions people will
adopt. There are two main reasons for such a disclaimer.
First, as Harr (1979) has noted, accounting is not just about
social actions, it is itself a social activity. This is more
profound than saying that people respond to being the subjects of
study by treating the activity as a social encounter, but that
accounting is always, wherever and whenever it occurs, a
story-making act-in-itself. As Section 8.3.1 made clear,
accounts should not be construed as lever-like 'things in the
head' that trip a person into action, but rather as 'texts' from
which people 'make sense' of action.
The second reason why accounting may not relate directly to
action is that account sympatricity reflects the ways that
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thinking is often confused and contradictory. Within such a
system, action is, by definition, unpredictable. People
themselves, when they are 'in two minds', are uncertain what they
will do until they do it. Their thought is transitive until it
becomes substantiated in action. If actors themselves are
uncertain aixut what they will do up until the very moment of
action, an external observer can clearly do no better.
Tb make this point more explicitly, imagine the situation where a
researcher interviews somebody concerning their 'beliefs about
health and illness'. Imagine further that the influences stack
up within the interview so that the throughout most of the
conversation the exposition of the 'healthy lifestyle'
account becomes the most functional and socially acceptable (as
negotiated by interviewer and interviewee). The interviewer
returns with the interviewee neatly categorised as a believer in
'healthy living', and predicts that she will act accordingly.
This assumption is legitimate within a theory-base that regards
'health beliefs' as fixed and singular essences. But it is quite
invalid within an account sympatricity formulation, for that has
to assume that in different circumstances, with different
influences, other accounts (e.g. the 'individual autonomy'
account) may be more salient, and hence action would be
predicated not upon a 'healthy lifestyle' but upon, say, 'my
body, my lungs, my right to do with them as I choose'. Account
sympatricity would portray this person as continually faced with
dilemmas and choices, so that sometimes they would act one way,
sometimes another; their actions would be, in that sense,
contradictory because the accounts from which they are operating
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are complementary and hence contradictory.
However, an account sympatricity interpretation does not deny
that there can be links between accounts and actions. Accounts
can relate to actions in at least three ways
* as sources from which to plan action;
* as sources with which to predict action (one's
own, or the actions of others);
* as sources from which actions (again, one rs own
and the actions of others) can be (made sense of" -
explained, understood or justified.
Accounts as sources from which to plan action have already been
examined in Section 8.3.1., as the basis for answering questions
like "What do I do now ?". Which account will be selected will
be dependent upon the events or issues or dilemmas to be
responded to. Being bitten by a rabid dog is an extraordinarily
threatening event demanding fast action and rapid and clear-cut
account selection, and people are unlikely to prevaricate.
Eeciding whether or not to give up smoking, go on the pill",
seek out alternative healing or give money to a medical research
Charity are more complexly instigated actions, and accounting is
therefore likely to be a much-more-considered, vascilating
-between-accounts process.
Furthermore, some accounts are more action-prescriptive than
others. For example, the "wonders of modern medicine ( account
contains within it specific action-plans and rules such as
"always follow doctor's orders ( and "keep taking the tablets'.
Other accounts are more interpretational and less
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action-orientated, such as the (stress (
 account (which, within
its psychodynamic roots, largely denies that the sufferer is able
to act purposively) and the (cultural critique ( account (which
may stop you donating to medical research charities, but in its
specific denial of individual responsibility, contains few
action-specific prescriptions).
Treating accounts as the (texts ( from which we may be able to
predict action permits two important insights. The first is
providing a framework for understanding what psychologists have
been doing in much of their theorisation. As many
interpretational social psychologists (e.g. Gergen, 1.982. ;
Mbscovici, 1971; Oahoda, 1986) have recognised, such theorists
have not been (as they have assumed that they have been)
constructing and testing theories about universal psychological
processes.
What they have actually been doing is utilising their own
understandings ( , drawn from the accounts they share
with the subjects of their experiments, as a common (text ( from
which to predict action. The researchers were .able to predict the
actions of their experimental . stljects, not because they had
access to action-predictive psychological theories, but because
the experimental subjects knew (by drawing upon the same
culturally sedimented (texts ( the experimenters used to plan the
experiment) what was expected of them. It is the very combination
of the taken-for-grantedness of culturally sedimented and
sanctioned accounts, their prEscriptive qualities (and hence
their power to specify action) and the cultural homogeneity of
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experimenters and experimental subjects that has led so many
psychologists up the primrose path, into offering their culture-
and even class-specific accounts for action as universal rules to
explain human behaviour.
The other insight is that action can only be predicted (if at
all) by access to the account upon which it is predicated. I have
a neighbour who smiles wanly each year as she asks me to
donate to cancer research, clearly unable to understand how
anybody could refuse on moral grounds. Her incomprehension is, I
believe, the consequence of her having no access to my (cultural
critique account of medicine (however hard I try to explain
it). If such a complete lack of comprehension can occur between
two people who ostensively share, in any demographic analysis, a
single socio-economic class, gender and age-group, how much more
is it likely to occur between people whose social and cultural
origins and roles differ more widely ?
The eight accounts listed in Section 8.1 and described more
fully in Section 8.2 and elsewhere within the thesis should, I
hope, offer food for thought for theorists attempting to
understand the ways people account for health and illness as
routes for predicting their actions.
Formulations like (Health Locus of Control' have singularly
failed to predict action (See Chapter 6) because the
researchers using them assumed that people would only (make
sense ( of health and illness by reference to the constructs
incorporated into the HLC scale. People who scored high on
'external control" were classified as (fatalists ( . However, while
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workers like Pill and Stott, Blaxter, and Cornwell have avoided
this simplistic assumption, they have tended to offer only
singular antithetical positions (e.g. "external control' as a
realistic appraisal of structural inequality).
I hope that my descriptions of the the diversity of accounts will
persuade other researchers to consider that there are likely to
be, for example, many different reasons for refusing to adopt a
(healthy lifestyle", and that these are not simply matters of
interpersonal variation, but intrapersonal variability too. For
instance, the argument that people act in particular ways as a
function of self-presentation (as Cornwell, 1984, suggested)
assumes that there is a singular "self" to be presented. The
strikingly different portrayals of authentic personhood embodied
within the different accounts deny such singularity. To
understand the role of self-presentation in accounting for health
and illness requires much more sophisticated analysis of the way
people construe themselves differently according to different
situations (cf Wbinreich, 1983).
Similarly, the observation that different religious and ethical
beliefs and ideologies are salient to the accounting of many
people, and the broader recognition that accounts are not just
explicatory but contain moral and meaning elements as well,
should, I hope, persuade researchers to move outside of their
portrayals of people as mere "rational" or even "rationalising'
beings, and seek to understand them as feeling, moral and
spiritual beings, whose values and life-plans go beyond
pleasure-seeking, and risk reduction. In their very
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different ways the people who articulated the Theistic and
(cultural critique (
 accounts demanded to be understood as morally
authentic persons, with more important life-agendas than the
pursuit of physical health.
It is no longer good enough for researchers to just look within
their own understandings in their attempts to predict the
actions of others. Before we can even begin to predict what
people will do, we need to gain a better understanding about why
people do what they do, based upon their understandings of
their actions. Action-predictive studies may well need to wait
until we have made a better job of that.
In fact, treating accounts as the basis from which to
interpret actions is a growing field of interest, already
engendering subtle and complex theorisation (e.g. Giddens, 1977;
Barrg 1974, 1979; Marsh et al, 1978; Scott and Lyman, 1968).
Semin and Manstead (1983) provide a thorough and clearly
articulated review and analysis of this area. A number of complex
typologies have already been generated in attempts to clarify the
large variety of social cognitive functions that accounting can
serve for the explication of action, working from Goffmanrs
(1959). perception of interaction as an (expressive order ( within
which accounting plays a crucial role, particularly when there is
any fragmentation or interuption of the smooth flow of social
intercourse.
Goffman himself (1971), Tedeshi and Reiss (1981) and Schlenker
(1980) have explored accounts as apologies; Hewitt and Stokes
(1975) examined accounts as disclaimers; Schonbach (1980) sought
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to typologise varieties of : explaining refusals to act; excuses;
and justifications. Semin and Manstead (op cit) have drawn these
together in an over-arching typology of accounting which covers
such constructs as scapegoating, sad tales, appeals to religious
and moral authorities and face maintenance.
I believe the data and theorisation here in this thesis have two
main suggestions to contribute. The first is that although the
kind of typologisation engaged in by Semin and Manstead is
analytically illuminating, its list-like, (coding-frame(
qualities (quite possibly unintentionally, but compellingly
nonetheless) portray an image of accounting strangely
decoupled from any cultural or social context. The kinds of
accounts described in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 offer an alternative
portrayal, in which action-explication is a process much more
like seeking out an appropriate (storyline ( than, each time an
action demands explaining, re-constructing an articulated
justification or excuse anew. It also offers a sense of the way
that once one becones (keyed in ( to a particular storyline in
order to excuse a rule infraction or whatever, it carries with it
a lot of extra conceptual baggage so that the excuse becomes a
convincing (story ( in and of itself, woven around and weaving the
event, its actions, and its contextual elements.
The second contribution is that because Semin and Manstead have
focussed selectively upon social norm infraction as the kinds of
actions that accounts are needed to explain, the typology, though
lengthy, gives only a partial picture of accounting. It
de-emphasises biological and other (natural (
 discontinuities
420
(e.g. those arising from temporal features, cf Stainton Rogers,
1987 and 1988, forthcoming) and, in its specific concern with
discontinuities, omits consideration of accounting for continuity
(e.g. in the case of chronic illness) and "wholeness'.
Although theorists like Harre- (1979) have argued that the smooth
flow of ordinary social interaction, in its taken-for-granted
qualities, requires no explaining, Dingwall (1976) (See Section
1.3.3) has argued that the social pressure to do usual, expected,
normal things at usual times in usual places requires a great
deal of fluency with commonsense knowledge, and that our
understandings of illness are thus predicated upon our
conceptions of 'ordinariness''. Hence, I would argue, we cannot
gain understanding of people's accounting simply by reference to
the way they account for discontinuity and the fracturing of
'ordinariness'. We must find out how people account for 'being
ordinary' too.
I deliberately chose the topic of health and illness as a subject
matter because it offers biological as well as social
discontinuities that need explication, and it incorporates the
ref lexivities of continuity/discontinuity, wholeness/dislocation.
Thus the accounts identified and described in this thesis cover a
more comprehensive field. I agree with Henriques at al (1984)
that
...whilst we should avoid founding a theory of subjectivity on a
taken-for-granted biological origin, we cannot construct a
position which altogether denies biology and its effects." (p 21)
If we are to gain understanding of the role that accounting plays
in social being, we need to develop a comprehensive theory of
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accounting that includes the ways people account for their
biological as well as their social realities, and "ordinariness"
as well as (disorder". This thesis is offered as a contribution
to that endeavour.
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1: Biography (health history and experiences of illness, medical
care, professional involvement).
2: What first interested you in 	  (health context) ?
3: Definition of 'health'
4: Can disabled people, the elderly be healthy ?
5: What do you think causes - the common cold ?
- cancer ?
- heart disease ?
- obesity ?
- allergy ?
6: How should ill health be treated/ managed ?'
7: What role does an individual play in their own state of
health ?
8: What is the role of conventional medicine ? Other
alternatives ?
9: Do people have unrealistic expectations (e.g. diagnosis, cure,
long evity) ?
10: What is the most important thing we as a society could do
to improve health ?
11:What are the most important problems we face ?
12:What is the most desperate need for research ?
13:Realtionship between health and personal attractiveness ?
14:Any gender differences ?
15:Are you healthy ? Do you practice what you preach ?
16:Are there/why are there social class differences ?
17:Are there/why are there national differences ?
18:Define 'a healthy personality' ?
19: What influence are social, psychological and emotional
factors ?
20:Anything else you consider important ?
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Interview Summary Participant No.9 : Dr Peter North (pseudonym)
Biographical details 
Dr North was a GP who worked in a village in the south of
England, in at a small group practice which served three
surrounding villages and also had some patients from a local
small town. The practice had three GPs, a part-time practice
nurse, part-time health visitor, part-time district nurse, a
practice manager and clerk. I contacted Dr North for interview
because he was well known in his community as a doctor who
frequently prescribed homeopathic medicines.
Dr North was in his fourties. He had trained initially as a
psychiatrist, and had worked for several years in a mental
hospital. However, he had become increasingly unhappy with
psychiatry, because, he said, it was an "unreal world" that did
not give him the opportunities he wanted to "... really make an
impact". He described his motives for going into medicine as "...
a desire to, I suppose it is a cliche, but to make some
contribution to human good". Psychiatry within the NHS failed to
give him this satisfaction :
"Most of the people I work with need a lot, lot more than I can
ever offer them. It's a patch up service at best, and very
reliant on drugs which ... even at that time I was disturbed with
... I felt I was doing little more than zcnking them out half the
time."
He therefore re-trained as a GP, though he still maintained a
part-time post at the mental hospital and did two or three
sessions a week. He had been a GP for five years when I
interviewed him. In the last three years he had become
increasingly interested in homeopathy, and was in the process of
gaining extra training in this area. In fact, a year after the
interview, he gave up general practice, and took up homeopathy
full-time.
IntereSt in homeopathy 
When I asked Dr North to describe his reasons for using
homeopathy, he laughed
"It"s a funny story, I suppose. It didn't start out with any deep
commitment, indeed to tell you the truth ... I was very
sceptical. But as a GP I found myself coming more and more into
conflict with my patients. It started off as a way out of that
conflict. ... (Y)ou see, a lot of the people who came to me for
help, well, people today have lost faith in their body's ability
to heal itself. They think when they are ill they won't get
better unless they have medicine. It's 'Doctor, I need some
antibiotic for my throat' or they want a 'pick me up' ...
basically they want a prescription. People today... are
convinced that every little ache and pain is serious, or if not
serious will 'turn into something serious unless they take
something for it and so they tend to run to the doctor with every
little ache and pain and expect you to offer an instant cure.
They don't recognise that most illness is self-limiting. People
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don't recognise the body's own powers of self-healing. But they
have a very fragile image of their bodies, as though once it gets
attacked it's powerless and they need help.
TAMA., part of the reason I wanted out of psychiatry ... was its
reliance on drugs and the ... (problems of) side-effects, and
here I was being expected to pump my patients full of drugs,
often just to make them feel that somebody was taking some notice
of their illness, or because they were frightened that they
wouldn't get better unless they took same sort of magic potion...
And so I got into conflicts, a lot of conflicts, some people got
very angry... so I couldn't win. If I gave them a prescription,
which is what a lot of GPs do, I knew that they didn't need and
would quite possibly make the situation worse, then I had to
square that with my conscience, or I told them to go away, and,
you know, take it a bit easy and let their body do the work it
was designed to do, either way I couldn't win. And so I thought I
would try it because in those dilutions it couldn't really do any
harm, and they would go away happy."
He described, however, that fairly soon he thought he had better
make at least some attempt to prescribe according to same kind of
homeopathic principles, and so started reading up in books about
it
"Well, it had two effects really. I had to take a history in a
different way and ask a lot of much more detailed questions, and
although that itself causes problems in terms of time, you know,
it was also a plus, because I had to learn a lot more and listen
a lot more. ... But also, to my surprise ... it seemed as though
they had same action ... it did seem to work."
Consequently he had become increasingly involved in homeopathy,
both as a means of offering patients "a prescription' which
validated their illness but did them no harm, and more and more
as the treatffent of choice for a range of illnesses. He mentioned
that the "...rituals attached" to taking homeopathic medicines
(these include taking the pills from the bottle cap and not
touching them, and giving up coffee and ordinary toothpaste while
taking a course of medication, all necessary to ensure that there
were no ccmpeting substances) made them "...excellent placebos"
but that he also became more and more convinced that the
medication and indeed the whole system worked.
"I do continue to prescribe all opathic drugs, I'm not
doctrinaire. But I am now able to use, say, antibiotics, very
much more sparingly in the few cases I consider them really
necessary, and I feel a lot more comfortable about that. ... But
it also gives me a dialogue, a way of talking to patients that
they understand and can relate to. When I tell them that what I
am doing is trying to help their body marshall its own defences,
and that the drug they are getting is to do that, then I find
that we are talking a language that makes sense to them."
The status and management of health
Not surprisingly given his background and involvement in
homeopathy, Dr North saw health wholistically, and in terms of
equilibrium:
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"Health is a positive, it's ... to do with having the resources,
both physical and psychological, to take on life's demands and
... onslaughts. It has a lot to do with samething inside, with a
sense of purpose and tranquility and something ... of being
there, of being in control, of a balance of life."
In seeing health in this way, he was convinced that both older
people and the chronically sick can be healthy, basically can
reach their own potential, and maintain their balance and control
so long as they had the will to do so. He felt that health is
something to be sought primarily by psychological management
"Of course there are the basic things like diet and exercise and
not smoking. At that level, the body is a bit like a machine and
if it's neglected or abused, it will cease to function properly.
But it's a lot ....more than a machine, or at least, at that
level, a very complicated one with enormous powers to fight off
infection and to heal so long as ... these capacities have not
been undermined by drugs and other abuses... But you know, that's
only at the one level ... beyond that there is the person, and
they ... can be a victim of their body, or their worry, or their
circumstances and feel that they are weak and powerless, or they
... can feel strong, and it is that strength that is what really
matters."
He spoke at same length about the homeopathic viewpoint on the
management of illness. That for the vast majority of (health
problems' the task is to do three main things. First, to maintain
a sensible lifestyle "... though there needs to be a balance
between being sensible and having fun ... I don't always follow
my own advice - I do not take the exercise I should, I let my job
take over my life ... I eat food that I enjoy sometimes, even if
it's not ideal, I even smoke cigars sometimes:" Second, for the
person to gain a sense of purpose and to fight feelings of
powerlessness. Third, at a bodily level, to work in ways that
promote self-renewal and self-healing, with homeopathic remedies
if necessary, and certainly by avoiding substances (particularly
prescribed drugs) that throw the balance of the body. Clearly
within this context he favoured alternative medicine, and
although homeopathy weas his own particular concern, saw other
forms of alternative medicine as useful:
"All share two important things. A respect for the body and its
powers ... working with it rather than against it .... and a
wholistic approach, both in terms of time ... looking at health
and illness within the sequence of life from one time to
another... and ... in terms of all the aspects of a person, not
just the body, and ... especially not just one set of symtams
of one organ separate from another."
Causes of illness 
Common colds, Dr North said, were not in one sense really
illnesses at all. A person's body is in a constant state of
balance with other organisms, always having to maintain itself in
a kind of homeostasis that keeps organisms at bay. Colds are
symptxus which arise out of this process, when the balance is
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disrupted (which it can be by a wide range of different things,
both internal and external). But the symptoms are functional, and
should not be treated but allowed to run their course and do
their work.
Cancer, he suggests, is similarly a continual process. All of us
have (cancer ( in the sense that cells replicate in dysfunctional
ways at times, but most of the time for most of us the body's own
fine tuning mechanisms cope and the process only becomes
troublesome (i.e. disease) when the coping mechanisms break down.
Heart disease he says has a complex aetiology. It is impossible
to talk of simple cause-and-effect because it arises "... within
a complex network of things going on." Thus he accepted many of
the received biomedical explanations to do with hypertension,
smoking, blood fats, exercise, but spoke at length about the need
to place these within the context of the person's psychological
approach to life, and their social context.
Obesity is, according to Dr North, a social not a personal
illness
"Let's be frank about this, obesity is not about being
fashionably emaciated like a model in (Vague' and anything else
is obese. There are degrees of carrying too much weight that are
bad for health, but they are much less tough than many people
claim. And overweight, which is a problem because ... say, of
the strain it puts on the system, is much more a product of a
society in which 'naughty but nice ( is the message ... the
sickness is in that ... and in a world in which over half of the
world's population is starving. Now that is really sick. ...
Looked at worldwide, obesity is not the problem, hunger and
malnutrition and starving are the problem."
Allergies were something that intereste d him, but he felt unsure
of himself at answering
"I don't think we have begun to understand, and of course, I am
learning a whole new way of looking at this ... I don't think
orthodox medicine is even close in its current understanding."
Social responsibility 
As his comments on obesity showed, and hus motivations for moving
into general practice, Dr North was a man for whom moral and
broad social issues were important. He spoke for same time, in
answer to this question, about the Black report, inequalities in
health, and the undesirable professional bias in medicine towards
high technology and the consequent neglect of its duty to the
chronically sick, the old and to the causes of illness that are
the products of poverty. He also mentioned that as a doctor,
commited by oath to preserving life, he felt it a moral duty to
be a member of CND and to refuse to co-operate with any plans for
responding to nuclear war
"Living as we do here so close to Greenham and Upper Hayford, to
make any kind of plans is irresponsible in the extreme... it is
giving a message to people that some kind of civilisation would
survive.., and it wouldn't ... I see nuclear war as the greatest
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threat we have to face."
He felt, not surprisingly, that research endeavour should be
shifted away from developing ever more high technology surgery
and drug testing towards looking at the psychological aspects of
illness, at people's everyday lifestyles, at health education,
and in particular at alternative medicine
"Though I don't expect it to happen, people have too much at
stake and fixed ideas. But I for one would like to know a lot
more about why homeopathic treatment seems to work."
He saw major gender and social class differences, arising from
social forces and "... things like the way a person sees
themself. We force ... a lot of people (in)to lives that strip
them of their self-confidence and how can they be expected to
have the confidence not to run all the time looking for a doctor
with a magic wand who will solve all their problems for them ...
we take away their faith and their ability to solve (them) ...
for their selves."
Finally, he defined a 'healthy personality ( thus
"It is to do with living by your own lights, a person ... who
lives according to their own reasons and goals and has the
personal courage and tranquility to do that... and at ... the
same time, is sensitive to others... in a way (in which) they 
define their own worth, and live up to that worth, and other
people value them for it. This is their strength, and their
strength is very powerful, and their health would be in and come
from that."
455
APPENDDC 2
DERIVATION OF Q ITEMS FOR STUDY 1
Interviews,
[2,6,7]
Conversation
recorded in
notebook
Interviews
[8,3,10]
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Q Item	 Source
Interview [1]1. However complex the programming,
computers will never be as good at
medical diagnosis as doctors.
2. To allow the prescription of
tranquillisers on the NHS makes no
more sense than dishing out State
subsidised beer or whisky.
3. People who take overdoses as a
cry for help .' are abusing the Health
Service and misusing its facilities.
4. It is foolish and pig headed to go
against your doctor's advice.
5. Disease and bodily decay are
inevitable aspects of being alive,
and anyone who promises you different
is a liar or a fool.
6. Medicine is first and foremost a
science and must be based on rigorous
scientific principles.
7. We have every reason to be proud
of our National Health Service.
8. Many so-called 'Mental illnesses''
are really just the signs of weakness
or the unwillingness to face reality.
9. Much of the illness we suffer is
caused by the unhealthy way we live
our lives.
Conversation, recor-
ded in notebook after
TV programme
Interview [2]
Interview [3]
Interview [4]
Interview [5]
10. Hard as it may be to understand, Comment made
disease and injury are all part of in post office
God's plan for us all.
11. Modern medical triumphs like
heart transplants are among the major
achievements of our time.
12. Working class people are 'off
sick .' from work more often than
middle class people because they
don't take the trouble to look after
themselves properly.
From TV
programme
Radio news
Comment
from notebook
Academic
Conference
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Q Item	 Source
Interview [8]13. In medicine a little knowledge is
a dangerous thing.
14. Fringe medicine is a dangerous
intrustion upon proper medical care.
15. Doctors can only treat symptoms;
they can seldom resolve the real
underlying causes of illness.
16.There is far too much Meddling(
in medical matters by lay people.
17. If we want to improve health we
should provide more sporting
facilities, not more health centres.
18. Doctors are quite right to keep
the truth from their patients if they
feel they could not cope with it.
19. Doctors should be free to
prescribe the (pill' to girls of less
than sixteen, even against their
parent's express wishes.
20. It is crucial to keep yourself
and your home clean and hygenic or
you will fall prey to disease.
21. Primitive societies which lack
the benefits of modern medicine are
bound to contain a high proportion of
people who are ill.
22. It is no concern of the doctor if
their patient lives an unhealthy
lifestyle. Their job is to cure
illness.
Interview [8]
Interview [7]
Interview [8]
Gillick
Action
Comment from
notebook
Medical
Conference
Zola
23. It is wrong to test out new drugs From
on animals, even if this may save notebook
human life.
24. A doctor does not reccauend Interview [11]
surgery unless it is absolutely
necessary.
25. The care of the elderly is a Interview [9]
social not a medical responsibility.
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Q Item	 Source
26. Big Business - like the Tobacco
Alcohol and Food Industries - 'Observer(
prevents the Government from
implementing an effective policy of
preventive medicine.
27.Decisions about who should live From
and who should die are moral not notebook
medical questions; they should not be
left just to doctors.
28.People are far too ready to run Interview [9]
to the Doctor with every little ache
and pain.
29. Treating people as (mentally ill' Comment from
is often a means by which society notebook
controls those who don't conform.
30. The health of people in our Ehrenreich
society will only improve overall
when we have overcome the injustices
between the ( haves and the
"have-nots".
31.The ability of the body to heal Interview [8]
itself is much greater than most
people realise.
32. Good health is a fundamental WHO
human right.
33. Health education is a critical Interviews
element in ensuring that people are [10,3]
fit and well.
34. People suffering from incurable Notebook
illness should have the right to be
painlessly dispatched.
35. Whether an individual is healthy Interview [12]
or not is largely a matter of choice.
36.Modern drugs are very effective From notebook
and have few unwanted side-effects.
37.Far too much rubbish is written Notebook
about the psychological aspects of
illness. Nearly all diseases are
caused by infection or bodily
dysfunction and have no psychological
element whatsoever.
[3]Interview
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Q Item	 Source
38. Some people are born with a Interview [13]
disposition to be 'sickly'.
Interview [6]
Notebook
Notebook
Interview [3]
39. Even when you feel completely
healthy you should have regular
health check-ups.
40. Many people use the excuse of
being ill to draw attention to
then-selves.
41. There is a lot to be said for a
compulsory medical examination at
regular intervals for the whole
population.
42. Good medicine requires good
teamwork, with the doctor
collaborating with a full range of
professionals for the patient's care.
43. A woman should have the right to
have medical treatment from a woman.
44. Being healthy is far more than an
absence of disease, it is to do with
a positive sense of wellbeing.
45. The vast majority of doctors have
no sympathy for their patients.
46. Sensible people plan their lives
to promote positive health and
wellbeing.
47. TO care for and cure the sick is
one of the highest callings in life.
48. Vegetarians are usually healthier
than meat eaters.
49. Doctors have a moral duty to
support Nuclear Disarmament.
50. The worry and stress of modern
life is society's major health
hazard.
Interview [14]
Notebook
Interview [15]
Interview [13]
Notebook
Interview [9]
Herzlich
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Q Item	 Source
51.Our modern environment is full of Notebook
pollution which undermines health.
52. More	 often	 than	 not, Interview [9]
tranquillisers are prescribed to help
people put up with intol erable
conditions under which they are
forced to live.
53. The "will to live' is a major Interview [9]
factor in whether people recover from
a serious illness.
54. Wherever practical, a doctor Interview [4]
should offer an ill person a range of
treatments and they themselves should
choose which one they wish to follow.
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APPENDIX 3
MATERIAIS USED IN STUDY 1
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INSTRUCITONS FOR OCMPLETING THE Q SORT
Enclosed you will find seven sheets of paper, on each of which
are numbered statements about health and illness; there are 54
statements in all. These are mostly things that people have said
in interviews, but also include statements in books, magazines
and on TV and radio. Your task will be to sort them in a way
that gives an impression of how you feel about them. You will
also find a further pink sheet, on which there are numbers
marked from -5 through 0 to +5. To carry out the Q sort you will
need to cut all of these out, so that you have two piles of
small bits of paper, one pile of 54 statements, and one pile of
11 pink numbers. You will also need a large, clear table or desk
- or the floor ! (as the process takes up a fair bit of space).
Your task will be to sort the statements according to a profile,
from STRONGEST DISAGREEMENT (-5) to STRONGEST ALCM/ABUT
(+5). If you look now at the response grid on the back page, you
will see the format of choices. As you will see, the pattern is
such that at the extreme ends you will need to place just three
statements - those with which you feel strongest disagreement at
one end, and those with which you most strongly agree at the
other. In between, you will place increasingly more statements,
in a V shape.
In this way you should be able to give a rough account of your
views about health and illness. I say "rough account" because a
technique like this can only go so far, and cannot represent a
lot of detail, or take account of the "...yes, but..." feelings
we all have about any issue or topic. However, this technique is
pretty good at describing the basic viewpoints that people hold,
and is very useful guide for further research using more
detailed techniques (e.g. interviews).
What you should do to begin, is to sort the statements into
three piles fairly roughly
Pile A
	
Pile B	 Pile C 
Those statements with 	 Don't know	 Those statements with
which you disagree	 No strong feeling	 which you agree
Ambivalent
Don't understand
At this stage it's probably worth going through the piles a
second time, just to make sure that you are happy with where you
have placed the statements. Induce in pile A all of those with
which you disagree, even if only mildly; and in pile C ensure
that there are all the statements with which you agree, even if
your agreement is pretty small. You can go on changing
statements from pile to pile as long as you want, right up to
the end of the sort, but people usually find that the sorting
gets easier later on if they make sure they are fairly happy at
this stage. When you are satisfied with your three piles, your
-3 0 +1 +2 +3 1+51+4
PLENTY OF SPACE
	1
-4 -1-2
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need for lots of space arises. Set out the pink numbers in a row
in front of you like this, with plenty of space below
Your task from this point on is to sort the statements according
to two considerations. First and foremost, consider the extent
to which you agree or disagree with each one. When a decision
gets hard, however, you should also consider the importance of
the subject matter to your beliefs and opinions - place those
statements that are salient to you before those that are of less
concern.
Now, using the grid on the back page, begin to sort your
statements according to the specified profile. Most people start
by selecting one pile (e.g. Pile A) and chosing from it the
three statements with which they feel strongest disagreement,
placing these under the -5 marker. The object from this point
on is to gradually refine your strength of disagreement by
next selecting four statements to go under -4, then five
statements to go under -3 and so on, working from pile A until
you have used them all up. Then you should move on to pile C,
and in a similar manner first find your three statements of
greatest agreement to put under the +5 marker, moving on in turn
to choices for +4, +3 and so on.
When you have used up all of your statements from piles A and B,
go on to place pile B. Here you should still aim as far as
possible to work from disagreement to agreement, but these
statements in the middle of the grid don't matter so much, and
you should not worry over them for too long. While for some
people the 0 row will be sufficient for all of pile B, for
others you may be using + or - columns. Again, don't worry too
much - nor be concerned if, say, you have more agrees or more
disagrees than the grid alows - the numbers are actually only
there to help you make your sort, and it is the order of your
responses which matters.
At the end of your sorting, you should have something in front
of you that looks like this
1 -5 
1 -4 .1 -3 -2
•••••
n•••n•••• •
taamamaaaa•
•••—•••••
••••
	 	
 r::::]
II.  • 	 I	
I	 I
I•••=--.:..
1
L=.=--- II 
+1 +5+3 +4+2 I1 0
•••••,••••
•••••••
••••••• 4••n
*
••n•••"JZ
	 1
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Even at this stage if you want to (and have the time) you should
feel free to move the statements around. When, however, you are
reasonably happy with your choices, fill in the grid with the
numbers of the statements. Please note, however, that for the
purposes of the analysis I will carry out on the responses, it
is absolutely crucial that you stick to the format specified by
the grid, with exactly the right number of statements in each
column (i.e. you should not put, say, four statements under the
+5 column, however much you may feel you would like to do so !).
93 PLEASE co STICK TO THE RIGHT NUMBER OF SENUMNIS IN EACH
COL1Mi - OTHERWISE THE CCMPUTER WILL sPrr CUT THE DATA, AND I
WILL OMR 2.1Y HAIR (ITT!!
Thankyou very much for helping me with my research, I appreciate
the time and effort required, and your willingness to give me
your support.
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ITEMS FOR Q SORT
These 54 items should be cut up carefully, and
used for sorting. The back page contains
markers to help you position the sort
correctly.
1. However complex the programming,
computers will never be as good at
medical diagnosis as doctors.
2. To allow the prescription of
tranquillisers on the NHS makes no
more sense than dishing out State
subsidised beer or whisky.
3. People who take overdoses as a
cry for help are abusing the Health
Service and misusing its facilities.
5. Disease and bodily decay are
inevitable aspects of being alive,
and anyone who promises you different
is a liar or a fool.
4. It is foolish and pig headed to go
against your doctor's advice.
6. Medicine is first and foremost a
science and must be based on rigorous
scientific principles.
7. We have every reason to be proud
of our National Health Service.
8. Many so-called "mental illnesses'
are really just the signs of weakness
or the unwillingness to face reality.
9. Much of the illness we suffer is
caused by the unhealthy way we live
our lives.
10. Hard as it may be to understand,
disease and injury are all part of
God's plan for us all.
11. Modern medical triumphs like
heart transplants are among the major
achievements of our time.
12. Working class people are 'off
sick' from work more often than
middle class people because they
don't take the trouble to look after
themselves properly.
13. In medicine a little knowledge is
a dangerous thing.
14. Fringe medicine is a dangerous
intrustion upon proper medical care.
15. Doctors can only treat symptoms;
they can seldom resolve the real
underlying causes of illness.
16. There is far too much 'meddling'
in medical matters by lay people.
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18. Doctors are quite right to keep
the truth from their patients if they
feel they could not cope with it.
17. If we want to improve health we
should provide more sporting
facilities, not more health centres.
20. It is crucial to keep yourself
and your home clean and hygenic or
you will fall prey to disease.
19. Doctors should be free to
prescribe the 'pill' to girls of less
than sixteen, even against their
parent's express wishes.
22. It is no concern of the doctor if
their patient lives an unhealthy
lifestyle. Their job is to cure
illness.
21. Primitive societies which lack
the benefits of modern medicine are
bound to contain a high proportion of
people who are ill.
24. A doctor does not recommend
surgery unless it is absolutely
necessary.
23. It is wrong to test out new drugs
on animals, even if this may save
human life.
26. Big Business - like the Tobacco,
Alcohol and Food Industries -
prevents the Government from
implementing an effective policy of
preventive medicine.
25. The care of the elderly is a
social not a medical responsibility.
28. People are far too ready to run
to the Doctor with every little ache
and pain.
27. Decisions about who should live
and who should die are moral not
medical questions; they should not be
left just to doctors.
30. The health of people in our
society will only improve overall
when we have overcome the injustices
between the laves' and the
'have-nots'.
29. Treating people as 'mentally ill'
is often a means by which society
controls those who don't conform.
32. Good health is a fundamental
human right.
31. The ability of the body to heal
itself is much greater than most
people realise.
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34. People suffering from incurable
illness should have the right to be
painlessly dispatched.
33. Health education is a critical
element in ensuring that people are
fit and well.
36. Modern drugs are very effective
and have few unwanted side-effects.
35. Whether an individual is healthy
or not is largely a matter of choice.
38. Some people are born with a
disposition to be 'sickly'.
37. Far too much rubbish is written
about the psychological aspects of
illness. Nearly all diseases are
caused by infection or bodily
dysfunction and have no psychological
element whatsoever.
40. Many people use the excuse of
being ill to draw attention to
themselves.
39. Even when you feel completely
healthy you should have regular
health check-ups.
42. Good medicine requires good
teamwork, with the doctor
collaborating with a full range of
professionals for the patient's care.
41. There is a lot to be said for a
compulsory medical examination at
regular intervals for the whole
population.
44. Being healthy is far more than an
absence of disease, it is to do with
a positive sense of wellbeing.
43. A woman should have the right to
have medical treatment from a woman.
46. Sensible people plan their lives
to promote positive health and
wellbeing.
45. The vast majority of doctors have
no sympathy for their patients.
48. Vegetarians are usually healthier
than meat eaters.
47. To care for and cure the sick is
one of the highest callings in life.
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50. The worry and stress of modern
life is society's major health
hazard.
52. More often than not,
tranquillisers are prescribed to help
people put up with intol arable
conditions under which they are
forced to live.
54. wherever practical, a doctor
should offer an ill person a range of
treatments and they themselves should
choose which one they wish to follow.
53. The
factor
a serio
51. Our
pollut
49. Do
suppor
tors have a moral duty to
:Nuclear Disarmament.
modern environment is full of
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'will to live' is a major
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COMMENTS FORM
Here are all the Q sort items listed on
sheets of paper. Please use the spaces
provided to make any comments about the
items that you think will be useful in
planning the next study - things like
wording, whether or not they are easy to
understand, and any reactions you have
to them, or problems with them.
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1. However complex the programming,
computers will never be as good at
medical diagnosis as doctors.
2. To allow the prescription of
tranquillisers on the NHS makes no
more sense than dishing out State
subsidised beer or whisky.
3. People who take overdoses as a
'cry for help' are abusing the Health
Service and misusing its facilities.
4. It is foolish and pig headed to go
against your doctor's advice.
5. Disease and bodily decay are
inevitable aspects of being alive,
and anyone who promises you different
is a liar or a fool.
6. Medicine is first and foremost a
science and must be based on rigorous
scientific princip .s.
7. We have every reason to be proud
of our National Health Service.
8. Many so-called 'mental illnesses'
are really just the signs of weakness
or the unwillingness to face reality.
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9. Much of the illness we suffer is
caused by the unhealthy way we live
our lives.
10.Hard as it may be to understand,
disease and injury are all part of
God's plan for us all.
11. Modern medical triumphs like
heart transplants are among the major
achievements of our time.
12. Working class people are 'off
sick' from work more often than
middle class people because they
don't take the trouble to look after
themselves properly.
13. In medicine a little knowledge is
a dangerous thing.
14.Fringe medicine is a dangerous
intrustion upon proper medical care.
15. Doctors can only treat symptoms;
they can seldom resolve the real
underlying causes of illness.
16.There is far too much 'meddling'
in medical matters by lay people.
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17. If we want to improve health we
should provide more sporting
facilities, not more health centres.
18. Doctors are quite right to keep
the truth from their patients if they
feel they could not cope with it.
19. Doctors should be free to
prescribe the 'pill' to girls of less
than sixteen, even against their
parent's express wishes.
20. It is crucial to keep yourself
and your home clean and hygenic or
you will fall prey to disease.
21. Primitive societies which lack
the benefits of modern medicine are
bound to contain a high proportion of
people who are ill.
22. It is no concern of the doctor if
their patient lives an unhealthy
lifestyle. Their job is to cure
illness.
23. It is wrong to test out new drugs
on animals, even if this may save
human life.
24. A doctor does not recommend
surgery unless it is absolutely
necessary.
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25. The care of the elderly is a
social not a medical responsibility.
26. Big Business - like the Tobacco,
Alcohol and Food Industries -
prevents the Government from
implementing an effective policy of
preventive medicine.
27. Decisions about who should live
and who should die are moral not
medical questions; they should not be
left just to doctors.
28. People are far too ready to run
to the Doctor with every little ache
and pain.
29. Treating people as 'mentally ill'
is often a means by which society
controls those who don't conform.
30. The health of people in our
society will only improve overall
when we have overcome the injustices
between the 'haves' and the
'have-nots'.
31.The ability of the body to heal
itself is much greater than most
people realise.
32. Good health is a fundamental
human right.
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33. Health education is a critical
element in ensuring that people are
fit and well.
34. People suffering from incurable
illness should have the right to be
painlessly dispatched.
35. Whether an individual is healthy
or not is largely a matter of choice.
36.Modern drugs are very effective
and have few unwanted side-effects.
37.Far too much zubbish is written
About the psychological aspects of
illness. Nearly all diseases are
caused by infection or bodily
dysfunction and have no psychological
element whatsoever.
38. Some people are born with a
disposition to be 'sickly'.
39. Even when you feel completely
healthy you should have regular
health check-ups.
40. Many people use the excuse of
being ill to draw attention to
themselves.
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41. There is a lot to be said for a
compulsory medical examination at
regular intervals for the whole
population.
42. Good medicine requires good
teamwork, with the doctor
collaborating with a full range of
professionals for the patient's care.
43.A woman should have the right to
have medical treatment from a woman.
44. Being healthy is far more than an
absence of disease, it is to do with
a positive sense of wellbeing.
45.The vast majority of doctors have
no sympathy for their patients.
46. Sensible people plan their lives
to promote positive health and
wellbeing.
47.To care for and cure the sick is
one of the highest callings in life.
48.Vegetarians are usually healthier
than meat eaters.
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49. Doctors have a moral duty to
support Nuclear Disarmament.
50.The worry and stress of modern
life is society's major health
hazard.
51.Our modern environment is full of
pollution which undermines health.
52. More often than not,
tranquillisers are prescribed to help
people put up with intol erable
conditions under which they are
forced to live.
53. The Will to live' is a major
factor in whether people recover from
a serious illness.
54. Wherever practical, a doctor
should offer an ill person a range of
treatments and they themselves should
choose which one they wish to follow.
ANY SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL ITEMS
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Q SORT PILOT TEST	 PARTICIPANTS' FORM
NAME
(or pseudonym)
ADDRESS 	
Telephone WORK 
	
 HOME 	
Gender 	
 Age 
	
Occupation or other description
of yourself
Any other information you think
might be salient (e.g. experience of illness) - 	
Would you be willing to	 Yes [ ]	 No [ ]
participate in further
Q studies ?
Would you be willing to	 Yes [ ]
	
No [ ]
be interviewed ?
Do you know anybody I might contact to 	
participate in future studies,
particularly with interesting or
unusual ideas about health and
illness ? If so, please provide name
and address :
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Q SORT PILOT TEST	 RESPONSE FORM
NAME
1 : Were the instructions clear and easy to follow"?
If not, suggest improvements
2 : List any items you found difficult to understand. If you
can, say what the problem was.
3 : Were any important issues/ideas missed out ? If so, suggest
statements to describe them.
4 : Describe any problems you faced completing the task
ANY OTHER COMMENTS ?
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APPENDIX 4
FA,CI'OR LOADINGS FOR STUDIES 1,2 AND 3
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Factor loadings obtained in Study 1 
Part.
Number
1
Factors
2	 3 4 5
1 0.37 0.70 0.08 0.03 0.18
2 0.23 0.16 0.54 0.38 0.06
3 0.46 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.09
4 0.01 0.38 0.50 0.47 0.01
5 0.85 0.23 -0.04 0.19 -0.13
6 0.47 0.38 0.51 0.13 0.03
7 0.07 0.36 0.70 -0.08 0.26
8 0.35 0.59 0.22 0.05 0.04
9 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.15 -0.02
10 0.69 0.37 0.08 0.20 -0.02
11 0.43 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.08
12 0.68 0.18 0.15 -0.09 0.04
13 0.43 0.63 0.26 0.14 0.09
14 -0.15 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.76
15 0.31 0.54 -0.09 0.25 0.14
16 0.50 0.41 -0.01 0.09 -0.07
17 0.74 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.06
18 0.06 0.56 0.14 0.14 -0.19
19 -0.03 0.28 0.34 0.02 0.06
20 0.15 0.72 0.32 0.16 -0.03
21 -0.24 0.07 0.23 0.04 0.18
22 0.23 0.16 -0.04 0.72 0.03
23 0.87 0.19 0.04 0.15 -0.09
24 0.09 0.33 0.17 0.10 0.08
25 0.18 0.38 0.03 0.62 0.26
26 0.74 0.27 0.15 0.09 -0.12
27 0.08 -0.05 0.68 -0.09 0.03
28 0.50 0.64 0.09 0.10 0.18
29 0.36 0.49 0.43 0.19 0.31
30 0.23 0.78 -0.10 0.40 0.03
Exeirplars marked 'in bold
All data rounded up to two decimal places
Factor loadings for Study 2 
fa4 FACTORS
1 2 3 4	 5 6 7 8 9
1 .14 .54 .22 .08	 .30 .06 .02 .14 -.31
2 .00 .32 .59 -.05	 .21 -.06 .01 -.05 .10
3 .34 .40 .14 .41 -.08 -.01 .32 -.07 .07
4 .11 .23 .08 .55	 .36 -.13 .17 .14 -.15
5 .40 .27 .52 .03	 .43 -.02 -.04 .05 .15
6 .88 -.07 .03 .07	 .12 .21 -.03 -.00 .00
7 .12 .46 08 .10	 .12 .29 .15 -.18 -.06
8 .57 .20 .26 .10	 .03 -.03 .06 .18 -.16
9 .10 .46 .02 .12	 .05 .19 -.04 -.01 .15
10 -.02 .37 .43 .16	 .33 .21 .15 -.03 .12
11 .30 .43 .04 .07 -.09 -.16 .03 .33 .02
12 .14 .33 .56 .19	 .19 .25 .09 .13 -.10
13 .57 .12 .32 -.10	 .05 -.16 .32 .23 .05
14 .35 .36 .42 .17	 .06 -.05 .01 .04 .05
15 .10 .61 .01 .57	 .07 .15 -.07 .17 -.01
16 .69 -.05 .00 .15	 .11 -.04 -.03 .22 -.23
17 .27 .36 .24 .17 -.01 .03 .42 .05 .00
18 .12 .31 .22 .41	 .17 .02 .15 .20 .10
19 .28 .57 .04 .31 -.09 .05 .16 -.05 .02
20 .12 .12 .11 .10	 .63 .25 .08 -.05 .04
21 .54 .03 .14 .39	 .29 .06 .50 .01 -.02
22 .04 .45 .47 .29	 .16 .00 .14 .22 .15
23 .07 .29 .21 -.01	 .49 -.03 .18 .05 .19
24 .13 .34 .05 .15	 .10 .10 .11 -.06 -.05
25 .90 -.06 .01 .04	 .01 .19 .06 -.08 .02
26 .05 .18 .35 .02	 .18 .11 .02 .15 .04
27 .06 .22 .25 .72	 .13 .15 .00 -.09 .07
28 .33 .49 .20 .07	 .23 .19 .31 .08 .11
29 -.11 .28 .33 .37	 .05 .34 .08 -.08 .19
30 .41 .19 .08 .14	 .33 .02 .04 .09 .19
31 .00 .55 .20 .14	 .14 .03 .11 -.20 .06
32 .57 .08 .07 .15	 .20 -.15 -.00 .03 .05
33 .17 .27 .26 .18	 .24 .26 .37 .01 .28
34 .53 .21 .23 .10	 .12 .04 .14 -.01 .24
35 .32 .21 .32 .04	 .03 .04 .14 .15 .50
36 .37 -.10 .22 .00	 .18 -.04 -.06 .07 .14
37 .16 .05 .19 .03	 .14 .26 .66 .09 .08
38 -.07 .19 .12 .10	 .25 -.00 .06 -.00 .69
39 .19 .15 -.02 .56-.08 .18 -.00 -.13 .09
40 -.05 .35 .11 .15	 .23 -.13 .12 .03 .03
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Exemplificatory Q sorts marked in bold
Data rounded to two decimal points.
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Factor loadings for Study 2 /cont. 
4.)
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c..)	 $4
-H
FACTORS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
41 -.02 .15 .19 .13 .23 .12 -.03 .04 .18
42 -.22 .41 .19 .08 .18 .01 .09 -.23 .14
43 .02 .29 .20 .17 .60 -.03 .09 .02 .17
44 .85 -.02 .16 .00 .09 .03 .11 .13 -.03
45 -.22 .50 .01 .07 -.08 -.02 -.14 -.29 -.25
46 .67 .29 .23 .16 .02 .18 .17 .03 .13
47 .05 .55 .26 -.11 .33 -.07 .04 -.01 .08
48 .29 .01 .71 .20 .18 .24 .09 .08 .04
49 -.14 .50 .05 .38 .27 .11 .06 -.09 .11
50 .84 -.14 .11 .05 -.03 .03 -.06 .00 .02
51 -.22 .52 .01 .16 .06 .16 .15 -.12 .03
52 -.11 .67 .26 .15 .14 -.09 .10 .07 .11
53 .26 -.01 .15 -.04 .02 .22 .07 .71 .03
54 .52 .22 .33 .11 .06 .36 .05 .14 .05
55 .41 .07 .29 .09 -.25 .43 .19 .19 .10
56 .09 .46 .06 .12 .00 .00 .06 .10 .11
57 .65 -.02 -.01 -.09 -.06 .06 .10 .34-.05
58 .14 .03 -.13 .04 .09 .55 .12 .19 -.15
59 .79 .03 .11 -.03 -.12 .15 .08 .04 .03
60 .41 .29 .42 .10 -.12 .08 -.00 .33 .01
61 .22 .17 .23 .29 .04 .10 .09 -.01 .03
62 .47 .05 .55 .08 -.02 -.00 .19 .25 -.08
63 -.10 .16 .20 .12 .11 .02 .03 .10 .06
64 .13 .16 .39 .30 • .27 -.00 .20 -.12 .09
65 .48 .13 .58 -.06 -.15 .03 .11 -.05 .11
66 .17 .29 .55 .15 .01 .10 .13 .03 .06
67 .55 .01 .42 -.01 .01 .04 .12 -.13 -.12
68 -.15 .69 .17 .02 .15 -.09 -.04 .15 .14
69 .26 .03 .19 .12 .11 .67 .12 .08 .02
70 .45 .15 .13 .15 .16 -.09 .17 .09 -.05
Exemplificatory Q sorts marked in bold
Data rounded to two decimal points.
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Factor loadings obtained with by-person factor analysis of Locus of
Control scores in Study 3
Participant
number 1 2
Factors
3 4 5 6 7
1 .39 .30 .36 -.02 .11 .05 -.05
2 .18 .76 .15 -.03 -.05 .29 .07
3 .13 .50 .20 -.03 -.13 .07 .12
4 .35 .44 -.04 .32 .52 -.05 .32
5 .25 .43 .15 .32 .22 .42 -.07
6 .42 -.00 .18 .31 .20 .23 -.06
7 .37 .48 .16 -.07 .11 .15 -.09
8 .66 .22 -.05 -.13 .23 -.05 .04
9 .01 .27 .51 -.14 -.10 .15 -.32
10 .68 -.03 .24 .03 .14 .23 -.15 •
11 .25 .30 .55 .08 .26 -.05 .06
12 .87 -.13 .02 .03 -.02 .09 .07
13 .35 .06 .14 .06 .08 .86 -.10
14 .87 .08 -.06 -.13 .14 .10 -.05
15 .77 .05 -.02 .22 -.00 -.03 -.02
16 .61 .02 -.00 .07 .03 .21 -.49
17 .60 .08 .02 -.03 .22 .20 .06
18 -.24 .90 .08 .10 -.02 -.06 -.01
19 .53 .08 .00 -.01 .29 -.04 -.08
20 .60 -.02 .12 .16 .31 .16 .16
21 .52 .06 -.08 -.01 .10 -.02 .06
22 .80 -.15 .29 .10 .09 .11 .04
23 .60 -.10 .41 .11 .06 -.18 .14
24 -.35 .20 .02 .33 -.22 -.00 -.05
25
-.01 .29 .20 .25 .81 .10 -.02
26 -.05 .29 .44 .16 .05 .41 .30
27 .18 .49 .35 .45 .07 .11 -.10
28 .87 .04 .02 .12 -.05 -.09 -.01
29 .67 .26 .26 .14 .12 -.07 .08
30 .13 .39 -.28 .15 .30 -.13 -.02
31 .90 .20 .12 -.04 -.14 .05 -.03
32 .34 .35 .15 .13 .09 .24 .34
33 .51 .51 -.03 .19 .07 .01 .04
34 .47 -.01 .06 -.05 -.02 .32 -.10
35 .81 -.10 .29 -.12 .08 -.11 .04
36 .82 .08 -.12 .04 -.01 .11 .28
37 .32 .02 .00 .02 .03 -.05 .81
38 .36 -.10 .39 -.10 .22 .15 -.02
39 .83 .02 .01 -.08 .18 .11 -.08
40 -.16 .73 -.16 -.15 .23 -.03 -.08
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Factor loadings obtained with by-person factor analysis of Locus o
Control scores in Study 3/ cont.
Participant
number 1 2
Factors
3	 4 5 6 7
41 .62 .17 .17 .13 -.17 .21 .00
42 .55 .09 -.12 .02 .23 .01 .27
43 .51 .40 .04 -.05 .03 -.35 .11
44 .38 .12 .21 .10 .01 .13 -.14
45 .03 .50 .11 -.00 .09 .15 .22
46 .72 -.03 .27 -.02 -.05 .14 -.11
47 .15 .41 .01 .69 .23 .04 -.10
48 .93 .09 -.13 -.00 .02 .03 .04
49 .91 -.06 .02 .05 .06 -.03 .07
50 -.11 .80 .04 .16 .03 -.07 -.12
51 .21 .15 .82 .09 .09 .14 .01
52 .61 -.08 .38 .12 .35 .22 .07
53 .21 .12 .47 .12 .38 .10 .00'
54 .33 -.08 .15 .27 .12 -.05 -.11
55 .12 .02 -.08 -.03 .04 .08 .13
56 .35 .60 .34 -.00 .23 -.15 .00
57 -.08 .30 -.04 .17 .09 -.03 .12
58 .03 .13 .04 .24 -.03 .02 -.05
59 .23 .56 .15 .16 .31 .14 .06
60 -.14 .05 .23 .75 .17 .05 .15
61 .88 -.24 .11 -.12 .11 .04 .08
62 .75 -.05 .23 .23 .09 . -.01 .05
63 .82 -.23 .25 .08 .08 .12 .20
64 .76 .01 .14 .07 -.27 .13 .06
65 .70 .25 -.06 .16 .10 .06 .13
66 .55 .45 -.07 .32 -.03 .13 .00
67 -.39 .75 .08 .07 .00 .10 -.01
68 .04 .80 -.20 .07 .01 -.03 .18
69 .37 .19 .10 .20 .16 .04 .08
70 .42 -.26 .63 .36 -.09 -.03 .02
71 .82 .26 .11 .29 .06 .09 .05
72 .71 -.32 .04 -.04 .09 .31 .25
73 .01 .17 .03 -.01 .07 -.04 -.03
74 .15 .44 -.03 .01 .06 -.01 -.06
75 .53 .04 .16 -.03 .01 .07 .25
76 .89 -.17 .16 .05 -.02 .07 .00
77 .76 .09 .44 .04 -.08 .07 -.09
78 .81 .10 .00 -.24 .10 -.11 -.09
79 .62 .41 .25 .03 .10 -.06 -.02
80 .64 .15 .25 .32 -.18 -.02 .31
81 .46 .15 .05 -.00 -.05 .10 -.14
82 -.04 .58 .14 -.06 .06 -.10 -.02
83 -.06 .22 .19 .10 .11 -.16 -.03
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Factor Scores obtained from by-person factor analysis of 
IHIQ data 
-H
a
,-1
I1 2
Factors
3	 4 5 6	 7
1 .68 .05 .19 .25 -.19 -05	 .02
2 .10 -.04 .73 .20 -.30 -16	 .03
3 .70 .04 .13 .23 -.25 - .01	 .07
4 .60 .01 -.16 -.02 .14 - . 12	 .16
5 .53 .12 .04 .10 .11 - . 12	 .12
6 .18 .23 -.12 -.07 .63 -- 35	 .15
7 .56 .08 .04 .10 -.16 - - 33	 .02
8 .68 .17 .03 .07 -.10 -03	 .01
9 .40 .13 .15 .34 -.03 -.02	 .10
10 .42 .23 .30 .22 -.04 -.03	 .	 .15
11 .59 .19 .20 -.02 -.03 .-.02	 -.09
12 .55 .20 -.20 -.10 .30 - - 05	 .30
13 .05 .12 .24 .17 -.01 -15	 .07
14 .03 .64 .14 .16 .08 -.12	 .07
15 .73 .11 .07 -.09 .08 .16	 -.11
16 .18 .10 -.02 .05 -.01 .10	 -.09
17 .76 -.04 .08 .01 -.18 -09.	 .02
18 .18 -.03 .11 .70 -.20 -.26	 .16
19 .60 .07 .40 .22 -.03 -03	 .10
20 .46 .19 .19 .18 .03 -07	 .06
21 .46 .11 -.30 -.14 .24 .12	 -.03
22 .17 .51 -.14 -.03 .25 - - 15	 1	 -39
23 .64 .21 .16 .17 -.15 .09	 1	 .12
24 .10 .05 .43 .27 -.06 - - 07	 .24
25 .63 .07 .16 .19 .20 -.18 .27
26 .20 .17 .58 .08 .03 - - 13 -.00
27 .24 .14 .41. .07 .14 .02 .00
28 .41 .20 -.11 -.20 -.00 .11 .24
29 .69 .25 .07 .11 .01 -.14 -.03
30 .44 -.08 .31 .08 .03 -12 .28
31 .49 .29 .10 .22 -.00 -13 -.16
32 .43 .29 .21 .07 -.12 -.01	 .16
33 .36 .27 .17 .21 .19 -10	 .17
34 .22 .17 .26 .19 -.09 -26	 .13
-35 .73 -.03 .03 -.09 .06 --04	 -.01
36 .24 .69 -.07 -.02 .21 --07	 .01
37 -.16 .16 -.14 -.08 .66 -.02	 -.00
38 .68 .07 .21 .18 .02 -- 04	 .18
39 .37 .28 .32 .11 -.13 - 18	 .08
40 .20 .10 .07 .04 -.05 - - 08	 -.09
,
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Factor Scores obtained from by-person factor analysis of 
IHIQ data 
t
21.,
9-1
q1 2
Factors
3	 4 5 6	 7
41 .05 .52 .24 .17 -.13 .19 .16
42 .79 .34 .05 .16 .02 .04 -.04
43 .50 .15 .28 .38 .07 -.03 .02
44 .72 .17 .27 -.00 -.02 .20	 .13
45
46
.57
.78
.01
.16
.17
-.01
.09
.00
-.02
.22
.25	 .10I
-.02	 •	 .11
47 -.04 .36 -.02 -.02 -.10 .19	 .14
48 .31 .67 .02 -.09 .05 .04	 .06
49 .20 .60 .09 .07 .17 -.04	 •-.13
50 .38 -.20 .31 .30 -.17 .01	 -.08
51 .39 -.07 .30 .19 -.24 .39	 -.05
52 .77 -.07 -.04 .17 -.00 .17	 .07
53 .55 .03 .20 .23 -.12 -.15	 •	 .05
54 .60 -.07 .12 .18 -.12 .20	 .21
55 -.04 .30 .30 .23 .27 .23	 .36
56 .29 .06 .03 .30 -.04 .02	 -.00
57 .72 .10 -.04 -.06 -.04 .1I	 .10
58 .16 .02 .00 -.12 -.11 .61	 .22
59 .43 -.02 .13 .30 -.14 -.15	 •	 .27
60 .15 .08 .06 .10 .01 .13	 I 	 .61
61 .70 .24 -.04 -.13 .00 .07	 .02
62 .20 .20 .25 .15 .06 .29	 .06
63 .25 .39 .17 .04 .09 .12	 .36
64 .42 .35 .02 .12 -.05 .17	 .13
65 .46 .31 -.12 .05 -.05 .04	 .01
66 .54 .19 .09 .17 .07 .17	 -.09
67 .08 -.10 .64 .23 -.15 .11	 .07
68 .06 .08 .30 .77 .01 .06	 .01
69 .25 .21 .20 .15 .09 .10	 .08
70 .36 .18 .20 .11 -.18 .17	 .21
71 .52 .26 .14 .05 -.04 .10	 .17
72 .08 .42 .04 .02 .18 .13	 .17
73 .60 .19 .37 .13 -.16 .11	 -.04
74 .10 .19 .04 .07 .07 -.02	 •	 .12
75 .14 .25 .08 .17 -.06 -.00	 -.10
76 .51 .29 .01 -.12 -.08 .15	 .24
77 .14 .24 -.02 .06 .06 .11	 .00
78 .79 .23 .21 .07 -.00 -.10	 .00
79 .23 .18 .31 .43 -.14 .28	 .12
80 .44 .19 .33 .03 .03 .08	 -.04
81 .24 .07 .13 -.02 -.17 -.03	 .21
82 .37 .18 .15 .23 -.07 -.07	 -.05
83 .58 .08 .22 .16 -.06 .12	 -.03
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Factor loadings from Q sort data obtained in Study 3
4
item
no : 1 2 3
Factors
4 5 6 7 8
1 .37 .19 .41 .55 .20 .05 .04 .07
2 -.17 .39 .50 .26 -.08 .19 .28 .14
3 .36 .08 .45 .60 .01 .10 -.04 .08
4 .44 .03 .31 .22 .44 -.03 -.15 .19
5 .04 .50 .16 .04 .22 .06 .21 .37
6 .42 .07 -.34 -.21 .42 .11 -.15 .11
7 .17 .13 .24 .28 .19 .06 .00 -.03
8 .20 .17 .33 .29 .19 .02 -.00 .03
9 .00 .37 .57 .16 .13 -.05 -.09 .25	 -
10 -.06 .68 .05 .23 .10 .04 .18 -.02
11 .29 .21 .56 .13 .09 -.32 -.14 -.06
12 .81 -.13 .03 -.01 -.04 .10 -.13 .13
13 .19 .53 .30 -.16 .10 .20 .28 .05
14 .20 .31 -.41 .11 .19 .22 .17 -.03
15 .50 .06 .53 .33 -.28 .07 .06 -.05
16 -.03 .79 -.02 .03 -.02 .16 -.05 .02
17 .28 .19 .69 .17 .01 .02 .09 -.01
18 -.15 .28 .15 .10 .11 .16 .25 .77
19 .17 .71 .23 .01 .06 -.04 .15 .17
20 .29 .27 .38 -.03 .37 .08 .12 .02
21 .61 .08 .17 -.08 .07 -.04 -.04 -.01
22 .56 .18 .17 .11 .29 .16 -	 -.13 .11
23 .19 .45 .37 .25 .15 .25 .19 .02
24 -.51 .58 .16 .04 -.11 .26 .16 .10
25 .02 -.00 .19 .37 .49 .02 -.02 .31
26 .12 .25 -.09 .24 .23 .20 -.08 .02
27 .34 .51 .09 -.00 -.04 .34 -.03 .13
28 .65 .25 .16 .04 -.08 .27 .10 .01
29 .44 .38 .47 .38 .06 .04 .08 .06
30 .05 .43 .12 .03 .00 .03 .58 .10
31 .44 .26 .10 .50 .03 .24 .10 .07
32 -.02 .15 .11 .07 .15 .07 .08 .07
33 .05 .13 -.01 .27 -.22 .05 .66 .17
34 .09 .78 .08 .11 .14 .12 .15 .21
35 .56 -.10 .32 .27 -.04 -.20 .01 .06
36 .83 -.13 -.10 .23 .14 -.05 .15 -.12
37 .46 -.18 -.27 -.15 .23 -.06 -.00 .00
38 .22 .40 .36 .33 .19 -.25 -.06 .04
39 .28 .50 .24 .47 .04 .05 .13 -.00
40 .01 .13 .29 .01 .00 .06 .10 .07
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item
no : 1 2 3
Factors
4 5 6 7 8
41 .40 .05 .11 .29 .16 .37 .12 .13
42 .47 .22 .24 .67 -.01 .05 .11 .14
43 -.01 .10 .16 .78 .22 -.06 .23 .02
44 .14 .43 .24 .31 .26 .13 .08 -.03
45 .05 .70 .05 .17 .16 -.00 .03 -.04
46 .44 .36 .30 .28 -.02 .13 .07 -.04
47 .05 .14 -.12 -.12 .04 .85 .03 .10
48 .83 -.08 .08 .17 .07 .04 .04 -.06
49 .66 .11 .15 .06 .33 -.01 -.00 -.11
50 -.25 .30 .59 .23 -.11 .43 .19 .18
51 .09 .32 .73 .15 .11 -.05 .02 .10
52 .47 .17 .55 .24 .10 -.00 -.03 .16
53 .07 .44 .24 .05 .37 .05 -.03 .03
54 .12 .29 .23 .08 .46 -.11 -.03 .24
55 .25 -.08 .03 .15 .51 .00 -.04 -.04
56 .01 .45 .26 .	 .24 -.09 -.16 .45 .08
57 .25 -.04 .58 .09 .14 -.05 -.01 .12
58 .13 .42 .23 .21 .42 .27 -.07 -.14
59 -.01 .34 .11 .16 .01 .08 -.07 .21
60 .04 .23 -.02 .00 .39 .60 .03 -.07
61 .65 .34 .25 -.10 .20 .06 -.03 .10
62 .33 .08 .18 .15 .21 .10 -.15 -.07
63 .44 .32 .10 .07 .52 .34 -.10 .07
64 .39 .19 .03 .38 .10 .39 -.08 .03
65 -.03 .27 .23 .11 .06 .31 .22 .12
66 .04 .22 .33 .46 .46 .33 .03 .06
67 -.23 .54 .43 .22 .08 .19 .21 .21
68 -.12 .17 .22 .33 .16 .18 .36 .13
69 .23 .15 .39 .10 .42 .28 -.13 .24
70 .23 .50 .28 .07 .30 .34 -.04 .05
71 .52 .24 .30 .36 .21 .22 .04 -.04
72 .51 -.09 .12 -.40 .28 .09 .12 -.01
73 .16 -.02 .64 .25 .26 -.14 .31 -.17
74 .33 .31 .16 .30 .28 -.04 .06 .31
75 .48 .07 .03 .24 .16 -.07 -.00 .02
76 .83 .19 -.00 .06 .17 -.06 .08 -.09
77 .25 .10 -.04 .04 .66 .12 -.05 -.06
78 .47 -.01 .34 .55 .04 -.27 -.02 .09
79 .12 .33 .05 .36 -.16 .04 .43 .53
80 .24 .48 .33 .23 -.14 .11 .12 .02
81 -.01 .50 .52 .08 .13 .11 .15 .03
82 -.05 .16 .16 .79 .04 -.12 .15 .05
83 .05 .43 .43 .35 .23 .17 .22 .07
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APPENDIX 5
DERIVATION OF Q SORT rrEms FOR STUDY 2
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 38]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 11]
From Health Locus of
Control Scale
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 14]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 15]
From pilot
interview
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 24]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 18]
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ITEM
	 SOURCE
1. When it comes to medical
treatment, patients should always follow
their doctor's advice.
2.Disease and bodily decay are inevitable
aspects of being alive - anyone who tells
you different is either a liar or a fool.
3. Medicine is a science and should be
based on rigorous scientific principles.
4. Many so-called 'mental illnesses' are
actually forms of weakness or an
inability to face reality.
5. People are born with a predisposition
to be 'sickly', 'robust' or whatever.
6. Modern theraputic achievements (like
heart transplants) are important
contributions to progress in health care.
7. Usually being struck by illness is
just a matter of bad luck.
8. Fringe medicine is a dangerous
intrusion on proper health care.
9.Doctors treat symptoms, not the
underlying causes of illness.
10. Being fit and well depends as much on
your state of mind as on the functioning
of your body.
11. We could improve health more in
Britain by providing better sports and
recreational facilities then by building
more and better hospitals.
12. It is very important to keep yourself
and your home clean and hygenic to keep
disease at bay.
13. Many forms of medical treatment today
seem to do more harm than good.
14.Doctors only recommend surgery when
it is really necessary.
15. When someone is seriously
knowing the full truth may not be in
their best interests.
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 4]
Item 5 in pilot
Item 6 in pilot
Item 8 in pilot
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 17]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 20]
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ITEM
	
SOURCE
16. Many diseases of modern life result
from the stressful, polluted, noxious
environment in which we live.
17.Treating people as 'mentally ill' is
often a means by which society controls
those who don't conform.
18.For same people being ill becomes a
way of life.
19.We will only improve the overall
health of people in the world when we
have found ways to overcome the
fundamental injustices between rich and
poor.
20. The ability of the body to heal
itself is far greater than most people
realise.
21. Good health is a fundamental human
right.
22. Modern drugs have made a major
contribution to fighting disease.
23. When deciding upon medical treatment
it is better to let incurably ill people
die with dignity rather than prolong life
regardless.
24.Treatment which uses 'therapy of the
mind' (e.g. relaxation or imaging
techniques) should be used much more
widely.
25.Giving birth is a natural process and
should not be treated as if it were an
illness.
26. Often just going to the doctor can
make you feel better.
27. Being healthy is a lot more than
simply not being ill - it has to do with
a positive state of wellbeing.
28.A vegetarian diet is more healthy
than one containing meat.
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 29]
From pilot
interview
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 30]
Item 31 in pilot
Item 32 in pilot
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 36]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 34]
Suggested by
participant
Suggested by
participant
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 44]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 48]
29. Our experience of 'being ill' is 	 From Herzlich (1973)
substantially something that we learn.
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 49]
From pilot
interview.
From pilot
interview.
From Foucault (1971)
Statement made in
conversation.
Suggested by
participant
Statement made in
TV documentary
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 9]
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 52]
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ITEM
	 SOURCE
30. The 'will to live' can be a
significant factor in whether people
recover from a serious illness or serious
injury.
31. It is quite possible to die of a
'broken heart'.
32. As doctors are commited to preserve
life, they have a moral duty to support
Nuclear Disarmament.
33. If people are unpleasant to me, it
can have the effect of making me ill.
34. To be healthy, it is best to live as
natural a life as possible.
35. Doctors don't discover diseases so
much as invent them.
36. It's a good idea to see illness as a
'challenge' - something to be overcome,
to fight with all the resources you can
muster.
37. I can't help seeing illness as a
'waakness' in myself and in others.
38.Basically I define llaalth' as an
absence of symptoms. I'm healthy when I
don't have to worry about my body.
39. Health in adulthood depends upon
building up a robust constitution when
you are young.
40. When I'm ill I feel as though in some
way I'm to blame.
41.Many people suffer from illnesses
caused by their own bad habits.
42. People who suffer from 'depression'
are often just responding to the
intolerable pressures and problems of
their lives.
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 53]
From Herzlich (1973)
'health as an
occupation'
From pilot
interview.
43. Adequate food, better housing and	 From McKeown (1974)
proper drains have done more to improve
our health than all the medical
discoveries of the last 100 years.
Need to see whether
salience differs.
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 12]
From pilot
interview
From anthropological
literature.
From Herzlich (1973)
'illness-as-destroyer'
From pilot
interview.
Suggested by
participant
Suggested by two
participants
To contrast with Item 24
(le. spirit vs psyche)
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 26]
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ITEM
	
SOURCE
'Converse' of Item 21
in pilot (for balance)
44. We are fortunate to live in a world
of medical excellence - skilled surgery,
highly trained professional care, etc.
45. Capitalism is inherently anti-health.
It puts making profits before the
wellbeing and safety of people.
46. Life is too short and too sweet to
spend time worrying over much about what
is 'healthy' and what is not.
47. Having good health is about the most
important thing in life.
48. The worst off in our society have
very little choice about the unhealthy
lives they lead.
49. Health is largely a matter of
moderation in all things.
50. Sometimes being struck by illness is
a punishment for misdeeds.
51.When I'm ill I don't just feel pain
and discomfort, I feel less of a person.
52. Lazy people are seldom really
healthy.
53. Health promotion has become just
another fashion - health foods and
jogging suits are just more ways to
persuade people to spend money.
54. A good health service is one which
respects people's autonomy even if it
puts people at risk.
55.Being healthy depends a lot on the
food you eat.
56. Faith-healing can bring about a cure
where conventional medicine fails.
57. I have more important goals in my
life than the persuit of optimal health.
58. The Government cares more about
Tobacco revenues than the health of its
people.
From Navarro (1978)
From pilot
interview.
From Ehrenreich (1978)
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ITEM
	 SOURCE
59. Recent medical advances (e.g. in
contraception and childbirth) have been
particularly beneficial to wamen.
60. People should be free to damage their
own health (e.g. by smoking).
61. People should take responsibility for
their own health.
62. Information about improving our
national diet has been suppressed because
of lobbying by the Food industry.
63. In the future medical science will
have eradicated disease.
64. The 'work ethic' has a lot to answer
for when it comes to people's health.
65. It is important that all children are
given a full set of innoculations.
66. Obesity is an illness and needs to be
treated medically.
67. Dental decay is more a matter of bad
luck than poor care of your teeth.
68.Tao much 'junk food' in childhood can
be a serious threat to health.
69.Most of the things I enjoy are bad
for my health in some way or another.
70. For most minor illnesses ( like a
'c61.(1') it's better to let nature take
its course than seek out medical
treatment.
71. Medical researchers should be
encouraged to look for the underlying
causes of so-called spontaneous recovery.
72. Drug companies are more concerned
with profits than making people well.
Converse of suggestions
by participants (more
'feminist' than pilot
It 	 43)
Suggested by
participant
Rewritten from pilot
[Item 46]
Article in newspaper
Converse of statement
made in TV documentary
Comment made in magazin
article
Suggested by
two participants
From pilot interview
From pilot
interview.
Suggested by
participant
From pilot
interview.
Suggested by
participant
Suggested by
participant
Suggested by
participant
ITEM
73. Most people have cancer at some time
in their life but their body's defences
are able to overcome it.
74. More care about health in adulthood
could prevent many of the illnesses of
old age.
75.A lot of health problems are caused
by people not following their course of
treatment properly.
76. I approve
	 of measures like
fluoridation of the water supply.
77. Far too many drugs are prescribed
because people need to feel that their
doctor has 'done something' for their
illness.
78. I would prefer to be treated by
homeopathy than by conventional medicine.
79. Technical
important in
qualities.
80. We should
environmental
(e.g.cancer).
expertese is far more
a doctor than personal
be doing a lot more about
causes	 of	 disease
498
SOURCE
From pilot
interview
Statement made in
magazine
From non-compliance
literature
Suggested by
participant
From pilot
interview
To tap positive
assessment of
'alternative' medicine
Suggested by
participant
(converse)
Suggested by
participant
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APPENDIX 6
EXPERIMEMIL MATERIALS FOR STUDY 2
HEALTH BELIEFS
I am conducting research designed to discover the different kinds of beliefs!
people have about health and illness. I am trying to find out about a
variety of aspects. First, I want to document the range of beliefs held
by as many different people as possible. Next I want to see whether there
are any systematic differences between the beliefs held by different people
who work in the Health Care area, and how these compare with beliefs held
by others. And at a later stage in the project I hope to look at the
expectations people have about other's beliefs (e.g. what do doctors think
their patients believe? What do patients assume their doctor believes?).
Finding the right approach is difficult and my research involves a variety
of techniques. I began by interviewing a large number of people (some of
you may have been in this group). From these interviews and by reading
what other researchers have written about the . subject I have derived 80
statements to describe different aspects of health beliefs. What I am
asking you to do now is to work on these statements in a variety of ways.
Before I begin setting out what I would like,you to do, I need to make
clear that my main aim is to get as accurate and as representative an
understanding of what people belie .keas possible. However, some of the
tasks are a bit constrained by the way I'm setting about this. Part of
your contribution is designed in such a way that I can feed your responses
(anonymously)into a data analysis programme on the computer. This will
cluster the kinds of statements which seem to go together - the extent to
which believing one thing tends, in certain people, to go with another
belief. When you work on people's responses like this it inevitably imposes
limits upon what they do (you will see later that it forces you sometimes
to make quite difficult decisions). Please bear with this. I have done my
best to design the rest of the exercise in such a way that it is possible
to also make clear why you decide as you do, and what reservations you
have had. But if anything worries you or you feel you want to add any
comments, please do so, either in writing or by contacting me directly. If
you have any problems or want to discuss the research please give me a ring,
or send me a note asking me to call you.
Thank you for taking part in the research. I recognise that I am asking
busy people to take a fair amount of time to help, and I do appreciate
your contribution. Very little research of this kind has been done in
Britain, and at the moment what seems to happen is that people assume 
that certain beliefs are common, or held by particular groups, without
any proper basis.
wo2,44(stitukitt
Wendy Stainton Rorers
Health and Social Welfare Section
The Open University
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING PART IN THE RESEARCH
Please read and follow these instructions carefully. It is important that
you complete tasks in the order specified. In pilot tests the whole process)
was found to take about an hour. Some people found it hard to do with
distractions (like small children wanting attention) so you might find it
easier to arrange an hour of reasonable peace and quiet before you begin.
Please start with Booklet A. This sets out the 80 statements with a space
beside each. You should read through them all and add any comment you likd
in the spaces. Where there are statements with which you neither agree or
disagree, or which present you with problems of any other kind (e.g. you
feel ambivalent) please say why. Do feel free to suggest alternative
wordings or suggestions for improvements. What you do will depend largely'
upon the time you have to comment, but do feel completely free to say any-
thing about the items that strikes you as interesting or important.
On the final page are a series of blank spaces. Please use these to add
any statements that you feel are left out of my set. That is, if you feel
there are any beliefs about health that matter to You and have been left
off, this is your opportunity to exteni the set for future studies. I
would be grateful if you could spend a few moments on this because it is
very difficult to cover everything without suggestions from a variety of
other people.
Next move on to Booklet B which consists of the materials for completing a I
Q-sort. This is a technique designed to identify different 'worldviews'.
It is an open-ended technique, where different alternative viewpoints are
defined by the people participating in the research. Unlike other approache.
like attitude scales or questionnaires the researcher with a Q-sort does
not define, before the research, what 'types' of people there are, or what
particular 'worldviews' are. These emerge by way of the analysis which
will take your responses and compare them with others, clustering together
people who seem to think alike in terms of the statements which emerge,
for them, as most salient. To make this work it is important to fill in
-
the response grid exactly as it is set out for you. Please do conform
to the format, even if it is frustrating - otherwise the analysis will
not work.
Booklet C is provided for you to fill in after you have completed the
Q-sort. It is identical to Booklet A, with statements set out with blank
spaces. It is for you to use in two ways. First, there are no "right",
or "wrong" interpretations of any of the statements. The Q-sort technique
works on the basis of them meanining whatever they 'mean' to you (and
allows for this in interpretation). So different people will interpret
them in different ways. If one or more of the statements strikes you as
having several possible interpretations, please indicate which one you
used for the basis of your decision. Next, please add any information
you feel is salient to why you put particular statements in particular
places in your sort. Don't feel you have to comment on every statement.
Just use this booklet to dis-ambiguate or elaborate on anything which
you found' at all problematic.
Whnn you have completed all three phases of the task, please fill in the
participant's information form and send all the booklets back to me. You
are welcome to keep the Q-sort items if they are of any use or interest
to you.
Thank you once more for your help.
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INSTRUCTIONS Fat 0:14PLETING THE Q SORT
What I'm asking you to do, and why
Enclosed you will find several sheets of paper, on each of which
are numbered statements about health and illness; there are 80
statements in all. These are mostly things that people have said
in interviews, or in comments from a previous Q study, but also
include statements in books, magazines and on TV and radio. Your
task will be to sort them in a way that gives an impression of
how you feel about them. You will also find a further pink
sheet, on which there are numbers marked from -6 through 0 to
+6. TO carry out the Q sort you will need to cut all of these
out, so that you have two piles of small bits of paper, one pile
of 54 statements, and one pile of 11 pink numbers. You will also
need a large, clear table or desk - or the floor ! (as the
process takes up a fair bit of space).
Your task will be to sort the statements according to a profile,
from STRONGEST DISAGREEMENT (-6) to STRONGEST AGREEMENT
(+6). If you look now at the response grid on the back page, you
will see the format of choices. As you will see, the pattern is
such that at the extreme ends you will need to place just three
statements - those with which you feel strongest disagreement at
one end, and those with which you most strongly agree at the
other. In between, you will place increasingly more statements,
in a V shape.
In this way you should be able to give a rough account of your
views about health and illness. I say "rough account" because a
technique like this can only go so far, and cannot represent a
lot of detail, or take account of the "...yes, but..." feelings
we all have about any issue or topic. However, this technique is
is not intended so much to give an accurate picture of just one
person's views, but to be able to compare across people. I use
it to look for patterns of ideas, examining the ways some people
sort in similar ways, and some people sort very differently.
However, two booklets are included to give you the chance to get
your own particular viewpoint across. Booklet A is provided to
enable you to make more personal comments, or explain your
reactions to the statements; and Booklet C provides the
opportunity for you to say why you have put particular
statements in particular places.
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Starting to sort 
To begin the Q-sort, sort the statements first of all fairly
roughly into three piles like this
Pile A	 Pile B	 Pile C 
Those statements with	 Don't know	 Those statements with
which you disagree	 No strong feeling	 which you agree
Ambivalent
Don't understand
At this stage it's probably worth going through the piles a
second time, just to make sure that you are happy with where you
have placed the statements. Include in pile A all of those with
which you disagree, even if only mildly; and in pile C ensure
that there are all the statements with which you agree, even if
your agreement is pretty small. You can go on changing
statements from pile to pile as long as you want, right up to
the end of the sort, but people usually find that the sorting
gets easier later on if they make sure they are fairly happy at
this stage.
Doing the Q sort
lAihen you are satisfied with your three piles, your need for lots
of space arises. Set out the pink numbers in a row in front of
you like this, with plenty of space below
COI CII CO COI 1:13
PLENTY OF SPACE
C11 123
=I
I=1
C21
E::1
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Your task from this point on is to sort the statements according
to two considerations. First and foremost, consider the extent
to which you agree or disagree with each one. When a decision
gets hard, however, you should also consider the importance of
the subject matter to your beliefs and opinions - place those
statements that are salient to you before those that are of less
concern.
Now, using the grid on the back page, begin to sort your
statements according to the specified profile. Most people start
by selecting one pile (e.g. Pile A) and chosing from it the
three statements with which they feel strongest disagreement,
placing these under the -5 marker. The object from this point
on is to gradually refine your strength of disagreement by
next selecting four statements to go under -4, then five
statements to go under -3 and so on, working from pile A until
you have used them all up. Then you should move on to pile C,
and in a similar manner first find your three statements of
greatest agreement to put under the +5 marker, moving on in turn
to choices for +4, +3 and so on.
When you have used up all of your statements from piles A and B,
go on to place pile C. Here you should still aim as far as
possible to work from disagreement to agreement. While for some
people the 0 row will be sufficient for all of pile B, for
others you may be using + or - columns. Scme people even find
that their 'agrees' spread over into the (disagree' side or vive
versa. If either of these happens to you, then mark the grid
with lines, to show where your agreement ends, and where your
disagreement starts. But these statements in the middle of the
grid don't matter so much, and you should not worry over them
for too long. It is the statements at the end that are most
important for comparing your sorting with those of other people.
At the end of your sorting, you should have something in front
of you that looks like this
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Even at this stage if you want to (and have the time) you should
feel free to move the statements around. When, however, you are
reasonably happy with your choices, fill in the grid with the
numbers of the statements. Please note, however, that for the
purposes of the analysis I will carry out on the responses, it
is absolutely crucial that you stick to the format specified by
the grid, with exactly the right number of statements in each
column (i.e. you should not put, say, four statements under the
+5 column, however much you may feel you would like to do so !).
SO PLEASE DO STICK TO THE RIGHT NUMBER OF STATEMENTS IN EACH
COLUMN - OTHEPWISE THE COMPUTER WILL SPIT CUT THE DATA, AND I
WILL TEAR MY HAIR OUT !!!
Thankyou very much for helping me with my research, I appreciate
the time and effort required, and your willingness to give me
your support.
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Q SORT FEEDBACK FORM
NMME
Please indicate which of the 9 Accounts (derived from the Q
sort) is closest to the views you expressed about health and
illness in your Q sort. Circle the most appropriate number
Account 1
	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9
Please say briefly in what ways the description differs from
or distorts your viewpoint
Please add anything here that was left out
Please comment here about any of the other accounts (e.g. ones
with which you feel sympathy, or felt very stongly against :
Please use extra paper if you have a lot to say !
Thankyou once more for your help.
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FACTOR Accoms AS SENT TO PARTICIPANTS FOR CCMMENTS
Account 1
Poverty and disadvantage are the most common cause of ill-health,
both in our society and in other countries, with the poorest and
weakest deprived of the resources to promote health, and forced
to live and work in conditions which are unhealthy. Doctors treat
symptoms, not the underlying causes of illness. The medical
profession is a self-serving hegemony, who place their own
professional advancement before the needs of their patients, and
who impose their own views, diagnoses and treatments upon people
in a patronising and paternalistic manner. Modern medicine makes
little contribution to health - more has been achieved by better
drains and good housing (in the West) than by any medical
discoveries - indeed, many drugs and forms of treatment do more
harm than good.
Capitalism is anti-health. Drug companies are more concerned with
profits than health; Industry more concerned with production than
pollution; the (Health' Industry more interested in selling
expensive food and fashionable jogging suits than actually
promoting health itself. Women in particular get the least
resources and suffer the most oppression; they have been branded
as 'hysterical' and "weak'; their health problems have been
trivialised.
Account 2
Health is to do with the whole person - being ill or well
involves mind as well as body, and treatment for illness depends
a lot on the warmth, understanding and personal commitment of
doctors, most of whom are dedicated to helping others and
maintaining high professional standards. The body has tremendous
powers to heal itself and function properly; often a doctor's
main role is merely to promote this self-healing, letting nature
run its course and the body to use its own defences. However,
individuals have a lot of control over their own health, and must
be encouraged to adopt healthy habits. Anybody can improve their
health, given the will to do so.
I object to the notion of applying politics to health - health
and politics are quite separate. While it may be true that in
countries like Russia mental illness is used as a means of social
control that's not true here. Similarly, it is within democratic
and free societies like our own that new drugs and improved
health care has been made available to all - capitalism promotes
health by providing the incentive for new discoveries, and the
resources to fund our Health Service.
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Account 3
Good health is a fundamental human right; being healthy is a lot
more than simply not being ill - it has to do with a positive
sense of wellbeing, emotionally and spiritually and well as
physically. Good health is extremely important - only when you
are healthy can you enjoy what life has to offer. What is more,
we each have considerable control over our own health - people
can make major improvements in their health by taking sufficient
exercise, eating a sensible diet, avoiding too much alcohol, by
giving up smoking, and seeking out less stressful lifestyles.
Health education is crucial. The worst off in our society tend to
be the least healthy, in part because they have fewer resources
(e.g. for good food, adequate housing) in part because poverty is
stressful but primarily because they lack knowledge about
healthy living and healthy child care. Our Health Service is
essentially a good one, though it stresses modern hospital
nedicine to the detriment of preventive and community care. We
need to re-allocate NHS resources, putting less money into
unnecessary drugs, high-tech equipnent and expensive operations,
and more into primary care, education and health promotion.
Acommt 4
I see the human body rather like a very efficient self-regulating
machine which has evolved over millions of years the capacity to
mend itself when damaged and fight off attack from invading
organisms. Mechanisms like blood clotting, tissue repair and
biochemical balance mean that the body continually copes with
injury or malfunction, aided by inoculations and other preventive
measures. Illness is usually the result of disease organisms or
the breakdown of these resources. Modern medicine is able to
offer highly effective treatments to fight disease and to repair
the body.
I'm suspicious of explanations of illness that attribute personal
blame or psychological factors. Often falling ill is a matter of
sheer bad luck - being exposed to germs, or accidental damage. We
can, though, do a lot to look after ourselves - like having
innoculations to support our immune system, or eating wisely to
keep the body running smoothly.
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Account 5
Health is a product of people's preparedness to look after
themselves, take advice, stick to healthy habits and take
responsibility for therrselves. Although the worst off may not
have the opportunities or the education that others have,
everyone has a duty to accept responsibility for their own
health. Taking responsibility involves being prepared to make an
effort to devop healthy habits, and acting in an informed,
responsible manner. Doctors must involve their patients, and be
much more prepared to explain treatment to them, to ensure
co-operation.
We are fortunate to live in a world of medical excellence -
skilled surgery, highly trained professional care, effective new
drugs and major innovations in treatment. The problem,
unfortunately, is that all too often people don't benefit from
what modern medical science has to offer because of their
subborness, laziness or sheer unwillingness to participate fully
in their treatment.
Account 6
Everybody has a right to good health. Unfortunately, our society
is one which denies it to many, failing to provide them with the
income or the resources to live in a healthy way, and, by a
system of private medicine and privilege, offering one standard
of health care to the rich, and another to the poor. The worst
off must live in housing and work in environments which are
unhealthy, and drug companies and the like put profits before the
needs of sick people. Illness is the result, more often than not,
of disadvantage - people should not be held to blame for being
ill, nor see it as a form of weakness.
Modern medicine is something of which we should be proud - it
offers the opportunities for people in our society to recieve a
high standard of care and treatment when they are ill. The
trouble is, particularly now that the NHS is being starved of
funds, only a few can benefit from what is available. A far
greater proportion of our national resources should go into the
NHS, and its system of distribution should be made much more
equitable. A good start could be made by spending less on nuclear
weapons, and defence in general, and putting the savings into
proper health care for all.
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Account 7
TO understand what constitutes 'health' and what causes 'illness'
we need to take account of the psychological and social factors
involved. Health has as much to do with the mind as the body, and
therapies which act upon our psychological side are as likely to
be effective as drug treatments or surgical intervention -
sometimes better. Indeed, often the reassurance of talking out
your symptoms with your doctor can do as much good as any
treatment offered; and 'sugar pills (
 can work just as well as
drugs. Doctors need much more training in psychology and
psychotherapy; they also need more contact with the communities
in which their patients live, since without this understanding of
the social context of illness, the help they can offer is
limited.
State of mind has a major impact upon health - depression and
worry can lead to illness, whereas a positive outlook can make
all the difference to recovery. So yes, we need the support
modern medicine can provide; and most medical treatments are
useful and effective. But to work best they need to be
combined with an understanding of the psychological aspects of
illness, and tehniques which muster our psychological resources
for recovery and wellbeing.
Account 8
Illness is a function of feeling good about yourself and happy in
your relationship with others. Feelings of contentment and
happiness promote health and wellbeing; feelings of distress and
unhappiness drain the body of its energy and capacity to resist
disease, and so lead feelings of 'umaellness' and, in many cases,
actual illness. When people are unpleasant to me, it can have the
effect of making me ill; I respond to emotional scenes and rows
by feeling unwell, and often actually becoming ill. When I'm ill,
I feel less of a person; I also feel, sometimes, in some way to
blame - as though I have allowed myself to become ill by being
unable to cope with the upsets of life. And yet there is a sense
that we can 'want' to be ill - to get attention, to avoid doing
theings we don't want to do, to 'get a break' from life and have
some time to ourselves.
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Account 9
Nhen thinking about health - among other things - my primary
consideration is the absolute right of each individual to decide
for themselves about matters that affect them. Hence I would want
to live in a society in which things like private medicine are
available, if that is what somebody wants to buy; where health
services are offered, but people are free to refuse them; where
people are allowed, if they choose, to take risks with their own
health. In fact, I think in Britain we have a very healthy
society - much healthier than countries where there may be so
called 'egalitarianism' but in fact the opportunities for good
health care are less. There people have very little choice, and
must accept the treatment the State offers. Here we have the
Ability to select - to ask for second opinions, to buy whatever
expertese we want - and I believe that ability to shop around for
the service you want is very desirable. I reject ideas about
inequality in health, and deprived people having little choice.
We all have a lot of choice about the lives we lead, and many of
the worst off in our society could be a lot healthier if they
chose to spend their money more wisely, and organise their lives
more sensibly.
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Account 8
Interview with Participant No 53, Study 2
	 Rose Bentley
(Pseudonym)
Biographical details 
Rose was thirty six when I interviewed her, a graduate working
part-time as a lecturer in a College of Further Education
and a Polytechnic, teaching communication studies and Drama. She
was married with two sons of five and seven. She lived am n a
large city in the north of England, but had only been there for
some three years, although she had also been a student there
previously.
Written Comments about Account 8 
Rose wrote about this
Seems to suggest that external factors e.g. viruses are
irrelevant - obviously illnesses are frequently caused by
external influences. But this description accurately
demonstrates my feelings that the way we react to illness can
affect the severity of the problem. Add that people have a
responsibility to do what they can to look after their health
e.g. low chloresterol diet, exercise, not smoking, low alcohol
intake, keeping stress levels down. I feel very guilty when I
disobey my own rules.
Interview comments 
Rose reiterated what she saw as the overemphasis upon emotional
factors, and explained her views on emotional aspects thus
"My feeling is that if there is a cold virus going round you're
probably more susceptible to it if you are in certain conditions,
but having said that it's the cold virus that gives you the
snotty nose and the runny eyes etc. ... People, for example, are
more likely to catch polio if they have other factors going ...
why was it in the old days that some people caught typhoid or
cholera from the water supply and some didn't ?"
However, she gave several graphic descriptions of how emotional
upset can make her ill
"I experience illness in two quite different ways I think. ...
Like anybody else, I get the odd cold or cystitis or throat
infection, which is mostly, as I said, not a lot more than a
matter of catching a bug or being run down, really there's always
going to be a combination of factors involved. And then there are
the times when, quite literally, I become ill because of emotion.
For example, when I was teaching if I had a class that was being
really horrible I would come out and literally throw up. A recent
experience of grief literally physically prostrated me - it just
laid me out... I'm talking about my father's funeral where I just
collapsed. It was partly physiological in that I'd just had a
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double whisky. But it was mainly the fact that I was very
distressed and further emotional things on top of that literally
prostrated me. There was nothing physically all that wrong with
me, I hadn't eaten or drunk more or less than usual.
Interview comments about other accounts 
About Account 1, Rose said
"I have a certain amount of sympathy with that one although I
think I actually rated it fairly low because its seems obvious
that poverty does cause a lot of illness but the point where I
started to diverge from it was that I felt that it was really too
strong in that it denies the two things I picked out as being
most important which are one's own response to situations and
external causes of illness like disease. It's seeing it far too
much as external social constructions rather than what actually
happens to people themselves. I think that plays a part - that if
you tell somebody in a lunatic assylum that they are mad then
they are more likely to see themselves as mad, or you go to my
doctor and he says 'Oh, I see you are under stress at the
moment' that can help to define you as that. But it
overemphasises the effect other people can have, and denies the
way our own thoughts and feelings are important."
She was also less happy to define the medical profession as an
hegemony
"I have come across some absolute bastards among doctors and
among nurses for that matter and same are just power-hungry. But
soffe I have had to do with are superb ... absolutely marvellous
with good skills... I think you should not forget that a lot of
people that go into medicine do so for very idealistic reasons,
they really do believe that they are going to help people ...
because they perceive health care as something very valuable, as
something very worth doing. I think the danger arises once people
get in a position of power - they start to see themselves as
others see them, as very important people whose time is very
valuable and they stop remembering that they are part of the same
human race as their patients... but to lump them all together as
all bad is to deny human virtue and medical skills ... I bet
somebody like that is actually only too happy to live in a world
where they have access to a bit of medical expertise if they
broke their leg or had a stomach ulcer ... it's a
holier-than-thou sort of opinion, as though they never exploit
anybody or take part in power games themselves ... it's naive to
think anybody is immune."
About Account 2 she said
"I remember being absolutely staggered once when I went to the
doctor with something recurrent like cystitis and talked about my
uniwllingness to have antibiotics again because of the
after-effects and he said to me Veil, it will go away of course
by itself'. And that had never occured to me that things could go
away by themselves. I'd always considered it as being something
that if you have a symptom, then you have to treat it and if you
ignore it, it just gets worse. I never thought of it as going
away by itself, though I suppose that it does sometimes... but
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I'm very frightened of illness, and not very happy to assume that
the body will heal itself. But the whole person bit, yes that
fits with the way I see health, that there are multiple strands."
She spoke predominantly about psychological and emotional
factors, to do with 'willing oneself' well or ill, and suggested
a connection between mind and body
"People can be utterly determined to recover from something and
this can - I don't know how it works, but I suspect it triggers
chemical impulses or something."
She also spoke of individuals having a lot of control, and linked
this to Account 3
"Sensible things like not smoking, not drinking too much, taking
adequate exercise can actually make a tremendous difference and I
think we have a responsibility to ourselves and to our families
to do whatever we can to make sure we can stay as healthy as
possible ... I feel desperately guilty when I put weight on ...
when I don't take as much exercise as I should. I feel very good
when I do take exercise ... I mean I feel self-satisfied and good
about myself."
Note that even here, emotion slips back into the conversation
again
"Guilt is my central emotion ... I've came to accept that now
about myself ... it's guilt to myself, I feel I'm letting myself
down."
.hen asked where the guilt comes from, she replied
"I think, I'm fairly sure it's from my childhood. It was very
strongly instilled that one has strong responsibility, also a
religious thing. It goes back to Mother instilling in me at a
very early age the principle of service. I did a lot of little
services for her as a demonstration of love and it is the single
most dangerous thing in my life in that I still see services -
cooking, caring for clothes, buying little presents - I see that
as my strongest expression of love and it leaves me with the most
awful problems with my own life and it means I spend all my time
trying to do everything for my family and my friends and even
complete stangers and I ... end up doing too much and then I
discover I'm not wonderixoman... Only when my mother died did I
start to grow up... though I'm still looking, I think, for a
replacement for my mother ... I still need to have people who
need me... and I still define myself by how much people are nice
to me... and within that context, I feel guilty if I don't match
up, because if I'm not fit and well, then I need other people to
look after me, and I'm not able to look after them ... and so I
get frightened."
"... Illness in our family was a sign of weakness... an excuse
for not pulling your weight ... Mother got very cross with us
when we were ill ... but that was the paradox, and it might
explain a lot, if she really really thought you were ill, then of
course she waited on you, you got ... all her attention."
She said that she rejected Account 2 predominantly, however,
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because of its antagonism to politics
"Health and politics are quite involved in eachother...
politics at the moment in England are making sure that some of
the poorest people are getting inadequate health care. Politics
mean that people with arthritic hips have to wait three years for
an operation ... I think it's absolutely monstrous."
She said, therefore, that politically her views were best
described by Account 6, which she listed as second closest after
Account 9. She agreed with its basic approval of modern
medicine
"Having had a lot of experience with the health service over the
last ten years I think we are very, very lucky indeed with the
kind of care we get ... In the post war period when the health
service was set up it had very high ideals to provide proper
health care for everybody and I think we are very lucky. We have
a very well qualified medical profession in this country who
actually practice to very high standards and I think we have a
very, very good health serv"
And with its stress on inequality of resource allocation :
"I think it's absolutely scandalous that somebody who is
relatively young and articulate can get decent care for their
kids and I can, and yet the old and the weak and the frail aren't
able to articulate their needs as well, or who can't put pressure
or who, because theyv'e got a common, low-rated thing like
arthritis, they have to wait.... The health service is being sold
down the river by the fact that they are not employiong enough
surgeons, there are not enough nurses for premature babies, and I
think it's disgusting the waste of resources in this country
where qualified nurses are unable to get jobs and acute wards are
being shut down because there isn't the money to pay for the
nurses."
Mbst of the other Accounts received fairly short shrift, and were
dismissed with a few words. Account 9 received the most vehement
rejection
"This one struck me as incredibly right wing .. it takes a very
narrow view of choice - choice is available to people to the
extent that people know there are choices .. if you haven't got
the cash, you havn't got the choice. People on 'sup ben' have no
choices at all."
Comments on the sources of her views 
Rose clearly saw her views as embedded within her biography, as a
result of her childhood experiences and upbinging in particular.
When I asked her whether she had always seen health in terms of
emotion she responded
"... Yes, it's always been true. When I was about twelve I can
remenber a patch when I had dreadful, dreadful headaches ... and
it was partly traced to problems with my eyes, but even once I
got glasses I was having sort of migraines and headaches and so
forth, and it was partly to do with the fact that I was having
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problems coming to terms with growing up and sexuality and
things, and in the end I had a very thorough talking to by my
mother who told me I had to pull myself together and that was it
really."
Myself : Did that make a difference ?
Rose
"I think I - for the first time, I realised that these symptoms I
was experiencing were at least in part caused by my attitudes.
Before that I thought 'Oh God, I've got a headache, I'm ill'.
After she said to me "Now come on, you can't not go to school
every day 'cos you've got a headache' the headache didn't go
away, but I realised that I had to go to school, and of course
they eventually wore off."
Myself : Do you get ill if you are angry ?
Rose
"Oh yes, oh yes. Headaches and feeling sick for days afterwards
if I have a row with Alan, my husband. A really stinking row will
make me ill for days. My own anger makes me illest ... and it's
not just that way ... I feel really good when I'm happy. I can
experience symptoms very similar to being drunk - I can get
slightly weepy and lightheaded when I'm really, amazingly happy."
Rose felt she was unusual with the extent to which she
experienced emotions as physical symptoma, but commented that she
thought most people are "... a lot more like that than they are
prepared to accept."
Unlike most of the other interviewees, she said very little about
the media even though she read a great deal and saw literature as
an important part of her life
"I suppose that's it really, I suppose I am most concerned with
the individual and how the person constructs the world for
themselves ... a concern with 'inner life'."
She did say that her political views were influenced by media
including newpapapers (particularly the Guardian) and
documentaries, and by her friends who were mostly 'leftwingers'
(she was an active member of the Labour party). But in contrast,
say, to Helen (interviewed as a representative of the 'Marxist'
version of Account 1) who placed political analysis first and
personal experience a very guarded second source of ideas, Rose
spoke of her views as very much determined in the opposite
direction - personal experience and feeling as the dominant and
most salient, and politics a set of ideas which were 'there' but
a lot less important and 'top of mind'. Indeed she commented
that carrying out the Q sort had been instructive in making her
think through her ideas
"It made me think about things I probably havent thought about
very much, I've articulated things I don't totally understand
about my own thoughts ... I think it demonstrates that I've got a
sort of rag-bag of ideas that are sometimes in conflict with
eachother	 I've had the sense, particularly looking at those
520
descriptions in sort of cold, hard terms of almost sort of
'looking into' iffy own thinking in a rather objective way so that
I can say 'Yes, that makes a lot of sense' or 'That's total crap'
and yet I don't have any real understanding of why.
Perhaps most telling was something said when the interview had
officially finished
... It also gave me a sense of different situations - I can see
myself, say, as I'm getting into a conversation with some bloke
at work and arguing about the rip-off of the health service and
all that because he's on about, like the description at the end,
and well, my feelings about emotion would be irrelevant there,
and wouldn't came up... and you could say that I was expressing
my opinion, and I would be - they would be things I really did
feel... what people's views are differs according to the
situation ... what this did was make me able to see my views at
the same time, almost as if they were spread out in front of ue
like a big montage ... and it was a bit disturbing, because all
the paradoxes show up by contrast that you keep hidden from
yourself ... I have the experience in a way I've never had before
that some of the things I think are directly contradictory ...
and yet I think them, in all truth, I cannot deny them ... and I
find that a bit disturbing."
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Dear
After what seems like an awful long time finishing off my course
production work, I'm now on study leave and able to devote all my energies
to my research. I have taken up where I left off, and am now devising a
new Q sort questionaire which focusses on people's beliefs about the
causes of health and illness - what do they think keeps them well; and
what do they think makes them ill ? my aim is to design an instrument
that is better than the ones that exist at the moment, and will be useful
to people like Health Educators and theorists.
Now that I'm able to concentrate fully, I'm doing the job properly and
carrying out a pilot study of the items I intend to use. You will find a
list of 48 statements enclosed, and I would be grateful if you would give
me some feedback about them. There are four main aspects about which I
would appreciate your advice
1. 'Balance' 
With a Q sort questionaire it's important that different people feel able
to agree with about half of the items, and disagree with about half, with
some in the middle. Could you just say for each statement whether you
broadly agree or disagree with it, so that I can get the balance right.
2. Wbrdinq
Next, it is obviously essential to make sure the wording of the statements
is clear, feels 'right', and the spelling is correct ! Please use the
comments' space for telling me about any lack of clarity or other problem
with the wording. Do feel free to suggest alternative wording if you feel
that the idea could be expressed better.
3. Duplication
If you have carried out a Q sort you will know that it gets very difficult
when several statements seem to say much the same thing. Would you
therefore please say (in the box provided) whether you think any statement
is too similar to any other. By and large I have grouped statements
together to make this easier for you to do (obviously in the study proper
I will mix them all up).
4. Comprehensiveness 
It is crucial to cover as many different viewpoints as possible. I have
used several other scales and feedback from my last study to do my best to
include as wide a variety of different ideas as I can. But it would help a
great deal if you could add some more. I have suggested you think up about
three extra items - it would help me a lot if you could spend a few
minutes doing this at the end.
The statements are set out to make these tasks as easy as possible, and as
fast to do as I can make them. Of course I would be delighted if you could
give me a bit of your time - but will understand if you cannot. If not,
would you be kind enough to return the materials to me in the SEA
provided. Many thanks.
Yours sincerely,
HEALTH BELIEFS QUESTIONAIRE : PILOT STUDY
1. I feel that when I become ill there are a lot of things I can do tj
speed my recovery.
Agree [ ]	 Disagree [ ]	 . Ambivalent/ Don't know [ ]
1
Is this item too similar to any others ? Yes - state nos:
No [ ]
Canrrents.:
2. I feel directly responsible for my own health.
Agree [ Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/ Don't know [ ]
Is this item too similar to any others ? Yes - state nos:
No [ j
Comnents
3. When I become ill, Iim prone to feel that I'm in same way to blame.
Agree [ ]	 Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/ Don't know [ ]
1
Is this item too similar to any others ? Yes - state nos:
No [ ]
Carrrents
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To save space I have just listed here all of the items in the
questionnaire. They were listed three to a page, set out as the
first page shown. At the wnd of the questionnaire, additional
items were requested.
1. I feel that when I become ill there are a lot of things I can
do to speed my recovery.
2. I feel directly responsible for my own health.
3. When I become ill, I'm prone to feel that I'm in some way to
blame.
4. My physical wellbeing largely depends on how effectively I
take care of myself.
5. The way I live my life now is likely to determine how healthy
I will be in the future.
6. My body is my responsibility; in the long run only I can look
after it and keep it healthy.
7.'1 believe that my health is largely the result of the
constitution with which I was born.
8. I have a lot of faith in my body's own natural defences
against disease.
9. I believe that when I'm ill I can "think myself well again".
10.When I'm ill I see it as a challenge - it's up to me to make
up my mind to overcome the illness.
11. I feel I have a lot of power to control my body; wellbeing is
largely a state of mind.
12. I tend to see illness as a weakness in myself.
13.My health has a lot to do with my state of spiritual
wellbeing.
14.An important way for me to avoid serious illness is to see my
doctor regularly.
15. I believe I should consult my doctor regularly whenever I
feel ill.
16. I regard my health as dependent on receiving good
professional medical care.
17.When I'm ill I seek out the best medical advice and treatment
I can get.
18. I feel I should follow my doctor's advice regarding my
health.
525
19. I am grateful for the advice I get from medical experts to
help me live a healthy life.
20. Often just going to the doctor can make me feel better.
21. I feel that I have to battle to be healthy within the
polluted, competitive and stressful world that others have
created.
22. I am wary of seeking treatment or advice from medical
professionals who often serve their own needs rather than mine.
23. My health is partly a product of my economic and social
position.
24. I believe that if I'm going to get ill, then I will get ill,
no matter what I do.
25. Most of the times when I'm ill it's to do with things that
happen by chance.
26. When I'm healthy, it's not really to do with anything I do,
it's just my good fortune.
27. Like everybody else I have to accept that disease and decay
are inevitable aspects of being alive.
28. I believe that whan I'm ill, then this is a punishment for my
misdeeds.
29. If it is God's will, then I will stay healthy; if he wills
it, I may become ill.
30. For minor illnesses I would rather use an (over the counter'
remedy than go to my doctor for a prescription.
31. To me keeping healthy involves listening to what my body is
trying to tell me.
32. I think that living as natural a life as possible is the best
way for we to stay healthy.
33. I believe that I could become ill because of a (curse' or
ill-wishing on the part of another person.
34. I believe that faith healing could work for me.
35. I feel there is still a great deal that I don't know about
the mysteries of illness and disease which affect my health.
36. I think being unhappy or upset can lead to me becoming ill.
37. Overall I feel that I have the state of health I deserve.
38. A lot of the minor illnesses and pains I suffer are the
result of my own bad habits or failure to take care of myself.
39. I feel as though in some ways nature is malevolent -
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39. I feel as though in some ways nature is malevolent -
disease organsism seem to be able to attack me, no matter what
medical treatment I get.
40. I am wary of seeking medical treatment because I don't like
to feel I'm giving up control of my body to someone else. .
41. Many illnesses are out of my control, or the control of
medical treatment - they cannot be (cured ( or prevented.
42. By maintaining a good state of overall health, I feel that I
can help my body fight off disease.
43. I think I have certain inbuilt weaknesses. No matter what
I do, there will always be (weak spots' which may lead
eventually to illness or disability.
44. I believe that when I'm under stress I'm much more vulnerable
to becoming ill.
45. I recognise that there are times when I (use ( illness as an
excuse to avoid doing things I don't want to do.
46. when I'm ill, it's the care and support I get from my family
and friends that helps me get better.
47. My state of health is affected by the way other people look
after me.
48. 'hether or not I stay healthy depends a lot on what other
people do.
527
APPENDIX 10
Q SORT STRUCTURE AND QUESTIONNAIRE USED TO FURTHER PILCT STUDY 3
528
HEALTH ATTRIBUTICN Q-SORT : PILGT STUDY
The purpose of this questionnaire is simply to test out a series of
statements to be used in a Q sort study. In other words, I'm far less
interested in your responses themselves at this stage, than getting
feedback on the following :
A : BALANCE
Your agree/disagree responses are needed to make sure that
the Q statements are reasonably balanced (i.e. people will
in general be able to agree with about half, and disagree
with about half). My hunch is that there are too many
"agrees" at the moment, so I will need to change some items
into the converse (e.g. X is not a factor ) But I
need some responses from different people to check which
ones need to be changed.
B : ENGLISH/COMPREHENSION
This is a structured Q sort (i.e. based upon a matrix of
different causes versus different situations). Some slots on
the matrix were difficult to fill, and I'm worried that in
consequence my expression has been poor. Could you mark any
statements that are unclear, or where the English needs
improving - where possible, do suggest better alternatives.
I enclose a copy of the matrix to help show what I'm trying
to do (the items are roughly in order).
Thankyou for your help.
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S`TRUCTURE FOR HEALTH ATTRIBUTION Q-SORT
SITUATIONS/HEALTH STATUS
POSSIBLE FACTORS
AFFECTING :-
State of
Health
Health
Promotion
Becoming
ill
Recovery
from
illness
Self
Body
Mind
Action
	 _ 	  - 	
Chance . 	
Fate
Probability
- 	
.
Agents	 	
Persons
God
Organisms
Environment
Circumstances
Events
Substances
	 _ 	
-
_ 	
_ 	
_ 	
.
My present state of health is influenced by the constitution with which I
was born.
Agree [ ]
	 Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/don't know [
I see my body as rather like a machine - how well or badly it is running
determines my state of health.
Agree [ ]	 Disagree [ ]
	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
My physical health and wellbeing are affected by my state of mind.
Agree [ ]	 Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
Emotional distress can upset my general health.
Agree [ ]
	 Disagree [ .]
	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
My overall state of health has a lot to do with my own actions - how well
or badly I take care of myself.
Agree [ ]
	
Disagree [ ]
	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
When my state of health is poor, it is often my own bad habits that are to
blame.
Agree [ ]
	 Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
How well or ill I am is largely a matter of luck.
Agree [ ]
	
Disagree [ ]	 Ambivalent/don't know [ ]
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Once more I have saved space by simply listing all the itens in
this questionnaire. They were all set out as the previous page.
My present state of health is influenced by the constitution with
which I was born.
I see my body as rather like a machine - how well or badly it is
running determines my state of health.
My physical health and wellbeing are affected by my state of
mind.
Emotional distress can upset my general health.
My overall state of health has a lot to do with my own actions
how well or badly I take care of myself.
When my state of health is poor, it is often my own bad habits
that are to blame.
How well or ill I am is largely a matter of luck.
Some of the time I'm likely to be healthy, some of the time ill.
At any point in my life, my state of health is often just a
matter of how the probabilities stack up.
The state of my relationships with others - how well or badly Irm
getting on with those close to me at a particular point in time -
has a significant impact on my state of health.
The care and support I receive from others has an influence on my
overall health.
I believe that God watches over my health.
My state of health is considerably influenced by whether or not
I'm exposed to infectious or cantagious disease organisms.
The physical conditions of my life (e.g. my working environment,
my housing situation) affect my general state of health.
My health and wellbeing are affected by my economic situation.
My state of health at any point in time reflects what is going on
in my life - some of the things that happen will improve it, some
make it worse.
I believe certain chemicals (e.g. additives in food, pollution in
the air) affect my general state of health.
In order to become healthier, I would need to marshall my body's
own natural capacities.
State of mind is a crucial part of my achieving better health -
by promoting positive feelings of contentment and fulfillment in
myself, I can enhance my state of physical health.
My own actions are crucial to achieving better health - it is
something I have to work for.
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Its a matter of luck whether or not my health will improve.
Improving my health can never be certain. The best I can do is to
change the odds to give myself a greater chance of becoming more
healthy.
Whether or not I can achieve better health will be influenced by
the quality of advice and support I receive from others.
God has given re the means by which to improve my own health.
When I am exposed to infection, my capacity to achieve better
health is impaired.
To improve my health would require improvements in the
environment in which I live.
My ability to achieve a better standard of health is
affected by whether my life circumstances are helpful or a
hinderance.
Being able to improve my health will depend, in part, upon what
is going on in my life at the time.
I may improve my health by, say, taking vitamins or changing to a
more balanced diet.
I believe I may have certain inbuilt weaknesses which make me
vulnerable to particular illnesses or disorders.
When I feel unhappy or under pressure, Lin more likely to become
My falling ill can be a weakness of will - I don't always
have the power of mind to fight off disease.
There are times I become ill because of my own bad habits, or
failiure to take care of myself properly.
If I'm going to get ill, then I will get ill - it's just the luck
of the draw.
Illness is a fact of life - I cannot expect to go through
life without ever becoming ill, or without risk of disability.
I believe I could become ill as a result of a curse or
ill-wishing on the part of another person.
When others are unpleasant to me, or I get into conflicts with
them, it can have the effect of making me ill.
Sometimes the stupid or thoughtless actions of others can lead to
me becoming unwell.
There may be times when God sends me ill health for reasons I may
not be able to understand.
Illness is often a simple matter of being attacked by disease -
nothing more complicated than that.
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Crowded conditions (e.g. public transport) can increase the risk
of me catching disease.
I can became ill due to an adverse environment - being somewhere
that is cold and damp, for example.
Sudden stressful life events (e.g. bereavement, moving house,
losing my job) can have the effect of making me ill.
On-going adverse life circumstances (e.g. being poor, or
frustrated with my lot) could lead to my becoming ill.
I believe I could become unwell as a result of exposure to
noxious substances in the day-to-day environment (e.g. food
additives, pollution, industrial waste).
When I'm ill, I have faith in my body's mechanisms to promote
recovery, and restore good health.
I see illness as a challenge to be overcame - a determined
attitude on my part can speed my recovery.
When	 ill, there are things I can do for myself which will
help me to get better faster.
By taking good care of myself when I'm ill I can help my self get
better.
When I'm ill, how rapidly I recover is a matter of chance.
Recovery from illness is, as much as anything, a matter of odds -
there's a certain probability I'll get better sooner or later,
and a certain probability that I won't.
The (tender loving care' I get from others has a strong influence
on my recovery when I am ill.
When I'm ill, my recovery depends a lot on the quality of medical
treatment I may receive.
Where illness is concerned, I believe I should follow medical
advice - my recovery will be faster if I comply properly with the
treatment I am given.
When I'M ill, sometimes just a chance to talk to the doctor will
make me feel better.
I believe that when I am ill, prayer can help my recovery.
The speed of my recovery from an infection depends a lot on the
virulence of the disease organisms causing the it.
When I'm ill, my recovery is influenced by the comfort and
peacefulness of my surroundings.
My recovery from illness depends a lot on the circumstances in
which I'm ill - some would help my recovery, others would make
it more difficult.
534
When I'm ill, my ability to recover will depend in part upon
other events in my life (e.g. whether there are other stresses
like trouble at work).
When I'm ill, I usually expect to take medicine to help me
recover.
535
APPENDIX 11
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAIS USED IN STUDY 3
536
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY
Department of Health and Social Welfare
The Open1 University
Walton Hall.
Milton Keynes. MK7 6AA
Telephone: (0908) 74066
Direct line: (0908) 65
Telex: 825061
Director
Professor Malcolm L. Johnson
June 4th 1986
Dear Participant,
I enclose some materials which you (or somebody on your behalf !) have
agreed to complete, to help me with my research into people's beliefs
about health and illness. There are basically two questionnaires - one
short, one rather long - and a Q sort, which is similar to a
questionnaire, but involves sorting statements into a grid (full
instructions are given).
I recognise that these are fairly time-consuming, and do appreciate your
willingness to help. I am able to offer you a payment of £5.00 in
recognition of your time - not a lot, I'm afraid, but all our Departmental
Research Budget will stand. Please indicate on the form provided in what
way you would like this sent (Book token etc.). Please would you return
the following to me
1. The Control of Health Questionnaire
2. The Influences on Health and Illnesses Questionnaire
3. The two Q sort response forms
4. The participant's details form
I am working to a very tight schedule, and so would appreciate their
return by Tuesday June 23rd. A stamped addressed envelope is enclosed. I
intend to have the study written up by the end of July, and will be
pleased to send you a report of the findings then, if you would like it.
On each questionnaire I say rather grovellingly "Thank you very much" for
all your time and effort. These thanks are genuinely heartfelt; the kind
of research I do would be completely impossible without the help of people
like you, and a willingness to find time in a busy life to contribute to
another person's work (it's always the busy people who have the most
interesting views, and so get asked to help !). I hope you feel that your
time is well spent. my hope is that by documenting the vast variation in
beliefs and perspectives, I can make some impact upon our understanding of
an important topic - and even possibly offer some contribution to the
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training of professionals, and an improvement in health care. Just a final
point, for those of you who don't really approve of questionnaires, and
feel they are attempts to pigeon hole people. The way that the data is
analysed is one which does not do that - it separates out different
viewpoints, but does not try to categorise you (or anybody else); and
the results that arise are used in conjunction with other methods (such as
interviews and group discussions) to give a more rounded picture.
Yours sincerely
Wendy Stainton Rogers
Lecturer in Health and Social Welfare
1. I believe I may have certain
inbuilt weaknesses which make me
vulnerable to particular illnesses
or disorders.
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9. I have little faith that the
advice I may get from the
ficclical profession can help very
much in improving my health.
2. When I'm ill enough to consult
a doctor, my recovery will be
faster if I comply properly with
the advice and treatment I get.
10. When I'm ill, I usually feel
as though I'm in some way to
blame.
3. My becoming ill is seldom, if
ever, the result of exposure to
noxious substances in the
day-to-day environment (e.g. food
additives, pollution, industrial
waste).
11. If I were ever seriously ill,
I would have a lot of faith in
the ability of doctors to find a
cure.
4. To improve my health would
require improvements in the
environment in which I live.
12. my state of health at
any time is considerably
'influenced by whether or not
I've been exposed to infectious or
contagious disease organisms.
5. I see my body as rather like a
machine; haw well or badly it is
running determines my state of
health.
13. I believe I could become ill
through a curse or ill-wishing on
the part of another person.
6. When I'm ill, my recovery is
influenced by the quality and
comfort of my surroundings.
14. State of mind is a crucial
part of my achieving better health
- by promoting positive feelings
of contentment and fulfillment in
myself, I can enhance my state of
physical health.
7. Some of the time Iim likely to
be healthy, same of the time ill.
At any point in my life, my state.
of health is often just a matter
of how the probabilities stack up.
15. When Iim ill, whether I get
better quickly or slowly is
largely a matter of luck.
8. I usually expect to take
medicine to help ire recover from
illness.
16. The physical conditions of my
life (e.g. my working environment,
my housing situation) do not
affect my general state of health.
539
17. Try as I way, there is nothinl
I can do that I can be
	 certain 25. In order to become healthier,
I would nd to marshal my body s
own natural capacities.
will	 in-prove my health. The best I
can do is to change the odds to
give myself
	 a	 greater chance of
beccming more healthy.
18. The state of my relationships
with others - how well or badly
I'm getting on with those close to
ue at a particular point in time -
has a significant impact on my
state of hêalth.
26.
	 My falling ill	 can be a
weakness
	 of	 will	 -	 I don't
always have the power of mind
	 to
fight off disease.
,
19. God has given me the means by
which to improve my health.
-
27. I cannot improve my health by
'tonics 
	
or taking extra vitamins.
•
20. When I'm exposed to infection,
my capacity to achieve better
health is impaired.
28. If I'm going to get ill, then
I will get ill - it's just the
luck of the draw.
21. How well or badly I look after
myself generally has an influence
on my overall health.
29. Illness is a fact of life - I
cannot expect
	 to	 go	 through
life	 without ever becoming ill,
or without risk of disability.
22. My ability to achieve
	 a
Letter	 standard	 of	 health	 is
affected by whether my life
circumstances are helpful or
unhelpful.
30. When others are unpleasant to '
me, or I get into conflicts with
them, it can have the effect of
making me ill.
.
23. WhenI feel unhappy, I'm-nxma--.
likely to become ill.
. 31. The speed of my recovery from
an infection -depends a lot on-the
virulence of the disease organisms
causing it..
24. My state of Overall health is
in part a product of my economic
resources
	
- how "well off" or
"badly off" I am.
32. It's a matter of luck whether
or not my health will improve.
,
33.	 Being exposed	 to crowded
conditions (e.g. public transport)
can lead to me catching disease.
•
-	 540
41.	 Elotional	 distress	 can	 upset
my general health.
•
34. The constitution with which I
was	 born has	 little if any
influence on my day to day state
of health.
•
42. When my state of health is
poor,	 it is often my own bad
habits that are to blame.
-
35.	 I believe that God watches
over my health.
43. When I'm ill, scmetimes just a
chance to talk to the doctor will
make me feel better.
36. Sometimes when I get ill, it's
a result of long-term pressures in
the circumstances of my life.
,
44. Recovery from illness is,	 as
much as anything, a matter of odds
-	 there's	 a certain probability
I'll get better sooner or later,
and a certain probability that I
won't.
37. When I'm ill, I have faith in
my body's mechanisms to promote
recovery, and restore good health.
45.	 Illness	 is often a	 simple
matter of being attacked by a
disease - hothing more complicated
than that.
38.	 Sudden stressful
	 life events
(e.g.	 bereavement,
	 moving house,
losing my job) can sometimes have
the effect of making me ill.
46. My overall state of health has
a	 lot	 to do with my own day to
day actions - I can allow myself
to get run down, or take steps to
keep healthy. •
39.	 I	 see	 illness	 as	 a
challenge	 to be. overcome- -, ..a-----
determined attitude on my pert can
speed my recovery,
i'
47. My recovery from illness
depends a lot on the circumstances
in which I'm ill - some -would
help my recovery, others would
make it more difficult.
40.
	 When I'm ill,	 there is very
little that I can do for myself
which will help me to get better
:.:faster.
	
-	
_
•
48. My state of health at any
,	 Point in time reflects what is
going on in my life - sate of the
things that happen will improve
it, sane make it worse.
i
49. Maintaining my health is
somewhat of an uphill struggle,
given the polluted, stressful,
exploitative society in which we
live.
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57. I don't believe that my
health is very much affected by
chemicals such as additives in
food, or pollution.
50. I feel I have the state of
overall health I deserve.
58. My own actions are crucial to
achieving better health - it is
something I have to work for.
51. Sometimes'I get ill because of
my own stupid behaviour.
59. Sometimes the stupid or
thoughtless actions of others can
lead to me becoming unwell.
52. When I'm ill, my recovery
depends a lot on the quality of
medical treatment I may receive.
60. How well or ill I am is
seldom, if ever just a matter of
chance.
53. My physical health and
wellbeing are affected by my state
of mind.
61. The 'tender loving care' I get
from others when I'm ill can make
all the difference to whether I
make a full recovery or not.
54. Being able to achieve a
better standard of health is not
really influenced at all by what
is going on in my life at the
time.
62. Often for me, feeling truly
fit and well, and feeling truly
happy are much the same thing.
55. There may be times when God
sends me ill healthfor reasons I --
may not be able to understand.
63. There are times when I think I
became ill because of deep-seated
worries of which I am not
consciously aware.
56. The care and support I receive
from others has an influence on my
overall health.
64. I believe that there are
people with the powers of a
"healer", who could cure me were I
to become ill.
65. With minor illnesses, l think
that I will do far better to let
'nature take its course' than suck
out medical treatment.
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73. Illness can be caused by the
external environment - my being
somewhere that is cold and damp,
for example.
66. My health is my own
responsibility.
74. A lot of the time when I am
ill, I use my own common sense to
work out what to do to treat it.
67. Major stresses in my childhood
have shown up as illness in my
adult life.
75. I think good health has more
to do with living a satisfying and
fulfilling life than being
obsessive over things like
exercise and diet.
68. I feel I have a right to chose
whether or not to act in ways that
harm my health (e.g. work too
hard, or smoke).
76. I believe that faith . healing
could work for me.
• 69. Stress only makes me ill when
I'm "down"; when I'm feeling full
of energy and/or content, I can
ride it out with no ill effects.
77'. By attuning myself to nature
itself - to the "power for good"
in the Universe, I can improve my
health.
70. Where certain forms of illness
are concerned, I would seek help
from competent practitioners in
'alternative' medicine.
78. Being healthy is a product of
lifestyle as a whole - -only by
living a healthy lifestyle can I
ensure that I'm fit and well.
71. No amount of praying on my
part could physically affect . my
recovery, if I was ill.
79. For me illness can sometimes
be a way of withdrawing fram life
or my responsibilities.
72. When I'm ill, my ability to
recover will depend very little
upon .other events in my life'
(e.g. whether there are other
stresses like trouble at work).
80. When I'm ill, I believe I
should seek deep within myself for
_ the reason - by tackling the inner
_motivations and pressures, I can
find ways to get better.
•••••••
3 statements
÷4.
5 statements
+ "3
7 statements
411•1111111111
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10 statements
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Under
	 [	 [1	 [	 [
PARTICIPANT 'S DETAILS FORM
The following information is useful, but not essential. You mity
insert a pseudonym and any address to which your token can no sent if yo,.1
prefer. However, all personal details will be strictly seen by me alono,
and no published report will mention names, or tie your responses to you
personally.
NAME  •
Male [ ] Female [ ]
OCCUPATION (if applicable)
	
ADDRESS
	
Any information which you consider to be important to your views - from
membership of a particular professional group, to deep religious faith.
Have you suffered from any serious
illnesses, or disability ? If so,
please give details.
Would you consider yourself
generally in good health at
the present ? If not, please
give details.
WOULD YOU LIKE YOUR £5 IN TH&FORM OF
Book Token [ ]
	 Record Token [ ]
	 Boots Voucher [ ]
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Q SORT RESPCNSE FORM - EXPIANMICNS
I •
It is very helpful when interpreting the different viewpoints to know why
somebody feels strongly about a particular statement. Therefore would you
be kind enough just to write a few words about your three choices for the
STRONGEST DISAGREE and • CD. AGREE placements. If you want to make
any comments about any other statements (e.g. if you found the wording
ambiguous, or didn't feel you understood what it was getting at) please
use the back of this page. Please don't forget to give the statement
number for reference.
-5 STRONGEST DISAGREEMENT
	
Statement
number 	
. -5 STRONGEST DISAGREEMERT
	
Statement
number 	
-5 STRONGEST DISAGREEMENT
	 Statement
number 	
+5 STRONGEST AGREEMENT	 Statement
number
	
+5 STRONGEST AGREEMEN2
	
Statement
number 	
5 STRONGEST AGREEMIENT
	
Statement
number 	
YOUR NAME
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Q SORT RESPONSE FORM
NOw please complete the matrix, inserting the statement numbers of the
choices you have made in each column. Please ensure you have the.right
number of statercents in each. Thankyou.
<--- STRONGEST DISAGREEMENT 
	  STRONGPST AGREEMENT --->
-5	 -4	 -3	 -2 -1	 0	 +1	 +2	 +3	 +4 +5
3
5
7
9
10
3
5
7
9
10
12
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
STRONGLY
	
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
	
AGREE
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CONIROL OF HEALTH QUITIONNAIRE
This questionnaire has been designed to discover people's views about what
controls their health and illness. It consists of 36 statements, and all
you have to do is tick just one of the boxes on the scale for each item,
indicating your views. For example
STRONGLY
	
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
	
AGREE
1. If I get ill, it is my own	 El	 []	 El	 [1	 [1	 El
behaviour which determines how
soon I get well again.
If you strongly agreed with this statement you would put a tick in the
far right hand side box like this
STRONGLY
AGREE
1. If I get ill, it is my own 	 E IE ]	 [
behaviour which determines how
soon I get well again.
If you, however, strongly disagree you would tick the far left hand side
box like this
1. If I get ill, it is my own
behaviour which determines how
soon I get well again.
[1]	 [	 [ ]	 [	 [ 1	 [ 1
However, if your disagreement was mild, you should tick a middling box
like this
StRONGLY	 STRONGLY
DISAGREE	 AGREE
1. If I get ill, it is my own 	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [1]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 I ]
behaviour which determines how
soon I get well again.
That's all there is to it. Please just make sure of three things. First,
don't confuse the agree/disagree - make sure that your tick says what it
is meant to say (it's all too easy to get them the wrong way round).
Second, make sure all your kicks are in the boxes not between them;
otherwise it is difficult to compare responses between people. Finally, do
try as far as possible to use the full range - include the extremes as
well as the middling boxes, to discriminate well between your feelings
about the different statements. Thanks for your help.
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STRONGLY	 STRONGLY
	
. DISAGREE	 AGREE
1. If I get ill, it is my own 	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
behaviour which determines how
soon I get well again.
2.Following doctor's orders to 	 [ ]	 [ ]
	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
the letter is the best way for
me to stay healthy.
3.When I become ill, it's a	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [	 [ I	 [ I
matter of fate.
4.1 can pretty much stay 	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ I	 [ I	 [	 [
healthy by taking good care of
myself.
5.Whenever I don't feel well,	 []
I should consult a medically
trained professional.
6.My family has a lot to do 	 [I	 [I	 [1	 []	 El	 El
with my becoming ill or
staying healthy.
7.Luck plays a big part in 	 [I
	 I I
	 []	 I J	 [I	 El
determining how soon I will
recover from an illness.
8.Having regular contact with 	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
my doctor is the best way for
me to avoid illness.
9.Even when I take care of	 [ I	 [	 [	 [ I	 [	 [
myself, it's easy to get ill.
10.The type of care I receive 	 [ ]
	 I ]	 [ I
	
[ ]	 [ ]	 ]
from other people is what is
responsible for how well I
recover from an illness.
11.My good health is largely 	 . [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
	
I ]	 [ ]
a matter of good fortune.
].2.When I feel ill, I know it	 [I	 [	 [ 1	 [	 [ 1	 [ 1
is because I have not been	 1'
taking care of myself properly.
14.1 can only maintain my health
by consulting health
professionals.
15.No matter what I do, I'm
likely to get ill.
16.If I take the right actions,
I can stay healthy.
17.Health professionals help
keep me healthy.
18 .No matter what I do, if I'm
going to get ill, I will get
STRONGLY
	
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
	
AGREE
13. If I take care of myself, I •
	[ ]	 [ ]	 [ I	 [ I	 [ ]	 [ ]
can avoid illness.
19. my physical well-being
depends on how well I take
care of myself.
[	 ] [	 ] E	 ] I	 ] [	 ] [	 ]
[	 ] [	 I [	 ] [	 I [	 I [	 ]
[	 ] [	 I [	 I [	 ] [	 ] [	 ]
[	 I [	 I [	 I [	 I [	 I [	 ]
[	 ] [	 I [	 I [	 I [	 ] [
20.When I'm ill, I just have to
	 [ ]	 [ I	 [ 1.	 [ I	 [ ]	 [ )
let nature run its course.
21.Nbst things that affect my 	 [	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [	 [ I
health happen to me by
accident.
22.Whatever goes wrong with my	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
health is my own fault.
23.1 am in control of my health.
	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ ]
	 [ I
	 I ]	 [ ]
24.0ther people play a big part
	 [ ]	 [ ]	 [ )	 t I	 [ ]
	
I]
in whether I stay healthy or
became ill.
25.When I get ill, I'm to blame.
26.1 am directly responsible for
my own health.
27.Health professionals control
my health:
28.If it's meant to be, I will
stay healthy.
29.The main thing which affects
my health is what I do myself.
30.It seems that my health is
greatly influenced by
accidental happenings.
31.When I recover from an
illness, it's usually because
other people (for example,
doctors, nurses, family,friends)
have been taking good care of me.
32.When I stay healthy, I'm
just plain lucky.
33.If I see an excellent doctor
regularly, I am less likely to
have health problems.
34.0ften I feel that no matter
what I do, If I'm going to get
ill, I will get ill.
35. Regarding my health, I can
only do what my doctor tells me
to do.
36.If I become ill, I have the
power to make myself well again.
	
- STRONGLY
	 STRONGLY
	
DISAGREE
	
AGREE
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[
[	 ]
[	 [
[	 [
[	 [
[
[
[
[	 ] ] [	 ] [ I [	 ] [
[I [	 ] [I [	 ] J [	 J
[I ] [I [	 ] ] [	 ]
[l [l [1 El [] [l
[
	 ] [I [	 ] [	 ] [	 ] [
[ I [	 ] [	 I [I E l [	 ]
[	 ] [I [	 ] [	 ] [I [	 ]
t	 ] I] [	 ] [	 ] [	 ] [
E] [	 ] [I E] [	 ] 111
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N1.1 1 11 •14,:1 • ; ON I	 AND I J141S Q(J1.n'l
This questionnaire is desiyntA to discover your views about whether or not
a variety of thinys influence four main aspects of health and illness
• Your current state of health
• Your capacity to become healthier in the future
• Whether or not you become ill
• When you do become ill, how quickly and effectively
you recover
These four aspects are set out in order, with a list of many different
thing that might or might not exert and influence. For example
MY CURREW STATE OF HEALTH
The constitution with which
I was born
EXERTS NO	 EXERTS A
INFLUENCE	 SaRONG
AT ALL	 INFLUENCE
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
All you have to do is circle one of the numbers from 0 to +7 to indicate
whether or not you think, in this case, your present state of health is
influenced by the constitution with which you were born. If you think it
has no influence at all, you would circle the 0. A small influence might
be +1 or +2; a strong influence +5 or +6. If you think constitution is
a crucial determining factor, you would circle +7. There are 124
statements like this to go through, and you should circle just one number
for each one. Work through fairly quickly - usually _with questionnaires
like this first thoughts are fine - and anyway, with so many, you would
become utterly frustrated if you pondered too long over them. Do write
comments if you want to explain or qualify your answer - though don't feel
you have to do so unless you want to.
One or two of the categories need some explanation. Environment, which
comes up several times, is to do with simple physical conditions - things
like heating, lighting, physical space, dampness. Circumstances are to do
with a broader range of more complex things - from how well off or poor
you are to the organisational pressures of your job. Note that
relationships are dealt with separately. On a couple of occasions a
separation is made between home and work. If you are currently not in paid
employment, make a brief note beside the 'work' questions, and answer in
terms of the impact upon you of not having paid work (e.g. of the demands
of your job of homemaking or child care; or the impact of unemployment).
'Just probability' is a difficult one to explain. It is intended to draw a
distinction between the aspects of "chance" that have to do with luck and
fortune (dealt with separately) and "chance" in terms of finite odds -
,,the idea that we all run risky in the hurly burly of life (of accidents,
contact with somebody suffering from a highly contagious disease) and
'just probability' indicates this aspect of chance.
With questionnaires like this, the responses people make are much more
helpful and meaningful if of the categories are used same of the
time (i.e. 0 and +7 as well as the middling responses). So please do try
to work across the scale as a whole, and spread your responses right over
the full range.
Just finally, this questionnaire is a genuine attempt to find out what
different people think - there are no "right answers" and no "trick
questions". Please feel free to respond just how you see things, and don't
worry about what other people might think, or whether you are "getting the
responses right". The research is based upon the notion that there are a
wide variety of different but equally valid viewpoints about the
influences on health and illness, and is designed to try to document each
of these viewpoints as accurately and sympathetically as possible.
Thankyou for your help. The time and effort you put into this
questionnaire is genuinely appreciated, and will contribute - I hope - to
a better understanding of this important topic.
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MY CURIUM' STATE OF HEALTH EXERTS NO
INFLUENK2E
AT ALL
EYYRTS A
S'ilW)NG
I NFI ,U ENc E
1.The constitution with which 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
I was born
2. My body's natural defences 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
3.My state of mind 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
4.My emotions 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
5. 'Inner forces' of my psyche 0 +1 +2 +4 +5 +6 +7
6.Whether I feel 'on top' of my
life, or pressured by it
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 .+7
7.Everyday behaviour (e.g.
getting enough sleep; •
eating spasmodically)
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
8.My overall life-style 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
9. 'Taking good care of myself' 0 +1 +2 -4 +4 +5 +6 +7
10.Whether or not I'm actively
taking action to be healthy
(e.g. monitoring my diet,
exercise etc.)
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
11.GOod or bad luck 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
12.Simple probability 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
13.The society in which we
live in Britain
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
14.The culture within which I
live
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
15. The weather
26.Whether or not I am being
exposed at present to
certain substances (e.g.
pollution;additives in food)
27. My age
MY CURIU.241' STATE OF IEFAL'Ill
16.my relationships with family
and friends
17.The care of medical
professionals .
18.Whether there is somebody
'ill wishing' me or not
19.Go3, or some other
supernatural power
20.Whether or not I have been
exposed to infectious
organisms
21.My home environment
22.My working environment
23.The circumstances of my
home-life	 .
24.The current circumstances
at work
25.Particular events in my ,
life at this time
DERTS NO
INVLUENCE
AT ALL
EXERTS
STRON,..;
INFLUENCE
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
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MY CAPACITY '10 BEOCME
HEALTILIER IN '111E FUTURE
WOULD	 EXERT
NO INFLUENCE
AT ALL
WOULD EXERT
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
28.The constitution with which 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
I was born
29.my current state of health 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
30.Marshalling my body's own
strengths
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
31.Promoting a positive
attitude
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 .4-7
32.Actively seeking out things
that make me happy
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
33.Tackling any unresolved
inner conflicts
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
34.Taking charge of, and
responsibility for my
own life
0 +1 +2 +3 t4 +5 +6 +7
35.Changing my day to day
behaviour
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
36.Actively changing to a
more healthy lifestyle
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
37.Giving up unhealthy
habits (e.g. smoking)
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
38. The weather 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
39.GOod or bad luck 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
40.Simple probability 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
43.Getting advice from
books or leaflets
44.Seeking out preventitive .
medical services (e.g.
getting blood tests, going
to a "Well Person" clinic
45.Getting advice from my
doctor or health
visitor
46.Getting advice from a
practitioner of
alternative medicine
47.Getting medical
treatment
51.Whether or not I am
exposed to infectious
organisms
52. Improvements in my
home environment
.556
MY CAPACITY TO BECOME
HEALTHIER IN THE FUTURE
41. Improvements in my
relationships with family
and friends
42.Getting advice from
friends and family
48. My age
49.God's power or
influence
50.Any other supernatural
influence
WOULD	 EXERT
NO INFLUENCE
• AT ALL
WOULD EXERT
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
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MY CAPACITY ID IMPROVE
MY HEALTH IN IHE FUTURE
.	 ,.
WOULD
AT
, NO INFLUENCE
DcERT
ALL
WOULD EKERP
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
53.Improvements in my
working environment
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
54.Improvements in my
circumstances at home
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
55.Improvements in the
circumstances in which
0.. +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
I work
56.Particular events - what
happens in the future
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
57.Whether or not I'm exposed
to certain substances (e.g.
pollution)
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
58.Taking vitamins or a tonic 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
WHETHER OR NUT I BEOCME ILL
59.The constitution with which 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
I was born
60.If my body's own natural
defences become weakened
or break down
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 - +6 +7
61. If my state of mind
becomes negative,
feelings of powerlessness
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
62.Feeling unhappy 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
63.Inner conflicts of my psyche
making themselves felt
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
64.Behaving in stupid ways (e.g.
not getting enough sleep,
working too hard)
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
83.Major pleasant life
changes (e.g. getting
married, being promoted)
84.Exposure to harmful
chemicals (anything from
pollution to other people's
cigarette smoke)
85.0ther people's stupid
actions (e.g. visiting
me with a bad cold).
86.Inbuilt weaknesses or
susceptibility to
particular diseases
(e.g. Having a 'weak chest')
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lilt OR nor I B • XPIE
	
tl,•()(	 EXERT
1\.:() I N1:1,1	 A STRONG
/1'1 A1,1,	 I NFLUDICE
78.Living in a poor	 0
environment (e.g. damp
or 'crowded housing)
79.Werking in a poor 	 0
environment (e.g.
bad lighting or
with noxious chemicals)
80.Stressful conditions at 	 0
home (e.g. bad conflicts
between other members of
the household)
81.Stressful conditions at
	 0
work (e.g. too much work,
threats of redundency)
82.Stressful, nasty or 	 0
unsettling events in my
life
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
87.The virulence of the
infective organism
88. The weather
89. My age
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 + + +7
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WHETHER OR NOT I B Dee I	 WOULD EXERT
INFLUENCE
ALL
WOULD EXERT.
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
NO
AT
65.Adopting a life-style	 0
that is unhealthy
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
66.Bad luck	 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
67.Simple probability	 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
68.Rows or conflicts with	 0
family or friends
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
69.Rows with people at	 0
work
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
70.Lack of proper medical 	 0
care
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
71.The ill-effects of poor 	 0
medical treatment
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
72.Uncaring or unsympathetic 	 0
treatment by my doctor
+1 +2 +3 +.4 +5 +6 +7
73.God's will	 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
74.0ther supernatural	 0
influences
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
75.A curse or ill-wishing	 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
76.Something at home or work that 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
I can avoid by being ill
77 .Whether or not I have been	 0
exposed to infectious
organisms
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
93.Taking responsibility for
myself, and doing all I
can to get better
94.Looking after myself and
taking things easy
95.Being careful about my day
to day behaviour (e.g.
getting sufficient sleep and
a nourishing diet)
96.Actively taking steps to
make my life-style more
healthy
97.Giving up unhealthy habits
(e.g. drinking too much)
98.Gocd luck
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WIEN I AM 111,, 11CW QUICKLY
AND F1711 • 711VELY I RECOVIat
90. Getting 'back to normal'
as soon as possible
91.Finding ways to make
myself feel happier
92.Finding ways to resolve any
inner conflicts
99.Simple probability
100 .The care I got from my
family and friends
101 .The quality of medical
treatment I received
102 .The sympathy and
understanding of my
nurse/doctor
WOULD EXERT
NO INFLUENCE
AT ALL
WOULD EXERT
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 .+6 +7
103.Thc quality of any
conventional medical
treatment
104.A curse or ill-wishing
110.An environment which
is conducive to recovery
(whether at home, at work
or in hospital)
111 .Circumstances which are
conducive to recovery
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WHIN I AM ILL, 110.4 QUICKLY
AM) ETFIrrivny i R•aDvm
105.The intervention of a
spiritual healer or
healers
106 -.Prayers said for me
107.God's will
108.Some other supernatural
power
109.The virulence of the
disease itself
112.Particular events in my
life at the time
113.Taking drugs or medicines
that are effective
114.Treatments (e.g. surgery,
radiotherapy) that are
effective
WOULD EXERT
NO INFLUENCE
.	 AT ALL
v,otiLD ExNa
A slizoNc,
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0. +1 +2 +3 . +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 , +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
118.Thinking positively and
seeing the illness as a
challenge
•n••
119.Following 'doctors orders'
- complying properly with
the treatment I am given
120.Letting nature take its
course
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Wilal I AM ILL, I1CW QUICKLY
AND al!	 DYIIUXXNER
117.My body's own natural
defences,"
115. Alternative therapies,
if I sought them out
116 .The constitution with which
I was born
WOULD EXERT
NO INFLUENCE
AT ALL
WOULD EXERT
A STRONG
INFLUENCE
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 -+7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
121.Seeking medical advice soon
enough - not waiting until
the illness becomes too
serious before I go to the
doctor
122 .Just the chance to talk
things over with the
doctor without any treatment
123. The weather
	
0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
124. My age	 0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
YOUR NAME 
	
ON THIS PAGE I HAVE LEFT SPACES FOR YOU TO ADD IN ANY INFLUENCES ON HEAMli
AND ILLNESS THAT YOU CONSIDER IMPORTANT, AND HAVE BEEN LETT OUT W THE
QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE SAY WHICH ONE YOU ARE REFERING TO (Present statc.: of
health, ability to improve health, causes of illness, factors affecting
recovery)
Your assessment of its influence
0	 +1	 +2 +3 ,+4 +5 +6 +7
Your assessment of its influence
0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
Your assessment of its influence
0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
Your assessment of its influence
0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
Your assessment of its influence
0	 +1	 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
YOUR NAME 	
